MY    MEMOIRS 


BY 


GRAND  ADMIRAL 

VON   TIRPITZ 


VOLUME  II 


NEW  YORK 

'     DODD,  MEAD   AND   COMPANY 

1919 


Copyright,  1Q19 

By  DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY,  INC. 


gfte  Cuinn  &  gotten   Campanp 

BOOK      MANUFACTURERS 
RAHWAY  NEW     JERSEY 


^3  1 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  II 

CHAPTER  XVII 

MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR 

PAGE 

I.  Military  opening. — 2.  The  question  of  the  principal 
enemy. — 3.  Our  weapons. against  England. — 4.  The  pos- 
sibility of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia. — 5.  The  ideas 
of  the  war. — 6.  Home  policy  in  the  war. — 7,  The  Fa- 
therland Party. — 8.   At  the  collapse 1 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  HIGH   SEA  FLEET  IN  THE  WAR 

I.  The  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. — 2.  The  achieve- 
ments of  the  navy. — 3.  The  plan  of  operations. — 4.  My 
verdict. — 5.  The  crippling  of  the  fleet. — 6.  The  lack  of 
a  Supreme  Command. — 7.  The  Battle  of  Jutland. — 8. 
The  last  phase 74 

CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  SUBMARINE  CAMPAIGN 

I.  The  cause  of  the  declaration  of  the  war  zone. — 2.  The 
first  reverse. — 3.  Lusitania  and  Arabic. — 4.  To  and  fro. 
— 5.  My  resignation. — 6.  Sussex. — 7.  The  unrestricted 
submarine  campaign,  1917. — 8.  The  sum  total  .       .       .  137 

EPILOGUE 

APPENDIX  I 
Extracts  from  my  letters  written  during  the  war  .       .      ,.:  216 

APPENDIX  II 
Remarks  on  our  shipbuilding  policy      .       .,      .      1.       .       .  389 


.'546587 


MY  MEMOIRS 


CHAPTER  XVII 


MAIN   QUESTIONS  OF  THE  WAR 

Military  opening. — 2.  The  question  of  the  principal  enemy. — 
3.  Our  weapons  against  England. — 4.  The  possibility  of  a 
separate  peace  with  Russia. — 5.  The  ideas  of  the  war. — 6. 
Home  policy  in  the  war. — 7.  The  Fatherland  Party. — 8.  At 
the  collapse. 


England  hoped  to  overwhelm  our  country  with  the 
Russian  steam-roller,  whilst  the  Franco-Anglo-Bel- 
gian army  brought  ours  to  a  standstill,  and  intended 
then  to  stop  the  war  if  the  danger  arose  of  the  Rus- 
sians winning  too  big  a  victory.  The  enemy  assumed 
that  Italy's  secession  would  upset  our  calculations  and 
cancel  our  numerical  superiority  in  the  west  during 
the  decisive  weeks. 

The  enemy's  well-founded  hopes  of  victory  were 
disappointed  by  the  way  in  which  our  military  machine 
did  its  work  and  the  speed  with  which  we  seized  Bel- 
gium. The  Russian  masses  did  what  could  be  ex- 
pected of  them.  But  they  had  the  misfortune  soon 
to  stumble  across  great  generals,  who,  favoured  by 
the  luck  of  battle,  brought  out  by  magnificent  ma- 
noeuvres the  best  qualities  of  our  nation  in  arms.  The 
Schlieffen  plan  of  attacking  France  through  Belgium 
was  intended  to  stave  off  from  Germany  the  first  vital 
danger.    I  am  not  in  a  position  to  judge  whether  the 


j2  MYMEMOIRS 

plan  of  campaign,  which  was  unknown  to  me  before 
the  outbreak  of  war,  was  absolutely  right  as  a  result 
of  the  increasing  technical  developments  towards 
trench-warfare,  and  in  view  of  our  political  situation 
in  the  world.  At  any  rate  it  ought  to  have  been  car- 
ried out  by  those  who  possessed  the  genius  completely 
to  control  such  a  gigantic  operation  and  the  incidents 
which  it  would  naturally  entail.  Our  army  leaders 
could  not  estimate  too  generously  the  coefficient  of 
safety  for  the  enormous  circular  movement;  but  they 
ran  it  too  finely.  The  army  was  kept  too  small  in 
time  of  peace,  and  the  fatal  omission  was  made  of 
not  drawing  sufficiently  on  Germany's  defensive 
powers.  At  the  end  of  191 1  the  Chancellor  intro- 
duced an  Army  Bill.  This,  however,  was  not  big 
enough,  and  the  19 13  Bill  came  too  late  to  take  full 
effect  during  the  war.  I  myself  had  proposed  to 
the  Minister  of  War,  von  Heeringen,  at  a  suggestion 
from  Admiral  von  Miiller  just  before  Christmas,  191 1, 
that  together  with  me  he  should  insist  upon  the  im- 
mediate introduction  of  a  Defence  Bill,  and  I  ex- 
pressed my  readiness  to  subordinate  my  demands  to 
those  of  the  army.  The  opinion  at  General  Head- 
quarters in  the  autumn  of  19 14  was  that  the  war 
against  France  would  have  been  won  if  the  two  army 
corps  had  been  there  which  the  General  Staff  had 
allowed  itself  to  be  done  out  of  in  1911-12,  contrary 
to  the  demands  of  its  experts.  In  addition  there  was 
the  under-estimation  of  the  British  army,  which  our 
public  still  liked  to  imagine  as  the  Aldershot  Tommies 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR        3 

with  their  little  caps  and  swagger  canes.  When  I 
warned  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  after  war  had 
broken  out,  against  rating  these  troops,  which  were 
almost  all  sergeants,  too  lightly,  he  replied :  "  We 
shall  arrest  them."  In  this  hope  he  probably  did  not 
foresee  that  he  would  have  to  detach  two  army  corps 
from  the  right  flank  for  the  eastern  front.  Even  in 
the  late  autumn  of  1914  I  encountered  doubts  at 
General  Headquarters  as  to  the  seriousness  of  the  new 
Kitchener  armies.  In  August,  19 14,  I  wrote  from 
Coblenz :  "  The  difficulties  will  come  when  the  army 
thinks  it  is  over  the  hill." 

At  that  time  it  seemed  to  be  more  important  than 
anything  else  to  cut  through  the  English  lines  of 
communication  and  to  get  to  Calais.  Everything  else 
would  have  been  easier  for  us,  if  only  we  had  com- 
pelled the  English  by  cutting  off  the  Channel  Ports 
to  transport  their  troops  to  Cherbourg  or  even  Brest, 
across  the  Atlantic  therefore  instead  of  an  inland  sea, 
and  this  would  have  put  quite  a  different  face  upon 
the  war  in  France. 

It  was  in  vain  that  I  urged  Moltke  to  do  this,  and 
even  Field-Marshal  von  der  Goltz,  who  shared  my 
opinion,  could  not  do  so.  I  could  not  obtain  any 
influence  over  Falkenhayn's  decisions.  My  desire  to 
cut  the  English  lines  of  communication  would  only 
have  been  possible  from  the  sea,  in  my  opinion,  by 
engaging  the  High  Sea  fleet  and  not  by  isolated  sorties 
of  lighter  craft.  This  was  only  one  side  of  my  de- 
mands for  the  use  of  the  fleet.    It  is  confirmed  at  this 


4  MY    MEMOIRS 

moment  (beginning  of  1919)  by  Lord  Haldane,  who, 
according  to  newspaper  reports,  indicated  in  a  letter 
to  The  Times,  as  a  mistake  of  German  strategy,  the 
fact  that  "  it  hesitated  to  make  immediate  use  of  its 
submarines  and  torpedo  boats  to  prevent  the  transpor- 
tation of  the  British  army  after  its  mobilization  on  the 
morning  of  August  3rd."  If  we  had  systematically 
prepared  for  this,  and  then  attempted  it,  the  British 
High  Sea  fleet  would  undoubtedly  have  appeared,  and 
the  naval  battle  would  then  have  developed,  so  much 
the  better  for  its  being  so  soon. 

Moltke  was  a  very  sick  man.  The  reins  trailed  on 
the  ground,  and  the  uniformity  of  the  army's  opera- 
tions went  to  pieces.  In  spite  of  his  unfortunate  per- 
sonality I  had  perfect  confidence  in  Moltke.  His  suc- 
cessor did  not  give  me  the  impression  of  having  been 
trained  to  master  the  task,  which  the  development  of 
the  war  into  a  war  of  attrition  increased  beyond  all 
bounds  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  Until  then 
the  army  had  been  animated  by  one  idea :  Cannae.  In 
the  war  of  attrition,  however,  the  superiority  of  the 
enemy,  thanks  to  his  mastery  of  the  seas,  was  bound 
to  bear  fruit  more  and  more.  All  victories  on  land 
trickled  away  owing  to  the  unparalleled  disadvantages 
of  Germany's  position.  Wedged  in  between  enemies 
on  land,  we  could  not  even  save  ourselves  by  making 
ourselves  unassailable  like  a  hedgehog.  For  our  life- 
threads  ran  across  the  seas.  Therefore  only  the  great- 
est boldness  and  resoluteness  could  save  us.  Land 
war  must  also  adjust  itself  to  the  general  aim.    After 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR        5 

the  Battle  of  the  Marne  the  army  had  to  revise  its 
methods.  The  Supreme  Command  at  that  time  al- 
lowed the  big  aims  to  go  begging.  Hindenburg  and 
Ludendorff,  however,  who  offered  a  prospect  of  an- 
nihilating the  Russian  armies  in  191 5  by  turning  their 
flank  at  Kovno,  and  consequently  did  not  agree  with 
the  frontal  attack  at  Gorlice,  were  not  allowed  to  carry 
out  their  scheme.  If  it  had  been  successful,  their  posi- 
tion would  certainly  have  dominated  that  of  General 
Headquarters.  In  war,  a  definite  great  political  aim 
is  needed,  towards  which  one  can  proceed  with  con- 
centrated politico-military  forces.  And  indeed  the 
chief  enemy  decides  in  the  war.  Partial  victories  over 
lesser  opponents  are  at  best  only  means  to  the  end. 
There  ought  to  be  only  one  real  aim:  ...  to  strike 
at  the  heart  of  the  Coalition.  Our  fate  depended  on 
our  recognizing  this  objective. 

But  who  was  our  main  opponent  ?  To  me,  without 
doubt,  he  who  had  the  greatest  resources  and  the  high- 
est determination.  London,  which  had  always  been 
the  political  nerve-centre  of  the  Entente,  became  ever 
more  definitely  the  military  centre  also.  It  let  no  real 
opportunity  slip,  not  even  the  construction  of  a  new 
Eastern  Front  in  the  year  1918.  While  London  stood, 
no  victory  over  the  Russians  could  be  regarded  as 
more  than  a  partial  victory,  serving  merely  to  render 
possible  the  swift  conclusion  of  a  separate  peace  with 
the  Czar  and  thus  to  free  our  strength  for  employ- 
ment against  the  chief  enemy. 

The  dismemberment  of  the  Czar's  empire,  the  aim 


6  MY    MEMOIRS 

of  our  diplomacy  and  democracy,  was  of  no  help  to 
us  if  we  could  not  wound  the  chief  enemy. 

II 

Our  national  sentiment  shows  a  sound  judgment  in 
attributing  not  to  our  military  leaders  but  to  the  states- 
man Bismarck  the  chief  credit  for  the  successful  wars 
which  have  made  Germany  free,  united,  and  prosper- 
ous. As  long  as  our  people  remained  sound  and  loyal, 
and  our  defence  impenetrable,  as  was  the  case  in  the 
first  years  of  the  world-war,  our  statesmen  had  politi- 
cal military  and  naval  material  enough  to  enable  them 
to  emerge  with  honour  from  the  war  with  England 
into  which  we  had  fallen.  The  army,  which  in  its 
own  particular  domain  was  not  drilled  to  fight  the 
English,  under-estimated  these  as  it  were  unattainable 
enemies.  I  was  attacked  as  a  pessimist,  and  the  say- 
ing at  the  "  Lion  d'Or  "  at  Charleville  ran :  "  There 
isn't  an  officer  in  G.H.Q.  who  doesn't  think  the  war 
will  be  over  before  April  ist,  191 5,  except  the  Naval 
Secretary  of  State."  In  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  I 
was  regarded  as  an  opponent  whose  isolation  in  the 
German  Government  was  most  welcome;  for  this  quite 
comprehensible  predominance  of  the  "  dry-land  "  point 
of  view  in  the  army  would  have  been  quite  harmless, 
if  only  the  Chancellor  had  been  on  my  side.  The  war 
could  not  be  won,  even  in  a  military  sense,  without 
a  sound  policy  which  gave  due  weight  to  the  naval 
position.  If  the  Chancellor  had  really  understood 
the  nature  of  the  war,  the  army  would  have  been 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR        7 

ready  to  attach  more  importance,  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  campaign,  to  the  English  lines  of  communica- 
tions; and  in  that  case  we  should  have  carried  out 
the  offensive  measures  at  sea  v^hich  form  the  subject 
of  this  and  the  following  chapters. 

On  August  19th,  1 914,  I  said  to  the  Chancellor,  in 
the  presence  of  Moltke  and  Jagow: 

"  Whatever  we  achieve  against  Russia  is  not  an 
embarrassment  but  a  relief  to  England.  Conditions 
have  forced  us  to  fight  on  a  front  which  is  not  in 
accordance  with  our  political  interests.  The  Russo- 
German  War  is  very  popular  in  England.  The  Eng- 
lish statesmen  are  absolutely  determined  to  hold  out 
to  the  end.  We  can  only  save  our  future  by  pressure 
on  England.  The  decision  of  the  war  turns  exclu- 
sively on  whether  Germany  or  England  can  hold  out 
the  longer.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  occupy  Calais 
and  Boulogne." 

This  point  of  view  seemed  unintelligible  to  the 
Chancellor.  He  held  that,  even  if  the  war  went  fa- 
vourably for  us  in  the  West,  we  ought  to  limit  our 
activities  there  and  direct  our  full  strength  to  the 
East.  As  early  as  the  first  half  of  August,  he  had 
remarked  to  a  mutual  acquaintance:  "The  war  with 
England  is  only  a  thunderstorm,  and  will  pass  over 
quickly.  Relations  afterwards  will  be  better  than 
ever."  Bethmann's  policy  was  to  reach  an  under- 
standing with  England,  and  he  accordingly  held  it 
right,  even  in  actual  warlike  operations,  to  handle  that 
country  gently.     To  him,  England  was  "  a  bulldog, 


8  MY   MEMOIRS 

which  must  not  be  irritated."  He  was  still  seeking 
for  the  hand  of  friendship,  which  he  had  not  found 
in  Grey's  proposal  of  a  conference.  He  failed  to 
realize  that  England,  now  that  it  had  once  come  into 
the  war,  was  clearly,  coolly,  and  consistently  bent  on 
winning  it.  The  dry-land  point  of  view  of  the  army, 
a  certain  weakness  of  the  Emperor,  and  the  hazy  po- 
litical views  of  wide  circles  in  Germany,  enabled  the 
Chancellor  time  and  time  again  to  rebuild  his  fallen 
house  of  cards.  He  never  forgot  the  peaceable  atti- 
tude shown  by  Grey  in  the  first  half  of  July,  and  as 
he  had  never  understood  that  the  reason  of  this  atti- 
tude was  simply  the  grave  risks  inseparable  from  naval 
warfare,  he  assumed  that  it  was  still  present  now  that 
England  had  made  up  her  mind  to  come  into  the  war, 
and  had  had  her  prospects  of  victory  strengthened  by 
the  manner  in  which  the  war  had  actually  broken  out, 
by  our  failure  to  occupy  the  Channel  coast,  by  the 
inactivity  of  our  navy,  and  by  the  events  of  the  Mame. 
As  I  have  already  said,  England  was  following  her 
old  traditions  in  seeking  to  increase  her  predominance 
by  war  against  whichever  continental  power  is  the 
strongest  for  the  time  being.  Puritanically  pharisaical, 
the  practical  and  utilitarian  British  politicians,  domi- 
nated by  the  interests  of  Anglo-Saxon  capitalism,  were 
absolutely  united  in  their  determination  to  fight  Ger- 
manism all  the  harder,  and  more  mercilessly,  just  be- 
cause up  to  July,  1914,  it  had  been  possible  that  we 
would  win  through  in  peace.  How  could  anyone 
think  that  England  would  not  use  to  the  full  the  oppor- 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR        9 

tunity  thus  given  to  her,  to  strike  down  at  the  very 
last  moment  th.e  competitor  who  had  very  nearly  over- 
taken her  in  the  race?  As  our  lack  of  determination 
showed  itself,  England's  determination  increased;  the 
influence  of  Lloyd  George  increased  at  Asquith's  ex- 
pense. With  us,  the  opposite  development  was 
seen,  the  determined  leaders  being  thrust  into  the 
background;  such  conduct  was  bound  to  lead  to 
defeat. 

Since  191 1  our  policy  has  consisted  in  chronic  mis- 
understanding of  England.  This  mistake  was  con- 
tinued during  the  war.  The  Press  were  instructed 
not  to  speak  too  severely  against  England,  these  in- 
structions being  repeated  again  and  again  by  the 
Foreign  Office  at  the  meetings  of  Press  representatives 
in  Berlin.  The  English  of  course  were  not  ignorant 
of  this,  and  drew  their  own  conclusions,  which  were 
certainly  not  those  which  the  dear  German  expected 
them  to  draw. 

As  our  leaders  were  ignorant  of  the  strength  and 
determination  of  England,  they  half  assumed  that  it 
did  not  exist,  and  never  realized  that  we  should  have 
to  accept  defeat  unless  we  succeeded  in  pressing  her 
so  hard  that  she  would  regard  reconciliation  as  more 
to  her  advantage  than  the  continuance  of  the  fight. 
The  knowledge  of  England,  in  spite  of  all  our  writers, 
from  Gneisenau  and  Frederick  List  to  Karl  Peters 
and  A.  von  Peez,  had  not  penetrated  our  leaders.  In 
the  Bismarck  period,  which  was  largely  used  as  a 
model  for  the  present  time,  our  policy  was  of  necessity 


lo  MY    MEMOIRS 

based  on  different  problems  and  conditions.  Outside 
the  navy,  the  power  of  England  and  her  determination 
to  beat  us  back  were  quite  overlooked,  and  this  all  the 
more  readily  as  we  were  wholly  ignorant  of  the  great 
means  we  already  possessed  for  combating  this  de- 
termination. The  navy  was,  however,  still  too  young, 
and  not  sufficiently  a  part  of  the  national  life,  to  infect 
the  people  with  its  point  of  view.  The  ever-increasing 
isolation  of  the  navy,  which  combined  strong  patriot- 
ism with  international  experience  peculiarly  useful 
for  the  world-war,  showed  that  the  nation,  or  at  all 
events  its  upper  classes,  was  not  ripe  for  such  a 
war.  In  the  first  months  of  the  war,  men  from  all 
circles  of  the  people  approached  me  with  the  request 
that  I  should  send  the  fleet  to  battle;  when  later  public 
opinion  lost  this  enthusiasm,  it  was  merely  following 
the  lead  given  by  its  political  chiefs. 

On  August  27th  and  28th,  in  connection  with  my 
plans  for  the  formation  of  a  corps  of  marines  with 
a  view  to  attacking  England  from  Flanders,  I  once 
again  urged  the  Chancellor  to  concentrate  against 
England.  It  was  even  then  almost  incomprehensible 
to  me  how  the  war  could  be  expected  to  be  won  against 
England  on  land  alone;  four  weeks  later,  when  the 
fighting  fronts  had  begun  to  stiffen,  the  idea  seemed 
absolutely  Utopian. 

As  I  have  stated,  I  stood  alone  in  my  views  at 
General  Headquarters,  and  especially  among  the  dip- 
lomats. I  could  scarcely  speak  with  anyone  of  my 
view  of  the  position.    Surrounded  by  these  men,  who 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      ii 

consciously  or  unconsciously  agreed  in  their  super- 
ficial optimism  in  differing  from  me,  I  often  asked 
myself:  "Have  I  been  stricken  with  blindness,  or 
have  all  these  others  ?  Do  I  take  too  gloomy  a  view  ? 
Have  I  really  been  deceiving  myself  all  through  my 
career  as  to  England's  stubborn  determination  to  pre- 
vail?" Our  leading  circles  were  dull  of  comprehen- 
sion in  dealing  with  the  nature  of  sea-power,  and  the 
fate  that  threatened  us;  they  were  unwilling  to  realize 
that  England  wanted  to  drive  us  off  the  seas.  Not 
until  events  unfortunately  proved  me  right  did  I  fully 
understand  the  terrible  meaning  of  that  English 
phrase :  "  but  you  are  not  a  sea-going  nation." 

Again  and  again  I  emphasized  to  the  Chancellor 
that  England  would  never  stop  fighting  while  any 
prospect  remained  of  breaking  our  world-position. 
Our  democrats,  more  than  any  of  us,  should  have 
been  afraid  of  this.  Had  not  Lloyd  George  said:  "  I 
am  not  afraid  of  von  Hindenburg,  von  Mackensen, 
and  all  the  other  Vons,  but  of  the  German  workmen  "  ? 
The  longer  the  "  knock-out "  was  delayed,  the  more 
dangerous  it  became  for  us,  for  the  main  weapon  of 
the  British,  the  fleet,  could  only  work  by  long  years  of 
blockade.  Even  on  land,  after  England  had  failed  to 
gain  a  swift  victory  with  other  people's  armies,  years 
passed  before  she  created  one  of  her  own.  But,  once 
England  committed  herself  to  this  gigantic  undertak- 
ing, which  threatened  her  whole  economic  organiza- 
tion, it  was  certain  that  she  would  demand  a  reward 
commensurate  with  her  efforts,  in  the  assurance  that 


12  MY    MEMOIRS 

she  need  not  fear  a  recovery  of  the  German  people 
for  centuries  to  come. 

To  my  urgent  attempts  to  reason  the  Chancellor  out 
of  his  false  estimation  and  incorrect  treatment  of  Eng- 
land, he  returned,  as  his  character  was,  no  definite  an- 
swer. There  was  no  doubt,  however,  that  he  was 
clinging  to  his  old  ideas.  When  on  August  19th  he 
informed  me  that  the  British  were  diverting  into  Eng- 
lish ports  Dutch  corn  ships  bound  for  Holland,  I 
could  not  persuade  him  to  expose  this  breach  of  neu- 
trality in  the  manner  proposed  by  me.  Even  then  I 
said  to  him :  "  Every  display  of  the  desire  to  reach 
an  understanding  with  England  will  simply  work 
against  an  understanding  and  be  regarded  as  weakness 
on  our  part.  The  utmost  stubbornness  in  dealing  with 
England  is  the  only  means  of  turning  her  from  her 
present  course." 

I  wish  to  state  here  that  my  advocacy  of  a  deter- 
mined conduct  of  the  war  against  England  in  the 
years  1914  to  1918  never  prevented  the  Government 
from  seeking  a  peace  of  understanding  with  England. 
I  am  not  seeking  to  defend  myself,  for  the  story  spread 
among  the  masses,  that  I  had  prevented  the  Govern- 
ment from  concluding  an  early  peace  with  England, 
is  too  foolish  to  require  any  defence  on  my  part.  So 
far  as  I  can  tell,  there  never  was  in  all  those  years 
a  moment  in  which  England  would  have  given  us  any 
peace  but  that  of  destruction.  My  influence  was  never 
strong  enough  to  have  thwarted  any  possible  peace, 
even  if  I  had  wished  to  do  so,  nor  did  the  Chancellor 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      13 

ever  communicate  to  me  any  tangible  possibility  of 
peace.  I  am  rather  speaking  simply  from  the  point  of 
view  of  political  tactics,  which  of  course  became  more 
and  more  important  as  our  position  changed  for  the 
worse.  The  moment  when  one  desired  to  reach  a 
tolerable  peace  of  renunciation  with  England  was  just 
the  very  time  in  the  war  when  it  was  most  necessary 
to  show  a  determined  fighting  front  against  England 
and  to  seek  a  rapprochement  with  Russia.  Such  a 
point  of  view  in  the  matter  of  tactics  is  so  simple  and 
elementary  that  it  is  adopted  by  everybody  but  the 
Germans.  In  national  questions  of  life  and  death,  the 
German  does  not  seem  to  have  sufficient  enthusiasm 
to  bear  this  principle  in  mind.^ 

The  last  prospect  of  achieving  a  tolerable  peace 
with  England  disappeared  when  we  adopted  the  ex- 
actly opposite  tactics  of  public  peace  offers.  To  show 
his  goodwill,  the  German  in  international  matters  is 
quite  ready  to  hand  over  his  trumps  in  advance  to  his 

*  I  could  value  it  properly,  even  when  it  worked  inconveni- 
ently for  me.  For  example,  a  decade  earlier,  when  the  Navy 
League  was  making  higher  demands  than  I  did  myself,  and  was 
attacking  me  personally  in  a  most  unpleasant  manner,  its  activi- 
ties made  it  much  more  easy  for  me  to  have  my  more  moderate 
programme  carried  through  the  Reichstag.  It  was  with  the 
same  motive,  with  a  view  to  giving  the  Government  a  tactical 
advantage  by  supplying  the  necessary  support  in  a  firm  morale 
at  home,  that  at  a  later  stage  the  "  Fatherland  party "  was 
founded.  I  have  often  been  amazed,  and  am  still  amazed,  that 
even  intelligent  men  wholly  failed  to  see  the  quietening  effect 
produced  abroad,  and  often  regarded  the  Fatherland  party  as 
a  mere  breeding-ground  of  uncritical  optimism.  Its  true  mean- 
ing and  purpose  could  only  be  understood  by  those  who  fully 
realized  that  we  were  fighting  a  foreign  foe. 


14  MY    MEMOIRS 

opponents,  in  the  hope  of  making  them  more  friendly- 
disposed.  From  these  peace  offers  onwards,  the  Brit- 
ish statesmen  watched  with  unerring  certainty  the 
progress  of  our  internal  crumbling.  Natural  instinct 
must  show  that  it  is  wrong  to  strike  the  enemy  with 
one  hand  only,  while  one  strokes  him  with  the  other. 
That  was,  however,  the  line  of  conduct  we  followed, 
in  order  "  not  to  irritate  "  the  chief  enemy.  Anyone 
who  understands  the  English  knows  that  they  can  only 
be  brought  to  reasonable  terms  by  the  utmost  firmness 
and  determination.  How  justly  were  we  criticized 
by  the  Irish,  the  Indians,  the  Egyptians,  and  other  en- 
slaved peoples.  They  know  by  long  and  terrible  ex- 
perience the  proper  way  to  deal  with  the  British. 
They  hoped  to  realize  their  freedom  through  us,  and 
now  they  saw  how,  by  false  tactics,  we  were  placing 
ourselves  under  the  control  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  while 
our  fighting  strength  still  stood  unshaken. 

When  on  September  4th,  19 14,  all  the  bourgeois 
parties  of  the  Reichstag,  then  in  complete  unity, 
planned  a  telling  demonstration  against  England,  in 
the  shape  of  a  proposal  for  the  increase  of  the  fleet, 
of  their  own  motion  and  wholly  without  any  sug- 
gestion from  me,  the  Chancellor  prevented  the  pro- 
posal being  brought  forward.  In  such  a  war,  such 
a  policy  of  repressing  national  determination  was 
nothing  less  than  morbid. 

When  I  learnt  in  the  early  part  of  November  that 
the  English,  in  order  to  block  the  entrance  to  the 
Channel,  had  established  a  war  zone  by  laying  mines 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      15 

in  the  open  waters  of  the  North  Sea,  thus  committing 
an  exceptionally  grave  breach  of  the  laws  of  the  sea 
as  they  then  stood,  I  could  not  persuade  Jagow  to 
adopt  the  declaration  of  protest  which  I  drew  up.  In 
lieu  of  this,  the  Foreign  Office,  with  the  aid  of  the 
Naval  Staff,  which  had  never  previously  had  experi- 
ence of  such  matters,  drew  up  a  declaration  which 
may  have  appealed  to  specialists  in  international  law, 
but  which  was  in  general  of  more  harm  than  good,  as 
its  meticulous  and  juristical  arguments  served  to  throw 
doubt  on  our  adherence  to  the  rules  of  international 
law,  which  up  to  that  time  we  had  observed  with  the 
greatest  strictness.  It  had  no  effect  because  it  did  not 
contain  any  reservation  of  the  right  to  use  reprisals. 

New  proofs  were  continually  arising  to  show  that 
it  would  have  been  better  to  show  a  determined  front 
against  England.  For  this  reason  there  was  anxiety 
in  England  lest  the  Chancellor  might  fall,  and  a 
stronger  hand  take  up  his  work;  for  this  reason  the 
exchanges  rose  in  London  when  I  resigned.  The  Eng- 
lish worked  skilfully  to  retain  the  Chancellor  in  office. 
Since  they  had  obtained  in  191 1  and  1912  an  insight 
into  his  manner  of  doing  business,  he  seemed  to  them 
to  offer  the  best  guarantee  of  their  victory.  Accord- 
ingly, wide  circles  in  Germany  looked  on  Bethmann 
as  Europe's  man  of  confidence,  and  our  democrats, 
to  whom  for  other  reasons  his  weakness  and  confu- 
sion were  necessary,  willingly  fostered  this  belief.  It 
is  tragic  to  reflect  that  this  man,  who  had  destroyed 
our  prestige  and  by  his  diplomacy  had  given  to  the 


i6  MY   MEMOIRS 

world  the  deadliest  weapons  against  us,  should  be 
thought  capable  of  bringing  the  English  into  a  lenient 
frame  of  mind.  The  Emperor,  however,  thought  him- 
self compelled  to  stand  by  the  man  who  appealed  to 
the  German  democrats  and  the  English.  Thus  did 
Bethmann  retain  his  office,  in  spite  of  his  failure 
through  three  long  years  of  war  to  provide  any  evi- 
dence that  England  would  concede  him  a  favourable 
peace.  But  the  English  declared  that  their  irreconcil- 
able attitude  was  only  directed  against  the  leaders  of 
the  armed  forces  of  Germany,  and  that,  once  these 
forces  were  defeated,  we  should  be  well  treated. 
And  many  a  good  simple  German  really  believed 
that! 

Even  newspapers  of  the  type  of  The  Daily  Mail 
sought  by  their  praise  not  to  discredit,  but  to  strengthen 
the  Chancellor,  as  may  be  seen  from  a  few  sentences 
from  their  leading  article,  "  The  Chancellor  and  the 
Pirate,"  on  August  31st,  19 15,  after  our  diplomatic 
defeat  in  the  Arabic  case : 

"  It  is  difficult  not  to  sympathize  with  the  Chancellor 
in  his  fight  with  Tirpitz.  For  the  past  year  he  has 
been  Chancellor  only  in  name.  His  business  has  simply 
been  to  extricate  Germany  from  the  complications 
brought  upon  her  by  the  real  directors  of  German 
Policy,  the  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty.  They  pur- 
sue their  courses  with  the  usual  disregard  for  civilian 
opinion.  His  function  is  to  clear  up  after  them.  At 
last  he  is  beginning  to  claim  a  voice  in  deciding  the 
policy  of  which  the  diplomatic  consequences  are  borne 
not  by  those  who  initiated  it,  but  by  himself." 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      17 

Passages  of  this  sort  were  quoted  among  us,  and 
taken  at  their  face  vr.lae.^ 

The  most  obvious  proofs  that  England  and  France, 
at  first  at  any  rate,  were  unwilhng  to  make  a  peace  of 
understanding  were  ignored.  Our  peace  offer  of  De- 
cember, 19 16,  which  was  accompanied,  to  the  best  of 
my  knowledge,  by  the  greatest  spirit  of  accommoda- 
tion, was  answered  contemptuously  with  the  Entente's 
well-known  programme  of  conquest.  Even  at  this 
time  we  should  have  been  confronted  with  conditions 
similar  to  those  which  the  German  Government  ac- 
cepted in  November,  19 18.  In  spite  of  this,  the  Chan- 
cellor and  the  democrats  still  failed  to  realize  that 
their  tactics  were  wrong.  They  went  farther  down 
the  slippery  slope,  undermining  the  confidence  of  the 
German  people  and  strengthening  that  of  the  en- 
emy by  an  uninterrupted  series  of  offers  to  capitu- 
late. 

The  worst  feature  was  that  this  policy  was  fed  on 
illusions  about  a  victory  in  the  East.  If  England  was 
to  be  regarded  as  invincible,  and  our  defeat  was  to  be 
accordingly  accepted  at  once,  that  would  after  all 
have  been  better  than  years  of  a  war  of  exhaustion 

*  How  well,  on  the  other  hand,  the  British  people  really  under- 
stood conditions  with  us  may  be  shown  by  the  following  small 
but  characteristic  example,  given  to  me  by  a  German  officer  on 
his  return  from  captivity  in  England.  He  had  heard  an  English 
coal  dealer,  who  had  been  called  up  for  service,  called  by  his 
fellow  soldiers  by  the  name  of  the  Chancellor,  and  when  he 
asked  the  leason  for  this,  he  received  the  reply:  "  He  always  calls 
him  Bethmann-Hollweg,  because  he  says  things  which  one  must 
not  say." 


i8  MY    MEMOIRS 

with  the  same  result.  But  a  certain  part  of  the  Press 
in  Germany,  with  which  our  political  leaders  un- 
fortunately co-operated,  was  hostile  to  "  Czarism  ''  for 
reasons  of  internal  politics.  On  England's  alleged 
invincibility  were  founded  the  prospects  of  a  German 
victory  over  "  Czarism  " !  I  would  like  to  quote  here 
a  typical  example.  An  official  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse, 
on  April  12th,  1916,  calmly  developed  this  view  of  a 
future  for  Germany,  founded  on  her  defeat  by 
England : 

"  For  us,  as  the  central  power  of  Europe,  the  first 
necessity  is  to  be  victorious  on  the  continent,  and  to 
group  our  neighbours  here  centripetally  around  us.^ 
We  must  not  compromise  this  objective  by  unneces- 
sarily embarking  in  a  risky  adventure.^  From  this 
firm  European  basis  we  can  construct  our  position  in 
the  world,  and  our  foreign  trade.  What  has  up  to 
now  been  done  in  this  direction  is  pure  dilettantism. 
Any  injury  done  to  England  is  of  course  welcome, 
but  it  is  simply  impossible  to  defeat  her.  We  must, 
therefore,  retain  sufficient  strength  and  credit  in  the 
world  to  be  able  to  continue  our  work  of  outstripping 
her  after  the  war.  In  the  future,  dangerous  unde- 
veloped forces  are  to  be  found  on  Russian  soil,  not  in 
the  riddled  purse  of  England.  I  think  that  peace  at 
Russia's  expense  offers  a  possible  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem. As  this  peace  would  be  made  at  the  expense  of 
reactionary  Russia,  it  would  not  exclude  the  possi- 
bility of  future  ad  hoc  understandings  with  another 
Russian  Government.  If  we  become  strong  in  Europe, 
and  the  guardian  power  towards  the  East,  an  under- 

'  Poland ! 

^  Submarine  warfare. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      19 

standing  with  England  would  not  be  difficult,  and  it 
might  even  be  the  case  that  the  interests  of  Albion 
would  for  once  coincide  with  those  of  the  strongest 
continental  power." 

At  the  beginning  of  July,  1916,  Secretary  Helfferich 
placed  before  the  heads  of  the  German  States  the  fol- 
lowing views  which  I  quote  from  a  contemporary 
memorandum : 

"  We  must  make  our  choice  between  England  and 
Russia,  in  order  to  gain,  for  the  ultimate  peace  as 
well  as  now,  protection  for  our  rear  against  one  or 
other  of  these  two  main  enemies.  We  must  choose 
England,  since  the  Russian  programme  is  wholly  in- 
consistent with  our  position  as  the  guardian  power  of 
Western  European  civilization  and  with  our  relations 
to  Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkans,  and  Turkey,  On 
the  other  hand,  a  division  of  spheres  of  interest  be- 
tween England  and  Germany  is  quite  possible.  Ac- 
cordingly, we  must  not  treat  the  fleet  as  a  necessity 
of  Germany's  existence,  and  must  weaken  Russia  as 
far  as  possible.  We  must  do  full  work  at  one  task, 
instead  of  half  working  at  many.  England's  inter- 
ests would  permit  us  to  work  with  our  whole  strength 
against  Russia.  The  determined  fight  against  Russia 
restores  to  our  procedure  in  the  world-war  its  moral 
justification,  which  consists  in  coming  to  the  aid  of 
Austria,  and  not  in  the  fight  for  the  freedom  of  the 
seas.  The  public  indignation  in  Germany  against 
England  should  accordingly  be  diverted  to  Russia." 

Thus  wrote  Helfferich,  closing  his  statement  with 
the  following  sentences: 


20  MY   MEMOIRS 

"  The  above  remarks  will  no  doubt  meet  with  the 
objection  that  I  am  reckoning  without  my  host,  seeing 
that  in  England  itself  hatred  and  the  lust  for  destruc- 
tion make  any  understanding  impossible.  Chamber- 
lain sums  up  this  tendency  with  the  remark,  which  had 
aroused  considerable  opposition  even  before  the  war, 
*  We  must  crush  Germany ' ;  but  both  Chamberlain 
and  our  newspapers  and  pamphlets  omit  the  subordi- 
nate clause  of  the  sentence,  which  contains  the  logical 
explanation  of  the  hostility,  to  wit,  *  before  it  crushes 
us.' 

"  In  the  abyss  of  deep  mutual  mistrust,  brought  to 
a  head  by  conscienceless  demagogues  and  too  powerful 
to  be  checked  by  the  respective  Governments,  but  hav- 
ing nevertheless  no  foundation  in  the  true  political 
conditions,  that  is  to  say  in  the  necessities  of  existence 
of  the  two  countries,  lies  the  whole  tragedy  of  the 
situation;  and  only  the  greatest  wisdom  of  the  states- 
men, combined  with  unconquerable  determination, 
which  must  be  present  in  equal  strength  on  both  sides, 
can  pull  the  coach  out  of  the  mire  of  demagogy.  This 
hope  is  not  so  vain  as  might  appear,  for  Asquith's 
ministry  of  demagogues  is  not  assured  of  perpetual 
office.  The  English  desire  for  our  destruction  may  in 
part  exclude  the  possibility  of  an  understanding,  but 
it  in  no  way  compels  us  to  take  up  the  fight  at  the 
points  where  the  English  are  strongest,  that  is  to  say, 
on  the  seas  and  in  Egypt." 

Thus  Helfiferich  too  saw  no  more  than  vague  hopes 
of  an  understanding  with  England,  and  nothing  tangi- 
ble whatever.  But  these  vain  wishes  were  enough  to 
lead  him  and  those  who  shared  his  views  to  refrain, 
during  the  precious  years  which  could  have  been  used 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      21 

to  save  Germany,  from  the  one  step  that  might  have 
forced  England  to  relent — to  wit,  an  understanding 
with  the  Czar,  and  the  utmost  development  of  our 
strength  at  sea.  We  did  not  deal  the  blows  against 
English  sea-power  that  we  could  have  done,  and  thus, 
by  sentimentality,  too  clever  calculation,  and  an  unmil- 
itary  conception  of  sea  warfare,  there  resulted  the 
achievement  of  England's  desire  to  administer  in  this 
war  the  awful  decisive  blow  against  the  mighty  Ger- 
man competitor,  from  which  he  could  never  recover. 
In  the  autumn  of  19 16,  when  the  English  defence 
against  submarines  was  becoming  as  it  were  settled, 
and  our  lack  of  courage  had  become  notorious  through 
the  Sussex  case,  Lloyd  George  ventured  already  to 
talk  of  a  "  knock-out." 

The  hope  above  mentioned  of  a  German  victory  to 
be  based  on  an  English  victory  seems  to  be  a  mere 
riddle,  but  it  was  unfortunately  allowed  to  determine 
the  fate  of  Germany  in  her  most  anxious  hour.  Re- 
bounding from  England's  prestige,  our  statesmanship 
followed  blindly  the  impetus  given  it  by  England  in 
the  direction  of  Russia.  Countless  Germans  at  home 
and  at  the  front  had  a  truer  instinct,  but  they  could 
not  prevail. 

This  attitude  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  was  accompa- 
nied by  the  further  pious  and  unconquerable  con- 
viction that  the  outstripping  of  England,  which  was 
not  permitted  to  the  German  Empire  while  it  was 
powerful  by  sea,  would  be  readily  conceded  to  a 
navyless  Germany.     The  Chancellor  and  his  friends, 


i22  MYMEMOIRS 

who  hoped  for  a  swift  and  complete  reconciliation 
with  England  after  the  "  thunderstorm,"  believed  that 
the  means  to  achieve  this  was  to  sacrifice  the  German 
fleet.  As  late  as  October,  1918,  German  politicians 
still  dreamt  of  buying  the  mercy  of  the  Anglo-Saxons 
by  abandoning  submarine  warfare.  Their  awakening 
after  November,  19 18,  was  a  cruel  one,  and  it  is  now 
too  late  to  know  better. 

My  standpoint  was  that  we  must  either  treat  Eng- 
land as  invincible  and  accept  our  defeat,  the  sooner 
the  better,  or  else  that  we  must  use  every  political 
and  military  means  to  shake  her  position.  In  prac- 
tice, I  could  of  course  only  contemplate  the  second 
course.  But  we  must  clearly  understand  the  way  we 
were  to  follow.  All  the  subtlety  and  waiting,  not 
based  on  this  plain  choice,  could  only  lead  to  destruc- 
tion. All  my  efforts  for  the  occupation  of  the  Channel 
coast,  for  forcing  a  battle  at  sea,  and  for  the  early 
adoption  of  submarine  activity,  were  based  not  on  any 
departmental  considerations,  but  simply  and  solely  on 
this  line  of  reasoning. 

Ill 

What  means  did  we  possess  for  the  exercise  of  mil- 
itary pressure  on  England? 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  I  was  surprised  to  learn 
that  the  navy's  plan  of  operations,  which  had  been 
withheld  from  me,  had  not  been  arranged  in  advance 
with  the  army.  The  army  based  itself  on  the  view, 
quite  comprehensible  from  its  standpoint,  that  the  war 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OFWAR       23 

at  sea,  and  indeed  the  whole  campaign  against  Eng- 
land, was  merely  a  secondary  matter.  Steps  could 
have  been  taken  before  the  war,  under  the  control 
of  the  Chancellor,  to  draw  up  a  single  plan  for  a  war 
on  three  fronts,  or  a  world-war,  but,  as  I  have  al- 
ready stated,  no  such  steps  had  been  taken.  Only  a 
homogeneous  Supreme  Navy  Command  would  have 
possessed  the  necessary  authority  to  compel  a  proper 
employment  during  the  war  of  the  valuable  informa- 
tion and  expert  knowledge  gained  by  the  navy  as  to 
the  strength  of  the  English;  and  such  a  command  was 
never  established. 

Of  the  three  possible  means  of  fighting  England, 
I  will  first  discuss  the  occupation  of  the  Channel  coast. 
It  was  easily  to  be  seen  by  the  end  of  August  that  the 
operations  of  the  army  would  lead  us  to  the  Flemish 
coast,  and  that  the  capture  of  Antwerp  would  only  be 
a  question  of  time.  This  rendered  possible  the  use  of 
Flanders  as  a  base  for  naval  warfare,  and  a  substan- 
tial improvement  of  our  naval  strategical  position.  In 
my  capacity  as  Secretary  of  State,  it  lay  in  my  power 
to  develop  these  possibilities,  and  I  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity with  all  my  strength,  forming  the  corps  of 
marines  and  fortifying  the  Flemish  coast.^  Beyond 
this,  however,  an  intelligent  Government  should  have 
aimed  at  the  capture  of  Calais.  So  long  as  the  army 
hoped  to  capture  Paris,  I  waited  for  the  coast  to  fall 
into  our  hands  of  itself.  I  leave  undiscussed  the  ques- 
tion whether  it  would  not  have  been  right  to  treat 

'  See  Chap.  XVIII. 


24  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  coast  as  the  objective  from  the  start.     Stationed 
on  Cape  Grisnez,  our  artillery  could  have  gravely  hin- 
dered traffic  in  the  Channel,  and  our  naval  forces  could 
also  have  worked  more  effectively  from  there.     The 
continual  interference  with  the  traffic  based  on  the 
Thames  would  have  caused  grave  interruption  to  Eng- 
lish industry,  and  thus,  at  that  time,  when  Germany's 
strength   was  wholly   uninjured   both   at   home   and 
abroad,  might  have  greatly  increased  English  readi- 
ness for  peace.    Later,  too,  it  would  have  been  possi- 
ble to  shell  London  itself  from  Cape  Grisnez,  which 
with  the  long  duration  of  the  war  would  have  been 
far  more  effective  than  the  bombardment  of  Paris 
which  was  carried  out  in  1918.     As  I  have  already 
stated,  I  have  always  opposed  measures  that  are  of 
no  military  importance,  including  casual  air  raids  on 
towns  in  the  interior.     On  the  other  hand,  a  really 
effective  concentrated  bombardment  of  London  by  all 
available  means  from  land  and  air  would  have  been 
thoroughly  justified  as  one  way  of  shortening  this  in- 
human war,  and  particularly  so  since  England  was 
notorious  for  observing  international  law  only  in  so 
far  as  it  suited  her  own  interest. 

The  second  means  of  exercising  pressure  on  Eng- 
land was  an  engagement  at  sea.  The  Entente  has  de- 
feated us  by  means  of  the  British  ships  of  the  line, 
which  made  the  starvation  blockade  possible,  and 
whose  prestige  yoked  to  England's  chariot  all  the 
peoples  of  the  world.  Of  all  the  reproaches  heaped 
upon  me,  one  only  has  really  affected  me,  that  I  did 


I 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      25 

not  build  more  battleships.  The  reader  will,  however, 
have  learnt  from  an  earlier  passage  of  this  book  that 
a  sea  battle  would  not  have  been  without  prospects 
of  success  for  our  fleet.  In  the  next  chapter  I  shall 
discuss  the  domestic  considerations  which  crippled  the 
navy  at  that  time.  Here  I  will  only  mention  in  ad- 
vance the  main  point,  the  failure  of  our  political 
leadership. 

As  already  stated,  the  point  of  view  of  the  Chan- 
cellor was  that,  if  we  were  to  come  to  an  understand- 
ing with  England,  we  were  not  to  irritate  her,  and 
further  that  at  the  end  of  the  war  the  fleet  should  as 
far  as  possible  be  still  intact,  in  order  to  influence  the 
peace  negotiations.  This  latter  view  has  always  been 
as  incomprehensible  to  me  as  the  former.  Other  im- 
portant persons  shared  the  views  of  the  Chancellor. 
Ballin,  for  example,  wrote  to  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet 
and  to  myself,  that  we  should  be  content  with  the 
"  fleet  in  being,"  this  being  the  only  right  policy  dur- 
ing the  war.  The  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  fell  in  with 
this  suggestion ;  he  had  never  been  much  in  touch  with 
opinion  at  the  front,  and  in  his  close  association  with 
the  Crown  he  became  more  and  more  a  compromise 
politician.  Under  his  influence  and  that  of  the  Chan- 
cellor stood  Admiral  von  Pohl,  who  wrote  to  me  on 
November  12th,  1915:  "While  I  held  the  office  of 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  the  Chancellor  impressed 
upon  me  many  times  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  fleet  should  be  preserved  intact  until  the  con- 
clusion of  peace." 


26  MY    MEMOIRS 

In  my  opinion,  it  was  simply  nonsense  to  pack  the 
fleet  in  cotton  wool.  The  "  fleet  in  being  "  had  some 
meaning  for  England,  for  her  fleet  thus  achieved  its 
purpose  of  commanding  the  seas.  But  the  principle 
was  meaningless  for  Germany,  whose  object  must  be 
to  keep  the  seas  free  for  herself.  Besides,  we  could 
not  allow  the  war  to  develop  into  a  war  of  exhaustion, 
but  must  attempt  to  shorten  matters.  How  cleverly 
the  English  must  have  worked  to  cripple  the  deter- 
mination of  Germany's  leaders  is  shown  by  the  re- 
mark, which  is  reported  to  have  been  made  by  one 
of  the  Emperor's  nearest  advisers  after  the  battle  of 
the  Skager-Rak,  and  which  is  at  any  rate  absolutely 
consistent  with  the  whole  outlook  of  that  circle: 
"  What  a  pity !  We  had  been  near  to  getting  peace 
from  England."  Among  such  influences  the  Em- 
peror's own  work  was  destroyed.  In  July,  19 14,  our 
politicians  were  playing  a  dangerous  game,  which,  if 
it  were  to  be  played  at  all,  could  only  be  based  on  a 
strong  Imperial  sea-power.  As  soon,  however,  as 
the  war  had  broken  out,  the  fleet  was  as  far  as  possible 
thrust  into  the  background,  and  the  impossible  task 
undertaken  of  defeating  England  before  the  walls  of 
Paris,  and  above  all  of  bringing  England,  by  fighting 
her  in  a  forbearing  spirit,  to  consent  to  a  favourable 
peace,  which  she  was  simply  not  ready  to  grant.  In 
peace  the  Chancellor  had  wished  from  the  bottom  of 
his  heart  that  we  had  no  fleet;  in  war  he  behaved  as 
if  it  did  not  exist.  The  German  Government  had 
never  approached  the  question  how  one  should  win  a 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR     27 

war,  simply  leaving  the  matter  to  the  General  Staff 
of  the  army,  which  in  its  turn  was  not  competent  to 
deal  with  the  political,  economic,  and  naval  questions 
raised  by  a  world-war.  Thus  the  Chancellor's  only 
hope  of  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  rested  on — the 
generosity  of  the  English! 

Many  persons  will  no  doubt  ask :  "  In  the  most 
favourable  circumstances,  of  what  use  would  a  suc- 
cessful sea  battle  have  been  to  us  ?  Were  the  English 
not  in  a  position  to  restore  their  North  Sea  fleet  rapidly 
from  their  reserves,  and  if  necessary  to  draw  on  the 
battle  strength  of  the  French?" 

The  answer  to  these  questioners  is  that  the  world- 
prestige  of  the  English  rests  in  the  main  on  the  very 
belief  in  the  invincibility  of  their  armada.  A  Ger- 
man sea  victory,  or  even  a  doubtful  success  for  Eng- 
land, would  have  worked  the  gravest  injury  to  Eng- 
land's position.  To  estimate  correctly  the  importance 
of  such  a  loss  of  prestige  for  England,  one  must  have 
seen  the  impression  made  abroad  by  our  victory  in 
the  battle  of  Coronel.  The  English  fully  understood 
the  effect  of  this  victory,  and  for  that  reason  they 
sent  out  from  home  an  overwhelming  force  to  wipe 
out  their  defeat.  The  fear  of  an  even  greater  loss  of 
prestige  led  them  to  act  with  ever-increasing  caution 
in  the  face  of  our  North  Sea  fleet.  The  question 
whether  a  victory  at  sea  in  19 14  would  have  had  the 
effect  of  breaking  the  blockade  was  not  at  that  time 
in  itself  decisive,  for  the  English,  having  regard  to 
their  oversea  position   and   the   existence   of  Japan, 


28  MY   MEMOIRS 

could  not  risk  any  substantial  weakening  of  their  sea- 
power.  If  we  had  won  naval  prestige  at  that  time, 
the  whole  course  of  the  war  would  have  been  different. 
Italy's  secession  to  the  enemy  camp  would  have 
been  prevented,  and  our  relations  with  the  Scan- 
dinavian countries  would  have  been  altered  at  one 
stroke.^ 

In  particular  the  Czar's  readiness  for  a  separate 
peace,  and  our  prospect  of  an  understanding  with 
Japan,  would  have  increased  as  our  prestige  grew  and 
that  of  the  English  fell.  It  could  not  be  contested  that 
we  were  strong  enough  at  any  rate  to  reduce  the 
English  fleet  considerably.  The  sea-power  of  the 
British  lay  like  a  nightmare  on  the  whole  of  the  non- 
Anglo-Saxon  world.  We,  and  not  the  British,  were 
the  natural  protectors  of  the  smaller  maritime  powers. 
All  eyes  were  turned  to  us.  It  was  the  critical  hour 
of  the  world's  freedom.  Yet  greater  things  were  at 
stake  on  sea  than  on  land,  and  at  sea  many  of  our 
momentary  enemies  secretly  sympathized  with  us. 
Only  strong  measures  could  help  us.    We  were  certain, 

^  The  occupation  and  fortification  of  the  Aaland  Islands,  which 
was  recommended  to  me  by  Swedish  friends,  seemed  to  me  to 
deserve  special  consideration.  With  the  occupation  of  the  islands 
as  a  base  we  would  have  controlled  the  Gulf  of  Bothnia,  the 
main  line  of  communication  between  Russia  and  England,  and 
strengthened  the  good-will  of  the  Swedes.  As  our  prestige  sank, 
both  the  sympathies  and  the  business  interests  of  the  Swedes 
were  more  and  more  transferred  to  the  English.  The  absence 
of  any  general  mobilization  before  the  war,  and  the  departmental 
limitations  of  the  naval  staff  in  their  relations  to  me,  were  the 
cause  of  my  being  unable,  until  the  war  had  actually  broken 
out,  to  consider  the  question  of  isolating  Russia  by  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Aaland  Islands. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      29 

at  the  least,  to  do  substantial  injury  to  the  "  Grand 
Fleet."  Any  penetration  of  British  naval  power 
would  awaken  the  Indian,  Egyptian,  and  other  ques- 
tions, deprive  England  of  the  further  allies  that  she 
needed  to  encompass  our  defeat,  and  incline  her  to 
peace,  England  understood  the  danger,  and  appreci- 
ated our  strength,  better  than  we  did  at  home.  That 
was  why  she  hesitated  to  enter  the  war,  and  that  is 
why,  when  she  had  entered,  she  avoided  battle.  In 
the  first  year  our  prospects  were  good,  and  even  later 
they  were  still  tolerable.  In  the  later  stages  of  the 
war  the  English  Press  were  merely  echoing  the  views 
of  the  Admiralty  when  they  spoke  warningly  against 
an  engagement  at  sea.  England  could,  they  argued, 
gain  nothing  by  a  "  precipitate  and  costly  action." 
"  So  long  as  the  German  fleet  remains  in  hiding,  we 
reap  all  the  advantages  of  sea-power,"  wrote  The 
Daily  Telegraph.  If  this  sea-power  had  only  been 
challenged  by  us  and  kept  in  doubt,  we  should  at  any 
rate  have  had  a  better  standing  among  the  neutrals. 
In  the  face  of  the  British  Fleet  tactics,  we  could  only 
gain  by  a  spirit  of  offensive,  and  not  by  passive  wait- 
ing. It  is  only  with  almost  unbearable  sorrow  that 
I  can  now  think  of  the  world-wide  difference  that 
would  have  been  produced  had  a  sea  battle  been  fought 
to  a  decision  in  the  early  months  of  the  war.  Indeed, 
even  an  incomplete  battle  like  the  encounter  at  the 
Skager-Rak  would  at  that  time  have  had  a  great  effect, 
whereas  that  engagement,  victorious  although  not 
fought  out,  was  unable,  after  nearly  two  years  of  the 


30  MY   MEMOIRS 

war,  to  achieve  any  lasting  political  result,  in  spite  of 
our  advantages  in  the  actual  contest.  For  in  the  time 
that  had  elapsed  the  general  position  had  changed  and 
settled  too  much  in  England's  favour,  and  the  coun- 
tries that  were  still  neutral  had  lost  their  belief  in  our 
ultimate  victory  since  our  surrender  to  Wilson's  brutal 
and  energetic  note. 

Even  an  unfavourable  sea  battle  would  not  have 
made  our  prospects  materially  worse.  It  could  be 
safely  assumed  that  the  losses  of  the  enemy  would  be 
as  great  as  ours.  Nothing,  indeed,  that  could  happen 
to  our  fleet  could  be  worse  than  its  retention  in  idleness. 

The  alleged  inferiority  of  the  German  ships,  which 
constitutes  one  of  the  most  tragic  and  disastrous 
libels  in  the  whole  history  of  Germany,  was  invented 
and  spread  abroad  as  an  excuse  at  this  time  to  justify 
the  inactivity  of  the  fleet.  The  "naval  policy"  of 
the  pre-war  years  was,  according  to  the  Chancellor's 
wishes,  to  be  put  forward  as  the  true  cause  of  the  war, 
although  in  1896  and  1905  England  had  been  far 
more  exacting  in  her  demands  on  Germany,  who  had 
then  in  the  one  case  no  fleet,  and  in  the  other  only  a 
weak  one,  than  she  was  in  July,  1914,  after  we  had 
built  ourselves  a  fleet  and  had  refused  in  191 1  and 
1912  to  abandon  it.  But  if  the  navy  policy  and  my- 
self were  to  be  found  guilty,  it  was  impossible,  with 
the  best  will  in  the  world,  to  separate  the  person  of 
the  Emperor  from  this  policy.  But  for  him  such  a 
policy  could  never  have  existed.  And  now  Bethmann 
intended  to  buy  friendship  and  peace  from  England 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      31 

at  the  price  of  the  definite  abandonment  of  the  policy, 
that  is,  in  truth,  of  our  one  source  of  strength  against 
England.  The  Emperor,  as  the  leader  of  the  navy  in 
war,  should  have  resisted  this  policy  of  self-deception, 
that  contradicted  the  whole  nature  of  the  world-war. 
But  when  the  report  was  spread  that  the  fleet  could 
not  go  out  to  battle  because  of  its  inefficiency  and  bad 
material,  then  I  and  I  alone  was  answerable,  and  the 
Emperor  was  relieved  of  all  responsibility  to  the 
people  for  the  inactivity  of  the  navy.  From  the 
divergence  of  political  views  between  the  Chancellor's 
party  and  myself  there  sprang  an  enormous  flood  of 
allegations  against  the  fleet  material  which  were  not 
disposed  of  until  the  test  at  the  Skager-Rak,  and 
prior  to  that  event  it  had  been  used  to  persuade  the 
Emperor  to  hold  the  fleet  in  check,  and  had  had  great 
effect  in  crippling  the  activities  of  the  navy.  If  the 
Emperor  had  taken  other  advice,  if  he  had  followed 
his  own  real  instincts,  Germany  would  not  now  be 
lying  in  ruins. 

We  were  defeated  by  the  old  traditional  English 
naval  prestige,  which  had  never  been  put  to  the  test 
in  modern  times.  This  prestige  made  our  governors 
fear  to  send  our  fleet  to  battle  when  the  time  came  to 
do  so.  And  thus,  with  the  failure  to  use  the  best, 
indeed  at  first  the  only,  weapon  against  England,  began 
the  tragedy  of  our  lost  opportunities.^ 

After  the  prospects  of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia, 
and  with  it  the  solution  of  our  problems,  had  for  the 
^  Fm-  details  see  Chapter  XVIII. 


2,2  MY   MEMOIRS 

time  being  become  much  more  remote  as  a  result  of 
this  naval  policy,  of  Italy's  entry  into  the  war,  and 
of  the  failure  to  carry  out  the  Hindenburg  plan  of 
campaign  for  19 15,  we  were  blessed  at  the  beginning 
of  19 1 6  with  another  gift  from  Heaven  for  the  sal- 
vation of  Germany  in  the  shape  of  the  submarine 
campaign,  which  was  then  ripe  for  execution.  A 
subsequent  chapter  will  give  the  story  of  the  stupidi- 
ties which  led  to  the  employment  of  this  last  decisive 
weapon  being  undertaken  too  late  by  one  crucial 
year,  to  the  consequent  ruin  of  our  future.  Time 
worked  against  us,  and  at  the  beginning  of  1916 
we  were  no  longer  strong  enough  to  survive  any 
further  slovenly  wasting  of  our  strength  and  our 
prestige. 

I  left  the  service  at  this  period  because  the  persons 
in  authority  would  not  recognize  our  prospects  at  sea, 
and  would  not  act  in  a  manner  befitting  the  real  seri- 
ousness of  our  position.  The  economic  war  had  be- 
come the  main  fight,  while  the  military  front,  in  spite 
of  the  tremendous  forces  which  were  necessarily  em- 
ployed in  the  defensive  fighting,  was  now  the  second- 
ary theatre.  Even  the  great  leaders  who  in  19 16 
were  appointed  to  command  our  glorious  army,  and 
who  brought  it  renewed  strength,  were  faced  by  but 
limited  possibilities  of  development.  The  moment  had 
arrived,  as  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when  the  question 
of  a  separate  peace  with  the  Czar  was  definitely  be- 
come a  question  of  life  and  death  for  us. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      33 

IV 

In  the  autumn  of  1916  I  had  conversations  with 
certain  pro-German  Russians,  which  in  conjunction 
with  other  indications  gave  me  ground  for  the  belief 
that  a  separate  peace  was  then  a  possibility,  I  of 
course  could  not  then,  and  cannot  now,  know  the  exact 
terms  on  which  such  a  peace  could  have  been  con- 
cluded; but  I  assume  that  the  following  basis  of  ne- 
gotiations could  be  regarded  as  giving  promise  of  suc- 
cess :  we  would  have  to  settle  the  Serbian  question  in 
an  accommodating  spirit,  agreeing  to  the  ten  points 
of  the  ultimatum  which  the  Czar  had  accepted  in  1914, 
and  consenting  to  arbitration  on  the  two  remaining 
points,  thus  in  the  main  bringing  about  a  Russian  suc- 
cess without  an  Austrian  defeat.  We  could  demand 
the  Narew  line  on  strategical  grounds,  to  protect  East 
Prussia  from  invasions  like  that  of  19 14,  offering 
Russia  in  exchange  an  equivalent  portion  of  Eastern 
Galicia,  Austria  in  her  turn  being  indemnified,  if 
necessary,  in  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar  and  in  Al- 
bania. We  would  have  to  secure  for  the  Russians  the 
passage  of  vessels  of  war  through  the  Dardanelles, 
and  also,  if  they  made  an  alliance  with  us,  an  island 
in  the  Aegean  Sea.  We  would  either  abandon  the 
Bagdad  railway,  or  share  it  with  them.  We  would 
leave  Persia  to  them  and  take  over  their  debts  to 
France.  We  could  have  given  them  even  better  terms 
if  they  succeeded  in  obtaining  peace  with  Japan  also 
for  us.     With  reference  to  Constantinople,  the  Rus- 


34  MY    MEMOIRS 

sians  would  have  to  realize  that  we  could  not  leave 
Turkey  in  the  lurch.  We  would  have  had  to  promise, 
however,  gradually  to  drop  our  Turkish  policy.  Pro- 
vision could  easily  have  been  made  for  the  per- 
sonal employment  of  the  Grand  Dukes,  and  other 
matters. 

Austria  could  have  been  persuaded  to  join  in  such 
a  peace,  and  Italy  could  then  have  been  forced  to  an 
understanding. 

To  the  Japanese  one  could  have  suggested  the  res- 
toration to  China  of  Tsingtao,  to  be  held  on  lease 
by  us,  without  fortifications,  on  the  terms  that  Japanese 
and  Germans  should  have  equal  rights  there.  We 
would  pay  them  in  return  a  certain  war  indemnity, 
and  would  also  propose  an  alliance  bidding  us  come 
to  their  aid  if  they  were  attacked  by  a  European 
power,  as  well  as  by  a  non-European  power,  they  in 
their  turn  having  to  help  us  if  we  were  attacked  by 
a  non-European  power  as  well  as  by  a  European.  All 
this  is  little  more  than  an  indication  of  the  sort  of 
basis  on  which  we  should  have  had  to  attempt  an 
understanding  with  Russia  and  Japan.  The  important 
point  beyond  any  doubt  was  that  at  all  stages  our 
whole  policy  should  have  been  directed  against  Eng- 
land. The  Russo-Japanese  rapprochement  of  1916 
offered  the  foundation  for  this  last  great  anti-Anglo- 
Saxon  alliance. 

The  matter  should  have  been  set  in  train  by  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  the  Czar.  If  I  may  put  myself 
in  the  place  of  some  person  having  the  confidence  of 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      35 

the  Czar,  I  conceive  that  he  might  have  spoken  as  fol- 
lows: "Your  Majesty  has  expressly  assured  me  that 
you  did  not  desire  war  with  Germany.  To  me  it 
appears  as  the  greatest  misfortune  that  Germans  and 
Russians  should  weaken  each  other,  and  if  a  stop  is 
not  put  to  the  process  the  future  development  of  both 
peoples,  and  the  thrones  of  the  Hohenzollerns  and 
the  Romanoffs,  are  in  peril.  I  understand  that  your 
Majesty  is  convinced  that  I  have  always  attributed 
the  greatest  importance  to  Russia's  friendship.  Give 
me,  therefore,  a  man  with  whom  I  may  negotiate 
without  the  feeling  that  he  is  boxing  my  ears."  The 
effect  after  all  depends  less  on  what  one  says  than 
on  success  in  catching  the  ear  of  the  other  party  by 
intuition  or  old  acquaintance.  The  Czar,  for  example, 
would  listen  gladly  to  an  officer.  I  know  from  my 
own  experience  it  was  possible  to  address  him  in  this 
manner.  In  addition  he  had  already,  in  the  person  of 
Stiirmer,  appointed  a  most  suitable  negotiator. 

Such  a  conversation  could  have  been  arranged  by 
an  autograph  letter  from  the  Emperor  to  the  Czar, 
so  worded  as  to  restore  the  latter's  self-confidence, 
and  pointing  out,  in  language  that  would  be  sure  to 
have  weight  with  him,  that  there  were  no  substantial 
conflicts  of  interest  between  the  two  old  friends  that 
could  not  be  adjusted,  but  that  the  present  unfortunate 
position  threatened  to  become  irremediable;  that  the 
letter  was  written  from  anxiety  for  their  two  dynasties, 
in    confidence   in   the    Czar's   discretion,    and   in   the 


36  MY   MEMOIRS 

certainty  that  he  would  never  allow  it  to  become  an 
official  document. 

Once  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was  removed,  the 
party  of  the  Grand  Dukes  could  not  create  any  irre- 
movable obstacles.  The  Czar  was  an  honourable  man. 
Such  an  opportunity  to  escape  from  the  cul  de  sac 
would  have  seemed  to  him  most  tempting,  and  the 
undertaking,  in  the  then  feeling  at  the  Russian  court, 
could  only  have  ended  in  success. 

The  attempt  to  establish  communication  was  con- 
demned to  failure  by  the  much  too  ostentatious  dis- 
patch of  Prince  Max  of  Baden,  who  was  little  fitted 
for  the  task.  The  premature  attempt  through  the 
Danish  court  failed  equally,  its  only  result  being  to 
enlighten  the  Danes  as  to  our  need  for  peace.  Above 
all,  however,  no  success  was  possible  while  Bethmann 
continued  to  rain  blows  upon  the  Russians,  compelling 
them  to  believe  that  we  were  determined  to  betray 
them  to  the  English  and  the  Poles.  I  doubt  whether 
even  the  German  supporters  of  the  Chancellor  can 
have  remained  unaware  of  the  fact  that  his  personality 
obstructed  the  materialization  of  the  peace  tendencies 
in  Petrograd.  The  Czar  would  have  presumably  writ- 
ten in  answer  to  a  letter  from  the  Emperor :  "  I  am 
ready  for  peace,  but  only  with  a  government  which 
gives  me  some  guarantee  of  anti-English  and  pro- 
Russian  sympathies,  and  which  enjoys  the  confidence 
of  Japan."  The  attitude  of  our  political  leaders,  as 
shown  in  the  above-quoted  memorandum  of  Helfferich, 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      37 

was  certainly  well  calculated  to  lose  this  excellent  op- 
portunity to  save  our  country. 

Never  in  the  whole  of  our  history  had  we  had  as 
much  to  offer  Russia  as  we  had  in  19 16. 

Among  remote  possibilities,  too,  there  were  many 
favourable  prospects,  as,  for  example,  that  of  a  re- 
vision of  the  Treaty  of  Prague  in  the  event  of  Den- 
mark following  Russia  and  entering  into  more  inti- 
mate relations  with  us  both,  which  was  fully  con- 
sistent with  her  natural  interests  and  with  her  geo- 
graphical relation  to  both  Russia  and  Germany. 
Through  the  mediation  of  the  Czar,  we  could  also  have 
brought  the  French,  in  their  then  position,  to  make 
peace,  by  conceding  them,  say,  the  small  portion  of 
Alsace  which  they  had  conquered.  The  peace  of  the 
whole  continent  could,  and  ought  to  have  been  secured 
from  Petrograd. 

By  the  time  that  the  suicidal  policy  of  Bethmann 
and  the  German  democrats  had  established  the  Polish 
kingdom,  making  the  Russians  still  more  hostile  to 
us  and  leading  them  to  their  revolution,  and  by  the 
time  that  the  submarine  campaign,  begun  too  late  and 
under  still  less  favourable  circumstances,  had  in  com- 
bination with  the  clumsiness  of  our  diplomacy  brought 
America  into  the  war,  Germany  was  externally  so  fast 
in  the  mire  that  the  decision  of  the  war  was  for  the 
future  to  be  souglit  mainly  in  her  internal  affairs,  in 
the  economic  war,  and  in  the  comparative  strength  of 
the  nerves  and  patriotism  of  the  Germans  and  the 
English. 


3(l(i587 


38  MY    MEMOIRS 


The  Anglo-Saxons  had  fully  understood  that  in 
this  tremendous  struggle  the  power  of  ideas  bore 
within  it  the  seeds  of  victory.  They  cried  aloud  in 
all  languages :  "  Hear,  ye  nations  of  the  world,  there 
is  among  us  a  people  which  is  ever  disturbing  our  con- 
cord, which  declares  war  and  desires  to  conquer  the 
world,  while  we  are  ever  bringing  you  but  freedom. 
It  began  with  Alsace,  it  seeks  now  the  same  end  in 
Belgium,  and  if  it  succeeds  there  a  like  fate  awaits 
you.  This  people  is  held  in  bondage  by  a  bloody 
caste  of  soldiers  and  Junkers,  and  their  autocrat,  the 
Kaiser,  sets  the  world  aflame  of  his  own  will.  Aid 
us  to  defeat  this  people,  that  we  may  punish  it  as  it 
deserves.  Only  when  that  is  done  can  that  league 
of  peoples  be  formed  which  is  the  desire  of  all  noble 
men,  only  then  will  there  be  peace  upon  the  earth. 
Mankind  will  then  be  as  a  herd  of  sheep,  and  so  far 
as  a  shepherd  be  needed,  we  will  readily  perform  the 
task."  Thus,  more  or  less,  flowed  the  story  from  the 
lips  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  leaders  in  a  thousand  tones, 
with  never-flagging  repetition.  With  such  tales  did 
they  drug  themselves  and  their  peoples.  In  order  to 
maintain  a  sufiicient  degree  of  hatred  among  their 
peoples  to  ensure  war  to  the  knife,  they  cried  to  the 
world :  "  See  these  Germans,  who  destroy  the  art  of 
France,  who  violate  her  women,  and  in  devilish  lust 
of  cruelty  hack  off  the  heads  of  her  children."  For 
this  work  our  enemies'  funds  were  distributed  in  all 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      39 

countries,  even  in  Germany  itself  where  opportunity 
offered.  Worse  still,  use  was  made  of  the  German's 
ignorance  of  the  outside  world,  and  of  that  strain  of 
self-destruction  which  runs  like  a  thread  of  blood 
through  the  thousand  years  of  our  history.  Clever 
advantage  was  taken  also  of  international  capitalism, 
which  here  and  there  had  found  its  way  into  Germany, 
and  of  that  ferment  of  decomposition  which  is  so 
admirably  represented  by  such  organs  as  the  Frank- 
furter Zeitung. 

What  response  did  our  political  leaders  make  to  these 
intellectual  and  commercial  attacks  of  our  enemies? 

They  might  have  said :  "  For  centuries  you  Anglo- 
Saxons  have  set  the  peoples  of  the  European  continent 
one  against  another.  Out  of  scattered  fragments  of 
tribes  and  strips  of  territory  Prussia  rebuilt  a  united 
Germany,  and  the  stronger  she  has  grown,  the  more 
clearly  has  she  realized  that  it  is  her  mission  to  fight 
for  the  freedom  of  Europe  against  the  giant  powers 
beyond  the  seas.  For  Europe,  the  sea-girt  continent 
of  many  states,  will  aways  reach  the  highest  level  of 
intellectual  achievement  while  her  many  closely  neigh- 
boured civilizations  are  free  to  develop  and  to  ad- 
vantage each  other  by  mutual  intercourse.  Germany 
stands  and  falls  with  Europe,  and  Europe  with  Ger- 
many. It  is  thus  Germany's  deepest  interest  to  main- 
tain the  peoples  of  the  continent  in  their  full  liberty 
and  their  full  power.  You  Anglo-Saxons,  on  the 
other  hand,  enslave  the  peoples  body  and  soul.  See, 
ye  peoples  of  the  earth,  how  many  of  you  are  already 


40  MY    MEMOIRS 

more  or  less  but  their  comatose  vassals,  and  how  much 
greater  the  danger  will  be  in  the  days  to  come.  Thus, 
we  are  fighting  for  the  freedom  of  the  world  against 
the  all-throttling  tyranny  of  the  Anglo-Saxons, 

"  You  Anglo-Saxons  call  us  militarists  and  auto- 
crats, whilst  among  yourselves  you  have  established 
for  the  maintenance  of  your  own  fighting  spirit  the 
most  absolute  dictatorship  that  history  has  known,  and 
you  exercise  a  military  power  of  Draconic  severity 
without  regard  for  personal  freedom  or  the  principles 
of  democracy.  You  rail  at  us  for  militarism,  but 
Germany  is  in  truth  the  only  independent  power  left 
in  the  world,  walking  her  own  path  and  capable  of 
maintaining  the  balance  in  Europe.  Your  masters  in 
the  City  of  London  and  in  Wall  Street,  New  York, 
know  quite  well  that  Germany  alone  stands  between 
them  and  the  propagation  over  all  the  world  of  their 
capitalistic  '  Understanding  theory.'  If  they  succeed 
in  removing  this  last  obstacle  and  in  establishing  an 
unlimited  world  monopoly,  then  indeed  will  a  Pax 
Britannica  bring  the  world  the  quiet  of  the  graveyard 
for  many  years  to  come." 

A  similar  line  of  thought  to  that  sketched  out  above 
should  have  been  encouraged  before  the  war,  and 
spread  by  all  possible  means,  for  our  people  lacked 
great  ambitions,  and  their  feelings  of  patriotism  had 
not  been  sufficiently  developed,  while  they  misunder- 
stood the  strength  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  and  had  al- 
lowed the  sense  of  our  imperative  need  for  external 
strength  to  be  largely  overlaid  by  cosmopolitan  Uto- 


I 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      41 

pianism.  But  in  the  war  itself,  when  life  and  death 
depended  on  it,  the  determination  to  survive  required 
to  be  awakened  and  kept  alive. 

And  what  did  our  political  leaders  do?  They  did, 
it  is  true,  rebut  this  and  that  slander.  But  in  the  main 
their  attitude  could  be  expressed  thus :  "  It  is  true 
that  we  declared  war,  but  we  do  not,  however,  want 
to  defeat  you,  but  merely  to  defend  ourselves.  It  is 
true  that  we  have  done  Belgium  a  wrong,  but  we  are 
ready,  as  far  as  possible,  to  make  it  good  afterwards ; 
we  have  no  intention  of  wholly  conquering  that  c'oun- 
try,  but  we  would  like  to  retain  part  of  it.  In  this 
war,  we  have  simply  no  aim,  no  objective,  no  idea. 
We  are,  it  is  true,  fighting  for  the  balance  of  power 
at  sea,  but  for  the  present  only  with  words,  as  we 
have  at  the  same  time  to  secure  that  the  reactionary 
and  corrupt  Russian  bureaucracy  should  not  again 
lord  it  over  the  noble  Poles.  That  our  unfortunate 
navy  should  incommode  the  Anglo-Saxons,  we  can 
well  understand,  and  we  concede  their  right  to  resent 
it,  although  our  fleet  has  really  only  half  the  strength 
of  the  English  alone.  Please  do  not  be  angry  about 
it;  I,  your  friend,  could  not  prevent  this  fleet  being 
built,  although  strictly  speaking  I  had  as  Chancellor 
the  power  to  do  so,  and  am  the  responsible  party. 
You  are  right  in  the  main,  too,  when  you  say  that 
our  institutions  are  less  democratic  than  yours.  It 
is  true  that  our  national  character,  the  experience  of 
our  history  and  our  geographical  position  render  an 
executive  of  very  wide  powers  a  necessity  of  our 


42  MY    MEMOIRS 

Government,  and  that  our  Emperor  has  not  even  the 
same  power  under  the  constitution  as  President  Wil- 
son; but  we  will  alter  all  that.  If  I  had  had  my  way, 
we  should  already,  long  ago,  have  handed  over  Alsace 
with  the  Vosges  barrier  to  the  French  propagandists, 
so  that  it  might  be  wholly  free.  On  principle  I  sup- 
port actively  the  party  quarrels  in  the  Reichstag,  in 
order  to  help  forward  democratic  feeling  in  Germany. 
It  would  no  doubt  be  better  to  leave  such  internal 
changes  to  be  dealt  with  after  the  war  is  over,  as 
their  discussion  at  present  diverts  the  attention  of  our 
people  too  much  from  the  terrible  seriousness  of  this 
hour  of  their  fate;  but  I  feel,  in  agreement  with  my 
democratic  friends,  that  by  democraticizing  ourselves 
we  may  win  your  approval  and  the  good-will  of  the 
whole  world.  I  am  accordingly  taking  steps  in  this 
direction  at  once,  and  as  I  admit  your  nobility  of 
character  even  while  you  are  hostile  to  me  I  feel  sure 
that  we  shall  soon  reach  a  peace  that  will  be  just  to  all 
parties." 

To  establish  these  views  in  Germany,  the  natural 
instincts  of  our  people,  which  were  so  emphatically 
displayed  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  were  systematically 
diverted  and  broken  by  Press  censorship  and  by  a  regu- 
lar drainage  system  of  repression  of  opinions  worked 
from  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  which  resulted  finally  in  the 
destruction  of  the  popular  morale  and  power  of  re- 
sistance, and  indeed  of  all  our  self-confidence.  In 
the  great  dangers  of  our  position,  which  were  obvious 
to  every  statesman,  an  active  development  of  patriotic 


i 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      43 

ideas  and  a  full  maintenance  of  morale  was  essential 
from  the  first  day  of  the  war  if  we  were  to  hold  our 
own  and  reach  a  conclusion  rendering  it  possible  in 
some  degree  to  make  good  our  heavy  losses  and  to 
continue  the  mission  of  Prusso-Germany  in  the  world. 

Bleeding  from  a  thousand  wounds,  underfed,  with 
its  back  against  the  wall  of  its  home,  the  best  of 
Germany  stood  fighting  for  its  life,  when  suddenly 
the  wall  was  overthrown  from  behind,  and  the  people 
lost  their  control  and  fell  into  delirium. 

The  curse  of  history,  and,  if  Germany  survives,  the 
curse  of  posterity,  will  rest  on  the  men  who  brought 
about  this  disaster. 

VI 

Our  political  leaders  gained  us  neither  allies  nor 
sympathies;  they  neither  gave  the  people  inspiring 
ideals  for  the  fight,  nor  opened  their  eyes  to  the  terrors 
of  defeat.  The  talk  of  a  pure  war  of  defence  was 
an  illusion,  and  bound  to  lead  us  to  destruction;  for 
England  had  already  during  the  war  destroyed  our 
position  in  the  world,  and  there  was  nothing  more  to 
defend;  merely  at  the  best  something  to  rebuild  if  we 
could.  The  German  people  could  not  hope  to  survive 
unless  the  terms  of  peace  ensured  this  reconstruction, 
but  the  thoughtless  talk  of  a  pure  war  of  defence  con- 
cealed this  necessity  from  the  masses.  How  different 
was  Lloyd  George,  with  his  talk  of  the  knock-out! 
Those  Germans,  however,  who  could  see  that  there 
was  no  other  outcome  but  that  either  the  English 


44  MY    MEMOIRS 

must  achieve  our  destruction  or  we  must  ourselves 
achieve  our  future,  and  v^ho  spoke  this  truth  boldly, 
were  sacrificed  by  the  government  to  the  hatred  of  the 
unintelligent  masses.  Bethmann's  conduct  was  the 
exact  opposite  to  the  statesmanship  with  which  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau  led  their  peoples  to  victory. 
The  Chancellor  and  his  friends  the  demagogues  ever 
directed  the  sharp  arrows  of  their  political  warfare 
against  their  homeland  instead  of  against  the  enemy. 
Thus  they  destroyed  the  resistance  of  the  people,  and 
paved  the  way  for  the  collapse,  until  at  last  the  people 
and  the  demagogues  who  had  come  to  rule  over  them 
threw  down  their  arms  and  laid  themselves  at  the 
feet  of  their  enemies,  with  the  cry:  "We  who  have 
always  believed  in  the  conscience  of  the  world,  for- 
swear the  accursed  disciples  of  the  policy  of  force, 
the  greedy  foes  who  wanted  to  swallow  you.  We 
never  wanted  victory,  we  feared  it  even,  for  would 
it  not  have  left  the  yoke  of  the  autocrats  and  mili- 
tarists firmly  upon  the  neck  of  the  enslaved  German 
people?  Now  defeat  has  freed  the  German  people 
from  the  despotism  of  the  Emperor  and  the  soldiers, 
has  brought  it  happiness,  and  made  it  worthy  of  a 
great  future.  Now  we  will  compel  you,  not  by  hate- 
ful force,  but  by  good  and  noble  words,  to  love  the 
German  people  and  further  their  interests.  We  will 
gain  the  confidence  of  the  world,  and  make  free  the 
way  that  leads  from  Imperialism  to  Idealism;  we  will 
sow  in  German  hearts,  not  hatred  against  the  imper- 
ialism of  the  British  who  have  starved  us,  nor  against 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      45 

the  French  and  the  Poles  who  seek  to  dismember  us, 
but  hatred  against  the  men  who  once  made  the  Ger- 
man Empire  powerful,  who  formed  armies  and  built 
ships  to  protect  it,  and  constructed  a  mighty  dam 
to  protect  its  prosperity  against  covetous  neigh- 
bours." 

This  end  of  Germany's  power  has  been  brought 
about  by  the  deception  of  the  mass  of  the  German 
people  throughout  the  war.  Now  that  the  awful  test 
of  facts  has  been  applied,  it  is  terribly  painful  even  to 
think  of  the  false  hopes  which  Scheidemann  and  Com- 
pany, with  the  complaisance  of  the  Government,  held 
out  to  the  people.     Their  theory  ran  thus: 

"  I.  If  Germany  will  democratize  herself  at  once, 
we  can  obtain  a  peace  of  understanding;  the  only  ob- 
stacles are  the  monarchy  and  the  military." 

When  the  Northclifife  propaganda  for  the  under- 
mining of  the  German  army  had  made  full  and  suc- 
cessful use  of  the  explosives  thus  supplied  to  it  by 
the  German  democrats,  Prince  Max  of  Baden,  Erz- 
berger,  and  Scheidemann  could  not  rest  until  they  had 
tested  their  theory  of  the  "  peace  of  justice,  not  of 
force,"  at  the  cost  of  our  monarchy,  our  army,  our 
honour,  and  our  freedom. 

"2,  If  we  only  state  frankly  that  we  will  give  up 
Belgium,  we  can  have  a  peace  of  understanding." 

The  doves  of  peace  had  been  flying  without  ceasing 
across  our  frontiers  since  19 17,  bearing  in  their  beaks 
the  renunciation  of  Belgium,  but  each  flight  merely 
confirmed  the  resolve  of  our  enemies  to  wait  until 


46  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  patent  internal  decay  of  Germany  had  achieved 
their  true  war  aim,  the  ruin  of  our  country. 

"  3.  The  Junkers,  captains  of  industry,  and  annexa- 
tionists made  the  war,  and  prolong  the  war,  for  their 
own  profit.  Overthrow  them,  and  the  free  peoples 
will  stretch  out  their  hands  to  you,  and  perpetual 
peace  will  come." 

Even  ancient  Rome  knew  how  to  build  a  policy  on 
the  internal  dissensions  of  the  Germans.  The  Entente 
had  further  help  from  the  jealousies  of  the  agitator- 
ridden  classes,  who  were  always  ready  to  destroy  the 
true  upholders  of  their  own  economic  existence,  since 
these  "  earned  more  "  than  they  did  themselves. 

Thus,  many  Germans  welcomed  the  "  Dawn  of  the 
Revolution."  Our  proud,  strong,  respected  Empire  has 
been  broken,  not  by  our  enemies,  but  from  inside.  Our 
unconquered  army  collapsed  because  our  people  was 
not  ripe  to  fulfil  its  political  tasks  in  the  framework 
erected  by  Bismarck.  In  London  or  Paris  the  man 
in  the  street  feels  of  himself  what  is  good  for  the 
country.  Among  us  he  fills  himself  with  illusions 
gathered  from  certain  newspapers  and  parties,  well 
fitted  to  lead  him  on  like  a  will-o'-the-wisp  from  dis- 
aster to  disaster.  Only  recently,  in  March,  1919,  the 
socialist  Paul  Lensch,  in  the  Glocke,  showed  how  quiet 
those  elements  among  us  now  are,  who,  like  the 
Berliner  Tagehlatt,  and  papers  of  that  stamp,  have 
been  assuring  us  for  years  that  we  need  but  drive 
the  "  Pan-Germans  "  to  the  devil,  and  make  a  frank 
declaration  as  to  Belgium,  to  achieve  a  favourable 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      47 

peace.  Whether  these  newspapers  to  which  Lensch 
refers  are  ever  quiet,  I  cannot  say.  I  am,  Tiowever, 
quite  certain,  as  must  everyone  be  who  has  followed 
the  effusions  of  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  with  any  at- 
tention and  who  believes  himself  to  stand  for  Ger- 
many, that  this  journal,  in  war  and  peace,  has  in 
effect  played  right  into  the  hands  of  our  deadliest 
enemies.  With  a  lack  of  national  feeling  that  would 
be  inconceivable  in  any  English  or  French  newspaper, 
it  has  always  attacked  the  State,  and  since  the  days 
of  Bismarck  has  continually  advocated  the  decisions 
best  calculated  to  weaken  the  power  and  dignity  of 
Germany;  at  every  critical  moment  it  has  dealt  its 
country  a  stab  in  the  back;  and  at  the  last,  absolutely 
consistent,  it  has  warmly  welcomed  the  revolution,  the 
ruin  of  our  honour  and  our  future.  In  its  task  of  de- 
ceiving the  German  people,  it  has  made  a  clever  use 
of  that  ignorance  of  the  outside  world  which  is  char- 
acteristic of  many  of  our  fellow-citizens,  who  know 
nothing  of  the  spirit  and  national  pride  of  other 
peoples,  and  draw  conclusions  as  to  foreigners  from 
their  own  character.  Loyal  and  simple,  but  at  the 
same  time  confused  and  forgetful  of  their  duty,  they 
miss  every  opportunity  for  political  achievement  or 
increase  of  strength.  They  fail  to  see  that  every 
weakness  involves  an  enemy  advance  and  increased 
attacks;  they  fail  to  see  that  in  our  position  in  the 
world  freedom  and  a  tolerable  economic  situation  can 
only  be  maintained  for  Germany  by  exceptional  unity, 
honesty,  and  self-sacrifice  on  all  sides. 


48  MY   MEMOIRS 

Another  socialist,  the  federal  minister  Dr.  David, 
said  at  the  beginning  of  1919:  "The  main  cause  of 
our  defeat  was  the  weakness  of  our  sense  of  duty  to 
the  State."  That  is  absolutely  right.  Many  years  ago 
an  Italian  friend.  Admiral  Bettolo,  said  to  me :  "  The 
only  dangerous  socialists  are  the  German,  for  they 
make  a  dogma,  a  religion,  out  of  their  party  principles, 
and  are  comrades  first,  and  Germans  only  second. 
Exactly  the  reverse  is  the  case  with  the  English  and 
the  French  and  even  with  our  socialists  in  Italy." 
The  hope,  which  I  had  for  a  time  in  the  autumn  of 
1914,  that  the  elements  with  a  proper  sense  of  patriot- 
ism would  gain  the  upper  hand  in  our  Social  Democ- 
racy, soon  disappeared.  The  international  Marxist 
propaganda,  after  decades  of  work,  the  narrow- 
minded  class  hatred,  the  German  leaning  to  utopian- 
ism,  had  sunk  too  deep  for  that.  A  number  of  able 
men  among  the  Social  Democrats  displayed  during 
the  war  sound  patriotic  instincts.  If  the  Government 
had  encouraged  them,  instead  of  following  at  the 
heels  of  stupid  or  malevolent  demagogues  of  the  inter- 
national wing,  the  German  workmen  might  have  grown 
with  confidence  in  the  school  of  war  to  a  ripe  German 
patriotism,  and  they  would  thus  have  been  now  in 
as  good  a  position  in  the  world  as  the  workers  of 
England.  But  our  politicians  of  the  left  showed  the 
basest  ingratitude  to  the  Prusso-German  State,  the 
best  of  all  governments.  The  wise  and  statesmanlike 
traditions  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  Bismarck 
counted  as  obsolete  against  the  views  of  agitators,  the 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      49 

mention  of  whose  very  names  must  be  repugnant  to 
true  Germans,  although  these  undesirable  individuals, 
not  content  with  having  ruined  our  country,  are  now 
actually  ruling  it  for  reward. 

Thus  many  circles  of  the  people  fought  passionately 
against  those  truthful  ones  who  from  the  first  said : 
"  Whatever  we  do,  whatever  we  offer  to  the  enemy, 
this  war  must  end  either  in  our  complete  salvation 
or  in  our  complete  destruction." 

When  Germans  contested  this  position  they  were 
injuring  our  strength  from  behind.  After  the  first 
years  of  the  war  our  enemies  knew  that  the  country 
was  wearing  itself  out  with  this  friction,  and  the 
knowledge  gave  them  more  confidence  than  their  own 
strength.  Scheidemann  thought  that,  by  loud  and 
energetic  renunciation  of  the  idea  of  victory,  he  could 
encourage  the  "  comrades "  in  enemy  countries  to 
take  a  like  step.  He  never  realized  that  he  had 
exactly  the  opposite  effect,  and  that  he  enabled 
the  enemy  Chauvinists  to  gain  the  upper  hand 
over  the  peacemakers.  And  what  real,  terrible 
annexationists  there  were  among  our  enemies,  in 
comparison  with  the  men  who  were  so  labelled  in 
Germany ! 

A  declaration  by  the  Government  and  the  majority 
parties  of  positive  war  aims  would  not  have  prevented, 
but  would  in  fact  have  assisted,  negotiations  with 
England  for  a  peace  of  understanding.  The  Ger- 
mans alone  did  not  know  that  war  aims,  the  desirability 
of  which  is  understood  by  the  population,  have  the 


50  MYMEMOIRS 

practical  effect  of  reducing  the  demands  of  the  op- 
ponents. 

In  fact,  in  the  fight  for  the  life  of  a  people  there  is 
but  one  spirit  which  makes  its  armed  forces  invincible; 
this  lies  in  the  words : 

"  Man  must  soar,  or  cower  low ; 
Either  conquer  and  be  free, 
Or  lose  all  in  slavery ; 
Triumph  or  disaster  know : 
The  hammer  or  the  anvil  be." 

Owing  to  the  conduct  of  the  Government  and  the 
party  leaders,  the  masses  remained  wholly  ignorant 
that  the  reviled  annexationists  were  really  advocating 
nothing  more  than  this  plain  truth.  They  thought 
them  monstrous,  and  condemned  them  without  under- 
standing. 

Cohn,  the  member  of  the  Reichstag,  taught  the 
masses  to  sing : 

"  The  rich  draws  profits  from  strife, 
The    poor   pays    with    his    life ! " 

The  name  of  "  never-endian "  became  a  term  of 
abuse.  Gambetta  had  been  canonized  by  his  people 
because  by  his  work  in  prolonging  the  war  he  gained 
them  better  terms  of  peace,  and  above  all  saved  their 
honour  and  their  self-confidence,  the  foundations  of 
all  national  prosperity.  The  German  people  did  not 
understand  that  England  would  not  have  a  peace  of 
understanding  (how  warmly  any  possibility  of  it 
would  have  been  welcomed  by  us!),  but  was  simply 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      51 

waiting  for  the  stupidity  of  our  misguided  masses  to 
overthrow  our  so-called  "  never-endians,"  that  is,  to 
prevent  the  employment  of  our  strength,  the  applica- 
tion of  our  energies.  The  aim  of  the  enemy  was,  as 
must  now  be  plain  even  to  the  most  stupid  among  us, 
our  destruction.  There  was,  after  all,  nothing  to 
move  England  to  a  peace  of  understanding,  since  that 
much,  such  were  our  policy  and  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  brought  about  thereby,  she  could  always  have 
when  it  suited  her.  It  was  thus  clear  that  she  wanted 
something  more.  Every  right-minded  German  would 
rather  fight  the  longest  war,  with  the  smallest  prospect 
of  victory,  than  accept  final  judgment  of  destruction 
without  a  most  crushing  necessity.  This  latter  course 
was  simply  a  betrayal  of  the  nation. 

I  do  not  of  course  overlook  for  a  moment  the  trials 
to  which  the  nerves  of  the  masses  were  exposed  by 
the  starvation  blockade.  The  mental  and  physical 
effects  of  this,  the  most  cruel  of  all  weapons  of  war, 
which  it  was  left  to  the  English  to  introduce  into 
modern  warfare,  must  not  be  underestimated;  they 
offer  indeed  a  strong  excuse  for  the  gradual  weaken- 
ing of  the  power  of  resistance  among  the  people. 
But  it  was  correspondingly  the  more  urgent  duty  of 
our  national  leaders,  and  indeed  of  every  far-seeing 
politician,  to  survey  the  problem  calmly  and  to  do 
everything  possible  to  maintain  and  direct  into  the 
proper  channels  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  people. 
Where  the  real  wish  for  victory  is  absent,  strength 
and  spirit  are  crippled  as  well. 


52  MYMEMOIRS 

My  so-called  "  annexationism  "  consisted  simply  in 
a  pessimistic  view,  which  has  unfortunately  been 
proved  correct  by  subsequent  history  of  our  politico- 
economic  prospects.  I  was  unable  to  console  myself 
with  ideas  about  a  peace  of  justice  and  a  league  of 
nations,  as  did  all  our  varieties  of  international  capital- 
ists and  socialists.  I  asked  myself  what  sort  of  a 
peace  would  be  required  to  secure  to  Germany,  in  her 
difficult  geographical  position,  equal  weight  with  the 
other  natural  world-powers.  Our  world-power  could 
only  cease  to  be  artificial  if  we  succeeded  in  reaching 
a  position  of  primus  inter  pares  in  Central  Europe, 
a  position  in  which  the  majority  of  the  continental 
nations  was  the  guarantee  of  their  own  full  freedom. 
That  was  the  true  objective,  and  until  it  was  gained  the 
power  of  Germany  would  be  as  little  consistent  with 
the  standing  of  the  German  people  in  the  world  as 
in  the  eighteenth  century  the  standing  of  Prussia  was 
with  its  material  strength. 

"  Territory  is  future "  was  a  true  motto  for  the 
empires  of  the  British,  the  Americans,  the  Russians, 
and  even  of  the  French,  who  were  capable  of  expan- 
sion in  North  Africa.  Territory  in  this  sense  could 
not  be  won  by  the  German  Empire,  wedged  in  in  the 
heart  of  Europe.  In  the  world  and  for  the  world,  her 
future  rested  on  her  work,  and  in  the  existing  political 
position  could  only  be  secured  by  concentrated  de- 
fensive strength  at  home,  compelling  the  respect  of 
all  neighbours.  That  is  the  real  reason  why  our  ene- 
mies wanted  to  crush  Prussian  militarism,  for  then 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      53 

our  greatness  would  be  gone.  For  the  Czar  or  the 
French  an  army  of  millions  might  perhaps  be  an  im- 
moral luxury,  for  who  ever  thought  of  attacking  those 
countries?  On  the  other  hand,  we  did  need  great 
military  defensive  strength  to  counter-balance  our  ex- 
traordinarily unfavourable  conditions  of  territory  and 
frontiers,  and  our  neighbours'  centuries-old  lust  of 
conquest;  this  was  expressly  confirmed  by  Lloyd 
George  at  the  beginning  of  19 14 — and  who  could  deny 
it  now,  after  the  final  experiences  of  the  world-war? 
But  from  the  point  of  view  of  international  politics 
Germany  could  not  after  1914  be  capable  of  defence, 
or  even  of  survival,  unless  the  English  supremacy 
over  Belgium  was  disposed  of. 

I  never  expected,  not  even  before  the  battle  of  the 
Marne,  a  complete  German  military  victory  in  the 
sense  of  1870.  In  any  case  the  Americans  would 
have  robbed  us  of  many  of  the  fruits  of  victory.  Even 
a  century  ago,  in  1815,  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  in  spite  of  the  then  hostility  of  the  United 
States  to  England,  is  reported  to  have  stated  in  a 
Presidential  message :  "  It  will  be  the  aim  of  a  resolute 
statesmanship  to  prevent  the  ripening  of  the  seed  that 
lies  in  Germany."  ^ 

My  own  view  was  that  a  complete  military  victory 

of  either  side  was  unlikely,  and  that  the  decision  would 

rest  with  the  moral  elements  of  determination  and 

power  of  resistance.     I  did  not  doubt  that,  if  we  suc- 

'  I  only  know  this  quotation  from  England's  Predominance,  the 
Days  of  the  Continental  System,  by  A.  von  Peez  and  Paul  Dehn 
(1912),  p.  346. 


54  MY    MEMOIRS 

ceeded  in  opening  the  eyes  of  the  German  people  to 
the  full  meaning  of  British  supremacy  in  Belgium,  we 
should  develop  strength  enough  to  secure  a  peace 
that  guaranteed  us  against  that  danger.  In  the  event 
of  defeat,  the  fate  of  Germany  would  be  subjection 
to  a  foreign  power.  It  was  better  to  go  to  the  farthest 
lengths  to  tempt  victory,  than  to  accept  such  a  helot 
status. 

Since  1870  our  greatly  increased  population,  on 
which  the  growth  of  our  prosperity  and  power  de- 
pended, could  no  longer,  with  our  limited  territory, 
be  all  accommodated  on  the  soil.  Land  hunger  thus 
led,  as  it  had  done  in  the  early  days  of  German  history, 
to  the  emigration  and  loss  to  Germany  of  the  surplus 
population.  An  artificial  increase  in  the  numbers  the 
country  could  support  was  only  to  be  gained  by  trade 
and  industry.  Even  if  our  population  had  remained 
stationary,  we  could  not  have  remained  the  predomin- 
antly agricultural  country  of  a  generation  before,  since 
after  1870  the  great  plains  of  America  and  Russia 
began  to  compete  with  our  agricultural  exports,  and 
had  indeed  put  a  stop  to  them.  To  our  export  of  raw 
materials,  if  our  population  was  to  increase  or  even  to 
keep  its  level,  had  to  be  added  the  export  of  the  manu- 
factured goods,  and  for  their  production  we  had  again 
to  import  large  quantities  of  raw  material,  as  indeed 
we  had  also  for  our  agriculture,  if  it  was  to  increase 
its  output  so  as  to  support  an  increased  population. 
Under  these  circumstances  a  stoppage  of  imports  and 
exports  would  amount  to  a  terrible  disease   of  the 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      55 

whole  body  politic,  a  crash  from  wealth  to  misery  un- 
precedented in  the  world's  history.  Throughout  the 
war  there  lay  upon  my  mind  like  a  nightmare  the  pic- 
ture of  millions  of  starving  and  workless  proletarians, 
rooted  from  their  homes  and  driven  to  destroy  each 
other  that  the  survivors  might  have  bare  room  to 
live. 

Throughout  history  the  possession  of  the  coasts  of 
the  Netherlands  has  always  meant  English  domina- 
tion on  the  Continent.  England  has  long  regarded  the 
Belgian  question  as  her  own  affair.  If  she  held  Ant- 
werp, she  held  the  Hague  too,  and  Cologne,  and  from 
her  points  of  vantage  on  the  Scheldt  and  the  lower 
Rhine  she  could  master  Europe.  Germany  could  not 
make  her  war  losses  good  to  any  extent  if  the  Meuse 
territories,  which  had  been  part  of  the  empire  for 
nearly  a  thousand  years,  were  again  brought  under  her 
protection.  For  an  export  trade  such  as,  up  to  19 14, 
lay  at  the  root  of  our  national  existence  necessitated  a 
high  political  standing  in  the  world.  Only  German 
dreamers,  who  did  not  know  on  what  they  themselves 
lived,  could  imagine  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  would 
permit  a  Germany  for  which  they  did  not  have  a 
certain  fear  ever  again  to  work  so  freely  and  un- 
hindered for  its  own  profit  all  over  the  world.  Before 
1914,  however,  our  world-position  was  not  based  so 
much  on  our  actual  strength  as  on  the  respect  won  in 
1870.  If  we  did  not  maintain  this  respect — that  is, 
if  we  did  not  emerge  from  the  war  as  well  as  England 
— then  we  lost  everything  we  had  built  up  in  the  world. 


56  MY    MEMOIRS 

Our  homeland  flourished  on  our  prestige  abroad,  and 
this  would  vanish  like  the  old  Hanse  League  if  we 
did  not  win  an  independent  position  over  against 
England. 

If  only  in  order  to  make  good  the  enormous  direct 
war  losses  that  we  suffered  overseas,  it  was  vitally- 
necessary  for  us  to  emerge  from  the  war  on  a  broader 
economic  basis  in  an  age  when,  as  the  British  said,  the 
great  grow  unceasingly  and  the  small  become  smaller. 
The  maintenance  of  our  pre-war  economic  influence 
in  Antwerp,  the  liberation  of  our  kinsmen,  the  Flem- 
ings, from  the  foreign  rule  of  Franco-Walloons,  the 
removal  of  the  English  from  the  continental  coast, 
were  my  only  material  war  aims,  and  they  cannot  be 
called  annexationist. 

I  pass  over  here  the  point  of  view  of  naval  strategy, 
which  laid  down  that  our  position  in  the  Heligoland 
triangle  became  untenable  if  England  drew  Belgium 
and  Holland  into  her  group,  and  thus  extended  her 
political  power  to  the  Ems. 

What  harm  could  have  been  done  if  the  whole 
German  people  had  taken  the  liberation  of  the  Flem- 
ings as  a  serious  war  aim!  And  would  this  have 
been  in  any  respect  more  immoral  than  the  reannexa- 
tion  of  German  Alsace  by  the  French?  One  would 
have  left  the  Flemings  their  independence,  whereas 
the  French  refused  even  to  grant  the  Alsatians  self- 
government.  The  only  difference  is  that  the  French, 
according  to  their  own  point  of  view,  hold  the  govern- 
ment of  others  to  be  their  natural  right,  and  the  Ger- 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      57 

mans  concede  this  to  the  French,  but  suffer  from  at- 
tacks of  conscience  when  an  opportunity  arises  of 
themselves  gaining  in  influence. 

Our  aim  should  have  been  to  maintain  the  economic 
prosperity  of  our  people,  to  preserve  our  beloved  lands 
on  the  Rhine  from  encroachment,  to  save  our  Hanse 
towns  from  degenerating  into  English  agencies,  to 
secure  our  whole  country  from  the  death  by  strangu- 
lation plotted  for  it  by  the  English,  and  finally  to  re- 
construct after  its  collapse  the  whole  artificial  struc- 
ture of  our  standing  in  the  world.  A  peace,  however, 
which  left  the  English  standing  on  the  Meuse  and  the 
Scheldt  meant  for  ourselves  and  for  the  whole  of 
foolish  disunited  Europe  the  end  of  freedom  and 
prosperity,  and  was  only  to  be  accepted  if  and  when 
the  very  last  chance  of  a  better  end  was  really  and 
finally  lost. 

After  the  war,  however,  there  was  no  neutral  Bel- 
gium, any  more  than  there  has  been  at  any  time  since 
1905.  Belgium  and  Holland  lived  on  our  prosperity, 
as  the  outlet  of  our  industrial  activity.  It  was  to  our 
interest  to  maintain  them  in  freedom  and  prosperity, 
while  the  English  simply  desired  them  as  bridge-heads. 

The  Government  should  have  copied  Lloyd  George 
and  Clemenceau  in  giving  the  people  an  outward  and 
visible  war  aim,  if  only  to  divert  them  from  vain  and 
fruitless  civil  strife  over  reforms  which  could  not  bene- 
fit any  party  in  the  event  of  defeat.  They  should  have 
taught  the  people  to  look  at  the  essentials,  and  to 
leave  secondary  matters  alone. 


S8  MYMEMOIRS 

I  felt  certain  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war 
that  defeat  would  be  surely  followed  by  a  revolution, 
although  I  certainly  never  dreamt  that  there  could  be 
Germans  who  would  yield,  before  the  war  was  over, 
to  the  temptation  to  revolt  and  deliver  the  whole 
country  into  the  hands  of  a  foreign  enemy.  Our 
policy,  leading  as  it  did  to  disaster  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  led  others  too  to  take  gloomy  views;  as  early 
as  19 1 5  the  Crown  Prince  asked  me  whether  I  thought 
he  would  ever  govern  the  country.  But  if  the  old 
State  were  to  collapse,  the  strength  of  the  German 
people  would  fall  with  it,  for  they  had  hitherto  always 
shown  their  incapacity  to  prosper  without  firm  leader- 
ship. They  needed  the  Prusso-German  State.  Their 
guardian  angel  was  the  tradition  of  Frederick  the 
Great  and  of  Bismarck.  Our  people  lack  natural 
political  genius,  such  as,  for  example,  the  French 
possess. 

We  had  a  powerful  monarchy  because  history  had 
taught  the  Germans  that  in  their  perilous  position  they 
could  not  stand  without  it.  And  now  we  were  demol- 
ishing our  constitution  at  the  time  of  our  greatest 
danger,  while  our  enemies  were  following  exactly  the 
opposite  course,  and  increasing  the  power  of  their 
executives  to  the  greatest  possible  extent.  By  this, 
we  did  not  merely  lose  the  advantage  of  homogeneous 
leadership,  which  we  had  had  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  We  rather  added  to  our  material  inferiority  a 
moral  and  spiritual  weakness,  by  opposing  in  the  last 
year  of  the  war  to  the  dictatorships  of  Wilson,  Lloyd 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      59 

George,  and  Clemenceau,  a  weary,  worn-out  old  man 
like  Herding,  and  finally  by  permitting  purely  destruc- 
tive party-leaders  to  divide  up  the  power  among  them- 
selves. 

The  internal  health  of  a  people  depends  on  the  pos- 
sibility of  its  freely  developing  its  strength  abroad. 
By  employing  their  strength  against  each  other  at 
home,  the  Germans  introduced  a  new  stage  of  decay 
in  which  the  unhappy  nation,  deluded  by  the  sorry 
spectacle  of  demagogues  squabbling  over  "  power," 
was  to  be  robbed  of  its  prosperity,  its  dignity,  and  its 
great  ideals. 

In  any  event,  and  from  whatever  point  of  view  the 
subject  was  approached,  the  only  escape  from  im- 
measurable misery  was  to  be  found  in  making  the 
people  fully  conscious  of  the  sorrows  that  threatened 
them,  and  really  imbuing  them  with  heroism  and 
loyalty  to  the  State  of  their  fathers.  It  would  then 
have  been  as  possible  for  us  to  hold  out  as  it  was  for 
the  French,  and  the  German  people  would  not  have 
had  to  undergo  the  physical  and  moral  trials  and 
humiliations  which  their  weakness  and  their  internal 
collapse  have  brought  upon  them, 

VII 

The  lack  of  comprehension  of  the  views  developed 
above,  and  the  endless  tactical  mistakes  of  our  Govern- 
ment and  our  democrats  in  the  attempts  to  obtain 
peace,  found  disastrous  expression  in  the  peace  reso- 
lutions of  July,  191 7.     It  at  once  became  clear  to  me 


6o  MY    MEMOIRS 

that,  after  such  an  obvious  nervous  collapse,  the  pros- 
pects either  of  the  early  conclusion  of  a  peace  of  re- 
nunciation or  of  a  further  successful  prosecution  of 
the  war  were  very  seriously  diminished.  If  there 
had  ever  been  in  England  any  real  desire  for  a  termina- 
tion of  the  war  on  the  footing  of  an  understanding, 
it  was  clear  that  after  this  proof  of  our  moral  and 
political  instability  the  well-known  remark  of  Lloyd 
George — that  England  need  never  make  any  sacrifice 
for  a  peace  of  renunciation,  because  that  could  still 
be  had  under  any  circumtances — gained  a  fuller  mean- 
ing than  ever.  The  course  we  had  chosen  was,  in  ad- 
dition, wholly  unlikely  to  help  towards  a  separate 
peace  with  Russia. 

If  in  these  circumstances  there  was  to  be  any  hope 
of  salvation — great  hope  there  could  no  longer  be — 
the  attempt  should  have  been  made  to  develop  a 
strong  national  counter-movement  among  the  people, 
in  order  to  create  the  impression  abroad  that  the 
German  power  of  resistance  was  still  strong,  to  give 
the  Government  a  footing  for  the  exercise  of  a  shrewd 
and  strong  policy,  and  finally  to  prevent  any  further 
advance  down  the  slippery  slope  of  public  peace  offers. 
It  was  these  considerations  that  led  District  Governor 
Kapp  and  a  number  of  East  Prussians  of  all  parties 
to  form  the  German  Fatherland  party.  The  first  of 
the  three  desired  effects,  the  impression  abroad,  was 
undoubtedly  achieved  by  the  tremendous  national 
strength  of  the  movement.  The  German  Government 
was,  however,  far  from  understanding  what  a  weapon 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      6i 

the  creation  of  this  party  had  placed  in  their  hand. 
They  never  dared  to  make  use  of  it,  doing  on  the 
contrary  all  in  their  power  to  hamper  the  movement. 
Such  an  attitude,  indeed,  was  prescribed  by  the  im- 
mediate counter-operations  of  the  authors  of  the  peace 
resolutions,  who,  in  order  to  maintain  their  position, 
succeeded  by  a  well-organized  campaign  of  lies  in 
fathering  internal  political  aims  on  to  the  new  party, 
and  in  bringing  it  into  suspicion  as  reactionary. 
Further,  in  complete  and  thoroughly  German  mis- 
understanding of  the  object  of  a  "  war  aim,"  they 
charged  the  party  and  myself  with  "annexationism." 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  leaders  of  the  party  had 
held  aloof  from  any  particular  policy  of  annexation, 
merely  making  certain  definite  demands  in  respect  of 
Belgium,  the  crucial  point  as  against  England,  there 
was  no  necessity  to  do  more  than  impress,  as  above 
mentioned,  upon  the  people  some  sense  of  the  matters 
that  were  indispensable  to  our  future  existence.  This, 
our  Government  had  unfortunately  wholly  omitted  to 
do.  It  should  at  least  have  been  grateful  that  the 
task  had  been  undertaken  for  it  by  a  great  popular 
movement,  and  should  have  made  use  of  the  move- 
ment in  the  way  one  can  be  sure  that  an  English  or 
French  Government  would  have  done.  At  this  very 
time,  if  it  was  necessary  and  possible  to  conclude  a 
peace  of  renunciation  (which  the  Fatherland  party 
could  never  prevent),  the  Government,  relying  on  the 
existence  of  that  party,  could  have  stood  out  for  better 
terms.     It  is  also  an  essential  point  that  during  the 


62  MY    MEMOIRS 

whole  period  of  the  party's  existence  no  opportunity 
arose  for  a  peace  of  understanding.  Nothing  but 
the  everlasting  and  baseless  delusion  of  our  democrats, 
that  Germany,  to  obtain  an  acceptable  peace,  had  but 
to  ask  for  it,  made  it  possible  to  attach  the  name  of 
"  never-endians  "  to  the  men  whose  views,  had  they 
been  allowed  to  prevail,  would  have  brought  the  war 
more  rapidly  to  one  or  the  other  conclusion.  The 
parties  really  guilty  of  prolonging  the  war  were  those 
who  steadily  undermined  our  power  of  resistance,  and 
gave  the  Entente  that  certainty  to  which  Lloyd  George 
has  given  expression. 

The  Fatherland  party  did  not  achieve  its  aim,  and 
indeed  could  not  do  so  when  it  was  opposed  not  merely 
by  the  hostility  of  the  authors  of  the  peace  resolution, 
but  also  by  the  strong  machinery  of  the  Prusso-Ger- 
man  State.  Its  work  of  political  explanation,  however, 
was  not  in  vain.  If  anything  can  give  us  hope  that 
German  patriotism  will  again  build  us  a  strong  and 
habitable  German  home,  it  is  the  fact  that,  after  three 
hard  years  of  war,  and  in  spite  of  the  activities  of 
Bethmann  and  the  democrats,  a  movement  could  arise 
of  such  power  and  patriotic  feeling  as  this  party  dis- 
played. The  spiritual  and  material  liberation  of  our 
country,  which  is  now  fallen  under  foreign  domina- 
tion, and  the  foundation  of  a  new  well-being,  can 
only  be  begun  when  disaster  has  led  to  disillusion 
and  disillusion  has  awakened  in  all  sects  and  classes 
of  our  people  a  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  and  a  determina- 
tion to  maintain  Germany's  civilization. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      63 

VIII 

When  in  October,  1918,  the  democrats  who  had 
come  into  office  seemed  Hkely  to  make  the  terrible  mis- 
take, unprecedented  in  history  since  the  time  of  Car- 
thage, that  one  could  throw  oneself  on  the  mercy  of 
one's  enemy  without  perishing,  I  wrote  the  following 
letter  to  the  then  Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden : 

"  Berlin, 
October  17th,  1918. 
"  Your  Grand-ducal  Highness, 

"  In  accordance  with  orders,  I  have  the  honour  to 
transmit  hereby  my  views  on  the  present  position. 

"  I  regard  as  fundamentally  false  the  political  tac- 
tics which  we  have  adopted  towards  England  and 
America  both  before  and,  above  all,  during  the  war. 
We  assume  in  our  opponents  points  of  view  which 
we  alone,  not  they,  possess.  In  these  tactics  I  perceive 
one  of  the  greatest  causes  of  the  war  and  of  our 
present  position.  The  aim  of  the  Anglo-Americans, 
followed  with  the  most  delicate  political  cleverness 
and  the  greatest  consistency,  has  been  the  destruction 
of  Germany,  as  a  further  step  towards  world-domi- 
nation by  their  capitalism.  It  was  only  by  a  dis- 
play of  strength  and  particularly  of  determination 
that  we  could  impress  upon  them  that  the  business 
was  not  a  paying  one,  and  thus  secure  for  ourselves 
tolerable  conditions.  Our  continually  repeated  public 
oflfers  of  peace  have  constituted  grave  tactical  errors. 
Wilson's  demands  rose  at  each  such  step.  We  did  not 
understand  that  we  were  faced  by  deliberate  extortion. 
Their  talk  of  peace  and  the  happiness  of  the  nations 
are  noble,  but  most  naively  intended  only  for  the  bene- 


64  MY   MEMOIRS 

fit  of  their  own  peoples;  they  are  designed,  too,  ex- 
pressly for  the  politically  unsuspicious  German  people. 

"  Our  latest  offer  of  peace  and  armistice,  which  is 
so  accommodating  as  to  amount  to  a  renunciation  of 
any  claim  on  our  part  to  rank  as  a  great  power,  has 
been  answered  bluntly  by  Wilson  with  a  demand  for 
our  complete  disarmament.  He  knows  quite  certainly 
that  the  cessation  of  the  submarine  campaign  makes 
any  further  resistance  on  our  part  impossible.  This 
demand  for  cessation  of  submarine  warfare,  the  pres- 
ent and  future  importance  of  which  is  shown  by 
Churchill's  speech  to  be  thoroughly  understood  in  the 
enemy  camp,  forms  the  kernel  of  Wilson's  note,  which 
is  surrounded  by  a  husk  of  pathetic  moral  indignation. 
As  this  indignation,  were  it  limited  to  the  war  at  sea, 
would  be  too  transparent,  a  further  covering  is  pro- 
vided in  shameless  libels  on  the  army.  At  the  same 
time,  Wilson  is  beating  the  victory  drum  and  working 
his  people  up  to  the  highest  pitch  of  fury.  He  would 
certainly  not  do  this  if  he  intended  to  treat  us  with 
any  leniency  afterwards.  The  reverse  will  be  the  case, 
notwithstanding  the  suggestions  in  his  note.  These 
are  merely  the  tricks  of  the  political  extortioner. 

"  Wilson's  answer  shows  further  that  it  was  quite 
a  mistake  to  assume,  if  anyone  did  assume,  that  the 
Entente  would  be  so  obliging  as  to  concede  us  an  im- 
mediate armistice  on  any  terms  that  would  admit  of 
our  putting  our  army  and  our  frontiers  in  a  position 
of  defence  in  the  event  of  the  peace  negotiations 
breaking  down. 

"  There  is  but  one  means  left  to  secure  better  terms, 
perhaps  even  but  one  means  to  secure  the  existence 
of  German  civilization.  We  must  make  an  appeal  to 
the  whole  people  to  defend  with  determination  our 
honour  and  our  future  existence,  and  we  must  at  the 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      65 

same  time  act  at  once,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  leave  not  the  least  doubt  of  our 
determination.  This  is  the  right  course  to  follow,  even 
if  we  are  even  now  desirous  of  answering  in  an 
accommodating  spirit.  If  we  were  to  answer  in  that 
spirit,  there  is  grave  risk  that  neither  the  enemy  nor 
ourselves  would  believe  that  we  were  still  in  earnest. 
The  decline  in  our  morale  and  sense  of  honour,  be- 
ginning at  home,  has  travelled  through  our  lines  of 
communication  and  reached  the  fighting  fronts.  The 
troops  cannot  hold  out  and  fight  when  they  see  only 
too  clearly  that  everything  is  being  sacrificed  at  home. 
What  are  the  men  to  fight  for,  and  how  are  their 
ofiEicers  to  keep  up  their  morale?  It  is  impossible 
under  such  circumstances, 

"  We  require  resolute  reinforcement  of  the  western 
front  with  every  available  man,  the  formation  of  cit- 
izen battalions  for  the  maintenance  of  order  at  home, 
and  the  relentless  prosecution  of  the  submarine  cam- 
paign, which  has  had  far  greater  effects  than  is  be- 
lieved at  home.  We  must  take  every  imaginable 
measure  to  maintain  the  spirits  of  the  troops,  the 
officers  must  have  the  same  rations  as  the  men,  and 
the  Government  itself  must  give  the  widest  possible 
explanations  of  what  is  really  at  stake.  Every  Ger- 
man must  understand  that  if  we  do  not  fight  on,  we 
fall  to  the  level  of  wage-slaves  of  our  enemies. 

"To  carry  through  this  policy,  a  dictatorship,  such 
as  the  enemy  in  direct  contrast  to  ourselves  have  es- 
tablished, is  essential.  It  is  absolutely  immmaterial 
of  what  party  tendencies  this  executive  power  is  com- 
posed, for  its  activities  must  be  directed  simply,  solely, 
and  exclusively  against  the  external  enemy. 

"  These  are  my  views,  hastily  dictated,  but  the 
product  of  the  thought  of  years;  they  have  nothing 


66  MY   MEMOIRS 

whatever  to  do  with  Chauvinism,  annexation,  or  a 
failure  to  understand  our  need  for  peace;  they  are 
directed  solely  to  the  rescue  of  our  people  from  the 
supreme  danger.  My  policy  may  not  succeed,  but 
it  at  any  rate  offers  the  only  possible  avenue  to  success, 
for  other  courses  lead  with  certainty  to  a  shameful 
issue. 

"  If  your  Grand-ducal  Highness  desires  to  have  a 
further  opinion  on  our  naval  position,  I  strongly  rec- 
ommend you  to  grant  a  short  interview  to  Admiral 
von  Trotha,  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  our  High  Sea  fight- 
ing forces,  who  is  at  present  here.  There  is  no  one 
so  capable  of  giving  so  clear  a  general  opinion  on 
the  matter  as  this  officer,  who  enjoys  the  confidence  of 
the  whole  navy.  I  believe  that  he  is  staying  with 
Admiral  von  Miiller,  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Cabinet. 
Having  regard  to  the  urgency  of  the  subject,  I  have 
ventured  to  send  a  copy^  of  this  letter  to  Field-Mar- 
shal von  Hindenburg  and  to  Secretary  Scheidemann, 
**  Your  Grand-ducal  Highness, 

"  I  remain  with  the  greatest  respect, 

"  VON  TiRPITZ." 

Prince  Max's  Government  rested  on  appallingly  dis- 
honest and  anti-national  influences.     The  submarine 

'  Prince  Max  read  this  letter  with  great  care,  marking  certain 
passages,  and  sending  it  on  to  the  other  Secretaries  of  State, 
at  any  rate  to  Vice-Chancellor  von  Payer  and  Secretary  Solf. 
On  October  17th  and  i8th  the  majority  in  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment were  in  favour  of  negotiating,  sword  in  hand.  On  the  19th, 
however,  the  Scheidemann  group,  with  the  addition  of  Count 
Wolff-Metternich  (a  particularly  unfortunate  selection),  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  the  majority  round.  Wilson's  desire,  trading 
on  our  utter  lack  of  political  instinct,  to  render  us  defenceless 
before  the  negotiations  were  opened,  was  fulfilled,  and  with  that 
our  utter  defeat  was  assured. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      67 

campaign  was  abandoned,  our  capitulation  undertaken, 
and  a  peace  of  justice  "  agreed  "  with  the  Entente, 
and  everyone  who  disagreed,  every  honest  German- 
thinking  man,  was  treated  as  an  outlaw,  although 
the  army  and  navy  could,  without  a  doubt,  have  held 
out  until  the  spring  of  19 19,  and  thus  have  rendered 
possible  real  negotiations  for  peace.  In  these  darkest 
days  of  Germany's  history,  when  we  were  still  fully 
capable  of  making,  with  our  sword  in  our  hand,  an 
offer  of  a  just  peace  to  our  equally  war-weary  ene- 
mies, but  instead  rejected  the  opportunity  and  went 
down  into  chaos,  I,  in  my  capacity  of  chairman  of  the 
Fatherland  party,  wrote  a  further  letter  to  the  Chan- 
cellor, as  follows: 

"  Berlin, 
"  October  30th,  1918. 

"Your  Grand-ducal  Highness, 

"  You  graciously  received  my  respectful  letter  of 
the  17th  instant,  but  in  one  important  respect,  to  wit 
in  connection  with  the  submarine  campaign,  you  have 
arrived  at  a  decision  which  is  contrary  to  my  advice, 
and,  I  am  told,  also  to  that  of  our  naval  and  military 
chiefs.  I  conceive  it  to  be  my  duty,  in  the  existing 
situation,  to  bring  once  again  to  the  attention  of  your 
Grand-ducal  Highness  a  consideration  which  I  did  not 
sufficiently  emphasize  in  that  letter. 

"  Every  military  retreat  which  is  not  to  develop 
into  headlong  flight  has  to  be  accompanied  by  well- 
timed  and  well-planned  counter-attacks  against  the 
advancing  enemy.  The  same  rule  holds  good  beyond 
doubt,  indeed,  with  even  greater  force,  of  a  political 
retreat.      Even   if   we    feel    convinced   that   we   can 


68  MY   MEMOIRS 

achieve  nothing  more  by  militay  means,  it  must  never 
be  forgotten  that  for  purely  psychological  reasons  the 
desire  of  the  enemy  to  avoid  further  sacrifices  has 
now  risen  very  high.  In  1871  a  similar  attitude  on 
the  part  of  France,  even  after  the  armistice  was  con- 
cluded, rescued  Bel  fort  in  the  peace  negotiations.  In 
battle,  if  a  soldier  lays  down  his  arms,  he  can  count 
on  mercy.  But  if  this  is  done  in  the  political  field, 
if  the  losing  party  deprives  himself  of  weapons  and 
surrenders  without  dignity,  his  attitude  commands 
anything  but  respect  from  the  enemy,  who  is  on  the 
contrary  more  inclined  to  relentless  'punishment.' 

"  For  these  reasons,  regarding  the  matter  from  a 
purely  material  standpoint,  and  leaving  on  one  side 
the  centuries  of  harm  that  would  be  wrought  by  such 
a  shameful  surrender,  I  can  think  of  no  worse  peace 
than  that  which  would  be  forced  on  us,  if  we  were 
simply  to  capitulate  at  a  time  when  we  still  have  left 
to  us  a  considerable  power  of  resistance.  The  enemy, 
■who  can  well  estimate  our  true  strength,  will  not 
treat  us  any  more  mercifully  if  we  disarm  prematurely, 
but  all  the  more  roughly  and  brutally,  since  to  the 
sensation  of  victory  will  be  added  a  feeling  of  con- 
tempt for  us.  Here  again  we  are  faced  by  the  dif- 
ference in  the  points  of  view  of  ourselves  and  our 
enemies.  In  this  respect  we  should  have  fared  better 
if  we  had  sought  peace  through  England  rather  than 
through  America  and  Wilson.^ 

"  I  would  like  in  conclusion  to  draw  attention  to 

^  I  did  not  of  course  suggest  that  it  would  have  been  more 
advantageous  to  throw  ourselves  on  the  mercy  of  England  rather 
than  on  that  of  Wilson.  Such  a  capitulation  meant  national 
destruction  in  any  event.  I  rather  meant  that,  for  negotiations 
sword  in  hand,  it  would  have  been  more  favourable  from  a 
business  point  of  view  to  treat  with  England,  mainly  because 
of  the  effects  of  the  submarine  campaign.    I  am  still  of  this  view. 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      69 

one  more  point.  At  the  moment,  not  only  are  our 
enemies  enjoying  the  full  flush  of  victory,  but  their 
people  have  the  feeling  that  at  last  they  are  at  the 
point  of  securing  the  peace  that  they  have  longed  for, 
for  years,  the  end  of  sacrifices  and  hardships.  All  the 
nerves  of  the  great  masses  are,  as  it  were,  screwed 
up  to  this.  If  we  now  make  up  our  minds,  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy  demands,  to  a  political  '  Halt ! 
About  turn ! '  if  we  show  our  teeth  once  more  in  de- 
termined fashion,  and  declare  that  we  will  not  accept 
these  terms,  the  sudden  need  to  resume  the  fight  will 
have  the  greatest  psychological  effect.  A  terrible  dis- 
appointment will  await  the  war-weary  masses  of  the 
enemy  peoples,  and  a  powerful  movement  will  de- 
velop for  forcing  their  Governments  to  reduce  the 
terms.  In  connection  with  the  increasing  strength  of 
the  heroic  resistance  on  our  front,  and  the  fully  justi- 
fied fear  of  Bolshevism,  such  an  attitude  can  alone 
give  any  prospect  of  obtaining  tolerable  conditions. 
"  Your  Grand-ducal  Highness, 

"  I  remain  with  the  greatest  respect, 

"  VON  TiRPITZ." 

As  I  wrote  this,  I  had  but  fugitive  hopes  that  the 
attitude  of  our  "  rulers "  could  change.  The  letter 
formed  the  conclusion  of  my  political  activities. 

The  unfortunate  result  of  the  war  has  given  to  those 
who  are  really  responsible  for  the  disaster  the  oppor- 
tunity, although  hardly  the  right,  to  accuse  before  the 
uncritical  masses  the  men  who,  if  they  had  had  a  free 
hand,  could  have  won  the  war  or  at  the  least  brought 
it  to  an  honourable  conclusion.  A  court  for  State 
trials  is,  it  is  said,  to  be  estabhshed;  if  this  is  done, 
there  should  be  placed  in  the  dock  others  than  those 


JO  MY    MjEMOIRS 

who  will  be  called  thither,  including  many  who  will 
want  to  sit  as  judges.  I  would  gladly  have  spared 
the  feelings  of  others,  but  I  must  expose  before  his- 
tory the  system  which  has  brought  us  to  destruction. 

This  political  system,  which  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
doubtless  unintentionally,  had  in  fact  aided  greatly  in 
developing,  and  which  at  present  enjoys  an  almost 
grotesque  access  of  strength,  involves  the  sacrifice  of 
all  our  constitutional  achievements  by  a  blindly  credu- 
lous adoption  of  the  avaricious  and  dishonest  misrep- 
resentations of  our  foreign  enemies,  and  of  certain 
international  dreams  of  our  own.  We  seem  to  have 
forgotten  all  our  traditions,  and  all  the  experience 
gained  by  the  tragedies  of  our  history,  through  which 
we  shall  need  to  pass  again. 

I  am  convinced  that  our  enemies,  in  their  desire  to 
attack  us,  found  their  opportunity,  or  their  pretext, 
in  this  system.  At  home,  it  so  softened  our  policy 
that  our  people  lacked  the  necessary  moral  strength 
to  hold  out  through  the  world-war.  The  same  system 
was  the  true  cause  of  the  strength  of  our  navy  not 
being  brought  to  bear  in  the  war.  The  same  system 
gave  us  the  wrong  strategical  aim  during  the  war, 
turning  us  to  attempt  the  defeat  of  Russia  while  spar- 
ing England.  The  same  system  is  to  blame  for  the 
unexampled  stupidity  and  loss  of  dignity  involved  in 
our  capitulation  in  the  autumn  of  1918,  the  terrible 
results  of  which  it  made  worse  by  subsequent  follies. 
After  the  revolution  the  same  system  raged  against 
the  last  remnants  of  political  intelligence  left  to  us, 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      71 

so  that  it  seemed  to  have  become  a  shame  and  a  crime 
to  be  a  German,  which  it  was  once  my  greatest  happi- 
ness and  pride  to  be.  Firmly  led,  there  is  no  more  capa- 
ble people  in  the  world  than  ours;  but  in  the  hands  of 
bad  and  incapable  leaders  the  German  people  is  its 
own  greatest  enemy.  It  will  soon  tire  of  the  black- 
red-and-gold  pre-Bismarckian  imitation  of  a  State  that 
has  for  the  present  been  foisted  upon  it;  but  what 
will  then  be  left  to  it  of  the  essence  of  the  good  old 
State,  which  our  enemies  envied  so  much  that  with 
the  help  of  our  radical  democrats  they  set  about  the 
destruction  of  all  its  virtues,  its  monarchy,  its  fighting 
power,  the  integrity  and  industry  of  its  officials,  the 
State-creating  power  of  Prussianism,  its  patriotism 
faithful  unto  death? 

We  are  now  in  a  worse  situation  than  we  were  at 
the  end  of  the  Thirty  Years  War.  Without  a  new 
Potsdam,  and  an  earnest  efifort  to  restore  our  self- 
consciousness,  without  a  spiritual  renaissance,  without 
a  wise,  powerful,  and  dignified  statesmanship,  the  Ger- 
man people  will  never  again  be  free,  but  will  slowly 
or  quickly,  according  to  its  constitution  and  popula- 
tion, drop  out  of  the  ranks  of  the  great  nations;  and 
then  a  new  Weimar  will  be  wholly  impossible.  We 
have  fallen  from  the  greatest  height  to  the  lowest 
depths,  and  it  is  idle  to  talk  light-heartedly  of  re- 
construction so  long  as  one  is  ever  sinking  deeper. 
The  ascent  of  recovery  is  terribly  hard  and  difficult. 
It  can  and  will  succeed,  if  and  only  if  our  people 
are  resolute  and  untiring  in  national   fortitude  and 


72  MY   MEMOIRS 

national  determination,  like  the  French,  the  Italians, 
the  English,  the  Serbians,  and  even  in  recent  times 
the  Indians.  So  long  as  we  remain  the  people  with 
the  weakest  national  feelings,  answering  every  seizure 
of  our  territory  or  other  indignity  with  talk  of  recon- 
ciliation, thus  leaving  the  insult  unavenged  and  invit- 
ing further  encroachments,  so  long  as,  lacking  any 
national  pride,  we  ape  the  forms  and  customs  of  other 
nations,  and  so  long  as  fighting  fellow-Germans  of 
other  parties  means  more  to  us  than  holding  together 
against  the  foreign  foe,  so  long  can  we  never  rise, 
but  only  fall  farther.  In  the  battle  of  the  Alemanni, 
the  Germans  called  to  their  chieftains,  "  Dismount 
from  your  horses,"  and  with  that  they  lost  the  battle. 
Internal  dissensions  have  again  brought  us  to  disaster, 
for  our  generation,  politically  and  in  some  sections 
morally  too,  was  not  great  enough  for  its  time. 

Past,  present,  and  future  have  thus  shown  me  my 
duty,  to  fight  this  system. 

But  if  on  the  other  hand  the  German  people  awakes 
from  the  chaos  of  the  collapse,  and  remembers  with 
pride  and  emotion  the  strength,  courage,  and  self-sac- 
rifice which  even  during  the  war  it  has  displayed  under 
the  Prusso-German  State,  then  it  will  do  right  to 
count  its  events  of  the  world-war  among  the  most 
sacred  memories  of  its  national  history.  How,  in 
spite  of  the  poor  quality  of  our  allies,  we  held  our 
ground  against  overwhelming  superiority  of  strength, 
how  we  defied  England's  world-conspiracy  against  us, 
how  we  kept  up  our  courage  for  years  in  spite  of 


MAIN  QUESTIONS  OF  WAR      73 

the  slanders  uttered  against  our  peaceful  disposition, 
and  in  spite  of  the  brutal  destruction  of  the  countless 
little  settlements  of  Germans  in  all  parts  of  the  earth, 
and  how  our  men  by  sea  and  land  knew  how  to  strike 
the  foe  and  give  their  lives  for  Germany, — the  mem- 
ory of  all  this  shall  make  future  generations  of  Ger- 
mans marvel,  and  give  them  faith.  But  Germany 
was,  as  in  Luther's  day,  "  A  fine  horse,  needing  but 
one  thing,  a  rider,"  In  every  respect  the  fight  that 
was  forced  on  us  bore  promise  of  success,  and  even 
after  all  our  errors  it  was  still  possible  in  October 
1918  to  resist  a  peace  of  destruction.  But  the  greeds 
of  internal  politics,  which  throughout  the  war  had 
been  ready  to  capitulate  to  the  external  enemy,  had 
seized  the  bridle  of  the  riderless  people. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  HIGH   SEA   FLEET  IN   THE  WAR 

I.  The  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. — 2.  The  achievements 
of  the  navy. — 3.  The  plan  of  operations. — 4.  My  verdict. — 
5.  The  crippling  of  the  fleet. — 6.  The  lack  of  a  Supreme 
Command. — 7.  The  Battle  of  Jutland. — 8.  The  last  phase. 


I  COME  now  to  the  most  painful  part  of  my  task,  the 
discussion  of  the  causes  why  our  fleet,  after  our  poli- 
ticians had  failed  to  avoid  the  outbreak  of  war,  was 
not  allowed  to  win  us  a  just  peace  in  battle,  but  itself 
met  the  most  shameful  end.  I  have  no  intention  of 
giving  a  naval  history  of  the  war,  which  would  be 
outside  the  scope  of  this  book,  but  I  desire  merely 
to  mention  the  points  that  are  essential  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  judgment  on  the  fleet;  and  in  the  first  place 
I  would  mention  that  even  our  army,  which  at  the 
outbreak  of  war  had  reached  absolute  perfection,  had 
finally  to  succumb  to  overwhelming  superiority.  I 
have  already  refuted  the  suggestion  that,  but  for  the 
navy,  there  would  never  have  been  a  world-war,  for 
it  has  for  many  years  been  a  cardinal  point  of  Eng- 
land's policy  not  to  suffer  any  defeat  of  France. 

In  the  year  1914  our  naval  power  was  already  con- 
siderable, but  it  was  not  large  enough  to  provide  that 
margin  of  safety  which  is  a  necessity  in  peace  and 
war;  it  was  still  in  the  full  course  of  its  development 

74 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET  75 

when  it  was  faced  with  war  against  the  five  greatest 
naval  powers,  to  which  in  191 7  the  United  States  of 
America  was  added. 

In  spite  of  everything,  I  am  still  to-day  convinced — 
and  that  is  the  tragedy  of  the  result — that  the  fleet 
could  have  fulfilled  its  destiny,  and  could  have  aided 
us  to  secure  an  honourable  peace,  if  a  right  use  had 
been  made  of  it.  The  fleet  was  good,  the  men  full 
of  eagerness  for  the  fight  and  highly  trained,  and  the 
material  was  superior  to  the  English.  The  most  strik- 
ing proof  of  the  fighting  value  of  our  navy,  and  of 
the  high  opinion  held  of  its  capacities  by  the  enemy,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  English  avoided  a 
meeting,  and  that  the  more  emphatically  the  longer 
the  war  lasted.  In  spite  of  their  ever-increasing  su- 
periority, they  never  attacked  our  forces  of  set  pur- 
pose. They  never  sought  any  encounter.  In  the  end 
our  fleet  was  seized  with  the  same  disease  as  attacked 
all  Germany.  If  it  broke  out  on  our  large  ships  a 
few  days  earlier,  and  in  a  more  striking  form  than 
occurred  in  the  army,  the  real  reason  for  this  is  merely 
the  close  relations  which  could  spring  up  in  the  dock- 
yards between  the  agitator-ridden  masses  of  the  work- 
ing classes  and  the  crews,  and  more  especially  the 
stokers.  This  party-political  movement  which  was 
controlled  from  Berlin  was  permitted  to  exist  by  the 
Government  then  in  power. 

As  in  the  whole  population,  so  too  in  the  fleet,  the 
war  was  begun  with  the  confident  belief  that  there 
was  not  a  man  in  Germany  who  had  wished  for  war; 


)l 


76  MY   MEMOIRS 

cleverly  as  England  had  utilized  the  opportunity  that 
was  offered  to  it  in  1914  to  bring  the  war  about,  its 
long-prepared  plan  for  the  destruction  of  our  future 
had  become  far  too  widely  known.  As  a  result,  the 
morale  of  the  navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  was 
very  high,  and  permitted  us  the  most  rosy  hopes.  Old 
reservists  on  their  recall  begged  to  be  allowed  to  serve 
the  guns  and  not  to  work  in  safety  below  decks  on 
the  ammunition  hoists.  Our  torpedo-boat  command- 
ers were  longing  for  the  order,  "  Z  flag  to  the  fore."  ^ 
The  cadets  and  midshipmen  from  the  naval  college, 
which  was  closed,  and  the  training  ships,  which  were 
placed  out  of  service,  were  wild  in  their  desire  to 
get  on  board  ship,  even  if  only  as  captain's  messengers. 
The  usual  prizes  for  records  in  coaling  were  refused 
by  the  stokers  and  seamen,  who  said :  "  We  work  with- 
out prizes."  Engineers  and  fighting  ranks  vied  with 
one  another  in  bringing  their  ships  to  the  highest  point 
of  readiness. 

Every  man  in  the  navy  was  quite  clear  at  the  out- 
break of  war  that  he  was  meeting  an  enemy  possessed 
of  a  great  superiority  in  strength,  and  whose  invinci- 
bility at  sea  had  become  almost  a  dogma.  French, 
Russians,  Italians  were,  so  to  speak,  not  reckoned  at 
all  as  opponents.  In  peace  the  German  and  English 
navies  had  had  a  particularly  great  respect  for  each 
other.  The  story  that  our  naval  officers'  messses  used 
to  drink  to  "the  day"  (the  battle  with  the  British 
fleet)  is  of  course  pure  invention;  it  is  merely  one 
^  The  signal  to  attack. 


THE   HIGH    SEA   FLEET  T] 

of  the  many  lies  in  the  long  chapter  of  attempts  to 
fasten  on  us  a  desire  for  war,  with  which  the  Press 
of  the  world  was  flooded.  Besides,  the  fellow-feeling 
for  the  English  naval  officer  was  much  too  strong 
before  the  war,  and  our  admirably  correct  attitude 
would  have  made  such  conduct  wholly  impossible, 
apart  altogether  from  the  stupidity  of  wishing  to  seek 
battle  with  an  enemy  twice  our  strength. 

Before  dealing  with  the  two  main  causes  of  our 
fleet's  being  prevented  from  working  out  its  destiny, 
I  will  give  a  short  account  of  the  actual  effects  which 
the  fleet  did  have  on  the  course  of  the  war. 

II 

At  home  the  fleet,  unaided,  kept  our  long  coast  from 
the  Memel  to  the  Ems  free  from  all  enemy  attacks; 
not  a  gun  was  fired  at  our  coasts.  Its  virtually  unlim- 
ited mastery  of  the  Baltic  ensured  the  free  import  of 
the  materials,  and  in  particular  of  the  ores,  which 
formed  an  urgent  need  of  our  war  industries,  and  pro- 
tected the  left  wing  of  our  forces  in  the  East  against 
raids  in  the  rear,  which  had  been  planned  by  the  Rus- 
sians and  had  been  a  feature,  I  believe,  of  the  naval 
convention  concluded  between  England  and  Russia  in 
1 914.  Later  the  fleet  rendered  possible  the  carriage 
of  reinforcements  by  sea.  The  successful  undertaking 
against  Osel  and  the  Moon  straits  under  the  command 
of  Admirals  Schmidt  and  Behncke,  in  happiest  co-op- 
eration with  the  army,  assisted  in  breaking  the  last 
resistance  of  the  Russians. 


78  MY    MEMOIRS 

The  fact  that  our  fleet  was  not  defeated,  and  that 
the  English  could  not  accordingly  establish  a  closer 
blockade  of  our  coasts,  made  it  possible  for  the  north- 
ern powers  and  Holland  to  remain  neutral  in  spite  of 
British  threats.  In  the  first  decade  of  the  present  cen- 
tury, when  our  fleet  was  still  weak,  England  had 
planned  a  landing  in  Jutland,  involving  a  violation  of 
Denmark  similar  to  that  to  which  Greece  was  later 
subjected.  In  the  face  of  the  German  fleet  this  was 
impossible. 

If  one  imagines  for  a  moment  that  our  fleet  had 
been  completely  defeated,  or  that  it  had  never  existed, 
one  can  realize  how  grave  the  consequences  would  have 
been  for  us,  both  economically  and  from  a  military 
point  of  view.  With  a  northern  front  broken  in,  or 
even  severely  threatened,  we  could  not  have  held  our 
fronts  in  the  east  and  west.  But  there  are  other  consid- 
erations too.  Our  fleet  forced  the  British  to  undertake 
an  enormous  increase  of  their  own  sea  forces.  The 
numbers  of  their  navy  alone  were  more  than  tripled. 
The  entire  complement  of  men  employed  for  sea  war- 
fare on  the  British  side  must  have  been  from  i,5(X),ooo 
to  2,000,000,  a  figure  involving  a  very  great  relief  to 
our  western  front. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  pointed  out  what  a 
blow  would  have  been  dealt  to  England  by  the  occu- 
pation of  the  French  Channel  ports  by  our  army. 
Such  an  occupation  could  only,  however,  be  a  substan- 
tial, perhaps  even  a  decisive,  danger  for  England  if 
we  had  a  fleet  which  could  use  these  ports  as  a  base. 


THE   HIGH    SEA   FLEET  79 

In  the  hope  of  realizing  this,  the  marine  corps  was 
formed,  constituting  the  only  direct  war  activity  which 
I,  in  the  Admiralty,  could  achieve  for  the  fight  against 
England. 

Our  army,  however,  was  unable  to  reach  the  north- 
ern French  ports,  taking  only  the  Flemish  harbours, 
which,  owing  to  their  geographical  position,  were  of 
much  less  importance,  as  they  did  not  directly  threaten 
the  Channel.  In  addition,  they  could  only  accommo- 
date submarines  and  torpedo  boats.  Nevertheless  they 
had  the  great  advantage  that  the  distance  thence  to 
the  English  coast  was  only  a  quarter  of  the  distance 
from  our  German  river  mouths,  and  thus  relatively 
smaller  submarines,  which  could  be  built  in  a  shorter 
time,  were  suitable  for  employment  here.  Attacks  by 
English  naval  forces  on  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend  were 
to  be  expected.  As  I  doubted  whether  the  army  would 
be  ready  to  undertake  the  necessary  organization  of 
the  coast  defence,  and  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  land- 
ward fronts  of  our  naval  ports  were  no  longer  really 
threatened,  it  seemed  wise  to  form  out  of  the  men 
thus  released  a  Marine  Corps  for  the  defence  of  the 
Flemish  coast.  The  army  consented  to  this,  but  only 
on  condition  that  the  corps  should  be  under  army 
command.  In  order  to  get  at  any  rate  something 
done,  I  fell  in  with  this  stipulation,  although  experi- 
ence shows  that  in  all  combined  operations  of  army 
and  navy  the  danger  is  ever  present  that  the  par- 
ticular objectives  of  the  latter  may  be  neglected.  The 
Emperor  studied  the  matter  with  the  greatest  under- 


8o  MY    MEMOIRS 

standing  and  gave  me  extraordinary  powers  for  the 
work  of  formation.  Our  marine  infantry,  which  had 
to  form  three  regiments  out  of  two  battahons,  were 
picked  troops  from  the  very  first  in  spite  of  this  great 
dikition,  thanks  to  their  three  years'  service  system. 
The  naval  gunners,  drawn  from  various  forts  and 
garrisons,  were  to  undergo  their  infantry  training  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Brussels,  but  owing  to  the  opera- 
tions in  September  had  to  be  employed  against  the 
Belgian  army  advancing  from  Antwerp,  some  of  them 
being  detrained  and  marched  straight  into  battle. 
These  troops  showed  their  value  here,  as  well  as  later 
in  the  capture  of  Antwerp  and  in  four  years  of  sta- 
tionary warfare.  With  the  passing  of  time  the  Marine 
Corps  under  Admiral  von  Schroder  rendered  the  sea- 
ward flank  of  our  western  front  impregnable,  and 
with  various  contrivances  turned  the  Flemish  ports 
into  quite  serviceable  bases  for  T.B.D.  and  submarine 
warfare.  Our  forces  stationed  there,  although  unfor- 
tunately I  was  not  strong  enough  to  secure  them  suf- 
ficient accessions  of  force  from  home  to  make  them  as 
powerful  as  Admiral  Schroder  and  I  could  have 
wished,  were  a  sharp  thorn  in  England's  side  right 
up  to  the  autumn  of   191 8. 

In  the  early  months  of  the  war,  also,  the  eastern 
half  of  the  Mediterranean  developed  into  a  theatre  of 
war  of  increasing  importance. 

Already  on  August  3rd,  as  news  had  come  of  the 
conclusion  of  an  alliance  with  Turkey,  I  had,  in  spite 
of  the  hesitation  of  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  as 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  8i 

to  the  Goben  and  Brcslau,  sent  instructions  to  our 
Mediterranean  squadron  to  attempt  to  break  through 
to  Constantinople.  This  order  was  cancelled  on 
August  5th,  as  the  embassy  in  Constantinople,  in  view 
of  the  position  there,  thought  that  their  arrival  would 
not  yet  be  desirable.  The  vessels  were  now  instructed 
to  go  to  Pola,  or  else  to  break  through  into  the  At- 
lantic. 

There  was  a  naval  agreement,  concluded  in  time  of 
peace,  between  Austria,  Italy,  and  ourselves,  according 
to  which  in  the  event  of  war  our  whole  naval  forces 
were  to  be  assembled  together  in  the  Straits  of  Messina 
against  the  double  alliance.  On  the  proposal  of  the 
Italians,  the  command  of  the  triple  fleet  was  to  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  Austrian  Admiral  Haus;  I  do  not 
discuss  the  question  whether  this  had  been  seriously 
intended.  The  Emperor  was  particularly  proud  of 
our  Mediterranean  squadron,  while  I  regretted  the  ab- 
sence from  the  North  Sea  of  the  Goben  in  particular. 
When  the  Goben  and  Breslau  arrived  at  Messina, 
after  successful  bombardments  of  Algerian  ports,  they 
met  neither  the  Italians  nor  the  Austrians,  and  the 
former,  who  had  declared  strict  neutrality,  scarcely 
allowed  them  one  coaling  at  Messina.  Enemy  ships 
were  cruising  at  both  ends  of  the  straits.  As  Austria 
had  not  yet  declared  war  against  the  powers  ranged 
against  us,  difficulties  of  form  stood  in  the  way  of  our 
gaining  help  from  the  Austrian  fleet.  The  Admiralty's 
demands  were  answered  on  the  afternoon  of  August 
5th  by  the  Foreign  Office  to  the  effect  that  our  ambas- 


82  MYMEMOIRS 

sador  at  Vienna  had  been  instructed  to  press  urgently 
for  a  declaration  of  war.  In  the  evening  the  news 
arrived  that  the  Austrian  naval  commander,  owing 
to  the  position,  the  distance,  and  the  state  of  readi- 
ness of  his  fleet,  was  unable  to  help — a  typical  instance 
of  our  preparation  for  the  war  in  the  political  field. 
Under  the  circumstances  Admiral  Souchon  was  in- 
formed by  telegraph  that  he  might  himself  choose  in 
what  direction  he  should  break  through.  He  there- 
upon, following  the  lines  of  the  orders  he  had  at  first 
received,  chose  the  way  to  Constantinople. 

The  whole  Turkish  question  received  its  definite 
favourable  ending  through  the  success  of  this  break- 
through. Before  the  war,  our  Eastern  policy  had 
always  seemed  mistaken  to  me,  as  Germany's  only 
real  prospects  of  release  from  encirclement  were  to 
be  found  through  Russia;  but  once  we  were  actually 
at  war  with  Russia  all  considerations  of  this  sort  van- 
ished, and  I  accordingly  supported  Turkey  so  far  as 
lay  in  my  power.  Her  weakness  made  it  impossible 
for  her  to  remain  neutral  in  the  long  run,  and  the 
arrival  of  our  vessels  made  it  possible  to  ensure  that 
she  came  in  on  our  side  rather  than  against  us.  The 
support  which  the  German  navy  was  able  to  give  to 
Turkey  under  the  difficult  circumstances  is  an  episode 
of  itself,  and  it  can  only  be  mentioned  here  that  our 
navy  took  a  leading  part  in  the  glorious  defence  of 
the  Dardanelles,  thus  assisting  in  the  saving  of  Con- 
stantinople. On  this  depended  victory  or  defeat  on 
the  Balkan   front,  which  was  so  important   for  the 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  83 

Central  Powers.  The  approach  from  the  Mediterra- 
nean to  Russia  thus  remained  closed,  while  the  main- 
tenance of  communications  with  Asia  Minor  rendered 
possible  our  serious  threats  against  the  English  in 
Egypt  and  Mesopotamia,  which  drew  off  in  that  direc- 
tion strong  English  land  forces  and  transport  vessels. 
With  our  "  dry-land "  point  of  view  one  is  apt  to 
forget  that  the  British  attempt  to  force  the  Darda- 
nelles was  undertaken  with  insufficient  strength,  and 
accordingly  failed,  only  because  our  fleet  forced  Eng- 
land to  keep  the  greater  part  of  her  navy  concentrated 
in  the  North  Sea.  Thus  the  distant  eflfects  of  our 
naval  strength  protected  Turkey.  We  helped  Austria 
too  by  sending  her  submarines,  and  established  bases 
in  Pola  and  Cattaro. 

The  entry  of  Japan  into  the  war  wrecked  the  plan 
of  a  war  by  our  cruiser  squadron  against  enemy  trade 
and  against  the  British  war  vessels  in  those  seas,  leav- 
ing our  ships  with  nothing  to  do  but  to  attempt  to 
break  through  and  reach  home.  On  its  way  home 
the  squadron,  under  the  brave  Count  Spee,  destroyed 
without  appreciable  loss  to  itself  the  English  squadron 
stationed  off  the  coast  of  Chile,  whose  commander 
had  only  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  war  enjoyed 
friendly  social  intercourse  with  Spee.  Only  one  small 
English  cruiser  escaped  from  the  battle  of  Coronel. 

The  ammunition  left  to  Count  Spee  after  the  heavy 
expenditure  in  this  engagement  seemed  to  me  insuffi- 
cient for  a  second  battle,  and  we  had  news  of  the 
assembling  of  strong  English  forces  on  the  east  coast 


84  MY    MEMOIRS 

of  South  America.  I  therefore  proposed  that  we 
should  place  Spee,  with  whom  we  could  communicate 
by  wireless  via  Valparaiso,  at  liberty  to  avoid  the  east 
coast  of  South  America,  making  his  northward  voyage 
in' the  middle  of  the  Atlantic  or  nearer  the  African 
coast.  My  intention  was  to  draw  Count  Spec's  atten- 
tion by  this  message  to  the  fact  that  having  regard 
to  his  shortage  of  ammunition,  we  did  not  expect 
any  further  active  operations  of  him,  and  that  the 
main  part  of  his  task  was  now  to  make  his  way  home- 
wards. Spee  would  then  be  able,  sailing  his  ships 
separately  through  the  vast  tracts  of  the  Atlantic,  to 
get  home  in  the  same  fashion  as  was  later  followed 
by  the  Mowe  and  other  vessels.  The  prestige  of. 
Coronel  would  then  have  been  established  in  the  eyes 
of  the  world. 

As  Count  Spee  was  not  informed  of  the  general 
position  of  the  war,  such  an  instruction  from  home 
seemed  to  be  highly  desirable.  The  chief  of  the  Naval 
Staff,  however,  regarded  it  as  unwise.  There  were 
differencs  of  opinion  between  him  and  myself  on  the 
matter.  He  was  unwilling  to  encroach  in  any  way 
on  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  Count,  who,  he 
thought,  would  be  better  informed  as  to  the  strength  of 
the  English  forces  than  we  were.  Unfortunately  this 
was  not  the  case.  Our  cruiser  squadron  was  destroyed 
at  the  Falkland  Islands  by  a  force  of  crushing  superi- 
ority, including  two  dreadnought  cruisers,  whose  pres- 
ence had  not  been  anticipated  by  Spee. 

Questions  have  been  asked  as  to  what  can  have 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  85 

moved  the  distinguished  admiral  to  make  the  Falk- 
land Islands.  To  destroy  the  English  wireless  station 
there  would  not  have  been  of  much  purpose,  since 
that  station  would  have  done  all  it  could  when  it 
sent  out:  "The  German  squadron  is  here."  The  at- 
tempt may  have  been  due  to  the  fear  on  the  part  of 
these  brave  men,  in  their  ignorance  of  the  war  situation, 
that  the  war  might  reach  its  end  without  any  further 
achievement  on  their  part.  The  victory  of  Coronel 
had  increased  the  pride  of  our  fellow-countrymen  in 
all  parts  of  the  world,  and  now  the  loss  of  the  crews, 
who,  with  Count  Spee  and  his  sons  at  their  head,  re- 
fused to  surrender,  awakened  sorrow  and  admiration 
in  every  heart. 

The  single  cruisers  stationed  in  different  parts  of 
the  world  also  did  their  duty  fully.  This  cruiser  war- 
fare, which  could  not  last  long  owing  to  the  lack  of 
bases,  had  been  very  well  prepared  by  the  Naval  Staff. 
Agencies,  and  the  supply  of  coal  and  stores,  fitted  their 
work  in  well  so  long  as  the  prestige  of  Germany  in 
the  world  was  not  falling.  The  activities  of  Captain 
Miiller  on  the  Emden  and  those  of  the  Karlsruhe  were 
glorious  and  effective.  The  commander  of  the 
Karlsruhe,  Captain  Kohler,  never  dreamt  of  taking 
advantage  of  the  permission  to  make  his  way  home- 
ward; working  with  four  auxiliary  vessels  in  the  At- 
lantic, surrounded  by  English  cruisers,  but  relying  on 
his  superior  speed,  he  sought  ever  further  successes, 
until  he  was  destroyed  with  his  ship  by  an  explosion, 
the  probable  cause  of  which  was  some  unstable  ex- 


86  MY   MEMOIRS 

plosive  brought  abroad.  The  Konigsherg,  under  Cap- 
tain Loof,  succumbed  after  severe  fighting  against 
great  superiority.  The  commander  and  a  large  part 
of  the  crew  subsequently  went  through  the  campaign 
in  East  Africa  under  General  von  Lettow-Vorbeck. 
Good  and  loyal  Germans  also  earned  much  honour 
in  later  cruiser  undertakings.  Bold  enterprise  let  the 
auxiliary  cruisers  Meteor,  Greif,  Mowe,  Seeadler,  and 
Wolf  through  English  waters  to  the  ocean.  Their 
spirit  of  enterprise,  however,  was  but  the  spirit  of 
the  High  Sea  fleet,  for  they  were  manned  by  officers 
and  men  of  that  fleet.  Our  ships  abroad  could  not 
produce  any  permanent  effect  on  the  course  of  the 
war,  since,  deprived  as  they  were  of  the  assistance  of 
any  base  of  their  own,  they  could  only  hold  out  for 
limited  periods.  Nevertheless,  the  losses  which  they 
caused  to  the  enemy  must  have  been  at  least  three 
times  as  great  as  the  strength  involved  on  our  side.  It 
is  remarkable  that  our  ships  were  never  destroyed  on 
the  high  seas,  but  only  when  they  were  forced  to  come 
to  the  land. 

If  one  keeps  before  one  these  effects  of  the  navy 
on  the  course  of  the  war,  one  is  bound  to  confess 
that  its  deeds  were  great  and  glorious.  I  know  of  no 
case,  apart  from  the  final  collapse,  in  which  the  crews 
did  not  fight  with  the  greatest  courage  and  devotion, 
or  in  which  the  superiority  of  our  personnel  and 
materiel  was  not  displayed.  It  would  not  be  unjust 
to  say  that  nothing  more  could  have  been  demanded 
of  a  fleet  fighting  against  enemies  five  times  its  own 


THE   HIGH    SEA   FLEET  87 

strength  with  no  base  abroad  and  with  a  bad  strategical 
position  at  home.  Nevertheless  our  navy  was  so  good 
that  it  could  have  achieved  the  greatest  things  had 
it  only  been  encouraged  instead  of  being  blocked. 

I  thus  come  to  the  two  fundamental  causes  why  the 
navy's  highest  aim,  the  winning  of  a  just  peace  by 
battle,  could  not  be  attained.  The  one  cause  of  the 
navy's  tragic  fate,  as  has  already  been  mentioned,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  obstacles  placed  in  the  way  of  its 
active  employment  throughout  the  war  for  political 
reasons;  the  other  cause  is  the  lack  of  a  single  re- 
sponsible command  of  the  whole  of  Germany's  naval 
strength. 

Ill 

The  plans  of  operation  which  I  settled  in  the  'nine- 
ties of  the  last  century,  and  at  that  time  submitted 
for  the  approval  of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
all  presupposed  the  benevolent  neutrality  of  England. 
When  in  the  middle  of  the  'nineties  this  supposition 
had  to  be  modified,  I  was  no  longer,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  concerned  in  the  working-out  of  the  plans 
of  operation.  Nevertheless,  I  always  exchanged  views 
with  the  Chief  of,  the  Naval  Staff,  according  to  his 
character.  When  Count  Baudissin  was  Chief,  in  1908, 
he  put  in  the  forefront  of  his  plan  the  immediate  and 
unhesitating  engagement  of  battle  by  the  active  fleet, 
with  which  I  was  fully  agreed.  In  subsequent  pre- 
war years,  however,  the  plan  of  operations  was  treated 
by  the  Naval  Staff  as  secret  even  from  me. 


88  MY   MEMOIRS 

The  plan  of  operations  which,  in  accordance  with 
the  Cabinet  order  of  July  30th,  1914  (to  be  discussed 
later),  was  now  laid  before  me  by  von  Pohl,  the 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  in  the  event  of  an  English 
declaration  of  war,  consisted,  as  I  found  to  my  sur- 
prise, of  short  instructions  to  the  commander  of  the 
North  Sea  fleet  to  wage  for  the  present  only  guerrilla 
warfare  against  the  English,  until  we  had  achieved 
such  a  weakening  of  their  fleet  that  we  could  safely 
send  out  our  own;  if  before  this  time  there  should 
be  any  good  prospects  of  a  successful  battle,  a  fight 
might  then  be  undertaken. 

At  that  time  there  was  a  strong  Press  campaign  in 
favour  of  the  so-called  guerrilla  warfare,  supported 
amongst  others  by  certain  discharged  naval  officers. 
It  was  forgotten  that  the  whole  prospects  of  such 
fighting  depended  on  the  enemy  being  kind  enough 
to  provide  us  with  opportunities,  which  they  were  not 
likely  to  do.  Guerilla  fighting  would  only  have  been 
feasible  if  the  English  had  decided  on  a  close  blockade 
of  our  coasts  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of  war. 
Whether  it  would  even  then  have  been  the  correct 
policy,  I  need  not  discuss.  The  news  from  England, 
and  especially  the  plan  of  their  strategical  manoeuvres, 
made  it  improbable  that  a  close  blockade  of  the  Ger- 
man coast  would  be  undertaken. 

The  Chief  of  Staff  thought  personally  that  more 
weight  should  be  given  to  the  English  eagerness  to 
come  to  blows,  and  expected  that  there  would  assuredly 
be  a  battle  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Heligoland,  which 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  89 

would  of  course  be  the  most  favourable  position  for 
us.  I  learnt  later  that  the  specialists  on  the  Naval 
Staff  held  the  view  on  this  question  that  the  British 
strategy  would  become  clear  in  the  first  few  weeks 
of  the  war,  and  that  new  directions  could  then  be 
given  according  to  what  that  strategy  proved  to  be; 
they  were  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  addition  of 
several  large  battle-ships  of  the  Kaiser  class,  and  the 
reserve  squadrons,  which  had  been  mobilized,  but  were 
not  yet  ready  for  action,  made  our  prospects  in  battle 
more  favourable  from  October  onwards  than  would 
be  the  case  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  war.  Political 
obstacles  were  not  expected  in  any  naval  quarter. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  numbers  alone,  the  above 
attitude  was  not  incorrect.  The  only  point  of  anxiety 
lay  in  this,  that  early  orders  imposing  restraint  might 
easily  lead  to  our  wasting  favourable  opportunities,  a 
recurrence  of  which,  having  regard  to  the  impossibil- 
ity of  prophesying  the  enemy's  line  of  action,  could 
not  be  regarded  as  certain,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
giving  the  enemy  advantages  which  we  could  not 
estimate.  I  accordingly  raised  objections  to  this  plan 
of  operations,  which  were  recognized  by  the  Chief  of 
Staff  to  this  extent  only,  that  they  were  altered  to  read 
that,  in  the  event  of  good  prospects  appearing  for  a 
successful  battle,  a  fight  must,  not  merely  might,  be 
undertaken,  I  considered  that  with  this  the  com- 
mander of  the  North  Sea  fleet  retained  sufficient  free- 
dom of  action. 

In   favour  of   immediate  activity  on  the  part  of 


90  MY   MEMOIRS 

the  fleet,  apart  from  political  factors,  there  were  to 
be  reckoned  the  probability  that  considerable  naval 
fighting  forces  were  immobilized  in  connection  with 
the  transhipment  of  British  troops  across  the  Chan- 
nel, the  fact  that  the  British  had  not  really  any  more 
experience  of  modern  naval  warfare  than  we  had 
ourselves,  and  lastly  the  circumstances  that  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  they  were  not  yet  acquainted 
with  the  superiority  of  our  naval  guns  and  other 
material.  They  were  probably  not  enlightened  as  to 
the  terrible  strength  of  our  armour-bursting  shells, 
which  would  gain  double  effect  by  surprise,  even  by 
their  defeat  at  Coronel,  the  cruiser  fight  of  January 
24th,  191 5,  being  the  first  occasion  on  which  they 
certainly  learnt  of  it.  And,  finally,  another  point  in 
favour  of  immediate  action  was  the  holy  eagerness 
for  battle  of  our  whole  personnel,  who  longed  for 
the  opportunity  to  compete  with  the  great  achieve- 
ments of  the  army. 

Against  an  immediate  fight  was  the  fact  that  the 
whole  English  fleet  was  ready  for  battle  when  the  war 
broke  out,  owing  to  the  test  mobilization,  whereas 
only  our  active  squadrons  were  ready.  Further,  Pohl 
had,  much  to  his  officers'  regret,  yielded  to  the  pres- 
sure of  the  Foreign  Ofiice,  which  desired,  in  order 
to  preserve  a  pacific  attitude,  that  the  fleet  on  its  re- 
turn from  Norway  should  be  divided  between  the 
North  Sea  and  Baltic  harbours.  As  a  result  of  this 
step,  which  did  indeed  give  a  new  demonstration  of 
our  anxiety  for  peace,  but  impaired  our  readiness 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET  91 

for  war,  that  part  of  the  fleet  which  had  proceeded 
to  Kiel  had  first  to  coal,  etc.,  and  then  to  pass  through 
the  by  no  means  safe  Kiel  Canal  before  it  could  join 
the  remainder/ 

Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  many  officers,  von 
Ingenohl,  who  was  in  command  of  the  fleet,  was 
brought  to  take  a  strongly  defensive  view  of  the  opera- 
tion order,  so  far  as  concerned  the  battle  fleet.  The 
position  was  not  altered  by  a  few  bold  mine-laying 
undertakings  on  the  English  coast.  Ingenohl  was 
awaiting  the  English  in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  in 
defensive  formation,  a  point  which  they  were  bound 
to  find  out  after  a  time.  So  arrived  August  28th,  a 
day  fateful,  both  in  its  after-effects  and  incidental 
results,  for  the  work  of  our  navy. 

Early  that  morning,  in  murky  weather,  small  Eng- 
lish cruisers  and  torpedo  boats  of  the  newest  design 
had  attacked  our  outpost  vessels  stationed  between 
Heligoland  and  the  coast,  sinking  an  oldish  torpedo 
boat.  As  the  English  vessels  drew  out  to  sea  again, 
the  order  was  given  to  our  small  cruisers  lying  in  the 
river  mouths  to  take  up  the  pursuit.  These  ships,  not 
being  informed  as  to  the  general  position,  left  their 
anchorages  alone,  without  the  support  of  the  torpedo- 
boat  flotillas  which  had  been  allotted  to  them,  rushed 
out  to  sea  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  the  first  fight, 

*  At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  canal  was  not  absolutely  finished, 
the  draught  being  in  places  too  shallow.  Damage  which  in 
part  was  not  discovered  until  the  ships  were  at  sea  through 
loss  of  speed,  excessive  coal  consumption,  etc.,  was  caused 
especially  to  the  screws,  hampering  subsequent  offensive  opera- 
tions. 


92  MY   MEMOIRS 

and,  about  sixty  knots  from  Heligoland,  met  a  large 
number  of  enemy  reconnaisance  vessels,  including  four 
battle  cruiers.  It  was  doubtful  whether  heavier  squad- 
rons were  present  in  the  rear.  The  Koln  and  Mains, 
fighting  bravely  against  far  superior  forces,  were  shot 
to  pieces  and  sank. 

The  crucial  point  seems  to  me  to  be  that  on  the 
approach  of  the  English  the  order  was  not  instantly 
given,  "  The  whole  fleet  to  sea,  with  every  vessel  we 
have!"  If  there  were  larger  elements  of  the  British 
fleet  in  the  Bight,  there  could  be  nothing  better  for  us 
than  to  come  to  battle  so  near  to  our  own  ports. 
If  the  English  had  only  weak  forces,  and  fell  back, 
the  fleet  had  at  any  rate  the  opportunity  of  a  remark- 
ably good  practice  in  the  deployment  of  all  our  vessels 
from  out  of  the  river  mouths  and  in  their  assembly, 
with  the  prospect  of  a  battle.  Unfortunately  this  was 
not  done,  nor  were  the  cruisers  reinforced.  The  order 
was  merely  given  for  one  of  the  squadrons  to  put 
itself  in  a  fuller  state  of  preparation  to  sail.  I,  in 
G.H.Q.,  did  not  at  first  understand  the  incident,  and 
I  wrote  to  a  friend  who  had  been  engaged  for  an 
explanation,  mentioning  at  the  same  time  the  conse- 
quences that  would  arise  if  the  fleet  did  not  come  to 
battle.  In  the  answer  which  I  received  the  view  of 
the  navy  command,  that  we  ought  to  await  the  English 
in  the  Bight  of  Heligoland,  resting  on  our  mine  bar- 
riers there,  was  recognized  as  correct,  and  the  loss  of 
the  cruisers  was  attributed  to  their  recklessness.  The 
judgment  of  the  majority  of  officers  was  to  the  con- 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET  93 

trary.  The  crews  too  were  disappointed  that  they 
had  not  come  to  a  fight,  and  their  bitter  criticism 
found  expression  in  some  instances  in  a  regrettable 
manner.  Messages  were  chalked  on  the  walls  ex- 
pressing their  anxiety  to  come  to  blows  with  the 
enemy. 

That  mistakes  should  be  made  in  the  early  stages 
of  such  a  war  was  natural  enough.  In  this  case  there 
were  plainly  results  to  be  seen  of  the  plan  of  opera- 
tions being  drawn  up  in  the  defensive  spirit.  It  was 
now  the  duty  of  the  supreme  naval  command  to  deal 
with  the  matter  and  point  out  the  mistakes  which 
had  clearly  been  committed.  If  that  were  done  the 
damage  was  soon  repaired. 

But  the  reverse  course  was  followed.  The  Em- 
peror did  not  wish  for  losses  of  this  sort,  and  the 
Chancellor  gained  further  pretexts  for  the  doctrine  of 
keeping  back  the  fleet  which  has  been  described  in  the 
previous  chapter.  The  outward  sign  of  the  victory 
of  Bethmann's  views  were  the  orders  issued  by  the 
Emperor,  after  an  audience  to  Pohl,  to  which,  as  al- 
ways, I  was  not  summoned,  directed  to  restrict  still 
further  the  initiative  of  the  commander  of  the  North 
Sea  fleet:  the  loss  of  ships  was  to  be  avoided,  fleet 
sallies  and  any  greater  undertakings  must  be  approved 
by  his  Majesty  in  advance,  etc. 

I  learnt  of  this  orally,  and  took  the  first  opportunity 
to  explain  to  the  Emperor  the  fundamental  error  of 
such  a  muzzling  policy.  This  step  had  no  success, 
but  on  the  contrary  there  sprang  up  from  that  day 


94  MY    MEMOIRS 

forth  an  estrangement  between  the  Emperor  and  my- 
self, which  steadily  increased,  not  without  encourage- 
ment from  various  quarters.  A  little  later  the  rumour 
ran  in  Berlin  that  I  was  driving  the  fleet  into  battle 
for  parliamentary  reasons. 

IV 

As  an  example  of  the  efforts  which  I  made  at  this 
time,  I  publish  below  certain  opinions  which  I  sent  to 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff.  Their  aim  was  to  bring 
about  a  battle.  In  my  statements  I  adapted  myself  in 
passages  to  some  extent  to  the  views  then  prevailing, 
in  order  to  get  something  done.  Thus,  for  example, 
I  recognized  the  view  that  we  should  make  efforts  to 
have  the  battle  fought  within  a  reasonable  distance  of 
Heligoland,  a  view  correct  in  itself,  but  brought  into 
one-sided  importance  by  the  Chiefs  of  the  Naval  Staff 
and  the  Naval  Cabinet.  Certainly  the  important  thing 
for  me  was  not  the  place  of  battle,  but  that  battle 
should  be  joined.  At  this  time,  too,  there  was  talk 
from  time  to  time  at  G.H.Q.  of  a  future  doubling  of 
the  fleet.  I  fought  consistently  against  the  false  "  fu- 
turism "  of  this  chatter;  it  is  to  this  that  the  sixth 
paragraph  of  my  letter  of  September  i6th  refers,  a 
passage  in  which,  through  an  almost  incredible  feat 
of  distortion  on  the  part  of  the  opponents  of  the 
fighting  policy,  the  suspicion  was  built  that  I  attached 
more  importance  to  future  parliamentary  successes 
than  to  anything  else. 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  95 

"  Luxemburg, 

September  i6th,  1914. 

"  To  THE  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  at  Luxem- 
burg. 

"  With  reference  to  our  discussion  of  to-day,  I 
humbly  submit  to  Your  Excellency  the  following  points 
for  consideration : 

"  I.  The  report  of  Admiral  von  Ingenohl  of  the 
I2th  instant,  Gg.  1738  Ai,  confirms  the  opinion  which 
I  had  already  put  forward,  that  we  cannot  achieve 
an  equalization  of  forces  by  means  of  the  so-called 
guerrilla  warfare. 

"  2.  The  aim  of  all  our  combatant  and  administra- 
tive work  for  twenty  years  or  more  has  been  battle. 
Accordingly  we  have  relatively  our  best  chances  in 
battle.  Nevertheless,  having  regard  to  our  numerical 
inferiority,  we  must  strive  to  give  battle  within  a 
reasonable  distance,  at  the  most  not  more  than  100 
knots,  from  Heligoland. 

"  3.  Our  best  opportunity  for  a  successful  battle 
was  in  the  first  two  or  three  weeks  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war. 

"4.  As  time  goes  on,  our  chance  of  success  will 
grow  worse,  not  better,  as  the  English  fleet  receives 
a  substantially  greater  increase  by  new  building  than 
we  do,  and  keeps  in  full  practice. 

"  5.  In  addition,  the  spirit  of  our  men,  which  was 
admirable  to  start  with,  is  bound  to  depreciate  if  there 
are  no  prospects  of  a  fight. 

"  6.  If  one  has  confidence  in  our  fleet,  one  must 
hold  that  in  a  battle  the  English  fleet  will  suffer  as 
many  losses  as  we  do.  I  personally  have  this  confi- 
dence. In  my  view,  the  actual  decision  on  such  a 
matter  can  of  course  only  be  taken  by  the  man  who 


96  MY    MEMOIRS 

has  the  responsibility  for  it,  that  is,  the  commander 
of  the  High  Sea  fleet.  He  must  also  have  confidence 
in  himself,  and  carry  the  genius  of  victory  in  his  heart. 
Almost  always,  throughout  the  history  of  the  world, 
smaller  fleets  have  defeated  greater  ones. 

"  7.  I  cannot  see  the  use  of  preserving  the  fleet  in- 
tact until  the  declaration  of  peace. 

"  If  we  come  to  the  end  of  a  war  so  terrible  as  that 
of  1914,  without  the  fleet  having  bled  and  worked,  we 
shall  get  nothing  more  for  the  fleet,  and  all  the  scanty 
money  that  there  may  be  will  be  spent  on  the  army. 
The  great  efl^orts  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  to  make 
Germany  a  naval  power  will  have  been  all  in  vain. 

"  8.  We  must,  however,  wait  for  a  short  time  before 
giving  battle,  until  Turkey  has  definitely  come  in  and 
the  main  decision  has  been  reached  in  the  west. 

"  9.  I  would  regard  the  dispatch  of  our  three  avail- 
able large  battle  cruisers,  without  other  vessels  and 
without  support,  against  the  supposed  enemy  blockade 
line  at  Lindesnaes,  as  a  mistake,  on  the  ground  that 
the  expenditure  of  force  seems  to  me  too  great  in  com- 
parison to  the  possible  gain. 

*'  VON    TiRPITZ." 

"  Charleville, 

October  ist,  1914, 

"To  THE  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  at  Charle- 
ville. 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  bring  to  your  Excellency's 
notice  the  following  comments  on  the  letter  of  the 
Commander  of  the  High  Sea  fighting  forces  of  Sep- 
tember 25th,  1914,  which  has  been  passed  to  me  for 
information : 

"  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  submarine  danger  has 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET  97 

hitherto  been  underestimated,  but  that  it  is  now  exag- 
gerated as  a  result  of  the  success  of  U9/ 

"  Shooting  from  a  submarine  is  extraordinarily  diffi- 
cult if  the  vessel  attacked  maintains  a  good  speed  and 
changes  direction  frequently  when  near  submarines. 
Before  the  attack  by  U9  the  three  cruisers  were  stroll- 
ing along  at  ten  knots  and  the  Hogue  and  Cressy  were 
stationary  when  attacked. 

"  Nevertheless  our  corner  of  Heligoland,  owing  to 
the  frequent  presence  of  enemy  submarines,  is  less 
fitted  as  a  point  of  departure  for  offensive  movements 
than  we  had  hitherto  assumed  on  the  basis  of  our  ex- 
perience in  peace-time.  Its  unsuitability  is,  however, 
perhaps  due  more  to  the  enormous  size  of  our  fleet, 
which  has  to  defile  out  of  the  narrow  river  channels, 
than  to  the  submarines.  Our  peace-time  mancEuvres 
did  not  draw  our  attention  sufficiently  to  this  point. 

"  The  fleet  is  now  faced  with  the  danger  that  it 
must  either  while  away  the  war  in  virtual  uselessness 
behind  the  river  barriers,  while  Germany  fights  out 
on  dry  land  the  battle  for  its  existence  as  a  power 
worthy  of  the  name,  or  else  for  honour's  sake  see 
itself  compelled  to  go  out  to  battle  at  a  moment  when 
the  prospects  of  success  are  at  their  lowest. 

"The  present  effect  of  our  fleet  (20  large  battle- 
ships, about  25  pre-Dreadnoughts,  100  torpedo  boats, 
etc. ) ,  could  have  been  equally  well  achieved  with  much 
smaller  forces,  if  we  had  merely  confined  ourselves  to 
the  defence  of  the  Baltic. 

"  The  English  fleet,  on  the  other  hand,  is  achieving 
the  full  effect  of  a  '  fleet  in  being ' :  extraordinary  and 
increasing  pressure  on  the  neutrals,  complete  destruc- 
tion of  German  sea-borne  trade,  the  fullest  practical 

^  This  refers  to  the  tactical  danger  of  submarine  attacks  on 
warships. 


98  MY    MEMOIRS 

blockade,  steady  transport  of  troops  to  France.  With 
all  this  is  connected  the  isolation  of  Germany  from 
news,  and  the  incitement  of  the  whole  world  against 
us. 

"  The  English  fleet,  and  England,  are  Germany's 
most  dangerous  enemy. 

"  The  use  made  of  our  after  all  very  strong  fleet  in 
no  way  corresponds  to  the  relative  strengths  of  the 
two  fleets.  I  do  not  propose  at  the  moment  to  go 
farther  into  the  reasons  for  this,  but  merely  to  state 
a  fact  which  we  must  all  face, 

"  For  this  reason  also  I  cannot  agree  that  the 
maintenance  of  the  fleet  intact  for  the  conclusion  of 
peace  can  have  the  least  political  influence. 

"  With  regard  now  to  the  second  point,  that  we 
may  be  forced  to  give  battle  under  unfavourable  cir- 
cumstances for  the  mere  honour  of  our  arms,  the 
English  need  only  to  bombard  Heligoland  one  morn- 
ing from  the  north.  A  squadron  of  fast  vessels,  keep- 
ing a  great  distance  and  steering  a  zigzag  course, 
would  suffice.  In  such  a  case  there  would  lie  farther 
in  the  offing  the  whole  English  fleet — that  is  to  say, 
every  vessel  they  have,  torpedo  boats  included,  that 
is  fit  for  high-sea  fighting.  In  the  Bight,  before  our 
river  mouths,  there  would  be  stationed  in  such  a  case, 
not  just  one  or  two  submarines — the  highest  number 
that  the  English  can  spare  for  keeping  perpetual  sta- 
tion in  the  Bight — but  every  submarine  of  long  radius 
that  they  possess. 

"  It  is  in  this  risk,  that  we  may  have  to  fight  for 
honour's  sake  in  an  unfavourable  situation  and  with- 
out full  preparation,  that  I  sec  the  greatest  danger 
for  our  fleet. 

"If  the  fleet  continues  to  remain  in  its  withdrawn 
position,  its  moral  strength  and  capacity  will  of  neces- 


THE   HIGH    SEA    FLEET  99 

sity  deteriorate,  with  results  that  may  easily  be  fore- 
seen. 

"  For  these  reasons  I  am  of  the  view  that  Admiral 
von  Ingenohl's  initiative  should  not  be  limited  in  any 
way,  and  that  it  should  be  left  entirely  to  him  what 
he  thinks  possible  and  right  to  do  under  the  circum- 
stances. He  ought  not  either  to  have  to  ask,  for  that 
too  is  a  crippling  of  his  initiative.  He  alone  must 
decide.  My  personal  opinion  is  that  the  fleet  has  con- 
siderably more  fighting  power  than  the  present  con- 
duct of  the  war  assumes.  That  is  particularly  true 
of  our  torpedo  boats,  which  are  not  being  used  at  all. 
That  the  English  torpedo  boats  can  attack  viciously 
was  proved  on  August  28th. 

"  For  these  reasons  I  am  of  the  view  that  farther 
advances  of  our  whble  battle  fleet  have  become  an 
absolute  necessity.  To  refer  to  the  incident  of  Sep- 
tember 22nd,  in  which  the  attack  of  our  three  large 
cruisers,  which  was  ordered,  did  not  take  place,  be- 
cause fleets  of  twelve  and  sixteen  ships  were  reported 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lindesnaes,  why  could  not 
our  entire  fleet  have  sallied  out?  It  is  improbable 
that  the  whole  English  fleet  would  make  such  a  cruise; 
and  even  if  we  had  known  that  we  had  to  face  not 
merely  the  first  fleet,  but  their  entire  forces,  we  could 
have  taken  measures  to  meet  the  situation,  and  length- 
ened the  battle  considerably,  for  example  by  letting 
the  slower  vessels  follow  on  the  same  course  at  a 
distance  of  fifty  knots  (echelon  order). 

"  It  is  now  objected  that  in  battles  developing  out 
of  such  attacks  our  damaged  ships  will  be  lost  on  the 
return.  But  why  are  we  to  assume  that  there  will  be 
many  damaged  ships?  Is  it  not  definitely  one  thing 
or  the  other?  In  a  large  battle,  will  not  the  bulk  of 
the  damaged  ships  be  torpedoed,  so  long  as  the  result 


loo  MY    MEMOIRS 

appears  in  doubt?  Are  the  English  not  in  the  same 
position?  The  long  nights  are  beginning  now,  and 
are  our  far  more  highly  trained  torpedo  boats  to  be 
found  wanting  against  the  English  fleet? 

"  The  objection  is  also  raised  that  the  retirement 
to  our  river  mouths  will  be  barred  by  the  detachments 
coming  from  the  South  of  England.  Is  the  distance 
to  Heligoland  so  much  greater  from  Lindesnaes  than 
from  England?  And  if  we  seize  the  initiative,  will 
all  the  detachments  of  the  British  fleet  be  ready  for 
instant  departure  and  linking-up?  Linking-up  is  as 
difficult  for  them  as  it  is  for  us.  There  will  not  in 
the  future  be  many  English  ships  stationed  at  the 
Hook  of  Holland  or  anywhere  in  similar  range.  For- 
tune favours  the  initiative;  (Emden,  U9,  Konigsherg, 
U21).  But  if  in  the  end  it  should  prove  impossible 
for  us  to  withdraw  to  Heligoland,  and  we  have  to  go 
into  the  Kattegat,  we  are  after  all  at  home  there,  and 
the  English  are  not. 

"  Admiral  von  Ingenohl  is  now  demanding  that  the 
Belts  should  be  opened.  After  recent  occurrences  the 
Danes  cannot  well  consent.  The  demand  ought  not  in- 
deed to  be  made,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  must  be- 
come known  at  once  in  England. 

"  In  case  of  need  we  shall  have  to  retire  through 
the  Kattegat  and  the  Belts  without  asking.  Besides, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Denmark  gave  us  to 
understand  that  she  was  dividing  the  Little  Belt  into 
two  parts,  a  Danish  part  by  Baage  which  it  was  clos- 
ing, and  a  German  part,  the  Aroe  Sound,  which  it 
was  for  us  to  look  after.  Denmark  could  take  shelter 
behind  this  excuse,  that  we  had  used  the  German  part 
of  the  Little  Belt,  and  for  our  part  there  is  no  ques- 
tion of  an  offensive  from  the  Belts,  but  only  and 
strictly  of  the  refuge  of  damaged  ships.    It  would  be 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         loi 

an  act  of  necessity,  Denmark  would  thus  not  declare 
war  against  us,  and  the  worst  that  could  happen 
would  be  a  demand  by  the  English  for  passage  for 
themselves  through  the  Belts.  This  they  have  not 
already  demanded,  only  because  it  is  not  to  their  ad- 
vantage. They  have  not  recognized  the  right  of  the 
Danes  to  close  the  Belts,  and  indeed,  according  to  the 
rules  of  neutrality  as  they  stand,  the  Danes  have  not 
the  right  so  to  do.  The  passage  through  the  Little 
Belt  is  thus  available  for  us.  The  closing  of  the 
Belts  by  the  Danes,  which  has  so  far  benefited  us,  is 
now  certainly  a  disadvantage. 

"  A  favourable  levelling-up  of  forces  through  guer- 
rilla warfare  is  not  to  be  expected,  to  judge  from  our 
experiences  to  date;  indeed,  the  reverse  is  likely,  which 
would  have  a  bad  influence  on  general  opinion  on  the 
fleet.  A  similar  bad  impression  will  be  produced  by 
the  impending  storming  of  Tsingtao,  and  the  slow  but 
inevitable  destruction  of  our  cruisers  in  distant  waters. 

"  There  is  nothing  that  argues  against  the  concession 
of  the  fullest  freedom  of  action  to  Admiral  von  In- 
genohl.  In  my  view  it  is  necessary  for  the  general 
conduct  of  the  war.  The  operations  and  the  forces 
in  the  Baltic  should  be  adjusted  accordingly. 

"von  Tirpitz." 

"G.H.Q., 
"October  nth,  1914. 

"  To  THE  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  at  G.H.Q. 

"  The  letter  of  October  6th  of  this  year — 168 — 
addressed  to  the  Chief  of  our  High  Sea  fleet  by  Your 
Excellency,  as  a  result  of  your  audience  of  his  Majesty, 
moves  me  to  place  the  following  matters  before  Your 
Excellency : 

"  I.  The  instructions  that  the  fleet  is  to  be  held  back 


I02  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  is  to  avoid  actions  that  might  lead  to  serious  losses 
will  in  my  view  result  in  the  fleet  never  having  an  op- 
portunity of  a  decision  by  battle.  It  is  indeed  more 
probable  that  the  fleet  will  only  succeed  in  finding 
favourable  conditions  for  battle  if  it  seeks,  by  attacks 
such  as  those  proposed  by  the  Chief  of  the  High  Sea 
fleet  in  his  letter  of  September  25th,  1914 — Gg,  2030 
— to  force  the  enemy  into  a  position  which  will  per- 
mit us  to  attack  parts  of  their  fleet  or  to  undertake 
night  torpedo  attacks  against  them.  The  appearance 
of  our  fleet  outside  the  Bight  of  Heligoland  will  of 
necessity  create  some  uncertainty  in  the  dispositions 
of  the  enemy  command,  and  lead  to  counter-measures 
that  will  bring  their  fleet,  or  substantial  parts  of  their 
fleet,  into  the  neighbourhood  of  our  coast.  It  is  only 
thus,  that  is,  by  our  seizing  the  initiative,  that  the 
fleet  can  obtain  the  opportunity  of  giving  battle  or  at 
any  rate  of  successful  torpedo-boat  action.  If  it  leaves 
the  initiative  to  the  enemy  and  waits  in  the  river 
mouths  until  the  latter  more  or  less  offers  battle,  it 
will  always  be  faced  by  vastly  superior  and  fully  pre- 
pared fighting  forces,  against  which  it  can  hardly  hope 
to  deploy  from  the  river  mouths  with  any  prospects 
of  success. 

"  2.  The  energetic  employment  of  torpedo  boats  is, 
in  my  view,  only  possible  if  these  vessels  can  rely  on 
the  support  of  strong  forces,  or,  best  of  all,  of  the 
whole  fleet.  Otherwise  they  must  soon  come  up  with 
mixed  forces  of  superior  strength,  and  thus  achieve 
nothing.  On  the  other  hand,  I  hold  that,  if  we  can 
succeed  in  bringing  our  torpedo-boat  flotilla  either  by 
day  or  night  to  bear  against  important  parts  of  the 
British  fleet,  we  can  achieve  great  successes.  A  guar- 
antee of  this  is  to  be  found  in  their  thorough  efficiency, 
based  on  decades  of  training. 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         103 

"3.  The  continual  retention  of  our  squadrons  in 
the  river  mouths  is  bound  to  have  a  bad  effect  on 
the  readiness  of  the  fleet  for  battle.  Not  only  is  the 
whole  fleet  deprived  of  the  chance  to  maintain  its  tac- 
tical training,  but,  without  the  least  reflection  on  the 
personnel,  one  must  recognize  that  in  the  nature  of 
things  their  magnificent  morale  is  bound  to  be  af- 
fected as  the  prospects  of  warlike  activities  become 
ever  more  remote. 

"  VON  TIRPITZ." 

V 

I  did  not  mean  that  we  could  seek  battle  in  any  case, 
and  in  any  position.  I  rather  desired  that  the  North 
Sea  fleet  should  create  by  continual  activity  a  position 
compelling  the  English  to  draw  nearer  to  us.  H  a 
battle  developed  in  this  manner  on  our  initiative,  not 
too  far  from  our  home  waters,  there  was  a  possibility, 
especially  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  war,  that  the  Eng- 
lish would  not  throw  the  whole  of  their  forces  united 
into  the  fight.  The  history  of  the  war,  which  it  is  not 
my  intention  to  write  in  this  book,  will  show  that  such 
opportunities  were  in  fact  given.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  war  the  fact  had  not  emerged  so  clearly  as  it 
did  later  that  the  British  fleet  fulfilled  its  raison  d'etre 
simply  by  lying  quietly  at  Scapa  Flow.  Public  opinion 
in  the  enemy  countries  might  have  made  it  very  diffi- 
cult at  that  time  for  the  British  to  avoid  battle.  Even 
minor  successes  on  our  part  might  have  driven  them 
to  seek  us  out. 


I04  MY    MEMOIRS 

There  was  further  to  be  considered  the  compara- 
tively favourable  numerical  relation  between  the  two 
forces  in  the  first  year  of  war/ 

Further,  the  mistaken  and  purposelessly  exhausting 
guerrilla  warfare  was  bound  to  depress  the  morale  of 
the  fleet.  Although  the  moral  endurance  of  the  per- 
sonnel lasted  until  19 18,  and  made  our  fleet  capable 
of  any  battle,  as  was  proved  at  Osel  at  the  end  of 
191 7,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  systematic 
undermining  of  the  men  by  the  social  democrats, 
which  alone  rendered  possible  the  destruction  of 
our  sea-power  and  our  whole  empire,  found  a  cer- 
tain receptivity  owing  to  the  long  inactivity  of  the 
navy. 

The  battleships  lay  behind  their  booms  in  or  around 
the  river  mouths,  without  any  apparently  useful  func- 
tion, seemingly  nailed  fast,  and  the  hard  but  mo- 
notonous daily  service  became  almost  unbearable  after 
from  five  to  seven  years'  unbroken  life  on  shipboard. 
All  peace-time  comforts,  scanty  as  they  were,  were 
banished  from  these  iron  boxes.  At  the  same  time, 
the  men  were  always  on  the  qui  vive,  so  that  they  had 

*  The  splendid  increase  we  maintained  up  to  1914  as  a  result 
of  the  four-a-year  programme  prevailing  from  1908  to  191 1 
fell  off  from  1915  onwards  as  a  result  of  the  two-a-year  pro- 
gramme of  1912  and  onwards.  At  the  same  time  there  came 
into  the  scale  the  enormous  English  increases  from  the  pro- 
grammes of  1910  to  1913,  which  we  expected,  owing  to  their 
great  speed  of  construction,  to  be  ready  in  the  spring  of  1915, 
but  which  in  fact  did  not  swing  the  scales  against  us  until  the 
autumn  of  that  year. 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         105 

little  leave  and  hardly  any  relaxation.  Thus  with 
time  this  life,  which  would  depress  any  but  the  most 
fish-blooded,  became  a  school  of  grumblers  and  a 
hotbed  of  revolutionary  infection. 

While,  however,  in  accordance  with  a  fundamental 
principle  of  discipline,  punishments  for  the  weak  or 
undesirable  elements  ought  to  be  made  more  severe 
in  war,  especially  when  large  numbers  are  mobilized, 
we  had  to  surrender,  in  accordance  with  the  whole 
policy  of  the  Government,  to  the  demands  of  our 
popular  representatives,  relaxing  punishments  and 
undermining  the  authority  of  the  officers  and  petty 
officers  by  over-frequent  pardons.  Our  enemies  acted 
in  exactly  the  opposite  manner,  just  as  we  had  done 
in  1813.  At  that  time,  when  the  Silesian  Landwehr 
was  threatening  to  break  up,  we  even  went  so  far, 
wth  Bliicher's  approval,  as  to  apply  the  remedy  of 
flogging,  in  itself  naturally  inconsistent  with  the  spirit 
of  a  fight  for  freedom.  In  the  days  we  have  lived 
through,  however,  the  darkest  days  of  Germany's 
history,  our  Government's  fatal  system  of  loosing  the 
reins,  even  in  matters  of  military  service,  held  the 
field.  Officers  and  petty  officers  saw  clearly  the  harm 
that  was  done,  but  could  only  obey  the  orders  of  the 
authorities.  After  the  sabotage  incidents  in  the  sum- 
mer of  191 7,  the  naval  command  again  pressed  upon 
the  Government  the  necessity  of  rooting  out  the  nest 
of  treason  in  Berlin.  The  seriousness  of  this  move- 
ment for  the  navy  was  probably  never  understood  by 
the  Government.    I  myself,  with  all  the  experience  of 


io6  MY   MEMOIRS 

fifty-one  years'  service  in  the  navy,  regarded  as  abso- 
lutely impossible  such  a  mutiny  as  broke  out  in  the 
autumn  of  191 8. 

When,  in  191 7,  the  leaders  of  the  independent  So- 
cialists, instead  of  being  prosecuted  for  high  treason, 
as  the  navy  expected,  were  shielded  by  the  Reichstag 
and  the  Government,  and  permitted  to  continue  their 
hellish  activities,  the  doom  of  the  sea-power  of  Ger- 
many was  in  truth  sealed. 

Wherever  the  centre  of  the  revolution  was  not  in 
touch  with  our  crews,  as  was  the  case  with  the  ships 
in  the  eastern  part  of  the  Baltic,  and  wherever,  too,  the 
ships  kept  in  continual  contact  with  the  enemy  even 
under  dangers  and  with  heavy  losses,  the  morale  re- 
mained unbroken.  The  naval  history  of  all  nations 
shows  that  it  is  difficult  to  maintain  discipline  on  large 
ships  in  relative  idleness.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  there  was  a  mutiny  in  the  English 
fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  and  in  the  Channel, 
and  Parliament  had  to  negotiate  with  the  mutineers. 
But  whereas  at  that  time  there  was  a  certain  ground 
for  insurrection,  in  the  bad  food  (doubtful  salt  pork 
and  ship's  biscuits),  the  cruel  and  more  or  less  arbi- 
trary flogging,  the  numerous  death  sentences,  etc.,  our 
men  had  no  real  ground  for  complaint.  The  majority 
of  them  did  not  even  know  what  they  were  doing,  the 
leaders  of  the  movement  taking  advantage  of  the  low 
state  of  their  morale  to  bring  the  mutiny  to  a  head 
on  the  large  ships. 

In  dealing  with  the  prospects  of  guerrilla  warfare, 


THE   HIGH    SEA   FLEET         107 

apart  from  its  incorrectness  in  principle,  one  must  re- 
member that  the  very  point  in  which  we  could  not 
hope  to  compete  with  England  is  in  the  craft  required 
for  light  warfare.  The  large  colonial  requirements  of 
the  English  ensure  this,  and  the  development  of  our 
fleet  had  for  similar  reasons  been  concentrated  on 
battle  fighting.  The  possibility,  too,  that  a  battle 
might  arise  from  the  initiative  of  the  enemy  and  not 
from  ours,  also  constituted  a  danger  for  us.  The 
English  only  needed  to  conduct  a  feint  attack  on  our 
coast.  An  attack,  for  example,  on  Borkum  or  Sylt 
might  easily  force  us  to  battle.  For  such  a  movement 
they  could  bring  up  their  whole  fleet,  including  a 
portion  of  their  coastal  vessels.  We  would  then  fight 
near  our  own  ports,  but  against  an  overwhelming 
superiority  of  forces  and  at  a  point  which  could  be 
rendered  most  unsafe  and  thus  unfavourable  by  mines 
and  submarines.  It  is  true,  as  the  facts  have  shown, 
that  the  English  estimated  our  superior  quality  so 
highly  that  they  did  not  even  seek  battle  under  these 
favourable  circumstances. 

The  English  squadrons,  however,  gained  during  the 
war  experience  of  the  sea  and  of  sea-fighting  in  the 
wide  waters  at  their  disposal,  thus  equalizing  the 
original  superiority  we  had  obtained  by  our  training, 
so  thoroughly  undertaken  in  peace-time,  and  they  be- 
came more  and  more  imbued  with  the  feeling  that  they 
were  continuing  the  invincibility  of  the  English  sea- 
power  of  the  Napoleonic  wars. 

The  organization,  the  training,  the  point  of  view, 


io8  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  the  spirit  of  our  navy  were  all  directed  to  swift 
action  and  sudden  attack,  just  as  that  of  the  army- 
was  directed  to  the  war  of  movement.  Battle  offered 
us  our  best  opportunity.  The  English  hoped  to  gain 
their  end  without  battle,  and  their  hope  increased  as 
time  passed.  It  was  thus  for  us  to  force  them  to 
fight.  The  only  right  action,  politically  and  strategi- 
cally, was  to  seize  the  initiative.  The  fleet,  by  not  being 
put  to  use,  lost  its  raison  d'etre.  It  wasted  the  great 
strength  it  possessed,  disappointing  both  the  hopes  of 
the  nation  and  its  own  expectations.  If  the  army  and 
the  diplomats  had  been  equal  to  gaining  a  favourable 
result,  the  throttling  of  the  navy  might  well  have  been 
borne;  but  it  has  been  explained  in  the  preceding 
chapter  that  the  idea  of  our  leaders,  that  we  could 
come  out  of  the  war  alive  without  showing  the  strong- 
est military  and  political  front  against  England,  was 
a  fatal  illusion,  and  lay  at  the  root  of  our  loss  of  the 
war. 

The  prospects  of  a  modern  sea  battle  are  difficult  to 
estimate,  and  it  is  easy  to  fall  into  the  error  of  cal- 
culating too  much  in  mere  terms  of  material.  One 
often  compares  the  relative  strengths  in  the  Navy 
Lists,  making  an  equal  deduction  on  each  side  for 
ships  requiring  repair,  and  forgetting  that  the  side 
whose  initiative  brings  about  the  battle  can  choose  a 
moment  advantageous  to  itself  and  unfavourable  to 
the  opponent.  Numerical  superiority  is  of  course  al- 
ways important,  but  when  it  is  not  overwhelming,  one 
has  to  consider  also  the  quality  of  men  and  material, 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         109 

the  degree  of  tactical  training,  and  the  value  of  the 
leadership.  Most  of  the  naval  victories  in  the  world 
have  been  won  by  the  smaller  fleet.  When  fleets  are 
over  a  certain  strength,  it  becomes  tactically  difficult 
to  reap  the  advantage  of  superior  strength  on  the 
water,  for  in  the  main,  after  all,  the  battle  is  of  ship 
against  ship.  As  there  is  no  land  at  sea,  and  out- 
flanking, among  other  matters,  is  far  less  important 
than  in  land  warfare,  numerical  superiority  does  not 
play  the  same  important  part  as  do  the  "  biggest  bat- 
talions "  on  land.  Simultaneous  fire  of  several  ships 
on  one  target  is  of  very  doubtful  advantage  at  the 
very  long  ranges  that  are  now  possible,  for  it  renders 
artillery  observation  difficult,  and  in  any  case  involves 
a  wasteful  use  of  ammunition,  which  is  scanty,  and, 
during  the  battle,  wholly  irreplaceable.  Besides,  all 
the  naval  fighting  of  the  last  century  has  confirmed  the 
experience  of  Nelson's  day,^  that  there  is  one  critical 
moment  in  every  battle;  and  that  from  the  moment 
that  one  of  the  ships  has  established  superiority  of 
fire  over  the  other,  the  latter's  fighting  capacity  falls 
rapidly  and  soon  ceases  entirely,  while  the  victor,  if 
only  injured  above  water,  survives  virtually  intact  for 
further  activity.  Thus  in  the  few  naval  fights  that 
have  been  fought  out  in  modern  times,  the  defeated 
party  has  lost  everything,  and  the  victor  suffered  extra- 
ordinarily little,  as  happened  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  at  Santiago,  at  the  battle  of  Tsushima, 

*  A  treatise  on  Naval  Gunnery,  by  the  English  General  Archi- 
bald Douglas,  1829. 


no  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  at  the  battle  of  Coronel,  In  this  way  the  smaller 
fleet,  if  only  her  ships  have  a  higher  value  in  them- 
selves, has  v^ithin  certain  limits  no  need  to  despair  in 
the  face  of  a  numerically  stronger  enemy.  The  con- 
sciousness of  superiority  in  each  ship  is  thus  the  foun- 
dation of  the  spirit  of  the  whole  fleet.  Who  can  judge 
what  the  end  of  the  battle  of  the  Skager-Rak  would 
have  been  if  the  night  had  not  fallen?  One  need  only 
remember  that,  at  the  long  ranges  at  which  the  Eng- 
lish preferred  to  fight,  their  guns  could  only  fire  some 
sixty  shots  before  losing  greatly  in  accuracy,  whereas 
ours  could  last  much  longer.  After  the  fight  a  feeling 
of  definite  superiority  ran  through  our  fleet. 

What  crippled  our  conduct  of  the  war  at  sea  in  the 
early  period,  so  rich  in  possibilities,  was,  besides  the 
already-mentioned  political  obstacles,  the  naval  pres- 
tige of  England,  which  had  its  effect  on  our  navy,  or 
at  any  rate  on  many  of  the  senior  officers,  who  were 
too  modest  in  their  judgment  of  themselves  and  of 
our  young  navy.  The  habit  of  grumbling  at  our  ma- 
terial, so  popular  in  peace-time  and  in  part  encour- 
aged in  high  quarters,  had  a  bad  effect  on  our  energies, 
which  should  have  gone  far  beyond  the  operation 
orders  received.  On  this  point  one  must  be  just,  and 
not  judge  the  navy  of  1914  by  comparison  with  the 
army  of  1870,  which  had  gained  by  the  trials  of  1864 
and  1866  the  full  consciousness  of  its  own  strength 
and  the  confidence  that  it  possessed  the  right  leader. 

The  position  was  extraordinarily  difficult  for  the 
commander  of  the  fleet.    He  was  only  to  risk  a  fight 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         iii 

under  favourable  conditions,  but  our  unfavourable 
strategical  position  made  it  very  difficult  to  recognize 
when  such  conditions  were  present,  while  we  were 
able  to  learn  from  the  wireless  messages  of  the  Eng- 
lish that  they  were  always  informed  immediately  any 
substantial  forces  on  our  side  even  left  the  river 
mouths.  This  created  the  possibility  of  our  striking 
an  unfavourable  moment,  and  we  had  always  to  be 
prepared  for  a  substantial  numerical  superiority  of 
the  enemy.  In  addition,  the  commander,  having  re- 
gard to  the  local  limitations  of  his  position,  could  not 
keep  au  courant  of  the  general,  political,  and  military 
position  so  as  to  know  whether  it  was  necessary  to 
come  to  battle  within  any  given  time.  Equally  little 
could  he  estimate  the  general  results  of  a  defeat,  with 
the  possibility  of  which  he  of  course  had  also  to 
reckon.  He  should,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  have 
been  relieved  of  this  responsibility.  I  shall  return  to 
this  point  later. 

In  their  view  of  the  position,  the  Chancellor,  the 
Chief  of  the  Cabinet,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff 
were  opposed  to  any  offensive  activity  of  the  fleet 
against  England.  They  were  able  to  gain  increased 
authority  for  their  views  owing  to  the  respect  which  it 
was  thought  necessary  to  pay  to  the  Russian  fleet.  My 
basic  idea,  that  we  must  keep  our  forces  as  united  as 
possible  in  readiness  to  deal  the  main  blow  at  any 
time,  whether  against  the  chief  enemy  or  for  once  in 
a  way  against  a  secondary  opponent,  never  gained 
acceptance.    In  the  whole  of  the  first  stage  of  the  war 


112  MY    MEMOIRS 

a  substantial  part  of  the  fleet  was  cut  off  for  use  in 
the  Baltic,  without  any  useful  result;  and  yet  it  was 
scarcely  ever  strong  enough  to  have  dealt  a  decisive 
blow  in  that  theatre.  Owing  to  the  feeling  that  after 
all  something  must  be  done,  several  enterprises  were 
carried  out  even  right  into  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
Gulf  of  Finland,  but  they  always  proved  to  be  blows 
in  the  air,  merely  delaying  or  interrupting  the  massing 
of  our  strength  in  the  North  Sea.  The  opponents  of 
the  policy  of  seeking  a  sea  battle  with  England  even 
carried  their  Baltic  views  so  far  as  to  develop  in 
several  quarters  the  policy  that  the  centre  of  gravity 
of  the  fleet  should  be  definitely  transferred  to  the 
Baltic.  This  view  was  approved  by  the  Chief  of  the 
Cabinet  among  others.  To  my  mind  such  a  policy 
could  only  be  considered  if  we  had  no  longer  any  pros- 
pect whatever  of  bringing  the  English  to  battle.  In 
that  case  the  old  Stosch  plan  of  operation  might  revive 
in  this  sense,  that  we  might  deal  a  really  heavy  blow 
against  Russia  in  co-operation  with  the  army,  and 
thus  either  make  the  country  more  disposed  to  a 
separate  peace  or  tempt  the  English  to  come  to  the 
aid  with  their  naval  forces.^ 

*  I  may  mention  here  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  we  had 
made  an  agreement  with  Denmark,  by  which  the  Great  Belt 
was  to  be  closed,  under  Danish  guarantee,  to  all  belligerents. 
England,  however,  did  not  recognize  the  right  of  Denmark  to 
do  this,  and  if  the  English  had  desired  to  force  their  way 
into  the  Baltic  they  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  overcoming 
the  weak  Danish  barriers.  This  agreement,  which  was  un- 
fortunately approved  by  myself  also  in  the  early  days  of  the 
war,   proved   disadvantageous  to  us,   since  we   felt  constrained 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         113 

In  all  the  early  period  of  the  war  I  fought  against 
the  withholding  of  the  fleet  from  the  pursuit  of  its 
great  aim  and  object.  Our  brave  men  did  not  know 
how  often  I  struggled  to  establish  the  policy  of  the 
strategical  offensive,  but  the  greater  number  of  the  of- 
ficers no  doubt  understood  the  tragic  situation.  The 
Emperor  found  it  necessary  on  several  occasions  to 
quiet  by  messages  to  the  fleet  the  anxieties  as  to 
whether  the  war  was  being  conducted  on  the  right 
lines.  On  September  7th,  191 5,  a  Cabinet  order  was 
issued  against  the  "  incorrect  conception  of  the  whole 
position  of  the  navy,  which  tends  to  cause  depres- 
sion." ^ 

The  Emperor  urged  the  fleet — 
"  to  maintain  the  spirit  of  cheerful  fulfilment  of  duty 
even  where  there  has  so  far  been  no  opportunity  for 
active  employment  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  or  where 
in  all  human  probability,  in  view  of  the  course  which 
the  war  is  taking,  no  such  opportunity  is  likely  to  arise 
at  all.  .  .  .  The  greatly  complicated  conditions  of 
the  war  make  it  particularly  necessary  that  all  officers 
should  have  confidence  in  the  supreme  command,  which 
in  deciding  where  to  advance  and  where  to  withdraw 

throughout  the  war  to  pay  respect  to  Denmark,  while  it  pre- 
vented us  from  improving,  by  the  use  of  the  Kattegat  and  the 
Skager-Rak,  our  unfortunate  strategical  position  in  the  Bight 
of  Heligoland. 

*  I  quote  here  the  main  contents  of  this  Cabinet  order  word 
for  word,  because  certain  conscienceless  journalists  used  it, 
with  convenient  abbreviations,  as  a  proof  of  the  bad  morale 
of  the  navy.  The  reverse  is  the  case ;  the  order  was  issued 
because  the  Emperor's  advisers  believed  it  necessary  to  restrain 
the  overflowing  eagerness  of  the  fleet  for  battle. 


114  MY    MEMOIRS 

has  to  consider  all  military  and  political  factors,  which 
in  greater  or  less  degree  are  withheld  from  the  view  of 
the  people  in  general," 

The  order  proceeds  then  to  describe  it  as  a  grave 
political  mistake,  having  regard  to  the  strategical  po- 
sition in  the  North  Sea,  to  send  the  fleet  to  battle 
under  conditions  which  can  be  seen  in  advance  to  be 
unfavourable,  and,  after  ordering  officers  not  to  pre- 
sume to  form  judgments  on  the  subject  of  submarine 
warfare,  closes  with  the  words :  "  I  demand  finally 
the  dutiful  subordination  of  all  to  my  will  as  supreme 
commander;  I  carry  the  heavy  responsibility  for  the 
future  of  the  Empire,  and  the  navy  should  be  con- 
vinced that  I  would  be  only  too  happy  if  I  could  send 
it  out  unhampered  to  fight  the  enemy."  These  last 
words  show  the  tragedy  of  the  Emperor's  position. 
The  men  who,  in  order  not  to  irritate  the  British  lion, 
recommended  to  his  Majesty  the  shackling  of  the 
fleet,  a  policy  contradictory  to  the  whole  spirit  of  the 
war,  must  have  wholly  failed  to  understand  that  this 
point  of  view  involved  the  destruction  of  the  Em- 
peror's own  great  work.  How  could  a  nation  build  a 
fleet,  and  not  send  it  to  battle  in  its  fight  for  existence  ? 
And  on  the  other  hand,  how  could  anyone  adopt  the 
policy  followed  by  Bethmann  in  19 14,  save  in  reliance 
on  mighty  naval  power  ? 

On  every  occasion  that  offered  itself,  I  placed  before 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  orally  or  in  writing,  my 
views,  which  were  wholly  in  contradiction  to  the 
spirit  and  tone  of  the  Cabinet  order.    To  submit  simi- 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         115 

lar  documents  direct  to  the  Emperor  seemed  to  me 
hopeless  of  success,  and,  as  being  beyond  my  province, 
only  likely  to  increase  the  tension.  I  became  more 
and  more  isolated.  Already  in  the  late  autumn  of 
1914  persons  in  the  Emperor's  immediate  entourage 
only  dared  visit  me  in  my  quarters  after  dark,  in  order 
not  to  expose  themselves  to  misconstruction. 

The  touchiness  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  prevented  me 
from  getting  into  direct  touch  with  Ingenohl,  the  com- 
mander of  the  High  Sea  fleet,  a  personally  brave  and 
chivalrous  man.  The  impression  which  I  gained  on 
October  25th  in  Wilhelmshaven  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  fleet  command  did  its  work  was  the  first 
incident  to  strengthen  my  anxiety  as  to  whether  the 
hitherto  inactive  attitude  of  the  fleet  was  solely 
due  to  the  instructions  received  from  Headquarters. 
After  the  conference  with  me,  Ingenohl  obtained  the 
Emperor's  permission  for  an  attack  on  Yarmouth, 
which  was  carried  out  on  November  3rd.  This,  and 
a  hopeful  letter  from  Ingenohl  of  November  9th,  in 
which  he  informed  me  of  his  confidence  in  the  fleet  in 
the  event  of  an  encounter  with  the  English,  which  he 
expected  to  arise  out  of  some  such  attack,  gave  me 
the  task  of  securing  him  the  utmost  possible  freedom 
of  action.  The  Cabinet  at  that  time  were  no  doubt 
quite  rightly  of  the  opinion  that  a  change  in  the  com- 
mand of  the  fleet  would  be  at  the  least  premature. 
It  was  not  until  after  the  later  attacks  of  December 
1 2th,  and  particularly  of  January  24th,  191 5,  and 
as  a  result  thereof,  that  Ingenohl  was  relieved,  his 


ii6  MY    MEMOIRS 

place  being  taken  by  Pohl.  This  change,  in  con- 
nection with  which  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  studiously 
avoided  any  contact  with  myself,  started  a  movement 
within  the  navy  which  aimed  at  the  union  of  all  the 
various  controls  of  the  navy  in  one  hand,  with  cor- 
respondingly large  powers. 

VI 

When  one  bears  in  mind  the  complicated  nature  of 
our  naval  operations  in  the  separate  theatres  of  war, 
and  the  check  imposed  upon  our  activities  by  the 
limits  of  our  possible  reinforcements  of  personnel  and 
material,  one  cannot  doubt  that  a  united  command 
was  the  most  urgent  necessity  for  the  proper  massing 
and  employment  of  our  available  forces.  Just  as  the 
various  authorities  governing  the  land  army,  who  in 
time  of  peace  worked  independently  side  by  side,  were 
united  under  a  single  G.H.Q.  during  the  war,  so 
should  the  navy  also  have  had  a  single  head.  The 
tragedy  of  our  naval  warfare  can  be  expressed  in 
the  one  fact  that  a  supreme  naval  command  was  not 
established  until  September,   191 8. 

Again,  in  all  negotiations  with  the  military  or  ci- 
vilian authorities,  nothing  but  a  single  supreme  naval 
command  could  have  the  weight  necessary  to  secure 
the  successful  conduct  of  the  war  against  England. 

The  Emperor's  personal  retention  of  the  command 
of  his  favourite  arm  was  no  substitute  for  united 
leadership.  For  apart  from  the  many  other  duties 
that  claimed  the  attention  of  the  sovereign,  it  was 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         117 

impossible  that  such  an  immense  technical  responsi- 
bility, for  example,  as  the  decision  to  force  an  early 
battle  could  be  allowed  to  rest  personally  even  upon 
him.  The  Cabinet  advised  the  Emperor  badly  when 
it  retained  for  him,  and  thus,  for  itself,  the  direct 
control  of  the  High  Sea  fleet.  The  result  was  that 
the  great  sea  weapon  forged  by  the  Emperor  himself 
lay  in  a  sense  rusting  in  the  Cabinet  chamber,  where 
the  decision  to  send  the  fleet  out  could  not  be  taken. 
The  Cabinet,  seeking  for  excuses  for  their  own  weak- 
ness, hit  on  the  idea  of  blaming  the  material  of  the 
fleet.  When,  after  Skager-Rak,  the  scales  fell  from 
the  eyes  of  the  doubters  and  they  realized  how  greatly 
our  ships  were  superior  to  the  British,  it  was  historic- 
ally too  late  for  repentance. 

Whether  the  supreme  command  should  be  given  to 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
or  to  some  other  official,  was  in  itself  immaterial,  and 
a  pure  question  of  persons.  The  command  should 
have  gone  to  the  individual  enjoying  the  greatest 
respect  and  confidence  in  the  navy.  H  this  were  the 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  then  he  certainly  should  not 
have  set  up  a  hastily  improvised  machinery  for  deal- 
ing with  questions  of  organization,  politics,  interna- 
tional law^  and  economics  (which  was  what  actually 
happened,  owing  to  the  separation  of  functions),  but 
should  have  employed  for  these  purposes  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Admiralty,  which  had  been  developed 
in  peace-time  by  the  work  of  years  for  this  very  end. 
The  dualism  which  prevailed  in  the  war  brought  about 


ii8  MY    MEMOIRS 

a  gradual  side-tracking  of  old  and  proved  officials, 
and  a  disproportionate  and  often  untrained  activity 
on  the  part  of  newly  created  departments,  which,  with 
the  jealousies  inevitably  involved,  led  to  a  fatal  re- 
duction of  the  authority  of  the  navy  in  the  Emperor's 
councils  and  of  its  prestige  among  the  people.  The 
Chancellor  and  the  Foreign  Office  often  had  recourse, 
in  questions  with  which  the  Admiralty  alone  was  com- 
petent to  deal,  and  on  which  that  office  had  the  accumu- 
lated experience  of  years,  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  whose 
peace-time  activities  had  not  enabled  him  to  realize 
that  inadequate  treatment  of  these  questions,  which 
were  wholly  strange  to  his  officials,  was  bound  to 
lower  the  prestige  of  the  navy. 

Although  I  could  not  of  course  foresee  all  the  mis- 
fortunes that  were  brought  upon  the  nation  by  the 
disjointed  treatment  of  naval  questions  in  the  war, 
a  right  presentiment  moved  me  as  early  as  July  29th, 
1914,  to  request  the  Emperor,  through  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff,  to  place  the  control  of  the  navy  in 
the  hands  of  one  man. 

Had  the  Chief  of  Staff  been  a  suitable  person,  I 
should  have  suggested  him  as  the  chief,  just  as  later, 
when  I  despaired  of  any  other  solution,  I  offered  to 
Admiral  von  Pohl  at  headquarters,  in  the  presence  of 
the  other  officers,  to  place  myself  wholly  under  him, 
if  only  he  would  discuss  his  decisions  with  me  before- 
hand. It  was,  however,  the  unanimous  view  of  the 
officers  of  the  navy  that  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
propose  to  the  Emperor  the  appointment  of  Pohl  as 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET         119 

the  supreme  commander.  He  was  a  good  seaman  and 
an  excellent  navigator,  and  he  had  led  a  squadron 
very  well;  but  he  had  no  further  capacities.  Accord- 
ingly, I  told  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  on  July  28th 
that,  in  the  then  position  of  the  parties  concerned, 
the  proposed  office  would  presumably  have  to  be  en- 
trusted to  myself. 

After  audience  of  His  Majesty,  Admiral  von  Miiller 
informed  me  that  the  Emperor  had  not  seen  his  way 
to  take  this  step,  but  that  my  co-operation  was  to  be 
secured  by  providing  that  in  all  questions  relating  to 
the  conduct  of  the  war  at  sea  I  was  to  be  consulted  by 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  and  that  any  unfavour- 
able views  on  my  part  were  to  be  brought  to  His 
Majesty's  notice.  A  Cabinet  communication  ordain- 
ing this  hapless  half -measure  was  delivered  to  the 
Chief  of  Staff  and  to  myself  on  July  30th,  but  it 
proved  in  the  course  of  the  war  to  be  a  dead 
letter. 

The  opinion  was  later  expressed  in  the  navy  that  at 
that  time,  when  my  influence  was  still  of  weight,  1 
missed  an  historical  opportunity,  in  not  persevering  to 
the  utmost  logical  conclusion  in  my  demand  for  a 
single  leadership;  but  no  one  acquainted  with  the 
Emperor's  character  could  have  expected  any  greater 
success  to  attend  my  demands  if  I  had  appealed  di- 
rectly to  His  Majesty  or  had  tendered  my  resigna- 
tion. In  the  first  case  the  Emperor  would  merely  have 
discussed  the  matter  with  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet 
before  deciding,  and  in  the  second  he  would  not  have 


I20  MY    MEMOIRS 

accepted  my  resignation.  And  to  have  persevered 
in  my  request  to  resign  because  my  own  demand  for 
a  higher  post  had  been  refused  was  impossible  for  me 
as  an  officer.  I  should  only  have  caused  grave  mis- 
understandings, and  to  no  purpose.  The  army  too, 
it  may  be  remembered,  had  to  wait  two  years  for  the 
leader  it  longed  for,  and  the  hint  given  in  the  winter 
of  1914-1915  in  this  direction  by  the  man  most  trusted 
by  the  army  brought  no  improvement,  and  merely 
made  the  possibility  of  his  own  further  usefulness 
more  difficult. 

I  did  what  I  could;  the  rest  was  for  others  to  at- 
tempt. What  they  did,  and  with  what  success,  as 
I  myself  took  no  part  in  the  discussions,  I  can  best 
explain  by  quoting  an  extract  from  the  diary  of  Ad- 
miral Bachmann,  which  has  been  placed  at  my  dis- 
posal : 

"February  2nd,  1915:  .  .  .  The  Chief  of  the 
Cabinet  informed  me  that  I  was  to  take  the  place  of 
Admiral  von  Pohl.  I  begged  that,  if  it  were  still 
possible,  I  should  be  passed  over  for  the  post,  as  I 
regarded  the  position  of  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  at 
G.H.Q.  as  an  absurdity.  The  war  at  sea  could  not  in 
my  firm  conviction  be  controlled  from  G.H.Q. ,  lying 
as  it  did  far  inland,  nor  should  its  conduct  be  hampered 
by  the  need  for  obtaining  the  decision  of  His  Majesty 
on  every  occasion.  It  must,  on  the  contrary,  be  under 
one  and  the  same  control  in  all  theatres,  and  that  in 
the  hands  of  a  single  supreme  commander  ...  in 
the  closest  touch  with  the  fighting  naval  forces,  armed 
with  the  fullest  powers  and   .    .    .   able  .    .   ,.   at  any 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET         121 

moment  to  take  decisions  independently.  His  Majesty 
should  resign  de  facto  the  supreme  command  of  the 
navy,  and  confine  himself  to  laying  down  general  lines 
of  policy.  After  the  earlier  mobilization  orders,  I 
had  never  dreamt  that  such  a  commander  would  not 
be  appointed  immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war. 
The  existing  situation,  with  the  Chief  of  the  High 
Seas  fleet  and  the  Commander  of  the  Baltic  fleet  and 
Marines  each  in  command  of  one  theatre,  with  the 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  at  G.H.Q.,  as  so-called 
leader  .  .  .  but  without  any  proper  power  of 
command,  was  in  my  view  disastrous  and  ought 
to  have  been  abolished  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment. .   .   . 

"  When  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  asked  who,  in  my 
view,  could  undertake  this  supreme  command,  I  an- 
swered that  in  my  view  the  only  possible  person  was 
Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  the  man  who  had  created 
the  German  fleet,  with  which  his  name  was  indissolubly 
linked.  He  possessed  the  greatest  authority  with  the 
navy  and  the  people,  and  the  necessary  personal  quali- 
ties for  this  most  important  of  all  naval  posts. 

"  Admiral  von  Miiller  expressed  the  view  that,  as 
Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  had  been  out  of  actual 
service  for  eighteen  years,  he  was  no  longer  capable 
of  leading  the  large  forces  which  were  now  at  our 
disposal. 

"  To  this  I  answered  that  the  actual  leadership  was 
primarily  in  the  hands  of  the  head  of  the  fleet  and 
the  other  commanders,  and  that  provision  could  easily 
be  made  for  the  purely  technical  part  of  the  general 
command  by  the  appointment  ot  an  experienced  staff. 
I  was  personally  ready  at  any  time  to  give  up  my  po- 
sition and  to  accept  the  appointment  of  Chief  of  this 
Staff,  if  I  was  thought  to  be  suited  for  the  post. 


122  MY    MEMOIRS 

"  The  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  explained  that  it  would 
still  be  impossible  to  appoint  Grand  Admiral  von  Tir- 
pitz  as  supreme  commander,  since  as  a  Secretary  of 
State  he  was  subordinate  to  the  Chancellor,  and  that 
he  had  so  frequently  quarrelled  during  the  war  with 
the  departments  with  which  he  had  come  into  contact 
that  his  appointment  would  certainly  lead  to  further 
conflicts.  Further,  he  had  forfeited  a  great  deal  of 
the  confidence  of  the  officers  of  the  navy,  since  the 
material  ^  of  the  fleet  had  not  proved  equal  to  the 
demands  made  upon  it. 

"  I  objected  that  it  would  be  quite  simple  to  release 
Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  from  his  under-secretary- 
ship  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  and  replacing  him 
for  the  time  by  Admiral  von  Capelle,  and  that  in  my 
opinion  the  disputes  which  the  Grand  Admiral  had 
had,  the  causes  of  which  were  quite  unknown  to  me, 
should  not  be  judged  so  severely  as  to  justify  the 
exclusion  from  the  command  of  the  navy  of  a  man 
deserving  so  well  of  his  country,  and,  further,  that 
the  fleet  criticism  of  the  material  was  in  many  points 
hasty  and  unjust. 

"  Admiral  von  Miiller  finally  added  that  such  a  re- 
organization could  not  be  improvised  in  war-time,  and 
should  have  been  prepared  in  peace-time  if  it  was  re- 
quired. 

*'  To  this  I  could  only  reply,  that  in  my  view  the 
appointment  of  the  supreme  commander  could  be 
carried  out  by  a  Cabinet  order  of  a  few  lines  in 
length. 

"  The  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  closed  the  discussion 
with  the  remark  that  nothing  could  now  be  altered, 
and  that  I  had  been  appointed  as  Chief  of  the  Naval 
Staff." 

^  With  regard  to  the  material  see  Appendix. 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         123 

Several  other  officers  of  high  rank  have  informed 
me  of  similar  steps  taken  by  themselves,  with  like 
results.  The  real  ground  on  which  I  was  excluded 
was  the  difference  between  the  strategical  points  of 
view  of  myself  and  the  Cabinet.  When  at  last  the 
battle  of  the  Skager-Rak  showed  the  baselessness  of 
the  suspicions  as  to  our  material,  which  had  been 
widely  used  against  me  in  the  country,  I  had  already 
been  dismissed  and  the  general  situation  had  been  en- 
tirely changed  to  our  disadvantage. 

That  curious  and  somewhat  incomprehensible  per- 
son, von  Muller,  Chief  of  the  Cabinet,  has  an  excessive 
share  of  the  responsibility  for  Germany's  fate.  An 
amiable  man  of  no  mean  artistic  gifts,  he  made  his 
reputation  in  Sweden  and  had  a  long  career  as  a 
courtier,  being  very  popular  with  the  ladies  of  the 
Court  and  in  society;  at  the  same  time  he  had  a  strain 
of  fanaticism,  being  a  teetotaller,  a  pacifist,  and  a 
friend  of  Stead.  He  was  not  primarily  a  naval  of- 
ficer. In  contrast  to  his  predecessor,  Senden,  he  had 
failed  to  imbue  himself  thoroughly  with  the  noblest 
and  most  distinctive  features  of  Prussianism.  In  a 
sense,  he  succumbed  to  the  temptations  of  his  office, 
being  too  weak  and  lacking  firm  judgment  of  men 
and  of  naval  or  military  questions.  In  discussion 
he  was  easily  convinced,  and  as  easily  talked  round 
again  by  a  third  party.  Himself  a  master  of  language, 
he  was  easily  captured  by  fine  phrases  such  as  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  knew  well  how  to  turn.  Much  im- 
pressed with  his  own  authority  and  living  in  the  at- 


124  MY    MEMOIRS 

mosphere  of  the  Cabinet,  "  if  he  could  not  achieve 
anything,  he  could  at  any  rate  prevent  anything." 
He  of  course  only  wanted  what  was  best,  but  it  was 
a  great  misfortune  that  two  such  congenial  natures 
as  his  and  Bethmann's  came  to  work  together  in  such 
intimacy. 

Unfortunately  the  Emperor  was  slow  in  not  realiz- 
ing the  extent  of  the  combined  influence  of  these  two 
gentlemen  on  the  formation  of  his  own  judgment, 
which  was  generally  more  correct.  He  rather  saw 
in  Miiller  an  admirable  go-between  between  the  two 
markedly  opposite  characters  of  Bethmann  and  my- 
self. Miiller,  however,  was  anything  but  a  go-between, 
as  had  already  been  proved  in  peace-time,  for  he  took 
Bethmann's  side  almost  invariably;  as  he  used  to  say 
at  that  time,  he  much  regretted  that  he  had  to  vote 
against  his  own  colour. 

The  phrase  has  been  used :  "  I  will  have  nobody  be- 
tween myself  and  my  navy."  To  encourage  the  illu- 
sion that  the  Supreme  War  Lord  himself  directed 
the  operations  of  the  fleet,  there  were  people  who  took 
delight  in  asking  the  Emperor  for  instructions  even 
in  smaller  undertakings  of  the  fleet,  and  even  in 
matters  of  detail.  The  Chancellor  and  the  Chief  of 
the  Cabinet,  who  held  Pohl  in  the  hollow  of  their 
hands,  made  use  of  his  peculiarities  to  inflate  to  an 
almost  morbid  extent  his  departmental  jealousy  of 
myself.  I  am  anxious  to  believe  that  the  serious 
malady  to  which  he  succumbed  a  year  later  was  in 
part  the  cause  of  this.     When  we  met  shortly  before 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         125 

his  final  illness,  he  expressed  his  regret  that  he  had 
not  followed  the  same  course  as  myself. 

I  had  moved  to  G.H.O.  with  the  rest,  and  remained 
there  so  long  as  I  had  any  hope  that  I  should  not 
entirely  lose  my  influence  with  the  Emperor.  The 
whole  atmosphere  surrounding  the  important  persons 
assembled  there  was  absolutely  strange  to  me,  and  I 
became  more  and  more  worn  out.  I  now  think  that 
the  position  of  under  secretary,  clipped  and  cut  short 
on  all  sides,  would  have  remained  stronger  if  I  had 
stayed  in  Berlin.  A  supreme  commander,  or  rather 
a  chief  of  the  Admiralty,  on  the  other  hand,  should 
not  have  been  tied  to  any  place,  but  should  have  been 
at  liberty  to  go  where  he  needed,  sometimes  to  G.H.Q., 
sometimes  to  Berlin,  sometimes  to  Wilhelmshaven  or 
possibly  on  board  ship.  To  take  up  his  post  on  the 
flagship,  where  he  would  lose  the  general  view  of  the 
situation,  would  have  been  as  antiquated  as  for  the 
leader  of  a  modern  army  to  remain  on  his  horse  on  a 
hill  on  the  battle-field. 

I  must  renounce  the  task  of  describing  in  particular 
the  damage  caused  by  the  lack  of  a  unified  command 
and  the  independence  of  the  various  navy  departments 
and  theatres  of  war.  The  bitterest  recollection  for 
most  officers  was  the  fact  that  no  battle  took  place, 
and  this  filled  them  with  the  greatest  anxiety  for  the 
future  of  their  country  and  their  navy.  In  1806 
events  moved  too  rapidly  for  many  to  foresee  the  ca- 
tastrophe before  its  arrival;  but  in  this  war  many 
recognized  it. 


126  MY    MEMOIRS 


VII 


In  connection  with  the  appointment  of  Pohl  as 
Commander  of  the  Fleet,  which  was  received  with  the 
greatest  astonishment  by  the  navy,  the  Chief  of  the 
Cabinet  attributed  great  importance  to  finding  a  suc- 
cessor to  him  at  G.H.Q.  who  would  fall  in  with  Beth- 
mann's  naval  policy.  If,  however,  he  regarded  Ad- 
miral Bachmann  as  suitable  from  this  point  of  view, 
then,  as  was  so  often  the  case,  his  judgment  of  men 
was  at  fault.  Far  from  falling  in  with  the  Chancellor's 
policy,  Bachmann  was  such  a  frank  supporter  of  the 
views  prevailing  in  the  navy  that  his  position  as 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  was  soon  rendered  difficult 
and  he  was  succeeded  by  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff 
in  September,  19 15. 

During  his  short  tenure  of  office,  however,  Bach- 
mann succeeded  in  obtaining  full  freedom  of  action 
for  the  Commander  of  the  Fleet,  Pohl,  it  is  true, 
still  held  to  his  views  in  favour  of  the  Baltic  theatre, 
and  felt  himself  bound  to  conform  to  oral  instructions 
which  he  had  received  from  the  Emperor.  At  the 
same  time,  too,  the  actual  prospects  of  success  in 
battle  seemed  to  become  less  favourable  for  us,  ow- 
ing to  the  increase  of  the  English  fleet  through  new 
construction  and  the  more  pronounced  massing  of 
the  enemy's  main  strength.  The  most  important  op- 
erations were  now  those  of  the  submarines,  which 
were  begun  in   191 5,  without  my  approval  and  on 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         127 

lines  which  in  my  view  and  that  of  Bachmann  were 
not  the  most  suitable. 

When,  at  the  beginning  of  January,  19 16,  Admiral 
Scheer  replaced  the  now  invalid  Admiral  von  Pohl  as 
Commander  of  the  Fleet,  he  and  his  Chief  of  Staff 
von  Trotha  (his  own  choice)  took  over  their  duties 
with  the  firm  intention  of  bringing  the  fleet  more 
strongly  to  bear  in  spite  of  the  less  favourable  general 
situation.  Scheer  accordingly  took  measures,  and 
successful  measures,  to  deal  with  the  decline  in  morale 
brought  about  by  the  long  previous  inactivity  of  the 
fleet.  The  recent  efforts  of  the  British,  undertaken 
at  the  cost  of  enormous  exertions,  to  close  our  tract 
of  the  North  Sea  from  Borkum  to  Jutland  against  our 
high-sea  fighting  vessels  and  submarines  by  means  of 
broad  minefields  had  already  made  it  much  more 
difficult  to  realize  his  intention  of  giving  battle.  To 
frustrate  these  efforts,  we  had  to  create  a  large  organi- 
zation of  vessels  to  keep  safe  fairways  open  on  a 
regular  system  through  these  minefields.  We  gradu- 
ally developed  a  most  exacting  and  dangerous  mine- 
sweeping  service,  which  cost  us  many  losses,  but  never- 
theless fulfilled  its  task  in  the  main  up  to  the  end  of 
the  war.  The  fleet  had  to  pass  through  these  fair- 
ways to  reach  the  open  waters  of  the  North  Sea, 
and  on  its  return  to  keep  the  same  course.  It  is  easy 
to  see  how  this  hampered  our  movements  in  compari- 
son to  previous  years. 

On  one  of  their  more  distant  advances,  originally 
designed  to  reach  the  English  coast,  our  cruisers,  at 


128  MY    MEMOIRS 

a  considerable  distance  from  the  mair  body  of  the 
fleet,  came  up  off  the  Skager-Rak  with  t.ie  numerically 
superior  English  cruiser  fleet,  and  immed'ately  at- 
tacked. The  battle  that  thus  developed  soon  made  it 
clear  that  our  vessels  were  substantially  superior  to 
those  of  the  enemy.  At  the  start  there  were  six 
English  battle-cruisers  against  five  of  ours.  The  air 
was  clear  as  crystal,  and  the  initial  battle  range  some 
15,000  metres.  Eighteen  minutes  after  opening  fire, 
the  battle-cruiser  Indefatigable  blew  up,  followed 
twenty  minutes  later  by  the  Queen  Mary}  In  the 
further  course  of  the  fight  the  British  were  strongly 
reinforced  by  five  of  their  newest  ships  of  the  Queen 
Elisabeth  class,  only  completed  during  the  war;  these 
vessels,  driven  exclusively  by  oil-fuel,  possessed  such 
a  high  speed  that  they  could  take  part  in  cruiser  fights. 
They  attached  themselves  to  the  English  cruisers,  and 
joined  in  the  battle  from  long  range.  Up  to  the 
moment  when  the  English  Admiral  Beatty,  sighting 
our  battle  fleet,  wheeled  about  and  went  on  a  northerly 
course,  the  fighting  capacity  of  our  squadron  had 
hardly  been  diminished.  The  most  badly  damaged 
of  our  ships,  the  Seydlitz,  had  received  three  bad  hits, 
including  one  from  a  38-centimetre  gun,  as  was  later 
seen  from  the  shell  fragments.  Even  a  torpedo  hit, 
which  she  received  later  from  an  English  destroyer, 
had  little  or  no  success,  its  effects  being  limited  by  the 

'  In  this  connection  one  should  remember  the  criminally  false 
reports  that  had  been  spread  about  the  alleged  inferiority  of  our 
large-calibre   guns. 


THE    HIGH    SEA   FLEET         129 

torpedo  bulkhead.  In  the  next  stages  of  the  battle 
the  Seydlits  was  able  to  attack  the  main  body  of  the 
enemy  fleet  at  high  speed,  receiving  twenty  more  heavy 
hits,  and  nevertheless  to  return  to  port  under  her  own 
steam.  While  the  feeling  of  danger  surmounted  was 
still  fresh  in  his  memory,  her  brave  commander,  Cap- 
tain von  Egidy,  sent  me,  to  my  great  joy,  a  telegram 
of  thanks  in  the  name  of  his  officers  and  men  for  the 
splendid  material  of  the  vessel.^  Admiral  Scheer  and 
his  Chief  of  Staff  von  Trotha  learnt  from  the  wireless 
reports  that  the  cruiser  fight  was  bound  to  lead  to  an 
ertcounter  with  the  Grand  Fleet,  whose  numerical 
superiority  and  at  that  time  homogeneous  composition 
of  ships  of  the  line  of  the  battle  class  was  well  known 
to  them.  History  owes  them  a  great  debt  of  grati- 
tude, that  they  hastened  out  to  battle  with  all  possible 
speed.  They  formed  a  better  judgment  than  had 
hitherto  been  held  of  the  personnel  and  material  of 
our  fleet. 

When  our  battle  fleet  accordingly  began  to  take 
under  their  fire  the  English  battle-cruisers  and  battle- 
ships which  were  making  off  to  the  northward,  the 
"  forward  "  position  of  the  enemy  prevented  any  of 
our  vessels  from  firing  save  the  battle-cruisers  who 
had  placed  themselves  in  advance  of  the  fleet  and  the 
leading  ships  of  the  Konig  class  under  Admiral 
Behncke.      The   English   admiral,   moving   gradually 

*  The  public  manifestations  of  gratitude  from  the  whole  fleet 
made  it  clear  to  me  that  the  true  value  of  our  ships  had  been 
established  by  the  ordeal  of  fire. 


I30  MYMEMOIRS 

from  a  northerly  to  an  easterly  course,  forced  the 
head  of  our  line  also  to  turn.  After  defeating  in  a 
few  minutes  the  battle-cruiser  Invincible,  and  two 
armoured  cruisers  of  the  Warrior  class,  which  came 
up  at  this  point,  the  head  of  our  line  suddenly  came 
upon  the  main  body  of  the  English  fleet,  lying  in  haze 
and  mist  and  deployed  in  a  long  line;  all  the  vessels 
of  the  fleet  immediately  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  us. 
The  position  thus  became,  by  accident,  tactically  very 
unfavourable  for  us.  Not  only  would  our  ships,  in 
order  to  obtain  a  good  tactical  position,  have  had  to 
deploy  under  the  fire  of  the  whole  enemy  fleet,  but 
light  was  now  such  that  the  German  ships  were  silhou- 
etted against  the  evening  sky  in  the  west,  thus  present- 
ing, in  the  occasional  moments  of  good  visibility,  ad- 
mirable subjects  for  artillery  observation,  while  on 
the  other  hand  the  mist  in  the  east  so  concealed  the 
hulls  of  the  British  ships  that  their  position  was  hardly 
to  be  discerned  save  by  the  flashes  of  their  guns. 
Admiral  Scheer  withdrew  from  the  position  of  danger 
thus  created,  by  a  simultaneous  wheeling  of  the  whole 
fleet,  a  manoeuvre  which  few  fleets  in  the  world  could 
have  succeeded  in  carrying  out  under  a  rain  of  fire. 
In  this  manoeuvre  the  fleet  was  supported  by  two  of 
our  torpedo-boat  flotillas  under  Captain  Heinrich, 
which,  recognizing  the  fleet's  dangerous  position,  at- 
tacked the  main  body  of  the  British  fleet  and  drew 
its  whole  fire  upon  themselves.  As  soon  as  Admiral 
Scheer  had  re-formed  his  fleet,  he  swung  round  again 
on  the  enemy,  to  repeat  his  attack.     The  approach  of 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         131 

darkness  soon  afterward  made  any  deliberate  fighting 
formation  impossible.  If  the  English  fleet  at  this 
stage  had  felt  superior  to  us,  they  would  have  clung 
to  our  fleet  in  all  circumstances,  for  as  we  had  with 
us  a  squadron  of  pre-Dreadnoughts,  and  their  fleet 
consisted  exclusively  of  new  battle  vessels,  they  were 
superior  to  us  in  the  general  speed  of  their  fleet, 
in  addition  to  having  available  a  group  of  battle-ships 
of  especially  high  speed. 

Under  these  circumstances  Admiral  Scheer  and  our 
whole  fleet  regarded  a  renewal  of  the  fight  on  the 
following  morning  as  a  certainty.  They  preferred, 
however,  to  face  this  fight  at  a  less  distance  from  the 
mine-free  fairway,  and  accordingly  decided  to  move 
thither  in  the  night,  and  take  station  close  to  Horns 
Reef.  When  the  day  broke,  the  sea  lay  empty  as  far 
as  man  could  see,  and  nothing  was  to  be  found  of  the 
British  fleet  until  an  airship  reported  the  approach 
of  a  new  and  apparently  large  body  of  ships  far  to 
the  westward.  It  appeared  later  that  this  was  in  fact 
the  main  body  of  the  British  fleet,  which,  however, 
soon  steamed  off  to  the  northward.  The  probable 
course  of  movement  of  the  British  fleet  was  that  it 
steamed  off  to  the  west  at  nightfall,  passing  to  the 
south  of  our  fleet,  with  the  rearguard,  consisting  of 
cruisers  and  a  large  part  of  their  torpedo  boats,  fol- 
lowing at  a  somewhat  considerable  distance.  Our 
fleet  on  its  journey  southwards  must  have  struck  the 
gap  so  existing  between  their  main  body  and  their 
rearguard.     The  mass  of  English  torpedo  boats,  sup- 


132  MY    MEMOIRS 

ported  by  cruisers,  were  thus  presented  with  an  in- 
credibly favourable  opportunity  to  attack  our  fleet, 
which  was  steaming  in  close  formation  in  one  long 
line.  The  attack  was  carried  out  with  courage,  but 
little  skill.  It  cost  us  the  Pommern,  a  pre-Dread- 
nought,  but  several  English  cruisers  and  at  least  six 
torpedo  boats,  under  the  fire  of  our  ships,  burst  into 
flames,  which  shot  into  the  sky  high  above  the  masts 
of  the  vessels.  As  a  high  officer  of  the  fleet  staff 
described  it  in  a  letter  to  me,  it  was  like  sailing  through 
an  avenue  of  fire.  In  addition  to  the  flames,  there  was 
the  glare  of  the  searchlights  and  the  sparking  of  the 
wireless.  The  main  body  of  the  English  fleet,  which 
must  have  been  at  no  great  distance,  cannot  thus 
have  remained  in  any  doubt  as  to  the  whereabouts  of 
our  fleet. 

Fortune  did  not  present  such  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity to  our  torpedo  boats;  they  passed  the  night 
without  finding  the  British  fleet,  and  their  splendid 
training  for  such  fighting  was  not  brought  to  bear. 

On  June  ist,  in  the  afternoon,  our  fleet  arrived 
back  in  the  river  mouths,  elated  and  in  a  sense  sur- 
prised by  their  success  and  by  the  clearly  proved  su- 
periority of  their  personnel  and  material.  Most  of 
the  men  simply  had  not  known  how  splendid  the  fleet 
was.  After  this  battle,  in  which  conditions  had  not 
favoured  us  and  only  the  armoured  cruisers  and  the 
leading  ships  of  one  squadron  of  our  whole  fleet 
had  been  able  to  take  any  real  part,  they  thought 
of  the  success  which  we  could  have  expected  if  at  the 


THE   HIGH    SEA   FLEET         133 

beginning  of  the  war  we  had  sought  for  a  favourable 
opportunity  and  had  sent  the  whole  fleet  to  battle.  In 
spite  of  our  numerical  inferiority  and  the  unfavour- 
able conditions,  our  losses  were  only  a  third  of  the 
British. 

In  the  course  of  the  year  1916  Admiral  Scheer  made 
several  further  earnest  attempts  to  bring  the  English 
fleet  to  battle.  The  enemy,  however,  were  quite  ob- 
viously avoiding  a  "  costly  and  precipitated  action," 
and  t]ie  numerical  inferiority  of  our  High  Seas  fleet, 
and  the  general  conditions,  made  it  too  unfavourable 
for  us  to  fight  a  battle  at  Scapa  Flow  or  off  Dover. 

It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  one  advance  made  by  our 
fleet  brought  us  to  within  30  knots  of  Sunderland, 
and  into  touch  with  the  English  fleet;  we  lost  sight 
of  it  in  a  heavy  rainstorm,  and  when  the  weather 
cleared  it  was  not  to  be  seen. 

VIII 

With  the  commencement  of  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare  on  February  ist,  19 17,  the  navigation  of  our 
North  Sea  waters  became  more  and  more  seriously 
harassed  by  minefields,  and  the  difficulty  of  keeping 
the  fairways  open  increased.  The  continual  presence 
of  our  heavy  vessels  for  the  protection  of  our  mine- 
sweepers became  more  and  more  essential. 

There  remained  one  possible  course  which,  right  up 
to  the  last,  might  have  changed  the  whole  position 
once  again.  This  consisted  in  a  complete  suspension 
of  the  submarine  campaign,  the  withdrawal  of  the 


134  MY    MEMOIRS 

submarines,  and  the  attempt  to  employ  them  m  battle 
in  co-operation  with  the  fleet.  But  once  this  cam- 
paign, which  according  to  all  our  reports  was  causing 
the  English  great  embarrassment,  was  undertaken,  all 
its  effects  would  have  been  lost  by  a  pause  which  would 
have  been  bound  to  cover  many  weeks,  during  which 
substantial  period  of  time  the  enemy  would  have  full 
freedom  of  movement  for  his  merchant  ships.  We 
should  have  had  to  some  extent  to  start  wholly  afresh. 
In  addition,  the  effect  of  submarines  in  battle,  having 
regard  to  the  high  speed  of  the  fighting  ships,  was 
almost  entirely  a  matter  of  chance;  indeed,  their  real 
value  was  rather  that  they  rendered  tracts  of  the  sea 
unsafe,  somewhat  after  the  fashion  of  a  movable  mine- 
field, and  in  the  danger  created  by  them  for  any  enemy 
ships  that  might  be  rendered  incapable  of  movement. 

I  will  not  discuss  here  the  question  whether  the 
introduction  of  surprises  in  the  way  of  constant 
changes  in  the  conduct  of  the  submarine  campaign, 
and  the  employment  of  cruisers,  would  not  have  suc- 
ceeded in  restricting,  or  even  temporarily  or  partially 
preventing,  the  operation  of  the  enemy's  counter 
measures. 

When,  however,  in  October,  1918,  by  sacrificing  the 
submarine  campaign  on  the  demand  of  Wilson,  we 
abandoned  the  only  weapon  which  still  embarrassed 
the  English,  and  as  a  result  everyone  who  possessed 
any  real  conception  of  our  enemies,  or  of  the  spirit 
and  meaning  of  the  war,  expected  us  to  be  faced  by 
the  most  merciless  and  humiliating  armistice  condi- 


THE    HIGH    SEA    FLEET         135 

tions,  Admiral  Scheer  decided  to  employ  this  last 
remaining  means  of  utilizing  our  submarines.  He  had 
only  a  short  time  previously,  under  the  pressure  of 
events  and  with  the  concurrence  of  Field-Marshal 
Hindenburg,  succeeded  in  prevailing  upon  the  Em- 
peror and  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  to  place  the  entire 
command  of  the  navy  in  his  hands.  A  substantial 
number  of  submarines  sent  out  in  advance  of  the  fleet, 
and  confining  their  activities  to  a  certain  tract  of  the 
sea,  could  always  make  good  our  numerical  inferiority 
to  a  certain  extent,  and  above  all  could  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  fleet  in  the  event  of  defeat.  In 
order  to  inspire  strength  into  the  now  generally  ebbing 
line  in  Flanders  by  offensive  action,  an  attack  was  to 
be  made  on  the  eastern  mouth  of  the  Channel  by  our 
faster  ships,  in  support  of  which  the  battle  fleet  itself, 
protected  by  submarines  and  minefields,  was  to  take 
up  a  covering  position  on  the  Dutch  coast.  The  possi- 
bility of  a  fleet  battle  had  in  the  circumstances  to  be 
borne  in  mind.  If  one  should  develop,  it  could  be  ac- 
cepted in  such  a  position  with  favourable  prospects, 
and  in  the  event  of  success  this  well-prepared  under- 
taking might  turn  the  fortunes  of  our  people  once 
again  into  a  happier  course.  But  just  as  the  poison 
of  the  revolution,  for  four  long  years  almost  encour- 
aged, and  at  any  rate  not  resisted  by  the  weak  rulers 
of  our  ancient  country,  had  made  its  way  from  home 
through  the  lines  of  communication  to  the  army  front, 
so  also  had  it  found  its  way,  without  giving  any  out- 
ward sign  of  its  presence,  into  the  navy.    At  this  point 


136  MY   MEMOIRS 

the  revolution  broke  out  in  the  fleet,  and  our  demo- 
crats were  openly  proud  to  strike  out  of  their  coun- 
try's hand  the  last  weapon  that  offered  salvation. 

How  badly  must  a  brave  people  have  been  led,  to 
have  lost  their  head  in  this  manner!  Faithful  even  in 
a  sorry  cause  to  the  duty  of  obedience  which  our  old 
country  had  taught  its  subjects  for  their  good,  Ger- 
mans now  delivered  up  our  magnificent  ships  to  the 
enemy.  May  the  world  judge  justly,  and  remember 
that  the  men  who  under  a  revolutionary  government 
obeyed  the  order  to  deliver  up  the  ships  had  hitherto 
performed  deeds  of  heroism  whenever  they  were  given 
the  opportunity. 

The  disappearance  of  the  German  navy  robbed  the 
other  small  navies  of  the  world  of  their  life.  Their 
importance  and  their  independence  depended  on  the 
possibility  of  a  league  against  English  monopoly, 
a  law  of  world-politics  which  we  have  never  fully 
understood.  Now,  the  maintenance  of  the  balance 
of  power  at  sea  depends  solely  on  the  American  navy, 
and  I  have  no  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  alleged  con- 
flicts of  interest  between  the  two  Anglo-Saxon  powers. 
Their  capitalism  works  in  unison  for  the  enslavement 
of  the  rest  of  the  world,  which  since  the  collapse 
of  the  German  fleet  has  no  support  in  the  fight  for  the 
maintenance  of  its  freedom. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  SUBMARINE  CAMPAIGN 

1.  The  cause  of  the  declaration  of  the  war  zone. — 2.  The  first 
reverse. — 3.  Lusitania  and  Arabic. — 4.  To  and  fro. — 5.  My 
resignation. — 6.  Sussex. — 7.  The  unrestricted  submarine  cam- 
paign, 1917. — 8.  The  sum  total. 


The  more  England,  after  the  first  weeks  of  the  war, 
kept  her  fleet  back  in  order  to  deprive  us  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  achieving  a  swift  decision  by  force  of  arms, 
and  to  strangle  us  economically  by  every  means  in  her 
power,  the  more  necessary  it  became  for  our  navy 
to  fight  the  enemy  with  similar  weapons.  The  most 
effective  weapon  that  we  possessed  against  England's 
commerce  was  the  submarine.  If  it  was  to  be  em- 
ployed against  enemy  freight  vessels,  it  was  clear  from 
the  outset  that  the  existing  rules  of  maritime  law, 
which  in  the  main  dated  from  the  days  of  sailing 
vessels,  did  not  properly  cover  the  circumstances  of 
the  present  day.  The  rules  most  nearly  applicable 
were  those  of  the  old  blockade.  In  the  American  war 
of  secession,  the  blockade-runners  had  been  simply 
shot  down  by  the  Federal  ships,  with  cannon  it  is 
true,  since  there  were  then  no  torpedoes.  Just  as  the 
English,  in  their  declaration  of  the  war  zone,  stated 

137 


138  MY    MEMOIRS 

that  it  was  "  in  effect  a  blockade  adapted  to  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  warfare  and  commerce,"  so  could 
we  also  without  any  doubt  claim  formal  justification 
for  a  submarine  blockade.  True,  we  could  expect  the 
neutrals  to  adopt  a  different  attitude  to  actions  on  our 
part  from  that  which  they  adopted  to  similar  steps  of 
the  English.  As  a  result  of  the  great  sea-power,  the 
traditions,  and  the  diplomatic  skill  of  the  English, 
the  neutrals  submitted  to  almost  anything  the  English 
did  at  sea;  but  if  Germany  adopted  a  corresponding 
line  of  conduct,  much  greater  neutral  opposition  had 
to  be  expected.  It  was  clear  to  the  majority  of  Ger- 
mans that  in  a  war  with  England  we  were  strongly 
"  handicapped  "  from  the  start. 

The  main  difficulty  was  to  be  expected  in  our  rela- 
tions with  America,  especially  since  this  country, 
against  the  whole  spirit  of  neutrality,  had  developed 
shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  war  into  an  enemy 
arsenal.  Since  the  bulk  of  the  freight  trade  of  the 
North  Atlantic  sails  under  the  British  flag,  any  attack 
on  English  trade  must  of  necessity  injure  the  Ameri- 
can manufacturers.  We  had  already  discovered  in 
connection  with  our  oversea  cruisers,  which  had  ob- 
served the  rules  of  the  old  maritime  law  with  the 
greatest  care,  that  the  attitude  adopted  towards  us 
by  the  United  States  was  by  no  means  an  impartial 
one. 

These  considerations  led  me,  with  a  view  to  sound- 
ing and  also  to  preparing  public  opinion  in  the  United 
States,  to  receive  the  American  journalist  von  Wie- 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       139 

gand  in  November,  19 14,  and  to  ask  him  what  Amer- 
ica, which  had  submitted  to  the  absolutely  unscrupu- 
lous breaches  of  maritime  law  by  the  English,  would 
say  if  we  were  to  reply  with  a  submarine  blockade 
as  we  were  clearly  entitled  to  do.  With  the  assent 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  the  interview  was  published. 
It  was  later  alleged  that  this  course  betrayed  in  ad- 
vance the  idea  of  the  submarine  campaign,  and  had 
unnecessarily  irritated  the  English.  Both  allegations 
are  unsubstantial  and  irrelevant.  The  employment 
of  submarines  against  English  freight  vessels  had  al- 
ready been  discussed  in  the  press  in  the  early  stages 
of  the  war,  and  indeed  even  before  the  war;  and 
if  there  ever  was  any  prospect  of  forcing  the  British 
Government  to  place  any  limits  to  their  disregard  of 
maritime  law  it  could  only  be  by  holding  a  loaded  pis- 
tol at  their  head.  No  political  consequences  need  to 
be  considered  until  the  pistol  was  fired. 

From  the  beginning  of  November  onwards,  there 
had  been  discussions  between  the  leading  authorities 
of  the  navy  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  submarine  cam- 
paign. On  November  7th,  1914,  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff  brought  forward  for  discussion  a  draft 
of  a  declaration  of  the  submarine  blockade  of  the 
whole  coast  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  I  pointed 
out  that  the  legal  position  of  a  blockade  by  this  new 
form  of  vessel  in  international  law  had  never  yet 
been  discussed,  and  that  we  ought  not  to  select  a 
date  for  such  a  declaration  of  blockade  until  such 
time  as  we  had   available   a  number  of   submarines 


I40  MY    MEMOIRS 

more  or  less  sufficient  to  maintain  it/  It  seemed  to 
me  that  it  would  perhaps  be  better  that  the  Admiral 
in  command  of  the  Marines  in  Flanders  should  de- 
clare the  blockade,  so  that  the  Emperor  and  the  Gov- 
ernment should  not  be  committed  in  the  matter.  "  The 
blockade  of  all  England,"  I  remarked  in  concluding 
my  short  argument,  "looks  too  much  like  bluff; 
blockade  of  the  Thames  to  start  with  seems  to  me 
better."  I  thought  it  would  be  more  correct  to  start 
with  small  beginnings,  in  order  to  see  how  matters 
developed  from  both  the  naval  and  political  point  of 
view.  Such  a  limited  declaration  would  have  been 
more  in  accord  with  the  means  available,  and  would 
have  accustomed  the  world  gradually  to  the  new  idea 
of  blockade.  We  should  have  spared  America,  in 
particular,  not  touching  the  Atlantic  passenger 
vessels,  which  always  sailed  to  Liverpool,  and 
should  thus  have  lessened  the  danger  from  that 
quarter. 

Admiral  von  Pohl  did  not  share  my  point  of  view. 
On  December  15th  he  laid  before  me  the  draft  of 
a  letter  to  the  Foreign  Office,  in  which  he  requested 
their  approval  of  the  opening  of  a  submarine  cam- 
paign at  the  end  of  January,  the  English  Channel  and 
all  waters  surrounding  the  United  Kingdom  to  be 
declared  as  a  war  zone. 

On  December  i6th,  1914,  I  answered  this  proposal 
as  follows: 

*  On  the  question  whether  we  could  have  built  more  subma- 
rines   in    peace-time,    see    Appendix. 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       141 

"  In  reply  to  Your  Excellency's  letter  of  December 
15th,  I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  I  would  regard 
the  dispatch  to  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  request 
therein  enclosed  as  premature. 

"  In  my  view  one  cannot  well  ask  the  Foreign 
Office  at  the  present  time  whether  there  will  be  politi- 
cal objections  in  February  of  next  year  to  so  momen- 
tous a  step  as  the  proposed  submarine  campaign. 

"  I  have  in  addition  certain  objections  against  the 
form  of  conducting  the  campaign  which  Your  Ex- 
cellency proposes  to  adopt.  Submarine  warfare  with- 
out a  declaration  of  blockade,  as  Your  Excellency 
proposes,  is  in  my  view  much  more  far-reaching  in 
its  effect  on  materials  than  a  regular  legal  blockade, 
and  is  thus  considerably  more  dangerous  politically. 

"  Our  experiences  of  the  war  so  far  have  unfortu- 
nately made  it  clear  that  Germany  has  to  pay  more 
respect  to  the  commercial  interests  of  neutrals  than 
England.  The  reference  to  the  measures  taken  by 
the  English,  in  designating  the  navigation  of  the  North 
Sea  as  dangerous,  does  not  seem  to  me  apt.  The 
English  have  not  merely  declared  these  waters  to 
be  dangerous  as  of  their  own  motion,  but  only  on 
the  ground  of  their  allegation  (false,  I  agree)  that 
we  had  laid  mines  there,  and  that  neutral  ships  were 
exposed  to  the  danger  of  being  mistaken  for  German 
mine-layers,  and  treated  as  such. 

"  Finally,  I  would  expect  that  certain  official  quar- 
ters in  Germany,  where  objections  are  already  har- 
boured on  grounds  of  international  law  and  morality 
against  a  submarine  blockade,  would  object  still  more 
to  this  form  of  procedure,  and  make  their  objections 
effective.  The  draft  put  forward  by  your  Excellency 
is  more  likely  to  increase  than  to  pacify  these  protests. 

"  Apart  from  the  above  comments,  I  am  wholly  of 


142  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  view  that  a  systematic  attack  on  a  large  scale 
against  English  trade  by  means  of  submarines  must 
be  prepared  by  the  navy  with  the  utmost  energy  and 
all  possible  resources.  So  far  as  my  department  is 
concerned  this  is  already  being  done." 

Admiral  von  Pohl  replied  that  he  could  not  agree 
that  it  was  too  early  for  the  proposed  step.  He  in- 
formed me  that,  after  full  and  detailed  discussions 
with  the  Foreign  Office,  and  on  the  basis  of  a  mem- 
orandum of  the  Permanent  Under-Secretary  Kriege, 
it  had  been  decided  to  keep  to  the  form  of  a  declara- 
tion of  a  war  zone,  and  not  to  that  of  a  blockade. 
The  Foreign  Office  was  quite  ready  to  justify  the 
new  form,  and  the  decision  thus  turned  on  considera- 
tions of  legal  doctrine. 

At  a  later  stage  I  recommended  that  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff,  before  conferring  with  the  Chancellor, 
obtain  the  concurrence  of  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  von  Falkenhayn,  in  writing  if  possible.  So  far 
as  I  know,  this  advice  too  was  ignored. 

On  January  27th,  19 15,  I  was  invited  to  a  con- 
ference with  the  Chancellor  on  this  question.  I  ex- 
plained to  him  that  we  could  only  make  progress 
against  England  by  making  her  feel  the  effects  of  the 
war,  and  that  in  my  view  we  should  not  be  able  to 
avoid  adopting  submarine  warfare  in  one  form  or 
another.  I  stated  that  I  was  not  sufficiently  an  fait 
with  the  legal  and  political  aspects  of  the  question 
to  make  a  final  decision  as  to  the  most  suitable  form 
without    further   information.      In   this   conversation 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       143 

the  Chancellor  did  not,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  re- 
ject the  possibility  or  necessity  of  a  submarine  cam- 
paign against  enemy  commerce.  In  his  view,  how- 
ever, political  conditions  made  it  impossible  to  take 
a  decision  before  the  spring  or  summer  of  19 15.  I 
was  quite  agreeable  to  such  a  postponement  of  the 
matter,  as  it  had  not  yet  been  sufficiently  worked  out. 
Among  other  points  I  thought  it  right  to  await  the 
completion  of  the  Flanders  submarine  fleet  and  of  the 
dockyard  installations  there. 

On  this  occasion  I  stated  to  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in 
answer  to  a  question  on  the  matter,  that  one  could 
not  of  course  give  an  unqualified  assurance  as  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  submarine  from  the  naval  point 
of  view,  having  regard  to  the  novelty  of  the  weapon, 
but  that  I  was  convinced  that  we  should  produce  very 
considerable  results  and  that  the  danger  threatening 
merchant  vessels  would  deter  many  of  them  from 
venturing  to  sea. 

After  these  proceedings  my  surprise  can  be  imag- 
ined when,  on  February  4th,  191 5,  only  a  few  days 
after  this  conversation.  Admiral  von  Pohl  in  con- 
currence with  the  Chancellor  submitted  to  the  Em- 
peror in  Wilhelmshaven  the  war-zone  and  submarine 
declaration.  This  document  proclaimed  the  waters 
round  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  including  the  Chan- 
nel, as  a  war  zone,  and  announced  that  every  enemy 
merchantman  found  in  that  area  would  be  destroyed, 
without  it  being  in  every  case  possible  to  avoid  danger 
to  the  crew  and  passengers.    Neutral  ships,  also,  would 


144  MY   MEMOIRS 

be  in  danger  if  they  navigated  the  proclaimed  area, 
since  owing  to  the  misuse  of  neutral  flags  ordered 
by  the  British  Government  it  would  be  inevitable  that 
neutrals  should  in  fact  suffer  from  attacks  intended 
for  enemy  ships.  For  neutral  vessels  the  waters  to 
the  north  of  the  Shetlands  and  a  strip  along  the  Dutch 
coast  were  left  free.  The  difference  between  this 
declaration  and  my  proposal  is  easily  seen.  I  wanted 
a  blockade  of  the  Thames  only  in  the  first  instance. 
A  blockade  is  effective  when  every  ship  passing 
through  the  zone  is  in  substantial  danger  of  capture 
or  destruction.  If  we  had  concentrated  on  the  Thames, 
in  order  to  achieve  an  absolute  stopping  of  all  traffic 
there,  neutral  or  otherwise,  the  rest  of  the  coast  would 
have  remained  free,  and  no  serious  inconvenience 
would  have  been  caused  for  the  time  being  to  neutrals. 
The  Naval  Staff  was  engaged  in  working  out  my 
proposal  of  a  Thames  blockade  when  Pohl,  on  Janu- 
ary 31st,  in  reliance  on  the  Chancellor,  put  a  stop  to 
the  work.  By  its  extension  to  the  whole  coast,  the 
scheme  was  rendered  less  effective,  of  ambiguous  legal- 
ity, and  more  exacting.  The  declaration  was  not 
effective,  and  lacked  substance,  thus  encouraging  ob- 
jections. It  injured  the  credit  of  our  own  declara- 
tions, and  thus  in  a  sense  damaged  the  prestige  of 
the  German  navy.  It  had  the  appearance  of  bluff, 
and  the  ambiguity  arising  from  our  obvious  efforts 
to  spare  neutrals,  coupled  with  our  threats  not  to  spare 
them,  raised  doubts  as  to  our  right  to  carry  on  this 
mode  of  warfare.     But,  apart  from  legal  considera- 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       145 

tions,  the  declaration  was,  both  navally  and  politically, 
ill-conceived.  I  never  learnt  what  reason  there  was 
for  ignoring  my  view  and  beginning  the  submarine 
campaign,  but  in  any  case  this  constituted  one  more 
instance  in  which — and  this  time  in  one  of  the  most 
important  questions  with  which  my  department  was 
concerned — I  was  not  consulted  at  all,  the  campaign 
being  started  over  my  head  and  against  my  will,  and 
that  in  a  form  which  did  not  promise  success.^ 

The  Emperor  agreed.  I  happened  to  be  present, 
but  the  only  modification  I  could  procure  was  that 
reference  should  be  made  in  the  declaration  to  the 
misuse  of  flags  by  the  English. 

*  A  communication  of  February  2nd  from  the  Naval  Staff  to 
the  Admiralty,  which  arrived  on  the  3rd,  announced  that  the 
Chancellor  had  approved  the  war-zone  declaration,  and  enclosed 
a  copy  of  the  proposed  declaration.  I  did  not  hear  of  this, 
as  I  left  Berlin  for  Wilhelmshaven  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd. 
As,  by  the  Cabinet  order  of  July  30th,  1914,  decisions  of  this 
sort  could  not  be  taken  without  my  being  consulted,  the  fault 
lay  in  the  fact  that  a  decision  of  such  great  moment  was  taken 
without  waiting  to  hear  my  views.  Such  a  step  should  have 
been  fully  worked  out  before  being  finally  settled.  Admiral 
Bachmann  writes  to  me,  with  regard  to  his  advice  in  these 
events :  "  I  expressed  unreservedly  to  Admiral  von  Pohl  my 
objections  to  so  early  an  introduction  of  submarine  warfare- 
on  February  2nd,  191S,  when  I  was  called  to  Berlin  to  learn 
that  I  was  to  become  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff.  My  objections, 
based  on  the  small  number  of  our  submarines,  the  lack  of  bases 
in  Flanders  or  elsewhere,  inexperience  of  submarine  warfare 
against  merchant  ships,  etc.,  were  all  rejected  by  the  Admiral, 
who  stated  that  the  matter  was  already  decided,  that  the  Chan- 
cellor, the  Foreign  Office,  and  the  General  Staff  had  approved, 
and  that  the  Emperor's  ratification  was  to  be  granted  imme- 
diately. When  I  entered  on  my  new  office  on  February  6th,  the 
war-zone  declaration  was  already  published,  with  the  signatures 
of  Bethmann  and  Pohl." 


146  MY   MEMOIRS 

I  learnt  later  that  this  decision,  so  important  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  was  in  fact  arrived  at  during  a 
meeting  at  the  Chancellor's,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Foreign  Office,  in  the  presence  of  the  Imperial  Ministry 
of  the  Interior,  and  apparently  without  any  objection 
on  the  part  of  the  General  Staff.  After  that  meeting, 
late  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  and  shortly  be- 
fore Pohl's  departure  for  Wilhelmshaven,  the  inter- 
national law  expert  of  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Per- 
manent Under-Secretary  Kriege,  on  the  Chancellor's 
instructions,  forced  upon  the  reluctant  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff  yet  another  alteration  in  the  draft  of  the 
declaration.  I  only  mention  this  to  show  the  close 
co-operation  of  the  departments  concerned,  and  the 
full  agreement  of  the  Chancellor  with  the  course  fol- 
lowed by  the  Naval  Staff.  On  March  8th,  19 15, 
Admiral  von  Miiller  wrote  as  follows  on  the  subject : 

"The  Secretary  of  State  and  myself  disapproved 
the  manner  in  which  the  submrine  campaign  against 
merchantmen  was  introduced.  The  time  was  ill- 
chosen,  the  means  insufficiently  prepared,  and  the 
wording  of  the  notification  characterized  by  the  great- 
est clumsiness.  Pohl  obtained  the  concurrence  of  the 
Chancellor,  who  was  still  very  ill-informed  on  the 
technicalities  of  the  matter,  and  then  took  the  Em- 
peror by  storm,  with  the  already  settled  draft  of  the 
declaration,  on  February  4th,  on  the  boat  journey 
through  the  harbour  of  Wilhelmshaven  to  the  Seydlits. 
It  was  a  disloyal  act  on  Pohl's  part  not  to  have  dis- 
cussed the  draft  beforehand  with  the  Secretary  of 
State.  It  was  disloyal  to  me  too,  for  he  had  previ- 
ously invariably  sought  my  advice  in  all  important 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       147 

decisions.  He  was  anxious  at  all  costs  to  get  the 
declaration  published  in  his  own  name,  and  February 
4th  was  certainly  the  very  last  day  on  which  this  was 
possible,  for  on  that  very  day  he  had  taken  over  the 
command  of  the  High  Sea  fleet,  and  strictly  speaking 
was  no  longer  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff." 

The  die  was  cast.  On  February  i8th,  191 5,  sub- 
marine warfare  was  to  begin,  threatening,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  decision  taken  by  Bethmann  in  opposi- 
tion to  my  advice,  the  destruction  of  every  ship  bound 
for  England  or  Ireland. 

II 

The  declaration  was  in  my  view  premature  and 
unhappy,  but  once  it  had  been  solemnly  published,  and 
that  with  something  of  a  flourish  of  trumpets,  it  was 
vital  to  hold  fast  to  it,  if  the  dignity  and  thus  the 
power  of  the  Empire  were  not  to  receive  a  severe 
injury  and  the  confidence  of  the  enemy  were  not  to 
be  fatally  raised. 

On  February  12th  the  Americans  dispatched  their 
first  note  against  the  submarine  campaign,  which  can 
hardly  have  been  unexpected  by  the  responsible  offi- 
cials. Nevertheless,  from  this  day  forth,  to  Pohl's 
astonishment,  the  attitude  of  the  Foreign  Office 
changed.  Its  representative  at  General  Headquarters, 
Treutler,  stated  that  Pohl  had  misunderstood  the 
Chancellor,  but  Pohl  categorically  denied  that  any 
misunderstanding  had  been  possible,  as  he  had  ex- 
plained the  whole  matter  thoroughly  to  the  Chancellor. 


148  MY   MEMOIRS 

Thus,  before  the  campaign  born  on  February  4th  had 
drawn  its  first  breath,  its  own  parents  were  hurrying 
panic-stricken  to  throttle  it. 

In  my  view  we  might  possibly  have  considered  the 
abandonment  of  the  submarine  campaign  if  England 
had  made  corresponding  concessions  in  the  realm  of 
maritime  law.  The  civil  departments  thought  that  a 
sufficient  concession  on  England's  part  would  have 
been  to  take  her  stand  on  the  Declaration  of  London. 
I  certainly  thought  it  possible  that  England  would 
change  her  course  to  this  extent,  if  she  regarded  the 
dangers  of  the  submarine  campaign  as  greater  than 
the  advantages  she  reaped  from  ignoring  the  Declara- 
tion of  London.  We  might  have  been  well  content 
with  this,  for  although  the  Declaration  of  London 
would  not  offer  any  really  decisive  relaxation  of  the 
naval  blockade  of  Germany,  the  English  would  at  any 
rate,  by  adopting  it  in  the  circumstances,  suffer  a 
severe  loss  of  prestige,  while  we,  although  having  to 
abandon  the  campaign  for  the  time,  would  at  least 
have  gained  something  by  its  introduction. 

The  Chancellor,  in  drafting  the  answer  to  the  Amer- 
ican note,  did  not  wait  for  the  concurrence  either 
of  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  or  of  myself,  but  on 
the  contrary,  with  the  aid  of  the  Naval  Cabinet,  re- 
fused von  Falkenhayn's  demand  for  our  co-operation, 
and  sent  the  draft  directly  to  the  Emperor,  who  was 
then  at  Lotzen.  The  newly  appointed  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff,  Admiral  Bachmann,  entered  a  protest  to 
the  Emperor  on  February  14th  against  this  course  of 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       149 

procedure,  as  also  against  the  contents  of  the  draft 
itself,  which  was  calculated  to  betray  to  the  enemy 
in  the  most  dangerous  fashion  the  vacillating  nature 
of  our  policy. 

On  the  evening  of  February  15th  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff  quite  unexpectedly  received  from  the  Em- 
peror the  order  not  to  begin  the  campaign  as  an- 
nounced on  February  i8th,  but  to  await  a  special 
order  for  its  introduction,  and  on  the  same  day, 
February  15th,  the  submarine  commanders  were  in- 
structed to  spare  neutral  vessels  in  the  barred  zone. 
At  the  same  time  a  telegram  arrived  at  General  Head- 
quarters from  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet,  to  the  effect 
that  the  Emperor  required  an  immediate  telegraphic 
answer  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  it  could  be  guar- 
anteed that  England  would  be  forced  to  modify  her 
attitude  within  six  weeks  of  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign. My  own  attitude  was  to  be  mentioned  in  the 
answer. 

The  kernel  of  our  altogether  too  humble  answer 
to  America,  which  was  dispatched  on  February  17th, 
lay  in  the  invitation  to  the  American  Government  to 
find  a  way  to  procure  the  observation  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  by  the  English,  with  the  suggestion 
that  in  that  case  the  German  Government  would  be 
ready  to  follow  out  the  logical  results  of  the  new  situa- 
tion thus  created.  That  meant  of  course  that  in  that 
case  we  would  abandon  the  use  of  submarines  not 
merely  in  the  barred  zone,  but  also  against  enemy 
vessels.     I  was  by  no  means  opposed  in  principle  to 


150  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  point  of  view  that  our  aim  should  be  to  force 
the  EngHsh  to  observe  the  Declaration  of  London; 
and  the  following  telegram  was  accordingly  dispatched 
to  Lotzen :  "  Secretary  of  State  and  Chief  of  Naval 
Staff  are  convinced  that  England  will  modify  attitude 
within  six  weeks  of  opening  of  new  campaign  if  all 
available  forces  be  energetically  employed  from  start." 
We  had  puzzled  for  hours  over  the  telegram  of  the 
Chief  of  the  Cabinet  and  the  answer  to  be  returned 
to  it.  We  arrived  at  the  conviction  that  the  question 
as  to  the  six  weeks  was  designed  to  force  us  to  answer 
in  the  negative,  with  a  view  to  the  use  of  our  opinion 
to  justify  a  surrender  to  the  Americans.  I  still  re- 
member Admiral  von  Capelle's  remark :  "  A  silly  ques- 
tion deserves  a  silly  answer."  It  was  unreasonable 
and  contrary  to  all  principles  of  warfare  to  attempt  to 
pin  us  to  such  a  limited  period;  and  on  the  other  hand 
it  was  in  fact  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  great 
effects,  at  that  time  limited  by  no  counter-measures, 
of  even  a  relatively  small  number  of  submarines  would 
force  England  to  yield  and  to  observe  the  Declaration 
of  London.  This  was  the  first  of  those  unhappy  at- 
tempts to  fix  limits  for  the  performance  of  warlike 
operations  which  were  so  frequent  and  so  dangerous 
in  later  stages  of  the  war.  I  always  regarded  such  at- 
tempts as  altogether  wrong,  but  both  now  and  later 
the  navy  was  forced  to  submit  to  it. 

It  was  of  course  not  impossible  that  England  might 
arrogantly  despise  the  submarine  weapon  and  remain 
obstinate.    In  that  case  we  should  have  had  to  continue 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       151 

the  campaign  on  its  full  scale,  and  that  solution  would 
have  been  the  one  most  in  accordance  with  our  own 
interest.  It  was,  however,  in  any  event  quite  clear 
that  there  could  be  little  hope  of  efifective  results  for 
the  campaign  in  the  form  in  which  it  was  in  fact 
opened  on  February  i8th — that  is  to  say,  on  the  foot- 
ing that  no  neutral  ships  were  to  be  sunk;  for  the 
English  ships  naturally  began  to  sail  regularly  under 
neutral  flags,  as  indeed  they  had  to  our  sure  knowledge 
already  largely  done.  The  misuse  of  neutral  flags, 
which  was  recommended  by  the  British  Admiralty 
to  their  merchantmen,  thus  became  very  effective. 
Many  brave  submarine  crews  were  the  victims  of  these 
directions;  the  Baralong  murder  will  be  remembered 
in  this  connection. 

We  left  the  war-zone  declaration  standing,  thus  re- 
taining the  shell  of  the  campaign,  which  had  angered 
the  Americans,  in  order  to  give  an  appearance  of 
firmness  for  the  benefit  of  German  public  opinion; 
but  at  the  same  time  we  removed  the  kernel  by  means 
of  the  modified  orders  which  were  given  to  the  sub- 
marine commanders,  at  the  instance  of  the  civil 
authorities;  we  acted,  in  a  word,  fortiter  in  modo  and 
suaviter  in  re.  The  submarine  warfare  now  became, 
as  Bachmann  had  prophesied,  of  no  effect  in  securing 
the  ultimate  victory  of  the  German  people,  but  still 
had  material  enough  to  create  incidents  and  quarrels 
with  the  Americans. 

As  I  have  stated,  although  Admiral  Bachmann  and 
myself  regarded  the  declaration  as  premature  in  time 


152  MY   MEMOIRS 

and  unfortunate  in  form,  we  were  both  of  the  view 
that,  once  it  had  been  announced  to  the  world,  it  must 
be  stood  by  at  all  costs. 

If  we  had  returned  to  the  first  Atnerican  Note  a 
polite  but  definite  refusal,  I  am  convinced  that  there 
would  not  have  been,  either  then  or  later,  a  declara- 
tion of  war  or  even  a  rupture  of  relations.  The 
Americans  had  not  then  become  so  embittered  and 
partisan;  they  still  respected  us,  and  were  not  so  in- 
volved in  their  loans  to  the  Entente.  The  sensitive 
respect  of  their  citizens  for  maritime  law  even  found 
the  unneutral  attitude  of  the  States  disquieting.  The 
pacifist  Bryan  was  still  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  It  would  have  been  quite  impossible  for  Wil- 
son at  that  time  to  make  the  country  hostile  to  us.  In 
this  lay  our  great  opportunity.  For  the  negotiations 
then  being  carried  on  by  Prince  Biilow  to  secure  the 
neutrality  of  Italy,  also,  our  embassy  at  Rome  ex- 
pressed by  telegraph  the  desire  for  "  unwavering 
maintenance  of  our  attitude  and  of  respect  for  the 
might  of  Germany  and  the  Germant  fleet."  It  is  essen- 
tial from  the  start  to  carry  on  a  strong  diplomatic  cam- 
paign by  means  of  notes  against  the  unneutral  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States;  we  ought  to  have  made 
protest  after  protest  against  the  supply  of  arms  and 
munitions,  the  manipulation  to  our  prejudice  of  the 
wireless  telegraph  service,  the  silent  acquiescence  in 
the  illegal  English  blockade,  the  measures  taken 
against  our  overseas  cruisers  and  against  neutral  mails, 
etc.     Such  a  policy  against  America  would  not  be 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       153 

dangerous,  for  we  were  after  all  not  compelled  to 
add  an  ultimatum  at  the  foot  of  a  sharp  protest.  Even 
if  we  had  not  prevented  the  Anglo-American  "  mutual 
guarantee  association "  which  grew  up  during  the 
war,  it  would  probably  have  been  rendered  less  dan- 
gerous. We  should  have  given  a  definite  cry  to  which 
all  the  elements  in  the  United  States  which  were 
working  against  Wilson  could  have  rallied :  the  Ger- 
mans, the  Irish,  the  Quakers,  the  cotton  interests. 
We  never  adopted  the  right  tone  in  dealing  with  the 
Americans.  When  we  said :  "  You  Americans  are  in 
form  quite  correct  in  supplying  munitions  and  so  forth 
to  our  enemies,  but  it  is  not  nice  of  you,"  the  effect 
was,  as  results  have  shown,  exactly  the  opposite  of 
what  we  desired,  apart  altogether  from  the  fact  that 
the  transformation  of  America  into  an  enemy  arsenal 
was  in  the  circumstances  the  most  outrageous  breach 
of  neutrality  imaginable.  As  between  Germany  and 
Atnerica  there  was  even  a  direct  precedent  on  the 
point;  during  the  Spanish-American  war,  on  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  American  ambassador,  Andrew  White, 
we  held  back  in  Kuxhaven  a  vessel  laden  with  arms 
bound  for  Cuba. 

Had  we  dealt  with  the  submarine  campaign  coolly 
and  consistently,  we  should  have  prepared  the  ground 
for  the  view  that  the  campaign  was  not  merely  justi- 
fiable as  a  reprisal  against  the  starvation  blockade 
(which,  unfortunately,  was  the  only  argument  put  for- 
ward on  our  behalf),  but  that  it  was  clearly  and 
irrefutably  justified  by  the  maritime  law  created  by 


154  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  English  themselves  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
The  new  weapon  could  not  be  bound  by  rules  made 
in  the  old  sailing  days  of  a  century  ago,  but  had  a 
right  to  new  law.  Does  anyone  seriously  believe 
that  in  any  future  war  a  people  fighting  for  its  life 
will  not  use  the  submarine  as  we  have  used  it  in 
this  war,  even  if  new  rules  of  international  law  for- 
bid them  so  to  do  ? 

We  ought  to  have  recognized  at  the  latest  in  Febru- 
ary, 1915,  that  there  were  elements  of  blackmail  in 
Wilson's  policy.  In  our  earnest  efforts  to  spare  neu- 
tral ships,  we  had  offered  to  permit  the  Americans 
to  send  their  vessels  through  the  barred  zone,  if  they 
were  made  unquestionably  recognizable  as  neutral 
(through  convoys).  America  had  not  sufficient  good- 
will to  agree  to  this.  When  English  submarines  tor- 
pedoed our  merchant  ships  in  the  Baltic,  even  in  Swed- 
ish territorial  waters,  or  in  the  Adriatic,  thus  doing 
exactly  what  we  did,  and  worse,  nobody  was  in  the 
least  agitated.  In  America,  the  awful  catalogue  of 
England's  reckless  breaches  of  international  law  lay 
closed  and  unread,  while  everyone  pored  over  the 
page  of  the  German  submarine  campaign.  The  weak- 
ness of  our  politicians,  which  was  bound  to  give  the 
impression  of  a  bad  conscience,  was  largely  the  cause 
of  this  unjust  attitude  of  the  world.  Repeatedly,  but 
in  vain,  I  pointed  out  to  the  Chancellor  the  true 
character  of  Wilson's  policy,  begging  him  to  modify 
his  attitude  accordingly.  We,  however,  evacuated  one 
just  standpoint  of  principle  after  another,  only  sue- 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       155 

ceeding  thereby  in  encouraging  Wilson  to  further 
claims  and  further  threats.  Demands  which  in  the 
first  years  of  the  war  we  could  have  rejected  calmly 
and  firmly  without  fear  of  a  breach  hardened  more 
and  more  into  questions  of  prestige.  While  our  credit 
suffered  immeasurable  damage  with  all  maritime  na- 
tions, who  must  have  thought  that  our  own  hopes 
of  victory  were  shaken,  we  were  screwing  Wilson 
more  and  more  up  to  a  standpoint  the  maintenance 
of  which  in  the  end  became  a  question  of  honour 
for  him.  Of  the  practical  advantages  which  were 
eagerly  promised  as  a  reward  for  a  compliant  attitude 
by  Bethmann,  Helfferich,  Count  Bernstorfif,  and  others, 
we  never  reaped  a  single  one.  America  never  made 
us  any  really  tangible  concession.  In  our  capacity  for 
self-illusion  we  got  along  without  that.  And  as  our 
prestige  and  the  neutral  belief  in  our  victory  declined, 
the  only  real  avenue  to  success,  a  change  in  our  politi- 
cal relation  to  Japan  and  Russia,  became  more  and 
more  difficult. 

Ill 

On  May  7th,  19 15,  the  Lusitania,  an  English  pas- 
senger vessel,  which  at  the  same  time  figured  as  an 
auxiliary  cruiser  in  the  British  Navy  List,  was  tor- 
pedoed. American  citizens  who  in  wanton  reckless- 
ness, and  in  spite  of  the  warnings  of  our  ambassador, 
had  embarked  in  this  armed  cruiser,  heavily  laden  with 
munitions,  lost  their  lives  in  the  sinking  of  the  vessel. 
It  may  be  mentioned  that  the  commander  of  the  sub- 


156  my;   MEMOIRS 

marine  which  torpedoed  the  Lusitania  did  not  know 
that  it  was  the  Lusitania  until  it  turned  on  its  side 
in  sinking.  He  attacked  the  ship  from  forward,  so 
that  he  could  not  at  first  count  the  masts  or  funnels. 
After  the  torpedo  had  hit  the  vessel,  there  was  a  second 
explosion  in  the  interior  of  the  vessel,  due  to  the 
quantities  of  munitions  on  board.  It  was  this  circum- 
stance alone  that  led  to  the  immediate  sinking  of  the 
vessel,  and  the  high  loss  of  life,  I  was  at  the  time 
in  Berlin,  and  on  May  9th  telegraphed  to  General 
Headquarters  that  it  was  now  urgently  necessary  to 
make  good  our  legal  position,  and  that  compromise 
was  more  dangerous  than  firmness.  One  could  re- 
gret the  loss  of  life,  but  must  insist  on  our  clear  rights. 
Our  prestige  would  then  be  increased  in  America,  and 
the  danger  of  war  thus  most  effectively  diminished. 
On  May  12th  I  had  an  answer  from  the  Chief  of  the 
Cabinet  to  the  effect  that  the  Emperor  agreed  with 
my  point  of  view.  On  May  15th  we  received  the  first 
American  Liisitania  Note,  which  demanded  an  expres- 
sion of  our  disapproval  of  the  torpedoing,  and  an  in- 
demnity. Our  answer  temporized.  Weeks  of  discus- 
sion between  the  various  departments  of  the  Govern- 
ment followed.  On  May  31st  there  was  a  general 
meeting  at  Pless  to  discuss  the  question,  the  Emperor 
presiding.  Admiral  von  Miiller  informed  Admiral 
Bachmann  and  myself  immediately  he  arrived  that  the 
Chancellor  refused  to  be  responsible  for  the  campaign 
in  its  existing  form.  Von  Treutler  and  General  von 
Falkenhayn  were  of  the  same  opinion  as  the  Chancel- 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       157 

lor.  The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  and  myself  on  the 
contrary  maintained  the  view  that  it  was  technically 
impossible  to  comply  with  the  Chancellor's  demand 
that  the  campaign  should  be  so  conducted  as  to  avoid 
any  political  conflict,  and  that  His  Majesty  would  ac- 
cordingly have  to  decide  whether  it  was  to  be  carried 
on  at  all  or  not.  The  Emperor  agreed  with  our  point 
of  view  and  said  that  if  the  Chancellor  would  not 
accept  the  responsibility  for  the  entire  abandonment 
of  the  campaign,  the  existing  orders  must  stand.  The 
result  of  the  discussion  was  accordingly  the  issue  of 
an  order  to  the  submarine  commanders  containing 
renewed  and  comprehensive  instructions  as  to  sparing 
neutral  vessels  (which  had  already  been  the  subject 
of  an  earlier  order),  leaving  untouched  on  the  other 
hand  the  instructions  for  the  sinking  of  all  English 
vessels,  without  any  exception. 

However,  soon  after,  on  June  2nd,  the  Chancellor 
wrote  requesting  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  to  have 
large  enemy  passenger  vessels  spared.  There  had  been 
no  suggestion  of  this  in  the  discussion  of  May  31st. 
Admiral  Bachmann  put  forward  his  objections,  but 
the  Chancellor  rejected  them.  Von  Bethmann  there- 
upon, without  our  concurrence,  appealed  to  the  Em- 
peror for  a  new  decision  as  to  what  after  all  was  the 
technical  conduct  of  the  campaign.  On  June  5th,  in 
accordance  with  this  appeal,  a  new  order  of  the  Em- 
peror was  given  out  that  passenger  vessels,  even 
enemy  vessels,  were  not  to  be  sunk.  No  attention  was 
paid  to  a  telegram  shortly  setting  out  our  objections, 


158  MY   MEMOIRS 

which  the  Chief  of  Stafif  and  myself  at  the  last  mo- 
ment dispatched  to  the  Emperor, 

The  Chancellor  had  not  the  strength  of  mind  to  de- 
cide on  the  complete  abandonment  of  the  campaign, 
as  he  wanted  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  maintain- 
ing it,  in  order  to  save  his  face  before  public  opinion 
at  home.  In  practice,  however,  after  this  order,  it  was 
impossible  to  attack  large  vessels,  as  it  was  in  virtually 
every  case  impossible  for  the  submarine  commanders 
to  distinguish  between  passenger  and  cargo  vessels. 
Both  Admiral  Bachmann  and  myself  tendered  our 
resignations  on  account  of  the  course  adopted  by  the 
Chancellor,  but  they  were  refused,  in  my  case  in  a 
most  ungracious  manner. 

On  June  2nd  our  Ambassador  in  Washington  re- 
ported that  Wilson  had  stated  to  him  in  an  audience 
that  he  was  aiming  at  the  complete  elimination  of  the 
submarine  campaign.  We  ought,  he  suggested,  to 
make  by  its  abandonment  an  appeal  to  general  po- 
litical morality,  since  the  war  could  not  be  finally  de- 
cided by  force  of  arms,  but  only  by  an  understanding 
on  this  point.  Count  BernstorflF  recommended  ur- 
gently that  we  should  agree  to  this,  stating  that  there 
was  some  prospect  that  in  that  case  the  export  of  mu- 
nitions would  be  prohibited,  whereas  otherwise  there 
was  the  possibility  of  a  rupture  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions and  a  tremendous  increase  in  the  supply  of 
munitions.  In  my  view  the  Ambassador  was  over- 
looking the  fact  that  the  American  munitions  industry 
would  in  any  event  extend  to  the  utmost  of  its  power, 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       159 

and  that  it  was  simply  Utopian  to  hope  that  America 
would  specially  prohibit  the  export  of  munitions. 

At  the  beginning  of  June  the  Foreign  Office  at  last 
dispatched  its  answer  to  the  American  demands  on  the 
Lusitania.  This  brought  about  a  further  American 
Note,  which  was  certainly  unfriendly  and  contentious, 
but  was  so  framed  as  not  to  make  an  answer  formally 
necessary.  The  matter  was  thus  settled  for  the  time 
being.  We  continued  the  campaign  in  a  form  in  which 
it  could  not  live  and  at  the  same  time  could  not  die. 

A  large  number  of  men  of  my  acquaintance,  who 
were  intimately  acquainted  with  American  conditions, 
expressed  the  firm  opinion  that  the  policy  of  our  Notes 
was  fundamentally  wrong  as  a  method  of  dealing  with 
Wilson  and  the  men  who  stood  behind  him.  Even 
those  who  in  the  main  used  all  their  influence  to  bring 
about  an  early  understanding  with  England  and 
America  did  not  agree  with  the  legal-bureaucratic  tone 
adopted  by  the  Foreign  Office  on  every  occasion. 
Thus,  Ballin  wrote  on  August  ist,  191 5,  dealing  with 
our  Note  of  reply  as  follows: 

"  Once  again,  in  connection  with  the  further  treat- 
ment of  this  American  question,  I  find  myself  in  com- 
plete opposition  to  the  views  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse. 
The  last  Note  should  have  been  answered  immediately, 
that  is  to  say  within  twenty- four  hours;  and  it  was  so 
easy  to  answer.  One  need  only  have  said :  *  The  Im- 
perial Government  expresses  its  lively  sense  of  regret 
on  learning  from  the  Note  which  your  Excellency  has 
had  the  goodness,  on  the  instructions  of  your  Govern- 
ment, to  hand  to  me,  that  the  Government  of  the  United 


i6o  MY   MEMOIRS 

States  of  North  America  is  not  prepared  to  recognize 
the  exceedingly  accommodating  spirit  displayed  by  the 
Imperial  German  Government  in  its  last  Note  of  reply. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment can  but  express  the  wish  that  citizens  of  the 
United  States  will  be  suitably  warned  by  their  Govern- 
ment against  embarking  upon  ships  of  enemy  flag 
which  propose  to  pass  through  the  war  zone  declared 
by  the  German  Government.' 

"  As  I  have  mentioned,  a  short  answer  of  this  sort 
should  in  my  view  have  been  given  to  Mr.  Gerard 
within  twenty-four  hours.  Another  fortnight's  brood- 
ing gives  the  Americans  the  impression  that  our  re- 
sponsible persons  are  at  a  loss  what  to  do.  One 
knows  that  Washington  conducts  its  politics  in  its 
shirt  sleeves,  and  American  questions  of  this  sort 
should  be  handled  in  a  manner  adjusted  to  American 
psychology." 

Those  are  the  views  of  Berlin,  but  I  would  like  also 
to  quote  a  representative  of  the  opposite  point  of  view. 
On  August  5th,  191 5,  Secretary  Helfiferich  wrote  to 
the  Chancellor  urging  that  the  submarine  campaign 
should  be  still  further  restricted  for  a  few  weeks,  or 
under  certain  circumstances  even  for  three  months. 
He  believed  that  the  American  Government  had  ex- 
tended a  definite  invitation  to  us  to  co-operate  with 
them  in  securing  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  he  ac- 
cordingly hoped  that  if  we  yielded  to  their  Note  we 
should  be  able  to  establish  a  common  Americo-German 
front  against  England.  The  cotton  planters  would 
exercise  so  strong  a  pressure  on  Wilson  that  the  Ger- 
man textile  industry  could  be  preserved  from  shutting 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       i6i 

down  and  starving.  If  we  were  to  offer  Wilson  this 
"  good  chance  "  to  stand  up  for  his  ideals,  he  could  not 
help  taking  it,  Germany  ought,  thought  Helfferich, 
to  dispose  of  her  enemies  separately,  like  the  last  of 
the  three  Horatii  who  in  the  story  defeated  the  three 
Curiatii  who  were  attacking  him,  separating  them  by 
a  clever  retreat;  the  German  Government  could  no 
more  be  accused  of  weakness  in  adopting  such  conduct 
than  could  the  ancient  Roman.  Helfferich  thus  took 
for  granted  that  loss  of  prestige  counted  for  nothing, 
and  that  the  world-powers  of  to-day  would  be  as  fool- 
ish as  the  three  Curiatii. 

I  imagine  that  Ballin  knew  better  than  Bethmann  or 
Helfferich  how  to  treat  the  Americans.  In  any  case, 
we  gave  up  after  the  Arabic  case  a  great  deal  more 
than  Helfferich  proposed,  without  getting  a  single  bale 
of  cotton.  Besides,  we  had  already,  at  the  time  of 
the  first  exchange  of  Notes  in  February,  191 5,  given 
Wilson  an  opportunity  to  establish  just  the  sort  of 
community  of  interests  that  we,  with  our  illimitable 
capacity  for  self-deception,  went  on  expecting  year 
after  year;  and  this  although,  even  if  we  succeeded 
wholly,  the  Declaration  of  London,  that  alpha  and 
omega  of  our  jurists  in  the  Foreign  Office,  would  not 
have  brought  us  any  decisive  advantages. 

Secretary  von  Jagow  stated  to  the  Reichstag  Com- 
mittee on  August  15th  that  we  would  not  allow  our 
submarine  policy  to  be  influenced  by  America.  As 
soon,  however,  as  the  Reichstag  had  substantially  fin- 
ished its  session — it  actually  rose  on  August  27th — 


i62  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  Chancellor,  supported  by  Falkenhayn  and  Admiral 
von  Miiller,  set  to  work  with  all  his  strength  to  have 
the  campaign  stopped.  The  sinking  of  the  English 
steamer  Arabic  was  used  as  the  ground  for  this  step, 
although  there  had  up  to  then  been  no  report  at  all 
from  the  submarine  and  no  complaint  from  the  Ameri- 
cans, As  von  Treutler  stated  in  the  later  audience  of 
His  Majesty,  it  was  not  a  question  of  the  Arabic  case 
itself,  but  of  a  final  understanding  with  America. 

In  the  face  of  his  promise  to  me  of  August  7th,  the 
Chancellor  took  Admiral  Bachmann  and  myself  by 
surprise  with  the  decision.  The  navy  was  to  be  pre- 
sented with  a  fait  accompli.  I  was  called  to  Pless  by 
telegram  shortly  before  the  departure  of  the  night 
train,  to  attend  an  audience  on  the  following  morning. 
I  was  only  able  to  get  into  touch  with  Admiral  Bach- 
mann on  the  short  stretch  from  Kattowitz  to  Pless. 
Arriving  there  on  August  26th,  we  had  at  once  a 
brief  discussion  with  the  Chancellor.  He  described 
the  position  as  very  grave,  basing  himself  on  a  report 
from  our  Naval  Attache  at  Washington  and  a  state- 
ment of  Ambassador  Gerard.  He,  the  Chancellor, 
could  not  stay  for  ever  on  the  top  of  a  volcano.  A 
telegram  was  to  be  sent  to  the  Ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington, that  the  submarine  commanders  had  definite 
orders  not  to  torpedo  passenger  steamers  without 
warning,  and  without  opportunity  being  given  for  the 
rescue  of  passengers  and  crews.  The  question  of  a 
Ltisitania  indemnity  was  to  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion, and  we  were  further  to  request  the  United  States 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       163 

to  bring  England  to  observe  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don. I  said  that  the  Chancellor  plainly  over-estimated 
the  importance  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  and 
that  an  arbitration  over  the  Lusitania  case  would  be 
quite  certain  to  result  unfavourably  for  us,  as  there 
were  so  far  no  international  rules  about  submarines. 

We  came  to  no  agreement  at  this  discussion,  and  the 
audience  of  the  Emperor  followed  immediately,  being 
cut  somewhat  short  by  the  fact  that,  through  the  open 
door  of  the  adjoining  room,  breakfast  could  be  seen 
waiting  on  a  table.  I  emphasized  the  view  that  in  any 
event  we  were  bound  to  await  a  report  of  the  sinking 
of  the  Arabic  from  the  commander  of  the  submarine 
before  any  decision  could  be  taken.  If  it  was  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  avoid  misunderstandings  with 
America  for  the  time,  we  could  withdraw  the  subma- 
rines entirely  from  English  waters  for  a  certain  period, 
and  send  them  to  the  Mediterranean,  as  I  had  men- 
tioned to  the  Chancellor  in  a  conference  on  August 
7th.  For  the  rest,  I  thought  that  a  sufficient  Note 
could  be  drawn  up  to  America  without  abandoning 
the  principle  of  submarine  warfare.  Bachmann,  who 
had  had  favourable  reports  as  to  feeling  in  America, 
pointed  out  in  the  general  audience  of  the  Emperor 
that  a  public  declaration  such  as  the  Chancellor  de- 
sired was  unnecessary,  since  instructions  to  subma- 
rines to  spare  passenger  vessels  had  in  fact  been  in 
force  since  the  beginning  of  June,  having  been  kept 
secret  merely  because  they  were  not  consistent  with 
the  statements  in  our  Notes  in  reply  to  the  Americans. 


i64  MY    MEMOIRS 

If  the  declaration  were  now  publicly  made,  we  should 
be  admitting  the  correctness  of  the  enemy  contention 
that  the  submarine  campaign  was  unlawful.  If  any- 
thing at  all  need  be  said,  it  would  be  sufficient  to  state 
that  measures — what  measures  was  a  matter  for  us 
alone — were  being  taken  to  preserve  passenger  vessels. 
A  too  hasty  abandonment  of  the  campaign — to  which 
the  declaration  desired  by  the  Chancellor  would  amount 
— would  be  taken  as  a  sign  of  weakness  and  would 
have  an  unfavourable  effect  on  home  and  neutral 
opinion.  In  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Chancellor 
and  of  von  Treutler,  the  representative  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  the  Emperor  decided  in  favour  of  the  proposal 
of  the  naval  representative,  that  the  cable  should  not 
be  sent  to  the  Ambassador  in  Washington.  He  ordered 
that  the  Chancellor,  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  and 
myself  should  prepare  and  submit  to  him  a  draft  of  a 
declaration  which  could  be  dispatched  to  the  United 
States  if  it  should  become  necessary. 

On  the  next  day,  August  27th,  the  Chancellor,  in 
spite  of  this  clear  settlement,  obtained  a  new  decision 
from  the  Emperor  in  the  direction  desired  by  him, 
without  giving  any  notice  whatever  to  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff  or  to  myself.  We  were  informed  of 
this  last  decision  by  word  of  mouth,  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day,  by  von  Treutler,  who  added  that  a 
cable  to  that  effect  had  already  been  dispatched  to  the 
Ambassador  at  Washington.  To  hasten  this  decision, 
it  was  said,  another  telegram  had  just  arrived,  at 
the  psychological  moment,  from  the  Pope,  urging  us 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       165 

to  adopt  this  attitude.  "  Now  they  are  eating  out  of 
our  hand,"  remarked  Gerard  on  August  27th;  he 
obviously  had  a  poor  opinion  of  our  diplomats,  and 
knew  that  America  could  do  what  she  liked  with  them. 
Already  on  August  27th  there  were  articles  in  English 
and  American  newspapers  on  the  lines  of  "  Exit  Tir- 
pitz."  This  information  had  thus  been  allowed  to  pass 
by  the  German  censorship,  that  is  to  say  by  the  Foreign 
Office,  actually  before  the  Emperor  had  given  his  de- 
cision. Thus  was  the  submarine  campaign  stopped 
for  the  time,  amid  resounding  cries  of  triumph  from 
Atnerica  and  our  enemies,  Germany  had  lost  heavily 
in  prestige.  The  neutral  world  was  full  of  Germany's 
surrender,  while  the  position  of  Wilson  everywhere, 
and  especially  in  America,  became  very  high. 

On  the  ground  of  this  conduct  of  the  Chancellor 
in  taking  me  by  surprise,  I  requested  His  Majesty  on 
August  27th  to  release  me  from  my  position  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  placing  myself  at  his  disposal  for  any 
other  employment  as  a  naval  officer.  On  August  30th 
my  request  was  refused. 

"  On  the  other  hand,"  so  ran  the  Cabinet  order,  "  we 
have  in  this  and  in  many  previous  instances  gained 
the  conviction  that  co-operation  between  yourself  and 
the  Chancellor  is  impossible  in  naval  questions  touch- 
ing on  the  domain  of  foreign  politics,  and  this  in- 
cludes almost  every  question  relating  to  the  conduct 
of  the  war  at  sea."  (Accordingly,  my  regular  ad- 
visory activities  in  this  connection  were  to  cease.) 
"  We  refuse,  however,  most  decidely  to  release  you 
from  your  position  as  Secretary  of  State  for  Naval 


i66  MY    MEMOIRS 

Affairs.  You  cannot  ignore  not  only  that  a  change  in 
this  office  during  the  war — especially  in  the  present 
position  of  the  personnel  at  the  Admiralty — would 
have  serious  disadvantages  for  the  work  of  the  whole 
navy,  but  that  your  departure  from  office  at  the  present 
moment  would  involve  the  most  regrettable  results  at 
home  and  abroad,  which  it  is  Our  sacred  duty  to  avoid. 
Further,  We  cannot  permit  an  officer  to  ask  for  his 
release  during  the  war  on  the  ground  of  differences  of 
opinion  on  questions  of  the  employment  of  Our  fight- 
ing vessels,  for  these  are  questions  which  in  the  last 
resort  have  to  be  decided  by  Us  as  supreme  war  lord, 
in  the  full  consciousness  of  Our  responsibility," 

'  On  my  stating  that  the  contents  of  this  order 
made  it  impossible  for  me  to  remain  in  office,  the 
Emperor  granted  me  a  short  private  audience,  and  I 
was  promised  a  modified  order.  Accordingly,  on  Sep- 
tember 19th,  191 5,  I  received  the  Imperial  assurance 
that  it  was  His  Majesty's  full  intention  "  to  take  my 
opinion  on  all  important  questions  of  naval  policy  " ; 
and  I  thereupon  resolved  not  to  insist  on  my  release. 
A  large  number  of  politicians  and  persons  of  very  high 
position  had  urged  me  to  this  resolve. 

Admiral  Bachmann,  however,  who  had  protested 
against  the  Emperor  being  thus  taken  by  storm  by  the 
Chancellor,  was  relieved,  being  replaced  by  Admiral 
von  Holtzendorff,  who  had  been  placed  on  half  pay 
after  the  naval  manoeuvres  of  1912.  Prior  to  his 
appointment  he  had  on  several  occasions  expressed 
himself  in  favour  of  the  views  of  von  Bethmann. 
He  was  instructed  to  take  up  his  regular  residence  not 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       167 

at  General  Headquarters,  but  in  Berlin,  a  course  which 
circumstances  at  that  time  also  prescribed  for  my- 
self. 

IV 

It  will  be  useful  to  examine  the  development  of  the 
submarine  campaign  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
fleet  command,  which  was  entrusted  with  the  control 
of  the  campaign  except  in  the  Mediterranean,  Flanders, 
and  the  Baltic.  The  then  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Fleet 
has  given  me  the  following  tabular  statement  on  the 
matter : 

"February  4th,  1915. — Declaration  of  war  zone. 

"February  14th,  1915. — Request,  on  urgent  politi- 
cal grounds,  to  send  orders  by  wireless  to  the  subma- 
rines sent  out,  not  for  the  present  to  attack  ships  sail- 
ing under  neutral  flag.  (In  the  then  state  of  subma- 
rine wireless,  the  request  could  not  be  complied  with, 
as  the  boats  were  already  far  off.  Besides,  every  ship 
at  that  time  sailed  under  neutral  flag.) 

"February  i^th,  1915. — Order  from  General  Head- 
quarters, that  submarine  and  trade  campaign  against 
neutrals  was  not  to  begin  on  February  i8th,  but  only 
on  receipt  of  special  order.  As  a  result  of  this  order, 
the  next  batch  of  boats  to  be  held  back,  thus  causing  a 
pause. 

"February  i8th,  1915. — A  belt  between  Lindesnaes 
and  the  Tyne  is  to  be  kept  free  for  Danish  and 
Swedish  vessels,  in  which  there  is  to  be  no  mining  or 
sinking. 

"February  20th,  1915. — Order  to  open  campaign 
in  North  Sea  and  English  Channel.     American  and 


i68  MY    MEMOIRS 

Italian  flags  to  be  spared  even  here,  A  free  safe 
belt  is  provided  for  Scandinavians  to  sail  to  Eng- 
land. 

"February  22nd,  191 5. — Order  to  open  campaign 
on  v^est  coast  of  United  Kingdom.  Especial  care 
recommended  to  spare  American  and  Italian  flags. 

"March  yth,  19 15. — The  free  belt  for  Scandinavians 
is  abolished,  but  is  not  to  be  mined;  it  is  thus  really 
hardly  endangered. 

"March  ^oth,  1915. — The  free  belt  is  wholly 
abolished, 

"April  2nd,  1915. — After  loss  of  several  subma- 
rines through  traps,  order  that  safety  of  our  own 
boats  is  to  come  before  all  other  considerations.  No 
longer  essential  to  rise  to  surface. 

"April  4th,  1915. — New  warning  as  to  sparing 
neutrals. 

"April  24th,  1915. — Ditto. 

"May  yth,  1915. — Lusitania  case.  Regarded  as 
great  success  in  the  fleet.  An  English,  that  is  to  say, 
an  enemy  steamer,  not  within  any  of  the  existing  limi- 
tations, and  armed  into  the  bargain.  Commander 
called  to  General  Headquarters  and  treated  very  un- 
graciously by  Chief  of  Cabinet. 

"June  6th,  191 5. — Orders  to  attack  no  large  pas- 
senger steamers,  not  even  enemy. 

"June  26th,  1915. — Chief  of  Fleet  Staff  writes  to 
Naval  Staff:  'In  my  view,  which  is  shared  by  the 
whole  navy,  we  should  yield  no  ground  in  connection 
with  the  submarine  campaign,  for  the  following  rea- 
sons: 

"  '  ( I )  Any  surrender  from  the  position  taken  up 
in  the  declaration  of  war  zone  must  be  regarded  as  a 
political  defeat. 

" '  (2)  The  intention  of  that  declaration  was  not 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       169 

the  destruction  of  certain  ships,  but  an  attack  on  the 
import  and  export  trade  of  England.  Sparing  neu- 
trals or  compensating  them  for  the  sinking  of  their 
vessels  actually  encourages  sailings  to  England  under 
neutral  flag, 

"  '  (3)  Any  yielding  gives  assistance  to  the  enemy 
arguments  that  the  proposed  method  of  warfare  is 
barbarous. 

"  *  (4)  Only  the  energetic  conduct  of  the  campaign 
can  turn  the  insular  position  of  England  from  ad- 
vantage to  a  disadvantage.  Is  also  of  tremendous 
importance  for  the  future  development  of  Germany. 
To  yield  is  to  sacrifice  the  whole  effect  of  submarines 
against  England.' 

"  The  Chief  of  Fleet  Staflf  requests  permission  to 
support  his  arguments  in  person  to  the  political  author- 
ities, since  he  has  undertaken  responsibility  from  the 
start  for  the  campaign.  The  personal  attendance  of 
the  Chief  of  Fleet  Staflf  is  not  permitted,  but  instead 
the  chief  of  the  submarines  and  one  submarine  com- 
mander are  ordered  to  attend  the  Chancellor  to  give 
information. 

"August  igth,  1915. — Arabic  case.  Count  Berns- 
torfif  states  in  America  that  the  commander  is  to  be 
punished.  (Submarine  commanders  again  instructed 
to  observe  the  restrictions  laid  down.) 

"August  2yth,  1915. — Orders  not  to  send  out 
further  submarines  for  trade  war  until  the  position  is 
cleared  up. 

"August  ^oth,  1915. — Orders  that  until  further  no- 
tice no  small  passenger  steamers  are  to  be  sunk  with- 
out warning  and  rescue  of  crew. 

"September  1st,  1915. — Chief  of  Fleet  Staflf  tele- 
graphs to  Chief  of  Cabinet  for  submission  to  His 
Majesty,  that  this  order  can  only  be  carried  out  at 


I70  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  utmost  danger  to  submarines,  for  which  he  cannot 
be  responsible;  accordingly  asks  permission  to  resign. 
Answer  from  Chief  of  Cabinet,  that  His  Majesty 
forbids  Chief  of  Fleet  Staff  to  question  His  Majesty's 
commands. 

"September  i8th,  1915. — General  position  necessi- 
tates that  for  the  next  few  weeks  all  risk  should  be 
avoided  of  breaches  of  regulations  laid  down  for  cam- 
paign. Order  accordingly  to  suspend  all  submarine 
activities  of  any  sort  on  west  coast  and  in  Channel, 
and  to  carry  on  in  North  Sea  only  in  accordance  with 
Prize  Order.  Practically  complete  cessation  of  all 
employment  of  submarines." 


Such  are  the  impressions  from  the  fleet.  Order, 
Counter-order,  Disorder ! 

When  one  reviews  these  commands  and  counter- 
commands,  which  in  part  were  quite  impossible  to 
carry  out,  and  when  one  remembers  further  that  they 
had  to  pass  through  the  different  commands  to  the 
individual  commanders,  one  can  well  understand  what 
confusion  and  irritation  must  have  been  caused  to  the 
commanders  by  this  perpetual  and  often  self -contra- 
dictory interference  of  the  political  authorities  and  the 
Cabinet.  On  the  one  hand  their  own  strength  and 
energy,  the  views  of  their  fellows,  and  no  doubt  also 
of  their  immediate  superior,  all  called  aloud  for  ef- 
fective action;  and  on  the  other  hand  punishment 
and  court  martial  awaited  these  brave  men  if  they 
misunderstood  these  ambiguous  orders  or  caused  any 
political  difficulties. 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       171 

How  differently  has  England  dealt  with  similar 
cases  of  sea  fighting!  For  centuries  the  principle  has 
held  good  there  that  any  action  on  the  part  of  a 
British  officer,  so  long  as  it  be  energetic,  will  be  pro- 
tected against  outside  consequences. 

V 

In  December,  19 15,  the  Alistrian  Government,  which 
in  the  Ancona  case  had  scored  a  remarkable  and  well- 
founded  prestige  victory  over  Wilson,  was  forced  by 
the  German  Office  to  say  "  Father,  I  have  sinned  " ; 
however,  about  the  same  time  the  point  of  view  of 
the  German  Army  command  in  relation  to  the  sub- 
marine campaign  underwent  a  certain  change.  The 
fighting  fronts  had  stiffened,  and  a  decision  of  the 
war  had  become  still  more  difficult  to  achieve.  It  was 
probably  under  the  impression  produced  by  these  cir- 
cumstances that  the  army  command  requested  a  con- 
ference on  the  question  of  the  submarine  campaign, 
which  was  held  at  the  Ministry  of  War  on  December 
30th,  1915,  and  January  5th,  1916.  General  von 
Falkenhayn  stated  that  now  that  Bulgaria  had  come 
in  on  our  side,  he  was  ready  to  accept  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare,  if  the  navy  guaranteed  success. 
He  stated  that  his  reason  for  supporting  the  Chancellor 
in  his  opposition  to  the  campaign  in  the  autumn  of 
19 1 5  was  that  he  feared,  on  the  strength  of  statements 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  that  Bulgaria  might  be  led  by 
such  a  campaign  to  refrain  from  joining  us.  Com- 
munications from  Enver,  and  remarks  of  Radoslavov 


172  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  of  Ambassador  von  Wangenheim,  however,  con- 
tradict this  assumption  of  the  Foreign  Office  most 
emphatically.^ 

At  the  meeting  at  the  Ministry  of  War  I  explained 
that  the  campaign  was  both  possible  and  practicable. 
In  place  of  the  former  declaration  of  war  zone,  I 
lecommended  a  sort  of  embargo  on  commercial  traffic 
to  and  from  England.  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff 
described  the  opening  of  such  a  campaign  as  the  salva- 
tion of  the  navy,  but  recommended  that  it  should 
not  be  begun  until  March  ist.  Falkenhayn,  Holtzen- 
dorff, the  Minister  for  War,  Wild  von  Hohenborn, 
and  myself  were  entirely  at  one,  both  as  to  the 
opening  of  the  campaign,  and  as  to  the  date  of 
opening. 

Holtzendorff's  oral  statement  of  his  views  in  favour 
of  the  campaign  was  confirmed  by  a  memorandum  of 
the  naval  staff  of  January  7th,  which  stated  that  if 
all  the  restrictions  were  removed  it  could  be  confi- 
dently assumed,  on  the  strength  of  our  earlier  experi- 
ence, that  the  English  resistance  would  be  broken  in 
at  most  six  months.  The  memorandum  recognized 
the  danger  from  America,  but  explained  that,  if  we 
could  not  secure  a  favourable  decision  of  the  war  by 
October,  1916,  all  hope  would  be  lost  of  a  peace  that 
would  render  possible  for  Germany  in  the  coming 
generation  reasonable  security  of  existence  and  chances 

*  A  Dutch  press  report  in  the  second  half  of  August,  191S, 
stated  that  Bulgaria  had  hesitated  to  ally  herself  with  us  when 
she  saw  how  we  kow-towed  to  America  and  England  after  the 
Arabic  case. 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       173 

of  economic  development.  A-  further  memorandum  of 
the  naval  staff,  of  February  12th,  1916,  which  was 
to  the  same  effect,  was  submitted  to  a  large  number 
of  economic  experts,  who  all  expressed  their  agree- 
ment with  it,  and  in  general  described  the  immediate 
opening  of  unrestricted  submarine  operations  as  the 
last  and  only  chance  for  Germany. 

I,  too,  in  February,  191 6,  sent  a  memorandum  to  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  dealing  with  the  necessity 
and  practicability  of  the  submarine  campaign.^ 

Captain  Widenmann  on  my  behalf  had  an  exhaustive 
discussion  with  Falkenhayn  at  General  Headquarters, 
on  February  nth  and  12th,  on  the  subject  of  this  mem- 
orandum and  of  the  submarine  question  in  general. 
The  effect  of  Falkenhayn's  remarks  was  roughly : 
"  We  all  agree  that  England  will  fight  to  a  decision. 
The  decision  turns  on  the  possession  of  Belgium.  If 
we  restore  it,  we  are  lost.  I  have  made  up  my 
mind  in  favour  of  the  campaign,  and  I  count  defi- 
nitely on  it  being  carried  out.  I  will  work  for  it 
with  all  my  strength,  and  secure  that  it  is  de- 
cided  on." 

In  complete  contradiction  to  the  Chancellor's  views, 
I  was  then  already  absolutely  convinced  that  any 
further  delay  in  beginning  the  campaign  involved  the 
greatest  danger,  and  I  concluded  the  above-mentioned 
memorandum  with  the  following  remarks,  which  un- 
fortunately for  Germany  have  been  subsequently 
proved  correct : 
*  A  similar  memorandum  was  first  sent  to  the  Chancellor. 


174  MY   MEMOIRS 

"  Immediate  and  relentless  recourse  to  the  subma- 
rine weapon  is  absolutely  necessary.  Any  further 
delay  in  the  introduction  of  unrestricted  warfare  will 
give  England  time  for  further  naval  and  economic 
defensive  measures,  cause  us  greater  losses  in  the 
end,  and  endanger  quick  success.  The  sooner  the  cam- 
paign be  opened,  the  sooner  will  success  be  realized, 
and  the  more  rapidly  and  energetically  will  England's 
hope  of  defeating  us  by  a  war  of  exhaustion  be  de- 
stroyed. If  we  defeat  England,  we  break  the  back- 
bone of  the  hostile  coalition." 

A  large  number  of  public  bodies  and  individuals 
approached  the  Chancellor  at  this  time  to  urge  upon 
him  the  adoption  of  the  campaign.  Among  these  was 
Hugo  Stinnes,  whose  letter  to  the  Chancellor  is  worthy 
of  notice;  according  to  reliable  information  it  counts 
for  as  much  in  Sweden  as  my  memorandum.  These 
representations  of  politicians  and  other  persons  in  im- 
portant positions  were  in  no  way  due  to  any  initiative 
of  mine. 

On  February  23rd  I  chanced  to  have  the  opportunity 
in  Wilhelmshaven  to  say  to  the  Emperor  how  happy 
I  had  been  to  learn  that  there  were  prospects  of  a  real 
campaign  against  English  freight  space.  I  mentioned 
that  freight  space  constituted  the  decisive  question  of 
the  whole  war,  and  that  it  permitted  no  delay.  The 
fight  was  a  fight  for  life  for  Germany.  The  small 
neutrals  presented  no  real  danger.  The  Emperor  must 
come  to  a  decision. 

The  decisive  audience  took  place  on  March  6th, 
1916,  and  that  without  my  being  summoned,  in  spite 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       175 

of  the  above-mentioned  modified  order.  I  heard  un- 
officially that  the  audience  was  to  be  held  and  had  the 
question  asked  of  Admiral  von  Miiller  whether  the 
Emperor  desired  my  attendance.  The  Admiral  an- 
swered :  "  No,  His  Majesty  has  not  commanded  the 
presence  of  the  Secretary  of  State."  The  Chancellor, 
Falkenhayn,  and  Holtzendorff  were  present.  Against 
Falkenhayn's  advice,  the  campaign  was  postponed  in- 
definitely. On  March  8th  I  reported  sick,  and  im- 
mediately received  the  request,  sent  over  by  telegraph, 
to  hand  in  my  resignation.  I  thereupon  dispatched  the 
following  request : 

"  Berlin, 
"March  12th,  1916. 

"  I  have  served  Your  Majesty  with  all  my  strength 
in  the  advancement  of  Your  Majesty's  life-work  of 
showing  to  the  German  people  the  way  across  the  sea 
and  into  the  world. 

"  In  the  decisive  fight  against  the  enemies  who  seek 
to  bar  us  by  the  sword  from  this  path  of  national  de- 
velopment. Your  Majesty  has  not  been  able  to  follow 
my  advice. 

"  In  the  most  recent  and  most  vital  decisions  as  to 
the  employment  of  our  naval  forces,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  exercise  the  influence  which  Your  Majesty  has 
repeatedly  been  so  gracious  as  to  assure  me  that  I 
possess. 

"I  find  myself  unable  any  further  properly  to  act 
as  the  representative  of  Your  Majesty's  Government 
before  the  German  people  in  naval  questions.  My 
great  grief  at  seeing  the  life-work  of  Your  Majesty 
and  the  future  of  Germany  as  a  nation  moving  to  its 
destruction  along  the  path  that  has  been  chosen  mak^.s 


176  MY   MEMOIRS 

it  clear  to  me  that  my  services  can  no  longer  be  of  use 
to  Your  Majesty's  Government, 

"  Your  Majesty  found  yourself  unable  to  grant  my 
previous  request  to  be  relieved  of  my  office. 

"  The  exhaustion  of  my  spirits  as  a  result  of  the 
increasing  mental  conflicts  which  I  have  lately  under- 
gone has  made  it,  however,  absolutely  essential  for 
me  to  report  to  Your  Majesty  that  I  am  no  longer 
able  to  carry  out  the  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  Naval  Affairs. 

"  After  Your  Majesty's  most  gracious  decision,  I 
venture  now  to  beg  most  humbly  for  gracious  permis- 
sion to  resign  my  office  as  Secretary  of  State." 

On  March  17th  I  received  my  dismissal,  being  suc- 
ceeded by  Admiral  von  Capelle.  In  the  summer  of 
191 5  a  decided  supporter  of  the  submarine  campaign, 
he  was  now  compelled,  before  accepting  office,  to 
undertake  to  support  the  Chancellor  in  all  naval  po- 
litical questions  of  which  the  submarine  campaign  was 
regarded  as  one. 

My  position  with  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor 
was  in  March,  19 16,  so  insecure  that  I  had  to  reckon 
with  the  possibility  of  any  convenient  opportunity  be- 
ing used  to  force  me  to  take  my  departure.  I  had  al- 
ready had  to  endure  grave  insults  without  protest.  I 
tendered  my  resignation  when  my  most  intimate  ad- 
visers had  become  convinced  that  it  could  no  longer 
be  postponed,  since  my  exclusion  from  discussion  in 
the  face  of  all  the  assurances  to  the  contrary  had  finally 
deprived  me  of  any  opportunity  of  useful  work.  I 
had  also  learnt  from  the  Emperor's  entourage  that  my 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       177 

position  with  His  Majesty  was  regarded  as  past  any 
restoration.  I  could  see  the  nation  rushing  into  the 
abyss,  and  could  no  longer  represent  in  the  Reichstag 
or  be  responsible  to  the  people  for  the  dangers  involved 
in  any  further  procrastination  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war.  Nevertheless,  I  regarded  my  retirement  as  a 
very  serious  matter,  since  I  knew  that  it  would  encour- 
age the  enemy  in  this  confidence  of  victory.  I  had 
offered  to  His  Majesty  to  make  my  departure  less 
striking  by  basing  it  on  grounds  of  ill-health,  but  this 
opportunity  was  not  taken,  and  I  was  only  able  to 
lessen  the  impression  created  by  the  event  by  suppress- 
ing, in  concurrence  with  the  military  government  of 
the  district  of  Brandenburg,  and  without  any  con- 
sideration for  the  feelings  of  the  would-be  par- 
ticipants, the  popular  demonstrations  planned  in  my 
honour. 

If  I  had  foreseen  that  the  battle  of  the  Skager-Rak 
would  once  again  strengthen  my  position,  and  that 
Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  would  come  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  army,  I  would  probably  have  sought  to 
hold  on  in  spite  of  all  humiliations;  and  in  that  case, 
having  regard  to  the  greatly  shaken  position  of  Beth- 
mann  in  the  autumn  of  19 16,  the  Polish  Proclamation 
might  not  have  been  published,  greater  efforts  have 
been  made  to  secure  peace  with  the  Czar,  and  the 
submarine  campaign  might  after  all  have  begun  in 
time.  But  who  can  tell  what  Providence  holds  in 
store? 


178  MY    MEMOIRS 

VI 

On  March  24th,  19 16,  the  French  steamer  Sussex 
was  torpedoed.  To  a  question  on  the  subject  from 
the  United  States  of  America  the  Naval  Stafif  replied 
on  April  loth,  before  the  arrival  of  the  report  of  the 
submarine  commander,  that  the  German  Government 
must  assume  that  the  damage  to  the  Sussex  was  due 
to  some  other  cause  than  the  attack  of  a  German 
submarine.  Later,  however,  the  report  arrived  that 
the  Sussex  had  really  been  torpedoed  by  one  of  our 
submarines.  According  to  the  report  of  the  particu- 
larly experienced  and  cautious  commander,  the  vessel 
was  painted  as  a  warship,  and  there  were  a  large 
number  of  British  troops  on  deck  in  uniform,  so  that 
he  thought  he  was  even  technically  in  order. 

To  our  Note  of  April  loth,  the  incorrectness  of 
which  in  fact  was  proved  by  the  Americans,  there  fol- 
lowed the  well-known  American  bullying  Note  of 
April  20th,  which  demanded  the  abandonment  without 
delay  of  the  system  of  submarine  warfare  that  had 
hitherto  prevailed,  and  threatened  a  rupture  of  rela- 
tions. After  this  Note  became  public,  I  sent  another 
memorandum  to  the  Emperor,  on  April  24th,  begging 
him  urgently  not  to  give  way  to  Wilson.  I  received 
no  answer  to  this  Note,  but  the  Government  on  May 
4th  sent  a  Note  to  America,  yielding  to  their  demands, 
but  inviting  them  to  insist  on  the  observation  by  the 
British  Government  of  the  rules  of  international  law 
as  they  were  recognized  before  the  war;  the  Note 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       179 

further  stated  that  if  the  United  States  did  not  suc- 
ceed in  this,  the  German  Government  would  be  faced 
by  a  wholly  new  position,  in  which  it  must  reserve  for 
itself  complete  freedom  of  decision. 

Wilson  had  demanded  the  punishment  of  the  sub- 
marine commander  who  had  torpedoed  the  Sussex. 
The  admiral  in  command  of  the  marines  in  Flanders 
did  not  impose  any  punishment,  since  the  commander 
had  been  in  the  right;  whereupon  the  commander  was 
punished  by  the  Emperor  himself.  Save  for  the  Med- 
iterranean, the  feeble  remains  that  still  survived  of 
the  campaign  in  effect  vanished. 

The  events  which  followed  the  arrival  of  my  above- 
mentioned  memorandum  at  General  Headquarters,  as 
reported  to  me  by  an  eye-witness,  are  characteristic 
of  the  forces  that  were  at  work  against  the  submarine 
campaign.  The  memorandum  was  most  unwelcome 
to  the  opponents,  but  it  made  a  lasting  impression 
on  the  Emperor,  probably  because  it  confirmed  his 
own  views,  and  he  resolved  to  refuse  Wilson's  demand 
and  to  carry  on  the  campaign  without  restrictions. 
He  informed  the  Chancellor  and  the  army  chiefs  of 
this  decision.  The  Chancellor's  objections  at  first  met 
with  no  success.  The  Emperor  was  then  strongly 
pressed  by  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet,  von  Miiller,  to 
give  way  to  the  Chancellor,  which  in  the  end  he  did. 
Some  weight  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff,  in  contradiction  to  his  earlier  memoranda 
to  the  Chief  of  the  Cabinet,  had  come  round  to  the 
Chancellor's  view.     In  this  last  decision  of  the  Em- 


i8o  MY   MEMOIRS 

peror  the  army  chiefs  do  not  seem  to  have  been  asked 
^for  their  views.  In  any  event  General  von  Falkenhayn 
immediately  tendered  his  resignation,  which  was  not, 
however,  accepted. 

The  Stissex  Note  was  a  decisive  turning-point  of 
the  war,  the  beginning  of  our  capitulation.  All  the 
world  could  see  that  we  were  breaking  down  before 
Atnerica.  From  the  time  of  this  decision  we  went 
downhill.  The  moral  indignation  over  submarine  war- 
fare in  England  and  America  had  at  first  been  only 
a  piece  of  bluff  designed  to  deter  us,  but  it  had  grad- 
ually become  more  than  bluff.  Those  persons  in  Ger- 
many who  had  a  sensitive  feeling  for  the  idealistic 
and  yet  at  bottom  highly  material  power  of  prestige 
were  greatly  moved  by  the  acceptance  of  the  demands. 
Our  decisions  of  March  and  May,  19 16,  freed  England 
from  the  gravest  material  danger  that  it  had  ever 
known  in  all  its  history.  In  rejecting  the  submarine 
campaign,  a  last  chance  of  salvation  which  had  fallen 
into  their  lap  like  a  gift  of  the  gods,  the  German 
people  not  merely  determined  their  own  disappearance 
from  the  ranks  of  world-powers,  but  at  the  same  time 
strengthened  the  determination  of  the  English  to  hold 
out  until  they  achieved  the  complete  destruction  of  the 
Germans. 

There  were  factors  of  uncertainty  about  the  adop- 
tion of  unrestricted  submarine  operations  in  the  spring 
of  1916,  just  as  there  are  in  all  questions  of  strategy, 
politics,  and  economics,  but  one  can  assert  now,  with 
more  assurance  than  ever  before,  that  it  would  have 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       i8i 

brought  the  English  to  a  conciliatory  frame  of  mind, 
not  of  course  to  one  which  would  have  found  such  a 
lamentably  stupid  expression  as  the  peace  resolution 
of  our  Reichstag  democrats  of  19 17 — the  English  are 
politically  too  well  educated  for  that — but  to  one 
sufficient  to  ensure  us  an  acceptable  peace.  In  the 
spring  of  1916  we  could  certainly  not  afford  to  lose 
so  much  as  a  month,  not  only  on  account  of  the  in- 
crease of  the  enemy  defensive  measures,  but  also  be- 
cause of  the  decline  in  our  strength  of  resistance.  If 
after  at  most  a  year  of  a  freight  space  war  England 
had  felt  the  pinch  of  famine,  the  morale  of  our  people 
and  their  reserves  of  strength  would  still  have  been 
high  enough  to  enable  us  to  wait  for  the  result.  For 
the  really  effective  strength  of  a  campaign  undertaken 
at  that  time,  and  for  the  vital  danger  that  it  would 
have  brought  to  England,  I  can  now  rely  on  a  long 
series  of  English  admissions,  which  our  democrats 
and  other  interested  parties  in  vain  wish  to  sink  in 
oblivion.  Even  in  191 7,  a  whole  year  too  late,  we 
were  close  to  the  goal,  so  that  one  can  see  that  the 
submarine  campaign,  undertaken  only  six  months 
earlier,  would  have  still  been  effective. 

Thus,  for  example,  on  September  7th,  19 17,  The 
Economist  writes: 

"Though  few  realized  the  imminence  of  our  peril 
at  the  time,  we  came  within  very  little  of  losing  the 
war  because  we  forgot  that  a  fighting  control  of  the 
seas  is  without  value  unless  one  possesses  also  the 
means  to  use  those  seas  which  one  controls.  .  .  , 


i82  MY   MEMOIRS 

"  Once  during  the  past  four  years,  the  Germans 
came  within  a  measurable  distance  of  winning  the  war. 
This  was  not  in  the  spring  of  1918,  when  the  British 
and  French  armies  were  reeling  before  the  German 
assaults.  It  was  in  the  spring  of  19 17,  when  the 
prospects  on  land  appeared  to  be  favourable.  The 
Germans,  defeated  on  the  Somme,  had  retired  to 
the  Hindenburg  Line  and  taken  up  the  defen- 
sive on  the  west.  Russia  was  still  a  factor  in  the 
war. 

"Yet  that  spring  of  1917  was  actually  the  most 
critical  and  deadly  dangerous  period  through  which 
we  have  lived  since  the  war  began.  For  a  short  time 
it  looked  as  if  the  Royal  Navy  had  failed,  and  that 
our  sea  communications,  upon  which  everything  de- 
pended, were  about  to  be  broken.  If  the  losses  of 
British  and  Allied  merchant  steamers  by  submarine 
attacks  had  continued  at  the  rate  recorded  for  April, 
May,  and  June  of  1917,  the  Germans  would  have  won 
the  war  before  that  year  had  closed.  But  the  navy 
.  .  .  got  to  grips  with  the  U-boat  peril  and  much  re- 
duced its  eflfectiveness." 

The  Morning  Post  of  October  3rd,  1918,  writes: 

"  Had  Germany  chosen  to  distribute  her  large  force 
of  cruisers  upon  the  distant  trade  routes  a  week  be- 
fore the  outbreak  of  war,  she  could  have  wrought 
what  might  have  been  disaster,  and  what  would  cer- 
tainly have  inflicted  very  serious  loss.  Then  Germany 
delayed  the  great  sea  battle  for  the  crippling  of  the 
British  fleet  until  it  was  too  late.  .  .  .  At  a  later 
period  of  the  war  Germany  sought  to  achieve  the 
same  end  by  submarine  warfare.  It  was  the  greatest 
danger  with  which  this  country  has  ever  been  con- 
fronted,  and  by  virtue  of  determination,   invention. 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       183 

and  indomitable  hard  work,  Germany  was  once  more 
foiled  when  she  was  almost  within  reach  of  suc- 
cess." 

A  statesman  and  an  expert  on  the  matter,  Chiozza 
Money,  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  November, 
1918: 

"  In  April,  1917,  the  German  submarines  were  so 
successful  that  England  would  have  been  ruined  in 
nine  months  if  the  destructions  had  continued  at  the 
same  rate." 

This  Renter  report  of  November  15th,  1918,  was 
sufificient  to  enrage  any  patriotic  German  who  realizes 
what  an  utter  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  naval  war- 
fare was  allowed  to  prevail  in  Germany  and  to  throw 
away  the  last  chance  of  our  salvation. 

The  strangest  incident  in  this  great  crisis  for  Ger- 
many, to  my  mind,  was  that  those  civilians  who  based 
their  hopes  of  a  tolerable  peace,  not  on  our  arms,  but 
on  Wilson  fighting  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and 
England  becoming  of  her  own  motion  ready  to  arrive 
at  an  understanding,  did  not  confine  themselves  to 
these  political  convictions,  but  also  assumed  a  right 
to  support  them  by  judgments  of  their  own  on  purely 
technical  naval  questions.  Contradicting  all  expert 
authority,  they  took  upon  themselves  to  decide  that 
in  the  historical  moment  in  the  spring  of  19 16  we  "  still 
had  too  few  submarines."  These  men  of  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse,  or  even  of  the  editorial  department  of  the 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  stated  in  February,  19 17,  with 


i84  MY   MEMOIRS 

arrogant  certainty :  "  We  are  beginning  the  submarine 
campaign  at  the  right  moment,  as  we  now  have 
enough  submarines."  And  when  the  campaign,  de- 
layed by  their  fault,  did  not  produce  its  effects  as 
rapidly  as  it  would,  according  to  the  experts,  have 
done  a  year  earlier,  these  men  lost  nothing  of  their 
audacity;  instead  of  feeling  ashamed  that  their  delay 
had  reduced  the  results  of  the  submarine  campaign 
by  just  the  decisive  degree,^  they  now  condemned, 
after  the  event,  and  in  contradiction  to  their  own  posi- 
tion at  the  beginning  of  191 7,  the  whole  submarine 
war!  To  gain  a  proper  impression  of  the  manner 
in  which,  in  the  hour  of  Germany's  destiny,  questions 
of  naval  warfare  were  gambled  with,  one  need  only 
imagine  diplomats,  journalists,  and  members  of  parlia- 
ment seeking  to  pronounce  decisive  strategical  judg- 
ments on  questions  of  land  warfare.  But  it  seemed 
that  in  sea  warfare,  a  question  of  life  and  death  to 
us,  all  things  were  possible  among  Germans.  Instead 
of  confining  themselves  to  the  American  question,  the 
political  seriousness  of  which  I  certainly  never  mis- 
understood, our  Germans,  with  their  instinct  for  self- 
destruction,  consoled  themselves  with  the  formula : 
"We  had  not  enough  submarines  in  1916."  Just  as 
I  was  to  be  the  scapegoat  for  the  failing  to  give  battle, 
on  the  pretext  that  the  fleet  material  was  too  bad, 
so  now  those  who  had  not  enough  courage  to  carry 


*  If  Chiozza  Money  says  that  nine  months  of  such  success  as 
we  had  in  April,  1917,  would  have  ruined  England,  there  would 
still  have  been  time  in  August,  1916,  but  not  in  February,  1917. 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       185 

on  the  submarine  campaign  in  defiance  of  Wilson  laid 
the  blame,  to  themselves  and  to  the  world,  on  "  the 
insufficient  number  "  of  boats/ 

This  rumour,  which  was  circulated  everywhere,  was 
the  main  means  employed  by  the  diplomatic  and  dem- 
ocratic supporters  of  the  Government  to  prevent  the 
timely  use  of  the  submarine  weapon,  and  to  substitute 
for  a  swift  and  mighty  blow,  and  thus  a  blow  most 
in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  humanity,  a  policy 
of  hesitation  and  delay,  betraying  weaknesses  and  a 
bad  conscience,  and  setting  the  seal  on  all  our  mis- 
fortunes.^ 

In  truth,  as  I  prophesied  in  February,  1916,  the  dam- 
age that  our  available  submarines  could  have  achieved 
in  19 1 6  was  far  greater  than  that  caused  in  19 17. 
The  decisive  factor  is  not  the  number  of  submarines, 
but  the  number  of  sinkings.  Our  hesitant  politicians 
were  too  clever  to  grasp  this  simple  truth.  The  yield 
of  the  submarines  sank  as  the  enemy's  defensive  meas- 
ures increased.  These  measures  required  years  of  prep- 
aration, years  which  we  gave  them.  The  submarines 
could  only  bring  us  victory  during  a  certain  period, 
and  this  period  we  threw  away  through  fear  of  Wil- 
son and  hopes  of  his  aid.  The  tragic  figures  which 
prove  this  could  not  be  made  public  during  the  war, 

'  On  submarine  construction  before  the  war,  see  Technical 
Supplement. 

*  The  parties  of  the  Left  in  the  Reichstag  have  so  large  a 
share  in  the  responsibility  for  delaying  the  campaign  that  justice 
compels  me  to  mention  that  at  the  beginning  of  1916  several 
sound  men  among  the  Social  Democrats  fully  shared  my  point 
of  view,  but  were  unable  to  prevail. 


i86  MY   MEMOIRS 

a  fact  of  which  the  opponents  of  the  campaign  took 
advantage  to  continue  their  misrepresentations.  Out  of 
the  mass  of  proofs  I  select  but  one  single  fact.  In  the 
spring  of  1916,  with  restricted,  that  is  to  say  with 
quite  inadequate,  submarine  warfare,  the  sinkings 
amounted  to  17,000  tons  per  boat  per  voyage.  The 
experience  of  1916  shows  that  the  results  of  unre- 
stricted warfare  are  at  least  thrice  as  great  as  those 
of  restricted.  We  should  thus  have  been  sure  at  that 
time  of  reaching  a  figure  of  51,000  tons  per  boat  per 
voyage.  But  in  the  summer  of  19 17  the  actual  sink- 
ings were  only  14,000  per  boat  per  voyage,  and  in  the 
autumn  of  191 7  they  had  fallen  to  9,000.  In  the 
spring  of  1916  we  could  reckon  on  205  submarines 
(in  commission,  building,  or  undergoing  tests)  for  the 
financial  year  then  beginning.  Of  this  number,  147 
were  building  for  delivery  in  the  financial  year.^ 
From  this  one  can  calculate  the  results  which  would 
have  attended  a  real  submarine  campaign  in  191 6. 
One  must  admit  that  the  English  are  right  in  their 
view  that  they  would  have  lost  the  war  at  that  time 
if  we  had  only  had  the  courage  to  win  it.  When  one 
looks  through  the  submarine  diaries  of  the  year  1916, 
one  can  realize  with  what  grief  the  commanders  had 
then  to  let  the  easiest  and  richest  booty  pass  before 
their  eyes,  and  it  becomes  plain  that  they  could  have 

*  I  do  not  trouble  now  to  deal  with  the  amazing  rumour, 
typical  indeed  of  the  then  conditions,  that  I  had  false  figures 
submitted  to  the  Budget  Committee  of  the  Federal  Council,  since 
it  has  been  disposed  of  officially  and  judicially  (only,  it  is 
true,  after  it  had  done  its  poUtical  service  against  me). 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       187 

sunk  on  each  voyage  five  or  six  times  as  much  as  was 
possible  a  year  later. 

Below  I  quote  as  an  example  the  experiences  of 
Senior  Lieutenant  Steinbrink,  a  particularly  able  com- 
mander, who  was  told  off  to  test  whether,  under  the 
regulations  laid  down  in  19 16  for  submarine  opera- 
tions, any  success  was  possible  without  infringing  the 
regulations. 

Commander's  Diary,  July- August,  19 16 

"  The  weather  being  very  unfavourable  for  torpedo 
attacks,  station  could  only  be  kept  before  the  mouth 
of  the  Seine  for  four  days,  as  long  as  the  wind  and 
sea  made  it  easier  to  escape  observation.  During  this 
time  the  incoming  steamer  traffic  was  watched  day 
and  night  at  a  distance  of  from  three  to  eight  knots 
from  the  main  point  of  entry,  and  each  single  steamer 
that  came  sufficiently  near  was  approached,  and  an 
estimate  of  her  character  made  at  the  shortest  possible 
range.  In  all  forty-one  day-approaches  (that  is,  ap- 
proaches ready  for  discharging  torpedo,  but  without 
actually  discharging)  were  carried  out,  and  none  of 
the  steamers  showed  the  signs  indicated  as  distinctive 
of  transports,  nor  did  their  appearance  in  general  give 
a  pronounced  impression  of  their  being  transports. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  early  morning  light,  we  saw 
in  all  six  camouflaged  1,500  to  3,000-ton  steamers 
(three  collier-type  and  three  cargo  vessels) ;  they  were 
painted  black,  with  grey  or  brown  upper  works,  and 
showed  no  flag.  Each  ship  was  separately  convoyed 
by  a  camouflaged  destroyer,  or  by  one  or  two  armed 
trawlers.  I  was  firmly  convinced  that  they  were  trans- 
porting troops  or  important  material,  but  as  my  view 


i88  MYMEMOIRS 

was  not  confirmed  by  the  signs  mentioned  in  the 
regulations  (troops  in  large  numbers,  parks  of  guns 
or  waggons,  dispositions  of  men  on  deck),  I  could 
not  attack  these  either. 

"  Under  the  conditions  at  present  laid  down  for 
submarine  attacks  on  transports,  there  is  absolutely 
nothing  to  be  done,  and  the  attempt,  which  in  view 
of  the  efficient  counter-measures  of  the  enemy  is  not 
without  danger,  is  hardly  worth  the  efforts  of  the 
crew." 

Attitude  of  the  flotilla  to  the  above  diary  extract: 
The  object  of  the  undertaking  was  to  ascertain 
whether,  with  the  regulations  now  in  force — that  is 
to  say,  that  merchant  vessels  are  only  to  be  dealt  with 
on  the  lines  of  the  Prize  Order,  and  that  no  vessels 
other  than  transports  ascertained  to  be  such  beyond 
question  are  to  be  torpedoed  without  warning — it  is 
possible  to  cause  damage  to  the  communications  of  the 
English  army  in  France,  which  in  my  view  is  at  pres- 
ent the  navy's  most  important  task. 

The  result  is  unquestionably  as  follows: 
Under  the  present  restrictions,  the  dispatch  of 
submarines  against  the  lines  of  communication  offers 
no  prospects  of  success.  .  .  .  Attempts  in  this  direc- 
tion are  accordingly  abandoned  for  the  time,  until 
the  regulations  permit  the  torpedoing  without  warn- 
ing of  all  vessels  other  than  hospital  ships  sailing  be- 
tween England  and  France. 

\  Trade  warfare  in  accordance  with  the  Prize  Or- 
der is  still  to  be  carried  on  in  the  western  part  of 
the  Channel,  in  spite  of  the  danger  run  by  the  sub- 
marines on  rising  to  the  surface.  We  are  forced  to 
this  decision,  since  this  is  at  present  the  only  means 
we  possess  to  damage  the  enemy. 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       189 

This  result  of  the  undertaking  was  only  to  be 
expected,  but  I  thought  it  nevertheless  valuable  to 
have  the  evidence  of  actual  experience. 

It  is  obvious  what  a  great  influence  our  submarines 
could  have  had  on  the  course  of  the  Somme  fighting. 
But,  apart  from  all  such  questions  of  detail,  anyone 
who  was  clearly  conscious  that  the  whole  existence 
of  the  German  people  depended  on  this  war  could  not 
read  without  the  deepest  emotion  such  reports  as  the 
above  of  the  crippling  of  our  most  effective  weapon. 

Our  conduct  in  the  spring  of  19 16  showed  the  whole 
world,  save  a  few  German  diplomats  and  democrats, 
that  Germany  was  moving  to  her  destruction. 

VII 

Not  having  had  any  part  in  the  events  which  led 
to  the  opening  of  the  unrestricted  campaign  on  Febru- 
ary ist,  1917,  I  can  only  deal  shortly  with  them  here. 
So  far  as  my  information  goes,  they  presented  a  typi- 
cal instance  of  the  disorganization  of  the  Bethmann 
system  of  government.  If  it  be  true  that  just  about 
the  New  Year  negotiations  were  in  progress  between 
Bethmann  and  Wilson  which  gave  us  promise  of  a 
reasonable  peace,  or  which  at  any  rate  Bethmann  him- 
self regarded  as  hopeful,  then  it  is  incomprehensible 
that  at  that  very  moment  he  should  have  allowed  the 
campaign  to  be  opened.  I  cannot  think  that  the  mili- 
tary authorities,  if  the  politicians  kept  them  sufficiently 
informed  of  the  negotiations,  would  have  resisted  a 


I90  MYMEMOIRS 

postponement  to  enable  the  diplomatic  situation  to 
define  itself.  In  the  autumn  of  1916,  G.H.Q.,  in 
view  of  the  attack  on  Roumania,  had  thought  it  neces- 
sary to  take  seriously  the  danger  of  war  with  Hol- 
land, which  was  incorrectly  reported  by  the  Chan- 
cellor and  Ambassador  von  Kiihlmann,  and  accord- 
ingly agreed  to  some  delay  in  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign. After  the  overthrow  of  Roumania  the  situa- 
tion was  different.  G.H.Q.  doubted  seriously  whether 
we  could  hold  out  for  another  winter  (191 7-18).  As 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  von  Holtzendorff  thought 
himself  in  a  position  to  promise  that  England  would 
be  ready  for  peace  after  a  six  months'  submarine  cam- 
paign; the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  desire 
to  obtain  peace  by  August,  19 17,  was  that  the  cam- 
paign must  be  opened  in  February,  1917.  This  cal- 
culation had,  however,  only  a  limited  value,  and  could 
not  be  taken  as  dogmatic.  As  I  have  stated,  I  think 
too  that,  if  the  various  separate  departments  had  been 
permitted  to  keep  sufficiently  in  touch  with  general 
policy,  none  of  them  would  have  clung  so  rigidly  to 
their  own  calculations.  The  old  weakness  of  our 
system  of  government,  the  exclusion  of  the  separate 
departments  from  general  responsibility,  and  the  with- 
holding from  them  of  information  necessary  for  the 
formation  of  their  views,  seems  thus,  if  my  impres- 
sions are  accurate,  to  have  been  responsible  also  for 
the  submarine  campaign  cutting  across  pending  diplo- 
matic negotiations. 

If  it  is  further  correct  that  Wilson  felt  himself  in- 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       191 

suited  in  his  confidence  in  German  politicians  by  this 
brusque  change  of  front,  then  there  was  here,  too,  an- 
other parallel  to  the  methods  of  surprise  employed  in 
July,  19 1 4,  and  the  Polish  "  slap  in  the  face  for  the 
Czar.  "  But  at  this  stage  of  the  war  repetition  of 
such  conduct  virtually  amounted  to  the  final  loss  of 
our  capacity  for  international  negotiation.  The  dam- 
age caused  by  this  loss  would  have  to  be  paid  not 
so  much  by  our  diplomats  as  by  the  people  in  general 
and  the  Hohenzollern  monarchy  in  particular. 

The  strangeness  of  the  proceedings  would  be  still 
more  striking  if  the  statement  is  correct  that  the  Chan- 
cellor even  then  personally  disapproved  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  allowed  himself  to  be  out-voted  by  others. 
It  is  impossible  to  understand  why  Bethmann,  if  those 
were  his  convictions,  did  not  take  the  obvious  course 
and  why  the  Emperor  did  not  allow  him  to  resign  and 
replace  him  by  a  Chancellor  who  believed  in  the  cam- 
paign. 

The  crowning  touch  to  a  piece  of  recklessness  which 
no  amount  of  ingenuity  could  render  harmless  is  to 
be  found,  if  the  above  assumption  be  correct,  in  the 
fact  that  Bethmann  expressed  the  view  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, against  his  own  convictions,  that  the  very  moment 
had  now  arrived  which,  politically  and  navally,  gave 
the  greatest  promise  of  success  from  the  unrestricted 
campaign.  One  may  just  point  out  in  passing  how 
presumptuous  it  was  to  hold  such  a  view  in  the  face 
of  the  opinions  given  by  the  Admiralty,  the  Naval 
Staff,  the  High  Sea  fleet,  the  Marine  Corps,  and 


192  MY    MEMOIRS 

G.H.Q.,  in  the  spring  of  191 6,  even  if  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff  had  about  the  end  of  19 16  brought 
himself  somewhat  nearer  to  Bethmann's  standpoint. 
However  that  may  be,  it  was  certainly  unfortunate 
that  the  campaign  should  be  under  the  control  of  a 
statesman  who  was  at  bottom  unfavourably  disposed 
towards  it  and  who  accordingly,  just  as  he  had  hitherto 
prevented  its  adoption,  now  in  this  last  stage,  ham- 
pered its  operation.  In  1916  we  could  perhaps  have 
accepted  the  responsibility  of  weakening  the  campaign 
by  exceptions  in  favour  of  certain  neutrals.  In  19 17 
it  was  too  late  for  such  measures.  If  we  staked  every- 
thing on  this  one  card,  it  was  the  very  first  necessity 
that  all  means,  military,  naval,  political,  personal,  and 
technical,  should  be  placed  at  the  service  of  the  cam- 
paign. The  navy  should  have  postponed  every  other 
task,  and  put  absolutely  every  available  man  and  ma- 
chine to  work  constructing  boats  or  engines,  or  in  the 
yards.  The  army  should  have  released  the  workmen, 
the  politicians  should  have  done  their  part,  and  the 
diplomats,  instead  of  standing  on  one  side  and  w^ait- 
ing  on  events,  should  have  worked  with  all  their  heart 
for  the  campaign.  Instead,  exceptions  were  made  in 
favour  of  European  neutrals,  which  weakened  the 
effect  of  the  operations,  and  both  in  naval  and  in  con- 
structional work  there  was  not  that  extreme  concen- 
tration on  the  submarine  campaign  that  alone  in  this 
advanced  stage  could  have  given  it  the  necessary  force. 
The  fundamental  fault  of  our  whole  conduct  of  the 
war,  the  lack  of  any  unity  and  determination  compar- 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       193 

able  to  that  displayed  by  the  English,  persisted  so  long 
as  the  Bethmann  system  held  the  reins  of  Government. 

When  the  Government  undertook  the  responsibility 
first  of  undertaking  a  campaign  in  which  it  had  no  real 
faith,  and  then  of  hindering  its  operation  ,the  pros- 
pects of  the  campaign  were  for  that  reason  alone  far 
worse  in  reality  than  they  would  have  been  in  19 16. 
Until  my  retirement  the  Admiralty  were  building  as 
many  submarines  as  was  in  any  way  possible.  I  thrice 
toured  all  the  yards  and  personally  examined  every 
slip  to  ascertain  whether  an  increased  output  could  be 
achieved.^ 

I  am  not  aware  whether  the  construction  of  subma- 
rines was  continued  with  the  necessary  energy  after 
my  departure.  The  fatal  element,  however,  was  the  in- 
crease of  the  enemy  counter-measures,  which  exceeded 
even  all  our  fears.  England  had  entered  the  war  un- 
prepared against  the  submarine  danger.  As  soon  as 
it  recognized  the  deadly  nature  of  the  danger,  it  set 
itself,  with  the  ample  aid  of  America,  to  the  creation 

*  I  mention  in  passing  that  if  the  campaign  had  been  opened 
in  1916,  it  would  presumably  have  been  impossible  for  the  British 
High  Seas  fleet  to  have  remained  so  consistently  in  hiding  at 
Scapa  Flow  after  the  battle  of  the  Skager-Rak.  I  would  also 
mention  that  at  the  beginning  of  1916  I  urged  at  a  council  that 
orders  should  be  given  to  the  captains  of  the  German  merchant- 
men lying  in  America  and  elsewhere  to  sail  out  to  sea  and  sink 
their  vessels,  or  otherwise  to  render  them  useless.  As  they  were 
not  of  course  warships,  they  could  not  have  been  prevented 
from  doing  this.  Ballin  spoke  against  the  proposal,  saying  that 
the  Americans  would  have  hanged  the  captains  (which  was  im- 
possible), and  that  we  should  lose  our  fine  vessels  for  good. 
The  result  was  that  in  1917-18  it  was  these  very  fast-sailing 
vessels  that  did  us  the  greatest  damage  by  transporting  American 
troops,  etc. 


194  MY   MEMOIRS 

of  defensive  measures,  which  began  to  operate  with 
great  success,  not  indeed  in  1916,  but  in  191 7.  The 
Entente  was  industrially  our  superior  in  quantity,  and 
the  defence  thus  improved  more  rapidly  than  the  num- 
ber of  submarines  could  be  increased.  In  the  spring 
of  1918  we  were  at  times  losing  more  submarines  than 
we  were  completing. 

This  position  was,  indeed,  to  be  foreseen  in  1916. 
I  mention  a  few  of  the  more  important  of  these  de- 
fensive measures :  transformation  of  merchantmen  into 
warships  by  the  supply  of  15,000  guns  with  trained 
gun-crews,  systematic  sweeping  of  the  seas  by  aero- 
planes, airships,  and  surface  vessels,  extensive  em- 
ployment of  submarine  sound  apparatus,  construction 
of  submarine-chasers,  traps,  and  depth  bombs;  de- 
fensive obstacles  such  as  nets  and  mines;  further,  in- 
direct measures  such  as  the  tripling  of  the  American 
shipbuilding  yards,  the  feverish  haste  in  construction 
of  cargo  vessels,  the  utmost  possible  accumulation  of 
stocks,  the  development  of  the  intelligence  service,  the 
monopolization  and  rationing  of  freight  space,  the  es- 
tablishment and  development  of  the  convoy  system, 
which  involved  years  of  work,  and  constituted  a 
tremendous  achievement  on  the  part  of  the  English, 
and  lastly  the  steadily  increasing  pressure  on  neu- 
trals, ending  in  the  robbery  of  their  commercial  ship- 
ping. 

The  consequence  of  these  measures  was  the  serious 
reduction  of  sinkings,  amounting,  as  explained  above, 
to  the  loss  of  four-fifths  of  the  former  effectivness 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       195* 

of  the  submarines.  One  should  bear  in  mind  that  at 
a  later  stage  there  were  many  thousands  of  submarine- 
chasers,  gradually  built  up,  at  work  against  us. 

In  February,  19 16,  our  boats  could  still  play  havoc 
among  enemy  merchantmen  like  wolves  among  a  flock 
of  sheep;  later  they  had  to  carry  on  a  regular  fight. 
A  mere  work  of  destruction  had  become  a  warlike 
operation  involving  great  danger  and  loss. 

The  question  now  arises  whether  the  campaign, 
if  it  had  opened  in  the  spring  of  1916  instead  of  in 
that  of  191 7,  would  not  simply  have  resulted  in  the 
arrival  one  year  earlier  of  those  hordes  of  xA.merican 
troops  on  the  continent  which  turned  the  balance 
against  us  on  the  western  front  in  19 18. 

I  leave  on  one  side  the  fact  that  General  Head- 
quarters, like  everyone  else,  had  not  thought  it  pos- 
sible that  these  enormous  numbers  of  American  troops 
could  be  brought  to  Europe,  and  had  accordingly,  at 
the  cost  of  substantially  thinning  our  fighting  strength, 
sent  a  million  men  to  the  East  for  economic  purposes 
which  must  after  all,  in  comparison  to  the  main  aim 
of  the  war,  be  described  as  secondary.  I  would  only 
point  out  that  in  the  spring  of  1916  the  probability 
that  the  Americans  would  send  troops  across  was 
much  less  than  it  was  a  year  later.  In  the  first  place, 
the  greater  effects  of  the  campaign  on  enemy  freight 
space  would  have  limited  from  the  outset  the  possi- 
bilities of  American  military  development  of  strength. 
In  addition,  American  opinion  was  not  then  ready  for 
a  declaration  of  war  against  us. 


196  MY    MEMOIRS 

In  February  and  March,  1916,  an  overwhelming  ma- 
jority in  the  American  Congress  had,  in  opposition 
to  Wilson's  views,  expressed  itself  in  favour  of  a 
warning  being  given  against  American  citizens  travel- 
Img  on  armed  vessels  of  belligerents,  so  far  as  it 
could  do  so  without  formally  disowning  the  President. 
The  same  thing  happened  in  the  Senate.  The  arming 
of  merchantmen  and  their  employment  to  attack  war 
vessels,  against  the  existing  conventions  of  maritime 
war,  was  at  that  time  not  yet  regarded  as  legal.  xA.s 
the  Government  did  not  pass  on  to  me  its  political 
information,  I  did  not  see  so  clearly  in  the  spring 
of  1916  as  I  do  now,  that  Wilson,  especially  before 
his  re-election,  could  not  have  declared  war  against 
us  at  that  time.  By  yielding  to  Wilson  then  in  sheer 
fear  of  this  bogy,  and  by  falling  back  on  pretexts  such 
as  the  Roumanian  harvest,  the  need  to  consider  the 
American  Committee  for  Relief  in  Belgium,  and  the 
like,  we  turned  the  bogy  into  a  genuine  terror  for 
191 7.  The  great  debates  of  February  and  March, 
1916,  in  the  Congress  and  Senate  were,  as  Hale  de- 
scribed them,  an  exhortation  to  Wilson  for  peace,  as 
urgent  as  any  a  Congress  had  ever  made  to  a  Presi- 
dent. But  the  success  of  his  bullying  note  raised 
Wilson  to  a  height  such  as  a  President  had  seldom 
occupied  before,  and,  as  was  natural,  fundamentally 
changed  the  attitude  of  the  American  people  to  the 
submarine  question. 

According  to  the  view  of  our  ambassador  von 
Hintze,  who  travelled  through  America  at  this  time 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       197 

on  his  way  home  from  Peking,  Zimmermann's  well- 
known  Mexico  telegram  rendered  Wilson  decisive  as- 
sistance in  the  realization  of  his  wish  to  take  his  stand 
against  us.  Ballin,  who  knew  my  views,  wrote  to  me 
on  July  19th,  1917,  that  he  had  recently  given  to 
innumerable  questions  the  answer  that  the  submarine 
campaign  as  now  carried  out  "  was  not  a  realization 
of  the  Tirpitz  idea,"  adding  the  following  remarks : 

"  Last  winter  I  had  already  expressed  both  orally 
and  in  writing  the  view  that,  if  Your  Excellency  had 
remained  at  the  helm,  you  would  not  have  begun  the 
unrestricted  campaign  at  all  at  the  present  time.  And 
I  hold  to  my  view  that  if  you  had  been  in  office 
while  Wilson  was  led  by  the  nose  in  the  way  he  was, 
his  ambitious  efforts  for  peace  were  thwarted,  and 
•he  was  finally  placed  in  an  impossible  position  by  the 
Mexico  telegram,  you  would  certainly  have  considered 
very  carefully  whether  it  could  be  right,  either  politi- 
cally or  navally,  to  announce  and  introduce  unlimited 
submarine  operations,  without  giving  Wilson  an  op- 
portunity to  withdraw  with  dignity  from  the  situa- 
tion. 

"  In  my  view — which  is  shared  not  only  by  Count 
Bernstorff,  Prince  Hatzfeld,  and  Privy  Councillor  Al- 
bert, but  also  by  everyone  else  who  was  on  the  other 
side  up  to  the  outbreak  of  war — Wilson  would  never 
have  been  able  to  declare  war  against  us  if  we  had 
not  turned  the  population  of  the  Western  and  South- 
ern States,  which  were  wholly  friendly  to  Germany, 
against  us,  by  the  Mexico  telegram  and  a  whole  series 
of  other  mistakes. 

"What  the  entry  of  America  into  the  war  means 
for  the  Entente,  I  do  not  need  to  explain  to  you." 


198  MY    MEMOIRS 

My  answer  of  July  23rd,  19 17,  is  well  illustrated 
by  the  following  quotation: 

"  My  telegram  to  Bassermann  and  to  Excellency 
Spahn  was  intended  to  show  my  conviction  that  the 
proposed  Reichstag  declaratPon  seemed  to  me  miscon- 
ceived from  the  point  of  view  of  both  home  and 
international  politics.  Even  if  one  desired  to  take  the 
standpoint  that  an  agreement  with  Wilson  should  be 
reached  as  quickly  as  possible  at  the  price  of  aban- 
doing  the  campaign,  it  would  from  that  purely  busi- 
ness point  of  view  seem  to  me  to  be  wrong  to  de- 
preciate at  the  same  time  the  effect  of  the  campaign 
to  the  whole  world,  and  to  whine  for  peace. 

"  As  you  know,  I  was  taken  by  surprise,  both  as 
to  manner  and  time,  by  the  declaration  of  submarine 
warfare  on  February  4th,  191 5,  and  this  all  the  more 
since  on  January  27th  I  had  been  in  agreement  with 
the  then  Chancellor  as  to  the  postponement  of  the 
campaign  for  the  time  being.  But  once  this  decision 
was  announced  to  the  world,  and  that  with  a  certain 
flourish  of  trumpets,  it  was  vital  to  hold  to  it.  By 
our  continual,  and  in  part  undignified,  yielding  to  his 
jostling,  we  have  really  made  Wilson  what  he  is. 
The  true  policy  for  us  was  to  take  the  diplomatic 
offensive  against  Wilson's  incredible  breaches  of  neu- 
trality, nor  would  this  have  involved  any  danger.  The 
bullying  note  we  should  never  have  accepted,  on 
purely  material  grounds.  I  do  not  deal  with  the  by 
no  means  wise  or  happy  manner  in  which  we  handled 
the  diplomatic  side  of  the  Sussex  case  itself.  In  the 
spring  of  1916  the  United  States  would  not  have  de- 
clared war  against  us.  as  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the 
then  discussions  in  the  Senate  and  Congress.  That 
was  the  right  moment  to  conduct  the  campaign  with 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN       199 

more  severity;  both  ourselves  and  our  allies  still  had' 
a  considerable  economic  strength  to  throw  in,  and  Wil- 
son was  not  in  a  position  to  declare  war,  for  the  fur- 
ther reason  that  his  election  was  then  imminent.  The 
submarine  needs  time  to  produce  its  full  effect,  and 
time  we  then  had  to  spare.  We  could  thus  too  have 
afforded  to  make  greater  concessions  to  neutral  ship- 
ping than  may  be  presumed  to  have  appeared  possible 
later  to  our  authorities.  In  truth,  on  February  ist 
of  this  year,  we  had  already  been  thrust  close  to  the 
edge  of  the  abyss.  There  is  a  further  point  of  view, 
arising  from  the  English  counter-measures  against  the 
submarines.  In  your  letter  you  mention  the  convoys. 
Now,  convoys  are  only  an  effective  measure  after  large 
numbers  of  submarine-chasers  have  been  built.  We 
have  given  the  English  time  to  build  them  and  time 
too  for  the  effective  arming  of  their  entire  merchant 
fleet  and  for  a  whole  series  of  further  counter-meas- 
ures. In  quantity,  the  Entente  can  outstrip  the  in- 
crease of  our  submarines.  It  was  of  course  not  pos- 
sible to  determine  in  advance  exactly  to  what  extent 
these  counter-measures  would  balance  our  increase, 
but  anyone  who  has  worked  on  such  technical  ques- 
tions will  know  that  such  a  balance  can  always  be 
reached.  It  was  thus  economically,  politically,  and 
navally  a  mistake  to  postpone  the  energetic  employ- 
ment of  the  submarine  weapon.  I  held  this  convic- 
tion just  because,  as  you  rightly  assume,  I  never  un- 
derestimated the  effect  of  America's  entry  into  the 
war.  I  know  of  course  that  you  hold  the  view  that 
I  neglected  submarines  in  favour  of  dreadnoughts. 
I  feel  sure  that  you  are  wrong  in  this ;  at  the  outbreak 
of  war,  although  we  certainly  did  not  boast  about  it, 
we  led  the  world  in  submarines.  Further,  the  long- 
range  submarines  could  not  be  developed  more  rapidly 


200  MY   MEMOIRS 

than  the  engines  permitted;  ordinary  internal-combus- 
tion engines  were  not  sufficient  for  them. 

"  With  regard  to  the  effect  of  the  campaign  in  its 
present  form,  and  to  the  question  of  its  continuance, 
the  fact  that  I  should  have  selected  another  method  of 
campaign  and  that  I  am  compelled  to  regard  prospects 
as  seriously  lessened  by  the  delay  in  opening  the  cam- 
paign cannot  deprive  me  of  the  firm  conviction  that, 
once  it  has  been  undertaken,  we  have  no  option  but  to 
continue  it  with  all  our  energy  until  England  is  forced 
to  make  such  a  peace  as  will  give  us  a  basis  for  our 
economic  reconstruction  and  for  the  maintenance  of 
our  position  as  a  world-power. 

"  I  think,  too,  that  it  is  still  possible,  although  at 
a  slower  rate  and  with  more  difficulty  than  would  have 
been  the  case  before,  to  achieve  such  a  peace  by  the 
campaign  against  enemy  freight  space.  For  this,  it 
is  true,  we  require  of  the  Government  and  the  nation 
an  energy  not  diverted  or  weakened  by  any  obstacle, 
and  a  political  activity  that  will  fully  support  our  con- 
duct of  the  war." 

In  any  case,  even  if  America  had  acted  in  19 16  ex- 
actly as  she  did  in  191 7,  it  would  always  have  been 
better  for  us  to  meet  her  a  year  earlier,  when  we  and 
our  allies  were  stronger.  It  is  certain  that  America 
would  in  no  case  have  permitted  an  absolute  defeat  of 
England.  But  what  the  campaign,  if  begun  in  1916, 
could  have  achieved  was  to  prevent  an  absolute  defeat 
of  Germany.  According  to  all  the  experience  ac- 
quired both  then  and  later,  the  campaign  in  19 16  would 
have  had  at  first  a  monthly  result  of  at  the  very  least 
700,000  tons  of  sinkings,  rising  later  in  all  probability 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       201 

to  1,000,000  tons.  I  do  not  rely  here  on  the  higher 
estimates  given  by  experienced  commanders.  Of  these 
results  one  can  at  any  rate  say  with  confidence  that 
the  resulting  damage  to  England's  world  trade  and 
military  strength,  apart  from  any  general  political 
effects,  would  have  substantially  and  permanently  re- 
lieved our  Western  front,  and  would  have  gravely 
hampered  the  application  of  such  great  American 
strength  in  the  land  war.  The  increase  in  freight 
space,  also,  that  the  Entente  received  in  191 7  could 
not  have  been  obtained  in  19 16,  as  the  newly  built 
yards  were  not  then  at  work.  It  would  be  foolish  to 
deny  that  the  views  which  I  formed  in  the  spring  of 
19 1 8  might  also  possess  elements  of  uncertainty,  but 
we  had  then  already  sufficient  experience  to  know  that 
the  longer  the  war  lasted  the  more  the  menace  of 
Atnerica  would  increase.  In  19 16  it  was  more  danger- 
ous than  in  19 15.  The  increase  was  continuous,  and 
we  had  to  face  this  development  squarely. 

VIII 

The  tale  of  the  submarine  is  long  and  painful.  The 
character  of  our  political  system  in  these  last  few  years 
was  bound  to  produce  one  step  after  another  of 
muddled  confusion. 

The  first  step  in  the  submarine  warfare,  the  declara- 
tion of  a  barred  zone,  was  undertaken  prematurely  in 
an  undeveloped  and  unsuitable  form,  and  with  un- 
necessary flourish.  We  followed  that  up  by  not  hold- 
ing our  ground,  continually  displaying  weakness  and 


202  MYMEMOIRS 

fear.  We  yielded  to  Wilson,  and  raised  him  to  a 
greatly  strengthened  position  in  America.  Our  appear- 
ance of  an  uneasy  conscience  encouraged  the  English 
case  that  the  campaign  was  immoral.  By  this  most 
unwise  behaviour  we  made  it  more  difficult  and  danger- 
ous to  resume  the  campaign.  For  now,  after  we  had 
so  long  foregone  our  clear  rights,  it  seemed,  as  if 
even  from  our  own  point  of  view  we  were  sinning 
against  humanity,  although  the  world  said  never  a 
word  of  protest  when  England  did  much  worse  things. 
In  determination,  cruelty,  and  cynical  depreciation  of 
her  opponents,  England  is  four  times  our  superior,  as 
she  is  too  in  her  cleverness  in  making  her  case  plau- 
sible even  to  the  enemy.  And  so  the  German  people, 
in  its  unlimited  capacity  for  belief  in  the  foreigner, 
was  misled  by  our  wavering,  and  patiently  regarded 
as  nothing  but  an  act  of  divine  ordinance  the  English 
war  of  starvation,  which  brought  bankruptcy  and  de- 
struction, consumption  and  death,  to  this  hitherto 
flourishing  people.  And  in  comparison  to  this  form  of 
warfare,  if  you  please,  the  submarine  campaign  was 
to  be  called  cruel  and  immoral,  the  campaign  which 
aimed  at  cargoes  and  cost  the  enemy  scarcely  a  human 
life — in  all  the  years  of  war  not  so  many  lives  as  there 
fell  Germans  on  a  single  day  on  the  western  front,  or 
as  died  daily  among  the  German  civil  population  actu- 
ally after  the  armistice  was  signed,  through  the  in- 
human retention  of  the  starvation  blockade.  But  there 
is  no  limit  to  Anglo-Saxon  hypocrisy,  or  to  German 
lack  of  judgment. 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN      203 

The  orders  to  submarine  commanders  constitute  a 
string  of  riders,  restrictions,  and  contradictions,  which 
have  cost  us  most  precious  German  lives  and  robbed 
us  of  final  victory.  The  campaign  failed  because  Ger- 
many did  net  hold  consistently  to  the  view  that  every 
just  weapon  available  for  naval  warfare  should  be  used 
relentlessly  to  the  bitter  end. 

If  this  course  was  not  to  be  followed,  we  should 
have  frankly  accepted  defeat  in  the  spring  of  19 16. 
The  terms  would  have  been  less  severe  then  than  later. 
The  army  and  the  diplomats  had  no  means  of  averting 
defeat,  and  in  that  case  it  was  a  crime  not  to  end  the 
war  against  England.  Time  was  working  against  us. 
Still,  but  not  for  long,  the  navy  had  a  weapon  that 
could  strike  at  England's  heart.  The  question  was 
simply,  would  we  risk  the  American  danger?  If  we 
would  not,  then  we  were  bound  to  grow  weaker  and 
weaker  until  we  collapsed.  If  we  would,  then  not  a 
month  was  to  be  lost.  This  was  the  simple  matter  for 
decision.  We  could  not  try  to  evade  it.  It  was  pure 
waste  of  time  to  wait  for  America's  intermediation 
against  England.  That  was  my  view  of  the  position 
at  that  time,  and  results  have  shown  that  it  was  the 
true  view. 

The  declaration  of  February  8th,  19 16,  that  we 
would  thenceforth  attack  armed  merchant  vessels  was 
a  mere  trick  to  deceive  the  people.  After  this  declara- 
tion a  perfectly  lawful  torpedoing,  in  the  Sussex  case, 
was  at  first  denied  and  then  disapproved.  And  after 
this  second  surrender  to  Wilson,  instead  of  clearing 


204  MY    MEMOIRS 

our  decks,  we  decided  in  the  autumn  of  1916,  over 
the  heads  of  Hindenburg  and  Scheer,  to  test  the  new 
half  measure  of  the  submarine  cruiser  campaign.  Then 
there  came  the  muddle  of  combined  unlimited  cam- 
paign and  peace  negotiation  at  the  end  of  1916.  Fi- 
nally we  undertook  the  unrestricted  campaign,  which 
a  year  earlier  would  have  appeared  as  the  act  of  a 
strong  people  confident  of  victory,  as  a  measure  of 
despair,  half-heartedly  and  with  already  broken  pres- 
tige. Then  came  the  further  sickly  story  of  strategical 
weakening,  under  a  political  chief  who  had  no  real 
faith  himself  in  the  success  of  the  weapon. 

Had  we  been  able  in  Germany  to  foresee  the  Russian 
revolution,  we  should  perhaps  not  have  needed  to 
regard  the  submarine  campaign  of  1917  as  a  last 
resort.  But  in  January,  19 17,  there  was  no  visible  sign 
of  the  revolution.  On  the  other  hand,  even  Govern- 
ment departments  in  Germany  were  plainly  not  fully 
aware  of  the  devastating  effect  of  our  diplomatic 
mistakes  in  dealing  with  Wilson,  in  particular  from 
the  Sussex  note  to  the  Mexico  telegram,  which  alone 
rendered  it  possible  for  the  American  people  to  be 
swept  with  such  amazing  vehemence  into  a  war  which 
had  so  little  to  do  with  their  own  interests. 

It  is  difficult  to  say,  whether,  if  I  had  been  a  respon- 
sible statesman,  knowing  then  all  the  available  details, 
I  should  have  still  begun  the  campaign  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1917.  Our  desperate  position  of  course  hardly 
left  us  any  other  way  of  escape  from  complete  ruin. 
The  value  of  the  campaign  was  by  now  lessened  and 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN       205 

the  dangers  involved  were  greater.  As  a  private  citizen 
without  inside  information,  I  had  at  the  time  a  pro- 
found feeHng  that  it  was  dangerously  late,  but  was 
convinced  by  the  attitude  of  the  men  then  in  office  that 
the  risk  could  be  and  would  have  to  be  taken.^ 

And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  if  we  had  then  directed 
our  whole  undivided  strength  to  this  one  aim,  as  our 
last  chance,  in  the  manner  in  which  England  set  to 
work  on  her  counter-measures,  we  should  have  inspired 
instead  of  depressing  the  moral  resistance  of  the  peo- 
ple; and  in  that  case  we  might  perhaps  have  achieved, 
not  victory,  as  we  might  have  gained  had  we  begun 
the  campaign  at  the  proper  time  (1916),  but  at  any 
rate  a  tolerable  peace.  In  the  late  summer  of  19 18 
the  supreme  naval  command  held  the  conviction  that 
in  spite  of  all  the  increased  difficulties  the  submarines 
were  still  causing  such  serious  damage  to  England 
that  we  might  expect  on  her  part  a  substantially  greater 

^  As  no  official  material  was  at  my  disposition,  I  was  not 
sufficiently  well  informed  to  give  any  authoritative  weight  to 
my  own  instinctive  fear  that  it  was  then  dangerously  late  for 
the  campaign  to  be  undertaken.  As  the  Government  held  it  to 
be  necessary,  at  any  rate  as  a  last  counsel  of  despair,  and  even 
those  who  had  hitherto  opposed  it  seemed  now  to  have  wholly 
changed  their  views  and  were  awakening  in  the  public  mind  the 
greatest  expectations  of  success  in  the  campaign,  it  was  plainly 
my  duty  not  to  take  any  steps.  In  confidential  circles,  however, 
I  certainly  could  not  suppress  my  anxieties  as  to  this  last  and 
perhaps  effective  means  of  salvation.  I  remember  how  a  well- 
known  member  of  the  Reichstag  hastened  to  meet  me  as  I  was 
walking  in  the  Tiergarten  in  February,  191 7,  and  congratulated 
me  on  the  submarine  campaign,  and  how  he  became  silent  with 
amazement  at  the  anxious  tone  of  my  reply.  When  I  discovered 
that  in  May,  1917,  there  was  even  a  note  in  The  Times  that  I 
had  expressed  myself  pessimistically  over  the  campaign  as  hav- 
ing been  begun  too  late,  I  refrained  with  even  more  care  from 
expressing  my  fears. 


2o6  MY    MEMOIRS 

readiness  for  peace  in  the  spring  of  19 19.  The  cam- 
paign was  sacrificed  in  October,  1918,  just  at  the  very 
worst  moment,  when  it  had  just  been  restored  to  full 
operation  by  a  substantial  increase  in  the  number  of 
submarines.  The  navy  had  such  complete  confidence 
in  the  results  of  this  arduous  and  dangerous  service 
that  the  sudden  suspension  of  the  campaign,  even  be- 
fore the  conclusion  of  an  armistice  based  on  the  pre- 
liminaries of  peace,  had  a  most  destructive  effect  on 
the  morale  of  the  whole  fleet.  The  crews  felt  that 
they  had  been  deceived  when  the  Government  on  Wil- 
son's demand  suddenly  disowned  what  was  our  most 
important  weapon.  This  feeling  of  disappointment 
and  discouragement  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  men's 
loss  of  confidence  in  their  superiors. 

Little  was  wanting  for  the  achievement  of  a  good 
peace.  It  was  not  the  fault  of  the  fighting  forces  that 
we  did  not  obtain  it.  True,  when  Hindenburg  and 
Ludendorff  were  at  last  called  to  the  command,  it  was 
too  late  for  the  army  to  win  it ;  but  the  navy  was  twice 
in  a  position  to  bring  a  possible  peace  within  grasp — 
in  the  autumn  of  19 14  with  the  fleet,  and  (still  more 
probably)  in  the  spring  of  1916  with  the  submarine. 
Terrible  is  the  realization  that  our  present  position 
could  have  been  avoided  not  only  by  political  means, 
but  also  by  naval  action. 


CONCLUSION 


The  German  people  did  not  understand  the  sea.  In 
the  hour  of  its  destiny  it  did  not  use  its  fleet.  To-day, 
all  that  I  can  do  for  the  fleet  is  to  write  its  epitaph. 
Our  people  has  passed  through  a  tragedy  without 
parallel  in  its  swift  rise  to  the  position  of  a  world- 
power  and  its  still  swifter  decline,  due  to  the  tempo- 
rary littleness  of  its  politics  and  its  lack  of  national 
feeling. 

If  one  considers  the  tragic  fate  of  our  fleet,  which 
is  bound  up  with  that  of  our  people,  one  might  come 
to  the  view  that  every  effort  of  a  European  State  to 
win  itself  equal  weight  at  sea  with  England  is  waste 
labour  from  the  start,  but  I  do  not  think  that  a  careful 
and  accurate  historian  would  arrive  at  this  conclusion. 

Spain  was  mistress  of  the  world  of  her  day,  when 
England  in  the  fight  against  the  Spanish  silver  ships 
— Westward  Ho! — developed  from  an  agricultural 
people  into  a  piratical  State,  and  finally  defeated  the 
Great  Armada.  Spain  was  equal  to  military  conquest 
and  could  hold  her  overseas  colonies  for  a  time,  but 
she  lacked  trade  and  traffic,  which  form  the  second 
condition  of  lasting  influence  at  sea. 

Holland  had  a  vast  and  wealthy  trade,  and  thus 
excited  the  greed  of  England.     She  possessed  too  a 

207 


2o8  MY    MEMOIRS 

good  war  fleet,  which  once,  under  de  Ruyter,  gained 
her  a  just  peace  with  its  guns  trained  on  London.  But 
Holland  was  small  and  had  no  hinterland  of  her  own. 
While  Germany  lay  bleeding  from  the  Thirty  Years 
War,  Louis  XIV  committed  the  great  historical  error 
of  attacking  Holland,  his  natural  ally,  in  the  back. 
But  the  Netherlands  might  have  held  their  own  for 
a  longer  time,  and  have  bridged  the  gap  until  a  new 
ally  grew  up  for  them  in  Germany,  if  the  Mynheers 
of  Amsterdam  had  not  given  too  much  thought 
to  immediate  profits  and  worshipped  their  pepper- 
bags.  In  spite  of  the  urgent  representations  of 
their  great  Admiral,  they  let  their  fleet  fall  into 
decay,  and  thus  brought  about  the  downfall  of  their 
country. 

The  rise  of  France  to  power  at  sea  varied  with  her 
political  changes;  the  way  that  Richelieu  and  Colbert 
trod  was  often  deserted.  Nevertheless,  before  the  out- 
break of  the  revolution,  the  strength  of  France  at  sea 
stood  as  high  as  that  of  England.  It  was  mainly 
through  her  fleet  that  Washington  secured  freedom  for 
America.  Suffern  had  maintained  the  balance  against 
the  English  in  India,  and  the  Mediterranean  was  in 
the  main  French.  The  revolution  destroyed  the  corps 
of  naval  officers  and  let  the  ships  and  crews  go  to 
ruin.  Napoleon  then  learnt  that  not  even  his  energy 
and  genius  could  create  sea-power  at  a  blow,  and  thus 
the  numerically  superior  Franco-Spanish  fleet  was  de- 
feated by  the  better  quality  of  Nelson  and  his  "  band 
of  brothers." 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN      209 

The  naval  prestige  of  England  then  lasted  through 
the  nineteenth  century. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  Ger- 
many possessed  all  the  conditions  of  sea-power :  trade 
and  commerce  of  world-wide  importance,  moving  al- 
most too  rapidly  in  their  mighty  development,  military 
genius,  organizing  capacity  and  an  industrious  tem- 
perament, a  strong  constitution  and  a  patriotic  people. 
The  time  was  short  to  make  good  the  delay  of  years. 
But  we  were  near  to  our  peaceful  goal  when  a  calami- 
tous policy  set  us  at  war  with  the  four  strongest  naval 
powers  of  Europe,  of  whom  England  alone  was  doubly 
our  superior.  From  the  start  we  could  not  reckon  on 
complete  victory,  on  the  defeat  of  England;  but  I 
dare  express  the  conviction  that  our  sea-power,  taken 
all  in  all,  was  very  considerable  and  already  strong 
enough  to  harass  England  to  such  a  degree  that  we 
could  have  been  able  to  reimburse  ourselves  for  our 
heavy  losses.  To  obtain  this  end  we  should  have 
grasped  the  idea  that  a  war  of  annihilation  was  being 
waged  against  Germany,  and  in  military  matters  as 
well  as  politically  have  acted  accordingly,  and  above 
all  staked  our  fleet  fearlessly  at  the  right  time  and 
under  a  single  command.  The  general  situation  did 
not  permit  us  to  miss  opportunities.  More  terrible 
than  the  sale  of  the  old  German  fleet  by  Hannibal 
Fischer  is  the  end  of  the  Imperial  Navy.  That  at- 
tempt of  our  fathers  was  premature  and  attempted 
with  inadequate  means;  while  our  attempt,  though  it 
was  late  in  beginning,  depended  on  a  Prussian  Ger- 


2IO  MY   MEMOIRS 

many  and  ought  to  have  succeeded.  Whether  our 
grandsons  will  again  be  able  to  make  the  attempt  lies 
hidden  in  the  lap  of  the  future.  Should  they  ever 
do  so,  may  they  learn  from  our  attempt  and  gather 
confidence. 

If  we  consider  the  rise  of  Prussia-Germany  with- 
out any  illusions,  from  the  complete  disorganiza- 
tion after  the  Thirty  Years'  War  to  the  height  of 
our  prosperity  in  July,  1914,  it  appears  almost  a 
miracle  that  our  country  succeeded  as  well  as  it  did. 
Situated  in  the  middle  of  Europe  with  difficult  access 
to  the  ocean;  possessing  natural  boundaries  of  only 
moderate  strength;  surrounded  by  nations  who  to-day, 
as  for  centuries,  have  been  lying  in  wait  to  attack  us 
— such  is  Germany's  position.  Possibly  these  condi- 
tions, and  possibly  to  a  similar  degree  the  character- 
istics of  our  race  are  the  reasons  why  Germany's 
power  and  prosperity  did  not  proceed  from  the  people 
itself,  but  is  almost  in  the  nature  of  a  work  of  art, 
erected  by  a  series  of  constructors  of  the  state  whom 
destiny  has  granted  to  us  in  the  last  three  centuries. 
Can  anyone  believe  that  the  "  Ewige  Reichstag  "  which 
outlawed  Frederick  the  Great,  that  the  Frankfort  Par- 
liament or  any  other  plebiscite  would  have  helped  us 
forward?  Prussia-Germany  was  on  the  contrary  the 
work  of  strong  individuals  who  demanded  and  en- 
forced fulfilment  of  duty  and  subordination  of  the 
individual  to  the  interests  of  the  State,  and  who  had 
the  ability  to  keep  their  aims  in  sight. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  century  we  entered  on  a 


SUBMARINE    CAMPAIGN      211 

new  period  with  utterly  new  conditions  of  life.  Our 
nation  with  its  flourishing  industry  was  forced  to  take 
part  in  international  trade  on  a  large  scale  or  see 
its  growth  stopped.  States  are  upheld  by  the  forces 
which  have  created  them.  Such  forces  were  for  Prus- 
sia-Germany real  power  and  devotion  to  the  state  as 
an  entity,  a  state  which  was  not  a  visionary  project 
of  a  fraternization  of  Teutonic  nations,  which  scheme 
the  Anglo-Saxons  have  twice  in  our  history  pressed 
on  us  in  order  to  choke  German  national  aspirations. 

It  was  my  conviction  that  the  mission  of  Germany 
for  the  good  of  Europe  and  of  the  whole  world  never 
reached  its  complete  fulfilment.  We  had  almost  but 
not  quite  succeeded  in  bringing  Germany  as  a  pioneer 
into  a  new  age.  A  sea-power  of  considerable  strength 
made  it  possible  to  obtain  peace  with  honour,  or  if 
it  was  unavoidable,  of  waging  war  with  tolerable  suc- 
cess. Our  fleet  was  besides  an  important  and  neces- 
sary instrument  for  bringing  our  people  more  in  touch 
with  the  everyday  work  and  the  current  thought  of 
the  outside  world.  When  our  future  powerlessness 
at  sea  has  rendered  our  decline  still  more  acute  and 
made  reconstruction  impossible,  coming  generations 
may  possibly  recall  this  fact. 

After  peace  and  war,  power  and  honour  are  lost, 
those  who  are  to  blame  stand  on  the  ruins  and  forge 
history.  They  deprive  our  simple  and  politically  in- 
capable race  of  belief  in  itself  and  in  the  logical  con- 
sistency of  its  history;  they  revile  the  old  German 
State,  its  prosperity,  and  its  achievements,  among  the 


212  MY    MEMOIRS 

latter  especially  our  navy  which  was  our  best  political 
trump  card,  and  take  the  greatest  trouble  to  break  the 
threads  which  bind  us  to  our  past  development.  To  be 
sure,  our  old  State  needed  certain  reforms,  but  it  pos- 
sessed in  full  the  capacity  for  development  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  a  new  age  of  our  children  and  their 
descendants.  But  the  Revolution,  throwing  overboard 
everything  that  had  made  us  great  was  the  greatest 
crime  ever  committed  against  the  future  of  our  people. 
Our  breakdown  is  not  due  to  any  defects  in  our  old 
state  system,  but  to  the  inadequacy  of  the  persons  who 
tried  to  run  it.  Our  upper  classes  had  to  a  large  extent 
sunk  into  decadence;  materialism  had  become  a  na- 
tional characteristic;  the  influence  of  universal  suf- 
frage and  the  vote  by  ballot,  which  always  tends  to 
place  power  in  the  hands  of  demagogues,  was  not 
counterbalanced  by  a  strong  government  or  a  steady 
upper  class.  Thus  the  men  who  formed  our  Gov- 
ernment, whether  in  the  Bundesrath  or  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, and  represented  the  State  during  the  war,  were 
not  equal  to  their  tasks.  If  even  one  of  the  legislative 
powers  had  worked  correctly,  our  disaster  would  never 
have  attained  its  present  proportions. 

Our  enemies  placed  dictators  at  their  head  who, 
when  necessary,  enforced  with  iron  will  the  determi- 
nation of  their  people  to  win  victory  or  death.  On 
our  side  the  government  in  power  openly  allowed 
processes  of  disintegration  to  go  on  in  Germany's  most 
dangerous  hour,  when  all  thoughts,  all  hearts  should 
have   combined   against   the   outer   foe.      The   worst 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN      213 

instincts  of  our  race  were  fostered  by  the  disintegrat- 
ing, un-German  spirit  which  gradually  gained  the 
upper  hand  with  our  people.  It  now  penetrates  our 
whole  life,  and  German  national  feeling  seems  at  pres- 
ent too  indolent  to  oppose  it.  A  realization  of  the 
State  as  a  whole  has  hitherto  been  insufficiently  de- 
veloped in  our  democracy. 

The  new  era  in  our  national  life  began  its  reign 
by  stripping  our  people  of  their  honour,  in  addition 
to  their  other  misfortunes,  and  exposing  them  to  the 
contempt  of  the  world.  Thus  only  has  it  been  pos- 
sible for  our  enemies  to  destroy  us  so  mercilessly,  as 
they  can  persuade  the  better  part  of  their  population 
and  the  rest  of  the  world  that  we  are  criminals  and 
deserve  no  better  treatment.  Admiral  Beatty  fur- 
nishes me  a  painful  example  of  this.  On  August  23rd, 
1914,  he  signalled  to  the  officers  and  crew  saved  from 
the  sinking  Mains:  "  I  am  proud  to  welcome  such 
brave  men  on  board  my  squadron."  In  November, 
19 1 8,  on  the  contrary,  he  gave  the  order  to  his  own 
crews  before  meeting  the  German  crews  who  came  to 
deliver  up  their  ships :  "  Never  forget  that  the  enemy 
is  a  despicable  beast." 

Though  I  cannot  shake  off  the  fear  that  Germany 
has  lost  her  last  chance  of  rising  to  the  rank  of  a 
great  Power,  she  will  at  least  attain  to  a  new  life  with 
honour  when  she  shakes  off  this  depravity  and  lack 
of  discipline  which  are  now  holding  her,  and  coming 
to  her  senses  recognizes  her  old  traditions  and  the 
forces  which  made  her  great.     Personally  I  do  not 


214  MY,   MEMOIRS 

at  this  time  believe  that  this  can  happen  under  a 
Republican  Government.  We  lack  too  many  of  the 
qualities  of  the  men  on  the  Riitli ;  and  in  addition 
there  is  our  difficult  geographical  position,  the  constant 
influx  of  non-German  elements,  and  the  divisions  of 
creed.  All  these  considerations  seem  to  make  mon- 
archical power  indispensable  for  a  German  State. 
Breaking  down  our  historical  development  was  there- 
fore a  mistake,  no  matter  what  kind  of  constitution 
one  may  advocate.  The  great  deeds  of  the  Hohen- 
zollern,  which  cannot  be  wiped  out  by  recent  mistakes, 
of  necessity  determine  the  destiny  of  our  people.  The 
republican  idea  as  we  have  developed  it  is  based  on 
promises  to  the  masses  which  cannot  be  fulfilled.  In 
order  to  keep  the  masses  in  hand,  therefore,  democracy 
is  continually  forced  to  give  "  rights  "  the  first  place 
and  consign  "  duties  "  to  the  second  rank.  This  course 
can  never  get  Germany  to  its  feet.  If  in  future  we 
desire  to  live  again  as  a  nation,  we  must  return  to 
the  fundamental  principle  of  our  old  State,  that  only 
work  for  the  whole  produces  in  the  end  benefit  for 
the  individual,  and  unrestricted  individualism  destroys 
the  State. 

There  only  remains  for  loyal  Germans  to-day  con- 
centration against  the  madness,  both  material  and 
moral,  that  has  overtaken  us,  to  keep  us  from  still 
more  dreadful  ruin.  To  save  all  that  we  can  that  is 
German  is  worthy  of  the  best  efforts  of  our  noblest 
souls. 

Let  our  hope  be  the  coming  generation.     We  were 


SUBMARINE   CAMPAIGN      215 

never  born  to  be  slaves.  During  two  thousand  years 
our  race  has  risen  again  and  again,  no  matter  how 
complete  the  overthrow. 

Should  these  memoirs  of  mine  support  and  further 
strengthen  faith  in  ourselves,  the  last  service  which  I 
can  render  my  country  will  have  been  performed. 


APPENDIX 


EXTRACTS  FROM  MY  WAR-LETTERS 

The  notes  in  diary  form  of  which  a  selection  is  given 
below  were  regularly  jotted  down  in  haste,  late  every 
evening,  or  shortly  before  the  departure  of  the  dis- 
patch-rider. I  must  not,  therefore,  be  taken  to  task 
for  disjointedness,  and  defects  in  style.  The  idea  of 
publication  never  entered  my  head.  When,  after  the 
debacle  of  our  Fatherland,  I  decided  on  publishing  a 
part  of  these  fleeting  past  impressions,  it  was  only 
because  they  seemed  to  serve  as  a  not  unimportant 
supplement  to  my  recollections,  and  above  all  because 
they  show  that  the  opinions  therein  expressed  did  not 
arise  after  the  war  ended,  but  in  all  essential  points 
agreed  with  the  judgments  I  had  formed  while  the 
war  was  running  its  course. 

1914 

COBLENZ, 

August  i8th. 
A  whole  world  is  mobilizing  against  us.  We  must 
see  it  through  to  the  last — that  is  the  only  possibility 
of  maintaining  our  position  in  the  world.  Up  till  now, 
I  feel  that  in  this  connexion  I  am  of  more  use  here 
than  in  Berlin.    Will  this  feeling  continue?    Chi  lo  sa? 

216 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  217 

Pohl,  released  from  his  office,  is  more  accessible.  I 
pay  him  all  honour  and  hitherto  have  given  him  the 
chief  initiative. 

COBLENZ, 

August  igth. 

Ultimatum  from  Japan  destroys  twenty  years  of 
successful  activity;  but  we  must  go  through  with  it, 
so  long  as  it  is  in  the  least  possible.  To-day,  conver- 
sation with  Bethmann  and  Jagow,  lasting  an  hour — 
Pohl  also  there.  I  have  used  every  endeavour  to  keep 
them  firm.  Breakfast  with  His  Majesty.  His  Majesty 
was  pretty  well  pleased  with  the  news  from  the  seat 
of  war.  After  the  meal  I  had  to  walk  about  the 
garden  with  him,  for  more  than  two  hours.  Fortu- 
nately we  walked  slowly,  and  it  was  warm.  I  tried 
all  I  could  to  keep  him  firm.  Most  of  the  time  it  was 
not  required.  He  saw  the  situation  with  complete 
clearness,  and  his  opinions  were  clearly  expressed.  H 
only  he  had  not  had  Bethmann  during  these  last  years, 
all  might  have  gone  better.  He  was  proud  that  his  six 
sons  were  facing  the  enemy,  I  congratulated  him 
thereon.  It  was  necessary  that  this  should  be  so,  for 
the  sake  of  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty.  He  was,  to 
my  mind,  a  bit  too  optimistic  with  regard  to  the  beat- 
ing of  England,  and  expressed  his  strong  belief  in  the 
justice  of  God.  I  confirmed  this  belief,  but  added  that 
we  must,  on  our  side,  be  deserving  of  it.  Men  were 
wanted  in  all  positions.  I  couldn't  very  well  lay  my 
finger  on  the  wound,  especially  as  I  am  convinced  that 
he  entirely  recognizes  Bethmann's  shortcomings. 


2i8  MY   MEMOIRS 

COBLENZ, 

August  20th. 
Again  this  morning,  long  confabs  with  the  very 
incompetent  Bethmann  and  with  Jagow.  Bethmann 
has  merely  continental  conceptions.  He  doesn't  see 
that  we  can,  as  a  purely  European  continental  State, 
cease  to  exist.  In  spite  of  that,  be  prepared  for  the 
great  possibility,  that,  later,  anathemas  will  fall 
on  me. 

COBLENZ, 
August  2lst. 

How  much  I  wish,  personally,  that  I  hadn't  to  ex- 
perience this  war.  I  still  cannot  comprehend  why  we 
couldn't  come  to  a  modus  vivendi  with  Russia.  The 
Balkans,  according  to  to-day's  news,  seem  to  be  again 
lukewarm.  Shall  we  ever  tear  to  pieces  the  world-web 
which  perfidious  Albion  has  spun  around  us?  Alas! 
how  terribly  right  I've  been. 

COBLENZ, 

August  22nd. 
It  is  hard  to  sit  here,  comparatively  inactive,  at  a 
moment  when  the  world  is  in  conflagration.  The  vic- 
tory of  the  Bavarian  Crown  Prince  has  excited  here 
great  jubilation,  all  the  more  that  further  develop- 
ments are  expected.  We,  the  navy,  can.  for  example, 
contribute  so  little  towards  anything,  and  that  is  what 
makes  our  position  so  abominable.  The  English  fleet 
stays  in  its  ports  and  operates  as  a  Heet  in  being.  That 
is  what  is  so  rarely  understood  among  us.    The  Eng- 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  219 

lish  aim  at  the  starvation  and  paralysis  of  our  eco- 
nomic existence.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  providence 
will  let  them  too  suffer  some  time  or  other  for  so 
unconscionably  setting  Europe  in  flames.  It  is  a  re- 
markable situation;  the  North  and  East  seas  free,  yet 
v^e  commercially  strangled.  In  the  meantime,  the 
v^ar  on  land  rules  everything.  But  how  will  it  be 
later? 

COBLENZ, 

August  23rd. 
No,  in  spite  of  the  news  of  victories,  which  up  till 
now  come  pouring  in,  one  cannot  rejoice,  and  it  is 
to  be  hoped  that  our  press  will  put  restraint  on  itself. 
So  far  there  have  been  no  decisive  results  (though 
certainly  in  the  fighting  south  of  Metz  150  guns  have 
been  captured),  and  nobody  seems  to  understand  that 
the  great  danger  against  the  polo-playing  Englishmen 
is  still  to  be  overcome.  If  we  had  had  no  fleet,  Eng- 
land would  have  been  against  us  ever  since  Sedan.  If 
we  had  made  more  progress  with  our  fleet,  England 
wouldn't  have  risked  it.  If  we  don't  want  to  be  ut- 
terly beaten,  we  must  build  fleets;  that  is  the  only 
way  by  which  we  can  again  get  an  outlet  for  our 
exports  and  industry.     I  tremble  for  our  Germany, 

COBLENZ, 

August  24th. 
Our  military  harbours  are  no  longer  threatened.     I 
am  preparing  to  utilize  further  the  personnel  there. 
The  army  has  so  far  had  enormous  successes  and  the 


220  MY   MEMOIRS 

navy  none.  That  is  what  makes  my  position  here  so 
dreadful,  after  twenty  years  of  effort.  No  one  will 
understand.  It  is  always  possible  that  it  won't  come 
to  fighting  in  the  North  Sea,  and  further  possible,  if 
not  very  probable,  that  the  end  may  come  sooner  than 
we  thought.  England  alone  is  the  obstacle.  The 
strength  of  the  French  army  is  now  nearly  broken. 
All  depends  now  on  the  battles  on  the  northern  front. 
Since  this  morning  our  troops  (Brandenburgers  it  is 
to  be  hoped!)  have  been  fighting  with  two  English 
divisions;  pray  God  that  the  arch  scoundrels  may  be 
annihilated,  for  it  is  they  who  have  set  light  to  our 
cultured  Europe,  in  cold  blood,  from  sheer  lust  for 
conquest  and  gain.  I  can  do  but  little,  and,  despite 
the  glorious  victory,  a  great  weight  oppresses  me. 
You  will  help  me  to  bear  it  when  the  time  comes  and 
the  finger  of  scorn  is  pointed  at  me.  Inwardly  I  am, 
of  course,  absolutely  certain  that  the  only  thing  for 
Germany  was  to  take  up  the  question  of  the  navy,  if 
our  people  were  not  to  sink — 

COBLENZ, 

August  25th. 

Don't  let  the  reverse  in  the  East  alarm  you.  That 
was  foreseen.  Certainly  our  generalship  there,  at  the 
start,  may  not  have  been  Ai.  The  struggle  from  Basel 
as  far  as  Namur  is  gigantic,  and  not  yet  over. 
The  Crown  Prince  is  hard  pressed,  and  the  French 
are  fighting  well.  We  ought  not  to  crow  too 
soon. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  221 

COBLENZ, 

August  23th. 

The  sinking  of  the  Magdeburg  you  will  have  heard 
of.  What  a  pity !  Such  a  beautiful  ship !  The  Mains 
and  other  cruisers  have  accomplished  a  daring  feat. 
Almost  past  understanding  that  they  got  away.  Here 
hopes  are  high,  although  the  general  order  for  a  re- 
treat by  the  French  High  Command  has  not  led,  as 
hoped,  to  a  cutting  off  of  a  great  part  of  the  army. 
The  English  have  also  withdrawn,  though  our  cavalry 
are  on  their  heels.  The  latter,  however,  are  in  need 
of  provisions.  The  forced  marches  of  Pomeranians 
and  Brandenburgers  have  been  colossal.  It  appears 
that  my  Brandenburgers  have  fought  against  the  Eng- 
lish. Yesterday  evening  I  met  King  Ludwig  on  the 
Rhine-promenade,  and  he  shook  both  my  hands.  Later 
in  the  evening  went  to  the  Kaiser  .  .  .  found  him 
very  pleased,  especially  about  his  sons. 

To-day,  all  decisions  take  place  in  Prussia.  One  is 
a  little  anxious  on  account  of  the  enormous  prepon- 
derance of  power  there.  I  still  cannot  bring  myself 
to  be  glad  and  rejoice  over  our  victory. 

So  many  have  confidence  in  me,  and  I  can  do  so 
little.  I  must  keep  myself  in  the  background  so  long 
as  the  army  has  solely  conquest  of  the  French  in  view, 
and  no  one  can  see  what  the  end  will  be. 

COBLENZ, 

August  28th. 
I  am  greatly  distressed  by  the  affair  in  Heligoland. 
It  seems  to  me  that  they  let  themselves  be  surprised. 


222  MY   MEMOIRS 

Our  light  fighting  forces  are  not  sufficient  for  such 
skirmishes.  If  things  go  on  thus,  they'll  soon  be 
wiped  out.  The  English  will  enclose  us  in  a  great 
circle  of  mines;  then  our  fleet  will  be  "bottled."  It 
is  awful  for  me!  I  have  always  been  opposed  to  a 
great  bottling-up  of  the  fleet,  but  against  the  opinion 
of  Pohl,  Miiller,  the  Kaiser,  and  Bethmann  there  was 
nothing  to  be  done.  Of  course  the  decision  lies  with 
Ingenohl,  to  whom  one  can't  dictate  the  details.  In 
this  acute  phase  I  don't  naturally  overlook  the  general 
situation.  The  army  marches  from  victory  to  victory, 
and  for  it  the  situation,  above  all,  becomes  increasingly 
difficult. 

In  my  opinion,  one  is  apt  to  underrate  the  obstinacy 
of  the  Englishman — a  considerable  factor  in  the  out- 
come of  the  war  on  land,  in  spite  of  our  victories  over 
the  English  army. 

COBLENZ, 

August  29th. 

I  can  scarcely  hope  that  Wolf,^  will  be  among  the 
few  saved  from  the  Mains;  circumstances  were  too 
little  in  his  favour.  The  small  cruisers  were  too  reck- 
less, and,  apart  from  that,  I  feel  very  bitterly  that 
my  advice  did  not  appear  to  be  properly  followed. 
One  doesn't  send  them  forward  into  the  battle  with 
armed  forces  unless  one  has  his  ships  and  torpedoes 
close  behind.  But  I  won't  remonstrate,  as  I  can't 
review  the  events  that  preceded  it.     This  much  seems 

*  His  son,  officer  on  the  Mains. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  223 

to  me  certain,  that  our  fleet  gains  nothing  by  pushing 
out  to  battle.  The  superiority  of  the  EngHsh  in  Hght 
forces  is  so  tremendously  great  that  any  loss  in  this 
direction  signifies  nothing  to  them. 

COBLENZ, 

August  30th. 
Words  fail  me  at  the  news  of  Wolf's  rescue.  We 
must  all  make  sacrifices  for  our  country.  But  what 
made  it  so  especially  bitter  for  me  was  that  the  sac- 
rifice of  our  small  cruisers  seemed  the  unnecessary 
consequence  of  mistaken  tactical  operations.  It  is 
truly  too  early  to  pass  judgment,  but  has  Ingenohl  the 
genius  of  a  conqueror?  Pohl  certainly  hasn't.  But, 
in  these  things,  I  can't  approach  the  Kaiser  in  an 
analogy  of  what  the  military  staff,  aided  by  Miiller, 
has  effected.  Obviously  the  Kaiser  is  prejudiced 
against  me.  Apropos  of  which  I  feel,  where  these 
questions  are  concerned,  that  I  have  more  in  my  little 
finger  than  Pohl  in  his  whole  anatomy :  Bethmann  con- 
tinually tried  to  influence  Pohl  not  to  coop  up  the  fleet. 
That  would  be  the  death  of  our  navy,  after  the  war. 
He  and  the  whole  bunch  of  diplomats  want  to  sell  the 
fleet  at  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  with  England;  that 
is  the  whole  secret. 

LuXEMBtJRG, 

September  2nd. 
The  great  wave  of  offensive  that  rolled  over  France 
and  Belgium,  like  a  cylinder,  begins  to  roll  more  slowly. 
Just  now  I  hear  that  the  Austrians'  main  army  has 


224  MY    MEMOIRS 

been  unhappily  beaten  (this  quite  entre  nous).  That 
is  very  bad,  on  account  of  the  reactionary  effect  on 
the  Balkans.  At  supreme  headquarters  they  are  beside 
themselves  with  rage.  The  English  are  making  gigan- 
tic efforts  and  are,  in  my  opinion,  the  most  dangerous 
adversary.  I  believe  the  province  of  Prussia  is  mean- 
while safe.  There  we  have  at  present  excellent  leaders, 
after  lopping  off  the  short  arm  we  began  with.  I  have 
got  from  Longwy  packets  of  dum-dum  bullets  taken 
as  proof  that  the  French  War  Office  ordered  them  to 
be  used. 

LUXEMBUEG, 

September  3rd. 

It  is  the  Kaiser  who  puts  the  brake  on  Ingenohl. 
He  won't  run  any  risks  with  the  fleet.  He  will  hold 
back  till  the  winter,  if  not  altogether. 

Hardships  are  now  telling  heavily;  one  doesn't 
know  how  long  it  may  be  before  France  will  collapse, 
and  then  we  shouldn't  have  to  contend  with  the  double 
or  rather  fourfold  enemy.  Added  to  that  comes  the 
winter.  For  the  rest,  I  have  made  some  use  of  being 
here,  while  the  Admiiralty  have  been  doing  excellent 
work.  The  whole  expedition  got  under  way  by  Use- 
dom  and  Schroder,  and  now  I  am  looking  for  a  third. 

During  the  time  of  sharp  distress  which  is  sure 
to  set  in  after  the  war,  the  navy,  to  my  mind,  will 
be  lost  if  we  haven't  deeds  of  some  sort  to  point  to. 
The  small  skirmishes  are  nothing,  and  through  ill- 
success  don't  count.     Here  in  grand  headquarters  we 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  225 

are  more  cut  ofif  than  you  would  credit,  getting  only 
scanty  news  of  the  whole  army.  Our  position,  through 
force  of  circumstances,  is  extremely  unpleasant.  No 
one  comes  to  me,  of  his  own  accord,  because  they 
are  too  afraid  of  me.  Audiences  here  are  not  practi- 
cable. I  can't  accuse  Pohl.  The  analogy  with  Moltke 
operates  too  forcibly  ...  it  would  be  put  down  to 
forwardness.  I  must  reserve  that  for  quite  big  re- 
solves. 

Luxemburg, 
September  4th. 

I  mistrust  the  Chancellor  and  his  set.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  they  are  not  equal  to  the  stupendous  times ; 
and  just  as  their  policy  could  not  prevent  the  war, 
it  will  bring  about  a  lamentable  peace.  The  English, 
low  and  brutal  as  a  nation,  are  to  be  esteemed  as  in- 
dividuals. In  a  hundred  years  they  have  created  a 
morality  for  themselves  in  which  they  believe.  Every- 
thing is  just,  good,  and  even  religious  that  brings  grist 
to  their  mill.  All  the  peoples  of  the  earth  are  their 
squeezable  objective,  according  to  God's  decree — 

Luxemburg, 

October  5th. 
People  seem  to  be  somewhat  victory-mad  in  Berlin, 
as  I  gather  from  various  letters.  As  yet,  we  haven't 
by  any  means  won,  regarding  the  war  as  a  whole.  We 
ought  therefore  to  be  modest,  as  only  through  tenacity 
of  purpose  can  we  be  preserved  for  ultimate  victory. 
The  hardest  days  are  yet  to  come.    England  is  hound- 


226  MY   MEMOIRS    ' 

ing  the  whole  world  upon  us,  and  the  unspeakable 
fabric  of  lies  publishes  our  so-called  defeats  and  our 
infamy  throughout  the  globe.  We  have  nothing  to  set 
against  this. 

Luxemburg, 
September  6th. 

There  is  so  much  to  be  done,  and  yet  I  do  nothing. 
I  have  too  little  influence  for  my  task.  Even  the 
interest  of  Miiller  is  sheer  water-soup.  He  is  soon 
absorbed  again  by  Bethmann,  and  Pohl  is  in  the  same 
category.  All  that  creates  for  me  a  very  melancholy 
position.  For  the  army  the  situation  is  difficult.  We 
haven't  succeeded  in  entrapping  and  taking  prisoner 
vast  masses  of  troops;  in  consequence  the  French 
army,  by  means  of  their  network  of  railways,  are  con- 
stantly taking  up  new  positions.  The  English  make 
huge  efforts  and  have  again  landed  40,000  to  60,000 
men  in  Northern  France.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
Maubeuge  will  soon  fall,  and  the  army  corps  held  up 
there  be  set  free,  which  is  very  necessary.  An  army 
corps  already  means  a  great  deal.  In  spite  of  all 
promises,  the  Turks  have  not  struck  a  blow.  Feeling 
in  Scandianvia  is  increasingly  unfavourable.  Italy  is 
burning  to  be  at  our  throats.  The  diplomatic 
conduct  of  affairs  is  slackening  the  bridle,  as  here- 
tofore. If  Bethmann  stays,  everything  is  sure  to  be 
bungled. 

I'll  now  go  at  once  to  the  Chancellor  and  try  to  get 
a  new  enterprise  inaugurated. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  227 

Luxemburg, 
September  7th. 

I  am  always  anxious  about  our  diplomats,  who  on 
one  side  are  indifferent  to  mighty  historic  events,  and 
through  their  feebleness  render  the  English  ever 
stronger,  and  are  duped  by  their  bluff. 

The  Austrians'  condition  is  very  critical.  Here  in 
the  West,  fighting  is  going  on  along  the  whole  front. 
Fortunately,  as  we  succeeded  in  getting  wind  yester- 
day evening  of  the  French  order  for  attack  to-day, 
and  were  able  to  meet  it  with  counter-commands,  I 
hope  that  we  may  conquer.  But  we  must  do  more 
than  conquer,  for  Italy  can  hardly  be  kept  off  Austria. 
It  is  now  certain  that  England  is  bringing  over  great 
numbers  of  troops  from  Asia.  But  all  would  go  well 
if  we  had  an  Iron  Chancellor  and  an  "  old  Kaiser." 

Luxemburg, 

August  gth. 
The  weapon  of  lies  and  calumny  which  England  is 
using  against  us  is  really  a  frightful  one.  The  whole 
world  is  being  hounded  on  to  us.  I  dined  to-day  with 
His  Majesty:  our  conversation  naturally  turned  on 
the  Paasche  affair.^  I  think  it  is  rather  precipitate; 
but  perhaps  to  be  greeted  as  calling  the  tune  for  the 
navy.  On  the  other  hand,  it  will  put  the  army  out 
of  tune.  Yesterday  too  I  conversed  for  a  long  time 
with  Oldenburg,  on  the  question  of  peace,  and  on  the 
same  subject  to-day,  with  the  Crown  Prince's  civil 

'  Compare  below,  September  10th. 


228  MY    MEMOIRS 

adjutant  (Maltzahn).     Hold  out,  hold  out  is  the  only 
solution  for  us  .   .   .  though  hard  to  fulfil  .   .   . 

Luxemburg, 
September  gth. 
Things  are  not  going  at  all  well  with  the  A'ustrians, 
and  that  keeps  all  the  Balkan  States  back.  We  too, 
in  the  west,  are  faced  with  a  great  crisis.  The  troops 
that  we  are  now  sending  to  the  extreme  right  wing 
have  assuredly  come  too  late.  We  have  over-estimated 
the  value  of  our  first  successes.  The  French  have 
withdrawn  according  to  plan,  and  now  advance  in 
enormous  masses  and  with  a  great  show,  while  our 
troops  are  exhausted  from  marching.  But  they  will, 
all  the  same,  hold  on,  till  the  next  new  batches  come 
up,  whereas  the  French  will  be  withdrawing  their  new 
batches.  The  navy  has  no  success  to  record.  If  the 
fleet  would  only  come  into  action,  and  no  blunders 
were  made,  it  would  fight  brilliantly.  The  drivel  about 
peace  is  immeasurably  absurd.  Even  if  we  wanted 
peace  with  England  we  should  be  obliged  to  open  our 
jaws  as  wide  as  possible.  We  don't  understand  this 
sort  of  blufif.  Read  the  statement  made  by  Goschen 
about  the  last  conversations  with  Bethmann  and 
Jagow. 

Luxemburg, 
September  loth. 
The  Chancellor  has  naturally  his  suspicions  about 
me,  in  regard  to  the  Paasche  affair  (introduction  of 
an  urgency  bill   for  the  strengthening  of  the  fleet). 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  229 

that  is  to  say,  at  least,  he  thinks  that  I  suggested  it. 
He  is  especially  furious  at  Reventlow's  article,  and 
even  here  thunders  at  the  Admiralty.  Things  don't 
go  forward  in  Turkey.  A  part  of  the  blame  lies  at 
the  door  of  those  who  cause  the  Turks  to  be  anxious 
with  regard  to  the  Dardanelles,  which  is  to  me  incom- 
prehensible. In  the  Balkans  the  opinion  prevails  that 
the  Austrians  will  suffer  a  great  defeat.  If  this  comes 
to  pass,  we  may  abandon  all  the  hopes  which  we  have 
built  on  this  corner  of  Europe  and  on  Islam.  The 
English  send  out  strong  reinforcements,  and  the  prog- 
ress of  our  army  has  of  late  come  to  a  standstill. 
Notwithstanding,  I  hope  for  ultimate  victory  here. 
We  have  been  rather  belated  in  learning  the  inten- 
tions of  the  French.  The  movements  of  our  troops 
no  longer  take  place  exactly  at  the  right  time.  The 
French  have  a  dense  net  of  railways  behind  them. 
Our  brave  soldiers  have  mostly  to  march  on  foot. 
The  French  get  all  their  intelligence  through  the  Eiffel 
Tower,  We,  on  the  contrary,  get  almost  none  in  this 
direction, 

Luxemburg, 
September  nth. 

The  war  will  not  last  such  a  short  time  as  many 
think.  England,  which  is  the  cause  of  all  the  evil, 
sees  that  she  is  fighting  to  maintain  her  position  in 
the  world.  In  the  month  of  August  she  sacrificed 
40  per  cent,  of  her  trade  and  commerce;  that,  in  a 
certain  way,  is  effective.  Women  in  England  are  said 
to  be  especially   angry   with   us,   and   ride   straddle- 


230  MY    MEMOIRS 

legged  through  the  streets  to  recruit  for  the  army. 
To-day  I  have  been  with  Hopmann  by  motor  to  a  for- 
est and  took  a  beautiful  walk,  lovely  scenery,  deep  val- 
leys. The  badly  forested  woods  have  on  that  account  a 
very  picturesque  appearance.  On  the  whole,  Luxem- 
burg seems  to  me  to  be  a  slovenly  country.  The  un- 
relaxed  exertion  of  every  faculty  and  military  service 
in  Germany  have  borne  brilliant  fruit.  That  makes 
one  reflect  on  liberal  squabbles  about  militarism, 
Zabern  affairs,  etc.  How  silly  all  that  was.  The 
Kaiser  must  be  credited  with  having  done  one  good 
thing  ...  he  didn't  allow  the  military  machine  to 
go  to  sleep,  in  spite  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

LuXEMBtTRG, 

September  I2tli. 

It  just  amounts  to  this,  that  we  could  never  get 
England  to  agree  to  a  peace  in  which  we  dared  hold 
ourselves  as  blameless.  This  talk  of  a  separate  peace 
is  impossible.  If  we  don't  want  to  be  trodden  under 
foot,  and  wiped  out  as  a  great  world-power,  there 
remains  no  choice  for  us  but  to  hold  on  and  see  it 
through.  Therefore  we  mustn't  let  ourselves  be  mis- 
led into  a  peace  a  la  Bethmann,  Harnack,  and  so  on, 
or  openly  hanker  after  such  a  thing,  for  this  feeble 
flummery  only  strengthens  England  in  the  hope,  Ger- 
maniam  esse  delendam. 

I  haven't  at  all  given  up  my  idea  of  concentration 
in  the  North  Sea.  I  was  only  of  opinion  that  a  battle 
in  the  North  Sea  with  any  hope  of  success  was  hardly 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  231 

possible  with  the,  at  that  time,  planned  and  now  car- 
ried out  preliminaries  of  Prince  Henry  and  the 
Moltke's  and  Tann's  need  of  repairs.  Then  we  should 
have  been  forced  to  conceal  this  intention,  according 
to  plan,  for  ten  days,  and  in  that  time  go  forward 
towards  the  east  with  large  forces  and  fanfare  in  order 
to  produce  a  lasting  effect.  Had  we,  in  carrying  out 
the  plan,  actually  come  in  collision  with  the  Russian 
fleet,  at  least  equal  in  strength  to  ours,  we  should  have 
sustained  losses,  even  in  a  victorious  encounter.  Every 
loss  against  Russia  would  be  a  pity,  because  my  view 
is  that  we  must  stake  all  against  England.  Therefore : 
only  with  superior  forces  against  Russia.  .  .  .  But 
I  will  not  speak  yet. 

Luxemburg, 
September  isth. 
The  battle  on  our  right  wing  has  not  been  going 
well,  but  on  the  left  wing  von  Billow's  guards  ad- 
vanced victoriously.  The  French  generalissimo  seems 
to  be  a  fine  fellow.  It  would  have  been  better,  people 
think  in  this  place,  if  we  had  let  the  troops  have 
time  to  breathe  a  little  before  going  on.  Meanwhile, 
despite  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops,  there  is  to  be 
a  renewal  of  the  attack  to-day,  that  is,  on  the  side 
of  the  English,  and  there  is  some  anxiety  about  re- 
inforcements arriving  in  time.  We  were  too  confident 
of  victory,  and  regarded  persistently  the  retreat  of 
the  English  and  French  as  defeats.  At  present  spirits 
are  damped,  especially  in  the  camp  here,  because  the 


232  MY    MEMOIRS 

Austrians  have  not  held  Lemberg  and  are  crying  out 
for  help.  The  new  victory  scored  by  Hindenburg 
in  East  Prussia  does  not  apparently  extend  so  far. 
I  set  little  value  on  Polish  aid.  Although  the  Guards 
were  victorious  on  their  wing,  on  the  last  day  of  the 
battle,  they  had  to  leave  their  wounded  behind  lying 
on  the  field. 

The  Admiralty  has  worked  famously,  but  this  kind 
of  assistance  is  little  noticed  or  appreciated.  The 
Kaiser  endeavours  to  suppress  his  own  excitement, 
but  he  is,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  out  of  it. 
When  one  thinks  of  1870,  the  dignity,  the  seriousness 
of  the  men,  clear  as  crystal,  who  could  both  weigh 
and  dare,  and  finally  of  the  "  Iron  "  one — the  victory- 
crazed  Berlin  of  to-day,  when  all  is  at  stake,  can  only 
fill  one  with  anxious  fears.  The  immense  moral  ex- 
altation with  which  our  whole  nation  took  up  the  per- 
fidious brutal  gauntlet  alone  gives  us  cause  to  feel  truly 
proud,  and  to  look  forward  to  a  decent  peace.  But 
it  is  too  soon  to  talk  of  what  form  peace  will  take. 

Luxemburg, 
September  14th. 
Here  we  are  still  more  or  less  in  painful  anxiety 
(entre  nous).  It  is  said  that  the  ist  Army  wanted 
the  victory  for  themselves,  and  hadn't  sufficiently  con- 
sidered the  whole  .  .  .  thus  the  gap  arose  into  which 
the  English  with  great  skill  wedged  themselves,  and 
up  to  now  there  has  been  no  successful  closing  of  the 
gap.    Great  masses  of  troops  are,  moreover,  in  forma- 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  233 

iion  in  the  rear  of  the  ist  Army.  The  French  have 
the  whole  of  their  railways  at  their  disposal  and  seem 
to  be  shifting  all  their  men  towards  their  left  wing. 
Our  troops  must  run  vigorously,  the  poor  fellows! 
Whether  we  can  make  good  is  now  the  great  question. 
Now,  too,  the  heads  of  the  army  are  beginning  to  find 
out  that  the  significance  of  England  as  an  opponent 
has  been  underrated.  Pohl  is  ghastly.  There  isn't 
a  scrap  of  nerve  in  the  man.  If  our  dear  God  doesn't 
help  the  navy,  gloomy  indeed  is  the  outlook. 

Luxemburg, 
September  15th. 
Here  the  crisis  is  by  no  means  over;  it  will  explain 
itself  to  you  by  the  changes  in  the  High  Command, 
of  which  I  may  not  write.  Perhaps  I  am  wrong,  but 
I  wouldn't  have  chosen  Falkenhayn,  for  all  his  quali- 
fications. The  I  St  Army  is  engaged  in  heavy  fighting, 
and  the  reinforcements  expected  from  all  quarters 
don't  arrive  any  longer  in  the  nick  of  time.  All  this 
is  pretty  fatal,  and  the  victory-delirium  of  the  Berlin 
press,  which  has  always  been  repugnant  to  me,  is  now 
more  than  ever  repulsive.  Plittenberg  has  clearly  an- 
nounced to  the  Kaiser  the  fact  that  in  many  regiments 
of  guards  whole  companies  have  only  about  50  men 
fit,  against  300  fallen  out.  Pohl  is  very  secretive  in 
his  attitude  towards  me,  perpetually  suppresses  In- 
genohl,  which  isn't  really  a  bit  necessary.  He  is  thick 
with  Miiller,  with  the  Kaiser  and  Bethmann,  so  that 
I  am,  as  it  were,  quite  out  of  it. 


234  MY    MEMOIRS 

LuXEMBtJRG, 

September  i6th. 

To-day  is,  at  all  events,  a  crisis-day  of  the  first 
order.  But  even  if  we  should  win,  our  position,  all 
the  same,  has  become  bad.  We  ought  to  do  more  than 
just  win  battles,  if  we  are  to  come  out  of  this  war 
with  a  prospect  of  rebuilding  Germany.  I  have  been 
asking  myself  for  years  whether  things  can  go  well, 
with  such  business  representatives  as  we  have  in  high 
places?  Yesterday  I  had  a  visit  from  the  General 
Director  of  the  Dillinger  huts,  Herr  Wemlig,  who, 
at  the  time,  was  responsible  for  the  decision  about 
acquiring  the  iron-works  in  Tsingtao.  An  energetic 
man,  a  specimen  of  what  the  people's  grit  can  pro- 
duce, compare  him  with  the  "  green "  ^  fellows  that 
take  up  a  long  table. 

These  folks  didn't  stop  Austria  making  war  on 
Serbia  in  July.  The  joke  "  Serbia  has  nothing  to  do 
with  us  "  was  too  fatuous. 

The  Austrians  continue  to  cry  aloud  for  help. 

Luxemburg, 
September  i8th. 
Just  as  I  was  on  the  point  of  writing  to  you,  Hintze 
suddenly  appeared.  I  regard  him  as  the  one  safe- 
guard against  a  certain  clique.  Whether  the  Kaiser, 
in  this  extraordinarily  perilous  hour  for  our  father- 
land, will  be  inspired  to  take  him  on,  is  another  ques- 
tion.     Nothing   decisive   has  taken   place   here,    but 

*  Official  uniform  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  235 

defeat  has  been  averted.  Things  are  essentially  better 
than  they  were  a  few  days  back.  If  we  ever  actually 
win,  we  haven't  succeeded  in  smashing  the  French 
army,  and  that  is  what  we  want.  Italy  is  ready  to 
spring,  and  Roumania,  at  the  same  time,  has  become 
very  dubious.  May  God  help  us!  England  goes  on 
arming  mightily,  though  of  course  her  elite  army  sticks 
fast  now  in  the  great  mud-slough.  It  is  said  they  have 
done  it  on  purpose  so  that  they  will  be  safe  in  retreat. 


Luxemburg, 
September  19th. 
My  hopes  of  Hintze  have,  alas!  ended  in  smoke. 
"  They  "  have  been  successful  in  shunting  the  danger- 
ous man.  The  Kaiser  may  after  all  be  right.  It 
would  have  involved  a  great  upset,  and  as  this  must 
have  happened,  it  is  better  to  avoid  it.  Hintze's  view 
was  that  the  lack  of  leadership  in  the  ruling  classes, 
either  in  victory  or  defeat,  must  forfeit  them  their 
position,  and  that  immediate  big  concessions  (such  as 
Social  Democrats  being  appointed  to  high  posts,  and 
reform  of  the  franchise  in  Prussia)  was  the  only 
means  by  which  the  gigantic  upheaval  in  the  nation 
could  be  guided  into  some  sort  of  equable  channel. 
With  regard  to  the  starting  of  the  whole  war,  and 
the  simultaneous  collapse  of  his  colleagues,  he  was 
exceedingly  wrathful.  He  is  very  clever.  The  battle 
is  still  raging.  An  improvement  is  expected  in  two 
or  three  days.     The   Austrians   are  wretchedly   de- 


236  MY    MEMOIRS 

spondent,  and  we  shall  now  have  to  take  the  matter 
in  hand. 

Luxemburg, 
September  20th. 
Owing  to  the  collapse  here,  of  which  I  have  given 
you  a  hint,  and  which  is  already  known  everywhere 
in  Berlin,  the  frightful  sacrifices  have  been  in  vain, 
bringing  no  real  success,  and  Germany  is  in  a  most 
dangerous  position.  All  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  last 
act  of  the  old  childish  pantomime  nearing  its  end. 
Perhaps  the  people,  and  the  power  of  the  people,  will 
save  us.  It  is  all  up  now  with  the  rule  of  caste  and 
class.    Victory  or  defeat,  we  shall  get  pure  democracy. 

Luxemburg, 
September  21st. 
How  hard  this  war  is,  above  everything  the  great, 
great  danger  that  all  the  blood  may  have  flowed  for 
nothing.  Roumania's  attitude  must  now  be  definitely 
defined;  should  she  strike  against  us,  I  can  scarcely 
dare  say  what'll  happen.  America,  at  heart,  is  on 
the  side  of  England,  and  supplying  France  with  muni- 
tions and  war  material.  In  the  dearth  of  munitions 
there  lies  danger  for  us.  The  French  are  splendidly 
led,  which  unfortunately  is  not  the  case  with  us. 
Physically,  Moltke  is  a  wreck.  Don't  breathe  a  word 
of  it  to  anyone,  but  our  position  has  become  as  peril- 
ous as  it  is  because  Austria  is  so  completely  disheart- 
ened. She  is  said  to  have  still  500,000  men  in  Galicia 
out  of  the  800,000  that  marched  out.     Here  in  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  237 

west  the  position  for  us  has  become  very  difficult,  I 
wouldn't  write  this  to  you  on  my  own  authority,  if 
I  hadn't  yesterday  talked  to  a  Berlin  man  (a  motor- 
driver),  who  knew  everything  and  said  that  all  Berlin 
knew.  The  English  send  over  masses  of  troops,  but 
the  quality  of  the  latter  must  certainly  be  getting 
poorer  and  poorer.  It's  not  that  I  think  that  we  shall 
be  positively  beaten  here,  though  that  is  not  absolutely 
impossible.  Our  men  in  themselves  are  superior  to 
the  French,  but  the  French  have  their  railways  to 
back  them  and  can  perpetually  arrange  new  move- 
ments, and  added  to  this  there's  our  terrific  loss  in 
officers:  in  Augusta  Regiment,  fifty-three  out  of  sixty, 
and  in  the  ist  regiment  of  guards  only  a  few  less, 
and  so  on.  It  is  the  much-caricatured  lieutenant 
who  does  most  of  the  work  in  the  higher  command. 
He  is  not  to  be  replaced. 

Luxemburg, 
September  22nd. 

My  position  here  continues  abominable,  for  I  am 
quite  superfluous.  Meanwhile  there  is  a  lull  in  this 
frightful  war,  though  things  are  not  going  well  with 
us  on  the  whole.  Our  chief  plan  of  campaign  having 
manifestly  failed,  we  stand  facing  a  superior  force 
which  has  all  the  local  advantages  on  its  side  and 
without  doubt  is  capitally  led,  America  is  really 
against  us.  I  have  just  heard  the  news  that  100,000 
Japanese  have  landed  in  Shantung,  which  demon- 
strates great  designs  on  the  part  of  Japan,  and  our 


238  MY   MEMOIRS 

colonies  haven't  a  chance  now.  That  is  to  me  especially 
awful.  If  we  had  scored  great  victories  here  at  once, 
our  position  would  be  different.  That  is  what  I  hoped 
when  in  Coblenz  I  adopted  the  point  of  view  that  we 
oughtn't  to  give  up  Tsingtao  without  a  fight.  So  far 
as  I  can  see,  our  fleet  won't  come  out. 

Luxemburg, 
September  23rd. 

Hopes  of  the  Balkans  are  now  nearly  extinguished. 
We  are  already  glad  that  Roumania  will  give  us  four- 
teen days  before  declaring  war.  All  depends  now  on 
whether  the  great  battles  now  pending  bring  us  any 
genuine  success  during  the  next  few  days.  The  Rus- 
sians are  turning  out  vast  hosts.  One  wonders  whether 
poor  East  Prussia  will  have  to  endure  another  Mus- 
covite occupation? 

To-day  the  forts  south  of  Verdun  have  been  bom- 
barded; their  fall  would  make  a  breach  which  is  of 
the  utmost  importance.  It  is  so  difficult  to  judge 
whether  England  is  suffering  economically  more  than 
we  are.  Up  till  now,  as  far  as  one  can  tell,  the 
hitherto  opposite  assumption  has  actually  been  the 
case. 

Luxemburg, 

September  24th. 

I  shall  tender  my  resignation  immediately  after  the 

war.     The  reconstruction  of  the  navy,  if  it  comes  to 

that,   must  be  undertaken  by  someone   else.      Pohl, 

Miiller,   the   Chancellor,   and   the   Kaiser   have   kept 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  239 

back  the  fleet.  I  believe  now  that  they  won't  let  off 
a  single  gun,  and  the  work  of  my  life  ends  with  a 
nought. 


Luxemburg, 
September  25th. 
The  general  opinion  is  that  the  system  of  the  Wil- 
helmstrasse  must  cease.  The  war  will  certainly  not 
come  to  an  end  before  the  New  Year.  Thus  we  have 
a  rigorous  winter  campaign  in  front  of  us.  The 
great  struggle  here  is  imminent  and  probably  the  mil- 
itary decision  will  come  then.  We  can't  count,  any 
more,  on  a  Sedan  or  Metz,  as,  through  mistakes  on 
our  side,  the  brilliant  drive  has  not  met  with  the 
success  desired.  In  Galicia,  the  renewal  of  the  strug- 
gle is  calculated  to  begin  about  October  ist.  The 
Russians  are  said  now  to  have  an  almost  superstitious 
terror  of  Hindenburg.  May  he  have  further  success 
in  good  fortune  over  there.  The  Minister  of  War 
yesterday  declared  that  the  danger  of  Eastern  East 
Prussia  being  again  invaded  by  hordes  had  disap- 
peared, because  70,00  Russian  corpses  so  poisoned  the 
atmosphere  that  one  couldn't  breathe.  Yesterday  we 
had  an  exciting  night.  The  news  came  that  the  Eng- 
lish had  broken  through  the  Beit.  Whereupon  Prince 
Henry,  with  two  squadrons  and  all  the  ammunition, 
had  been  caught.  I  had  implored  Pohl  and  his  subs, 
most  urgently  to  adopt  different  methods,  but  in  vain. 
I  was  beside  myself,  and  couldn't  sleep  the  whole  night. 
In  the  morning,  early,  the  news  turned  out  to  be  false, 


240  MYMEMOIRS 

but  the  English  are  plotting  something  of  the  kind  and 
we  know  nothing  about  it;  add  to  that  the  impassive- 
ness  of  our  fleet,  which  the  longer  it  lasts,  the  more 
useless  it  becomes.  The  submarine  successes  coun- 
teract much.  Thank  God  that  we  have  more  sub- 
marines for  offensive  purposes  than  England — it 
is  to  be  hoped  that  they'll  meet  with  still  greater 
success. 


LuXEMBtJRG, 

September  26th. 
We — that  is  to  say,  the  Court  and  Admiralty — still 
remain  here.  One  can't  be  sufficiently  certain  what 
the  outcome  of  the  great  forthcoming  combats  is  go- 
ing to  be,  to  move.  While  the  withdrawal  of  Grand 
Headquarters  is  not  feasible,  advances  on  our  side  are 
made  at  only  a  moderate  pace.  Though  we  have  need 
to  advance,  as  time  is  not  operating  on  our  behalf. 
It  is  very  curious  how  we  have  come  to  be  the  least 
beloved  people  on  the  face  of  the  earth.  Everyone 
wants  us  to  be  laid  low.  The  Crown  Prince  has  just 
'phoned  to  me  congratulations  on  U-boat  9,  and  then 
went  on  to  converse  about  affairs  in  general,  about 
Bethmann,  Jagow,  the  beginning  of  the  war,  etc.  I 
reserved  my  opinion,  but  did  say  this  much,  that  we 
have  the  strength  to  hold  out,  and  must,  if  the  rising 
of  our  nation  doesn't  go  against  the  Government.  The 
war,  in  the  end,  is  a  life-and-death  struggle  with  Eng- 
land. I  hear  from  a  gentleman  who  comes  from  the 
Front,  that  in  the  Army  an  idea  has  leaked  through 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  241 

that  the  command  is  beginning  to  throw  up  the  sponge. 
One  is  getting  serious,  .  .  .  estimates  the  enemy 
very  highly,  and  our  first  wonderful  elan  is  failing. 
But  nothing  is  known  of  this  in  the  nation  at  large, 
happily.  The  Luxemburgers  are  getting  restive  at 
our  staying  on,  they  imagine  things  must  be  looking 
bad  at  the  Front.  It  seems  that  the  jackals,  Rouma- 
nians and  Italians,  want  to  wait  and  see  how  the  cat 
jumps  here  before  coming  in.  Our  hopes  of  Turkey, 
according  to  a  letter  from  Usedom,  seem  to  have  come 
utterly  to  nothing.  Then  think  of  the  lazy  Austrians, 
for  whom  we  are  shedding  our  blood.  It's  not  pleas- 
ant. But  the  whole  business  was  inevitable.  An  ex- 
panding Germany  suited  nobody's  game. 

Luxemburg, 
September  27th. 

With  regard  to  the  Rohrbach  matter  ( Rohrbach  and 
Jacky  had  asked  for  an  interview,  in  order  to  work 
a  better  way  of  distributing  information  among  rep- 
resentatives of  the  neutral  press),  I  have  finally  ad- 
vised the  gentlemen  not  to  come.  For  me  to  receive 
a  visit  arouses  the  suspicion  of  the  whole  clique,  and 
I  am  correspondingly  picked  to  pieces.  I  have,  how- 
ever, taken  the  matter  in  hand  here,  and  shall  effect 
a  change.  But  under  Bethmann,  nothing  can  be  much 
better.  When  once  the  German  people  are  behind 
anything  there's  a  catastrophe.  The  riddle  of  the 
future  is  how  this  war  will  end.  How  can  a  respecta- 
ble peace  be  made  by  the  men  who  so  stupidly  let 


242  MY   MEMOIRS 

themselves  be  driven  into  it,  the  men  who  were  blind 
to  signs  in  the  heavens,  and  prepared  for  nothing? 
That  seems  to  me  the  positive  quadrangle  in  the  circle. 
We  feed  together  in  the  same  hall,  but  never  exchange 
a  word  with  each  other. 

Charleville, 

September  28th. 
The  Kaiser  said  good-bye  to  Luxemburg  two  days 
ago,  and  the  postponement  of  main  Headquarters' 
departure  was  giving  cause  for  remark.  Therefore 
at  one  o'clock  to-day  we  were  off.  Three  hours'  jour- 
ney here  via  Sedan.  Everywhere,  where  the  fighting 
had  been  going  on  there  were  villages  in  ruins,  not 
a  human  creature  to  be  seen.  Sedan,  which  once  in- 
terested me  so  deeply,  I  scarcely  noticed,  so  over- 
mastering is  the  spirit  of  the  present.  The  navy  is 
quartered  here  at  No.  i  Place  Carnot,  in  the  house 
of  a  rich  captain  of  industry,  or  rather  in  his  widow's. 
The  man  was  old  and  she  was  young.  The  liouse, 
just  as  it  was,  with  everything  in  it,  had  been  deserted 
by  the  family.  Only  the  porter  and  the  housekeeper 
had  stayed.  Their  unique  peur  was  of  the  soldiers. 
We  are,  naturally,  regarded  as  robbers,  murderers,  and 
ravagers  of  women.  We  pacified  them  thoroughly 
and  assured  them  that  we  weren't  Russians.  But  it 
is  nevertheless  a  strange  feeling  to  take  possession 
so  completely,  for  a  time,  of  a  foreign  well-to-do 
household.  Downstairs  are  the  salons,  sallc  a  manger, 
billiard-rooms,  and  so  on.     On  the  second  floor  noth- 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  243 

ing  but  extraordinarily  arranged  bedrooms,  I  believe 
for  the  children  of  the  first  marriage,  now  grown-up. 
I  was  first  quartered  in  the  Chambre  a  coucher  de 
Madame;  but  as  it  faced  north,  I  exchanged  it  for  a 
more  retired  room  that  had  a  little  sun.  Madame's 
room  was  furnished  in  Renaissance  style,  good  pic- 
tures, chest  of  drawers  full  of  things.  A  dressing- 
room  and  lavatory  attached,  but  nowhere  a  bath — 
very  remarkable.  Now  I  have  a  room  which  one  of 
the  daughters  had  occupied.  Besides  the  chief  piece  of 
furniture,  a  French  bed,  there's  a  night-stool  up- 
holstered with  cushions  apparently  for  decency's  sake. 
The  whole  main  Quarters  is  now  scattered;  General 
Staff,  War  Minister,  Chancellor  and  officials,  all  live 
by  themselves  and  I  believe  cater  for  themselves.  I 
have  a  feeling  that  not  anyone  will  have  us.  That  is 
what  makes  my  position  so  horrible. 

I  have  worked  like  a  horse  all  my  life  for  the  navy, 
and  now  that  it  has  come  to  the  breaking  point  I  am 
not  allowed  to  influence  its  use.  I  willingly  admit 
that  the  position  of  the  navy  is  extremely  difficult,  but 
neither  Pohl  nor  Ingenohl  have  the  necessary  genius. 
The  first  onrush  of  our  army  had  cost  an  enormous 
amount  of  bloodshed  and  brought  in  proportionately 
very  small  results.  "  The  silent  pressure  of  sea- 
power  "  will  grow  greater  with  time.  The  small  suc- 
cesses of  our  fleet  do  not  deceive  me.  The  cruisers 
out  at  sea  must  one  after  the  other  perish  for  lack 
of  coal  provisions  and  revictualling  ports.  England 
has  even  prevailed  with  Switzerland  to  issue  a  ban  on 


244  MY    MEMOIRS 

our  exports  and  Holland  likewise,  and  added  to  that 
there  exists  in  Holland  an  aversion  towards  us ;  Sweden 
and  Norway  are  in  many  ways  suffering  the  small 
miseries  of  war.  Norwegian  newspapers,  for  instance, 
are  not  allowed  now  to  be  sent  to  England.  If  we 
don't  get  a  bit  of  extra-good  luck  soon,  the  situation 
will  be  very  grave.  We  had  this  good  luck  once  in 
our  hands.  But  it  seems  Moltke  was  wrongly  ad- 
vised. 

Chakleville, 

September  2gth. 

This  place  is  not  beautiful.  Were  I  to  compare  it 
with  any  German  town  of  the  same  size,  the  compari- 
son would  be  greatly  in  favour  of  ours.  .  .  .  Houses, 
streets,  squares — somewhat  dingy.  And  although  the 
Place  Carnot  is  evidently  inhabited  by  well-to-do 
bourgeois  families,  it  looks  like  a  very  badly  kept 
parade  ground.  Nowhere  is  a  grass  lawn  to  be  seen, 
or  any  sort  of  town  beautification.  The  chief  square, 
Place  Ducale,  is  much  prettier  in  the  pictures  than  in 
reality.  As  far  as  possible,  I  am  not  going  to  let  my- 
self be  depressed;  but  the  whole  attitude  of  Bethmann 
and  company  does,  somehow,  depress — more  pro- 
foundly, it  is  true,  in  present  circumstances,  than  ever. 
Ingenohl  asks,  only,  of  course,  to  get  a  declining  an- 
swer from  Pohl  and  the  Kaiser.  In  this  state  of 
things  the  only  remedy  for  danger  at  the  helm  is  acting 
— if  one  knows  how  to  act  rightly. 

Mere  asking  doesn't  satisfy  me  at  all. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  245 

Charleville, 

October  ist. 

Here  things  go  neither  forwards  nor  backwards; 
and  time,  into  the  bargain,  is  not  on  our  side.  Even 
in  the  east  we  are  not  altogether  pulHng  it  off.  The 
world  is  ranged  against  us,  even  the  neutrals.  The 
gigantic  hopes  of  August  are  flown.  The  Kaiser  and 
Bethmann  are  not  holding  out.  The  former  appears, 
forsooth,  to  have  given  permission  to  Bethmann  to 
go  begging!  Italy  is  on  the  prowl!  I  am  of  no 
earthly  use  here;  I  haven't  since  we  were  here,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  seen  the  Kaiser,  How  can  the  finish 
be  any  good,  after  such  a  start.  In  the  last  few  dec- 
ades an  incalculable  capital  has  been  squandered; 
somewhere  and  somehow  the  bank  must  break.  Our 
people  are  sound,  and  have  proved  it.  After  the  war 
there  will  be  great  changes.  We  shall  all  rub  our 
eyes.  The  suppression  of  Vorwdrts  is  a  piece  of  crass 
stupidity. 

Mediation  would  have  had  a  better  effect  on  the 
more  reasonable  socialists.  ...  So  is  the  divine 
peace  for  which  have  we  such  a  burning  need  torn  in 
pieces.  The  French  will  perceive  now  the  folly  of 
their  Revanche  idea  ..."  travailler  pour  I'Angle- 
terre"  I  am  impressed,  in  spite  of  everything,  with 
the  bull-dog  energy  which  England  is  now  displaying. 

Charleville, 

October  2nd. 
To-day  I  have  written  a  really  desperate  letter  to 
Capelle.     Pohl  has  to-day  gone  off  to  Ingenohl  with 


246  MYMEMOIRS 

the  instructions  that  he  is  now  to  put  out  and  do  some- 
thing. Ingenohl  is  no  leader;  else  he  wouldn't  ask 
leave.  Now  he's  got  the  answer.  Pohl  shields  him- 
self behind  the  Kaiser,  Miiller  is  weak  and  vacillating. 
My  position  is  simply  vile.  I  am  quite  isolated.  .  .  . 
The  end  I  see  before  me  is  not  what  my  work  has 
deserved.  Only  the  poorer  classes  have  hung  on  here. 
All  the  rest  have  stampeded  in  terror  of  the  "  Bar- 
barians." Twice  a  day  I  take  an  hour's  walk;  mostly 
in  the  streets,  for  the  town  is  very  straggly.  Early 
this  morning  I  saw  the  gigantic  work  of  repairs  in 
progress  on  the  Maas  Bridge  here  and  the  tunnel. 
The  capability  and  the  resource  of  our  people  are  mag- 
nificent. Therein  exists  our  one  hope.  But  those  who 
hold  the  ruins  are  unspeakable.  Man  to  man  the 
French  are  not  to  be  compared  with  our  soldiers,  but 
they  are  excellently  led.  They  have  better  guns  than 
we  have,  and  know  how  to  manage  them  considerably 
better,  also  they  are  very  skilled  in  making  use  of  the 
country.  There  is  no  saying  beforehand  how  and 
when  the  present  situation  will  end.  .  .  .  Great 
leaders  have  not  arisen  with  us,  except  in  the  East, 
where  since  the  settlement  of  early  differences,  Hinden- 
burg  and  his  Chief  of  Staflf,  Ludendorff,  are  render- 
ing brilliant  services.  Pray  God  that  in  the  next  few 
days  they  may  again  meet  with  success.  I  am  not  at 
all  satisfied  with  the  fleet,  but  I  am  utterly  powerless, 
for  though  I  must  be  consulted,  I  accomplish  noth- 
ing, and  you  know  "  the  absent  ones  are  always 
wrong." 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  247 

Charleville, 

October  3rd. 

Just  now  Admiral  von  Miiller  came  to  call  on  me 
here.  He  was  not  in  agreement  with  me  about  our 
naval  war  policy.  The  Foreign  Office  is  behind  this 
question.  Miiller  is  evidently  now  completely  in  their 
hands.  It  goes  to  this  length,  that  he  has  let  himself 
even  in  what  concerns  Hintze  be  talked  over  absolutely. 
"  He  had  been  convinced  by  persons  who  knew  that 
Hintze  had  been  guilty  of  big  blunders  and  discour- 
tesies, and  he  must,  in  short,  go  on  at  once."  When 
I  made  closer  inquiries,  out  came  incredible  quite  dis- 
torted banalities — the  whole  Miiller  of  191 1!  This 
afternoon  I  went  by  motor  to  see  a  blockade  fort, 
which  had  been  frightfully  battered  by  our  shells. 
The  garrison  of  the  fort  very  soon  couldn't  hold  out. 
It  must  certainly  have  been  beyond  human  endurance. 
The  shells  pierced  and  shattered  everything  and  made 
the  fort  a  perfect  hell.  The  commander  couldn't  keep 
his  men  in  hand,  and,  in  despair  over  it,  shot  himself. 
A  company  of  the  Landwehr  buried  him  in  the  part  of 
the  wood  glacis  which  hadn't  been  entirely  ignited 
and  set  up  on  the  grave  a  pretty  cross.  On  it  is  the 
inscription : 

"  Here  rests  the  Captain  of  the  Fort, because  he 

would  not  desert  the  citadel  entrusted  to  him."    And 
then  something  like  the  following: 

"In  diesem  Kreuz  aus  Holze  schlicht,   ehrt  der 

deutsche  soldat  den  Fcind  als  Ritter  seiner  PHicht." 

("In  this  cross  carved  out  of  wood,  the  German 


248  MY    MEMOIRS 

soldier  honours  his  enemy  as  a  knight  who  did  his 
duty.") 


Charleville, 

October  4th. 

This  war  is  really  the  greatest  insanity  in  which 
white  races  have  ever  been  engaged.  We  are  extermi- 
nating each  other  on  the  continent,  in  order  that  Eng- 
land may  get  the  profits.  Moreover,  perfidious  Albion 
is  ready  to  indict  us  before  the  whole  world  as  the 
guilty  party.  One  almost  loses  one's  faith  in  goodness. 
Of  course  we  are  not  without  blame.  That  is  chiefly 
the  fault  of  our  leaders;  but  this  braggadocio  was  al- 
ways sickening,  and  especially  hateful  to  me.  And 
the  wrong  of  it  all  is,  as  Capelle  quite  rightly  wrote 
to  me  recently,  that  /  am  now  counted  among  the 
Chauvinists  and  Jingoes.  Antwerp  is  not  likely  to 
hold  out  much  longer.  For  the  rest  there  are  two 
lines  of  fortifications  that  run  across  France,  opposed 
diametrically,  up  till  the  present  partie  remise. 
Whether  the  new  command  is  any  good  is  a  pro- 
nouncement which  can't  be  made  yet.  Before  it  was 
undoubtedly  very  bad,  and  that  fact  is  gradually  leak- 
ing out.  The  biggest  reputation  is  that  of  Ludendorff, 
Hindenburg's  Chief-of-Staff.  But  he  has  a  very  heavy 
task  before  him,  as  our  brothers-in-arms  in  Galicia  are 
extremely  cautious.  Napoleon  III  was  right  when  he 
said  : 

"  On  ne  s'allie  pas  avec  un  cadavre." 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  249 

Charleville, 

October  6th. 
Pohl  has  just  come  back  from  Wilhelmshaven,  hav- 
ing got  Ingenohl's  consent  to  nothing  being  done.  The 
submarine  danger,  and  the  idea  generally  to  preserve 
the  fleet,  outweigh  everything  else.  Pohl  has  got  hold 
of  the  childish  notion  that  the  fleet  must  be  doubled 
after  the  war,  and  Bethmann  shares  this  opinion, 
while  the  highest  probability  points  to  its  being  re- 
versed, politically,  financially,  and  also  with  regard  to 
the  submarines.  Neither  have  I  much  faith  in  the 
wild  expectations  of  a  rising  in  our  favour  on  the  part 
of  Indians  and  Mussulmans.  Harnack's  answer  to 
the  English  savants  is  good,  I  think;  but  we  and  the 
English  don't  understand  each  other  any  more,  and 
never  have  understood  each  other  since  we  wouldn't 
go  on  owning  that  they  were  the  chosen  people  of 
Israel,  and  all  other  nations  merely  lemons  for  them 
to  squeeze.  To-day  I  had  a  long  letter  from  Ballin 
in  answer  to  one  from  me.  He  is  working  hard  for  a 
better  understanding  with  England,  and  demands  of 
me  an  attempt  to  come  to  a  naval  agreement  with 
Churchill — that  is  to  say,  in  other  words,  to  abandon 
our  independent  attitude  towards  England  and  vassal 
states,  after  the  French  pattern.  If  the  Hebe  Herr 
Gott  doesn't  make  a  special  intercession  it  may 
really  come  to  that.  The  ground  is  preparing  for 
this  new  departure,  and  I  am  the  wicked  scoundrel 
of  the  war.  I'll  know  how  to  behave  myself  in  the 
role.  .  .  . 


250  MY    MEMOIRS 

Charleville, 

October  7th. 
A  storm  has  burst  in  Tsingtao.  The  Japanese  are 
sending  more  troops  there.  It  is  significant  that  the 
English  are  taking  a  share  in  the  conquest  of  Tsingtao, 
with  1,000  native  regiments.  They  have  lost  now  all 
sense  of  blood  relationship  between  us.  Japanese,  In- 
dians, Niggers,  all  are  being  goaded  on  to  fight  us. 
The  latest  acquisition  are  the  Portuguese.  Biichsel's 
criticism  of  our  command,  in  the  cruiser-skirmish  on 
the  28th,  1914,  is  also  mine.  I  dare,  however,  hardly 
hint  at  it;  according  to  Miiller  all  has  been  splendid. 
Just  now  Captain  Mann  was  here  bringing  messages 
from  General  von  Schroder.  Our  sailors  acquitted 
themselves  very  well  at  Antwerp.  Pohl  has  come 
back  a  smaller  and  at  the  same  time  bigger  man  than 
ever.  I  am  not  at  all  delighted  at  the  resignation 
and  want  of  initiative  in  the  fleet.  Once  more  we  have 
been  lulled  into  inaction,  for  me  a  horrible  thought, 
and  I  am  powerless. 

Charleville, 

October  8th. 
I  came  home  the  day  before  yesterday  from  seeing 
the  Kaiser,  quite  depressed.  Nearly  an  hour's  lecture 
on  a  political  conversation  with  a  bourgeois,  with 
whom  he  lodged  in  St.  Quentin,  and  to  whom  he  laid 
bare  his  whole  political  faith.  Picture  to  yourself  the 
Kaiser's  grandfather  in  his  position.  Then  little  de- 
tails about  the  battle-field.   .    .    .   What  will  happen 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  251 

if  his  nerves  break  down?  That  has  not  been  fore- 
seen in  the  calculation  of  events. 

What  makes  my  position  so  difficult  it  is  impossible 
to  tell  in  a  letter.  I  have  guaranteed  that  Germany 
should  have  a  place  in  the  world.  For  this  she  was 
bound  to  have  a  fleet.  To  build  this  fleet  took  a  long 
time,  but  it  is  now  in  a  considerable  measure  ready, 
so  that  it  should  be  able  to  take  part  in  a  world-war. 
During  the  last  two  years  it  has  been  well  known  to 
us  and  the  English  that  the  submarine  must  play  a 
more  prominent  role  in  the  North  Sea  than  hereto- 
fore. That  is  part  of  the  technical  development.  It 
was  clear  to  me  even  last  winter  that  we  would  have 
to  change  probably  the  basis  of  the  law  for  the  navy. 
But  for  that  years  would  be  required  (by  the  by, 
we  are  stronger  in  submarines  than  England).  After 
recent  events,  the  significance  of  the  submarine  ^  to-day 
will  be  overrated.  I  don't  want  to  have  our  fleet 
start  for  England  straight  away  and  fight  there.  But 
I  do  believe  it  to  be  absolutely  wrong  policy  that 
Ingenohl  should  be  given  the  command  "  to  risk  noth- 
ing "  against  superior  forces.  That  means,  in  other 
words,  that  our  fleet  is  to  be  embalmed,  and  then  talk 
about  peace.  It  requires  in  addition  a  man  of  resolute 
power  to  make  anything  of  our  fleet,  and  with  all  his 
good  qualities  Ingenohl  isn't  that. 

Added  to  that  comes  the  political  side  of  the  ques- 
tion. As  you  know  from  Tarasp,  we  have,  from  a  dip- 
lomatic point  of  view,   in  an  irresponsible  manner 

*  What  is  meant,  is  against  warships. 


252  MY    MEMOIRS 

"  drifted  "  into  this  war.  With  England  for  a  year 
and  longer  we'd  been  playing  a  see-saw  game,  which 
finally  incurred  for  us  the  enmity  of  the  world;  and 
Bethmann  was  up  in  the  clouds.  Therefore  he  fell  a 
cropper  out  of  them  when  England's  ambassador  left 
Berlin.  Later  a  hundred  pens  will  be  set  in  motion  to 
maintain  that  the  breach  with  England  wouldn't  have 
come  about  if  the  "  dangerous  man  "  hadn't  been  pres- 
ent, and  now  there's  his  work  lying  idle.  It  didn't 
rest  with  me,  but  with  our  people. 

I  can  hardly  imagine  how  we  can  come  out  of  this 
war  with  honour,  after  the  frightful  mistakes  made  by 
our  generals  during  August.  The  one  hope  is  in  hold- 
ing out,  and  in  being  able  to  hold  out  ,  .  .  but  for 
that  we  want  men  of  iron,  and  when  one  sees  the  men 
around  the  Kaiser  and  Bethmann,  hope  sinks.  After 
the  war  will  come,  of  course,  mighty  changes  at  home. 
You  know,  don't  you,  how  often  I  have  said  a  catastro- 
phe was  bound  to  come,  though  one  couldn't  say  when 
and  how.  One  saw  it  creeping  on;  couldn't  alter  any- 
thing, and  in  the  end  was  accused  of  being  the  de- 
linquent. That  is  why  my  presence  here  is  so  hard. 
Many  have  counted  on  me,  and  I  can't  alter  things, 
and  the  little  that  I  could  have  done  in  the  maritime 
department  has  been  forbidden  because  they  didn't 
want  to  lose  their  plaything.  For  like  everything  else, 
this  was  only  play.  Japanese  are  not  coming  over, 
that  report  was  rubbish — but  20,000  Indians  are  in 
Marseilles,  and  amidst  the  acclamation  of  the  popu- 
lace  marched   up   the   Rue   Cannebiere.     In   Havre, 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  253 

20,000  Canadians;  Portuguese  may  be  coming  too. 
That  isn't  bad,  but  the  general  combination  of  British 
cold-bloodedness  with  fiery  French  blood  is  very  ef- 
fective on  the  battle-field. 

Charleville, 

October  9th. 

His  Majesty  has  just  summoned  me  for  a  discus- 
sion. I  met  him  in  the  street  with  his  entourage. 
The  discussion  consisted  of  being  told  that  Antwerp 
had  fallen.  Afterwards  I  had  to  go  to  supper.  The 
Kaiser  was  naturally  in  the  rosiest  humour.  General 
von  Beseler  pour  le  merite.  "  Our  cousins  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Channel  will  be  angry  now  we  can  go 
ahead."  The  cardinal  point,  i.e.  that  the  garrison 
could  have  moved  on  northwards,  seemed  not  to 
trouble  him  in  the  least.  Prince  Eitel  Fritz  was  there ; 
he  had  been  thrown  from  his  horse,  and  had  a  few 
days'  sick  leave;  simple  and  jolly  as  usual.  On  the 
whole,  however,  he  saw  the  position  was  serious,  as 
indeed  it  is.  It  is  almost  painful  to  hear  that  the 
Russians  are  once  again  converging  on  East  Prussia. 
This  apparent  success,  together  with  Antwerp,  made 
us  all  inwardly  anxious. 

I  forgot  to  tell  you  that  yesterday  morning  I  was 
in  Sedan,  and  explored  the  battle-field  there  pretty 
thoroughly.  We  stood  on  the  famous  Knoll,  whence 
the  old  Kaiser  watched  the  panorama  of  the  battle,  I 
believe,  near  Frenois;  then  we  went  to  the  house  at 
Donchery  where  Bismarck  and  Napoleon  met.     The 


254  MY    MEMOIRS 

house  is  still  inhabited  by  the  same  woman,  who  at 
that  time  was  a  young  woman  of  twenty-seven.  She 
makes  a  kind  of  business  of  showing  the  room  in 
which  Bismarck  negotiated  with  Napoleon.  Three 
Napoleon  d'ors  given  her  by  VEmpcreur  are  framed. 
It  is  a  diminutive  room,  poorly  furnished;  a  narrow 
staircase  leads  up  to  it.  We  went  on  to  Bezeille;  there 
in  the  house  of  the  dernier  e  cart  ouch  is  a  small  local 
museum.  A  French  battle-painter  has  made  the  event 
a  subject  for  a  great  picture,  which  was  also  ex- 
hibited in  Berlin  (although  it  depicted  the  Germans 
as  monsters).  Through  Sedan  itself,  and  from  there 
to  the  statue  of  General  Marguerite  and  his  cavalry; 
a  great  block  of  marble,  on  which  is  a  figure  of  "  La 
France  "  with  lowered  flag,  on  the  front  side.  The 
moment  when  the  cavalry  suddenly  see  and  plunge  into 
a  quarry  .  .  .  rather  theatrical,  but  a  piece  of  real 
art.  It  was  a  wonderful  October  day.  How  I  should 
have  once  enjoyed  it  all;  now  the  grim  reality  of  the 
present  and  the  distress  of  our  country  have  swept 
away  all  Interest  in  those  great  times.  Then  I  was  a 
young  lieutenant;  we  were  anchored  for  six  months 
at  Schillia  Reede,  till  the  ice  drove  us  inland.  We  had 
only  three  ships,  and  there  were  eight  farther  out;  in 
spite  of  that  we  twice  attempted  to  achieve  something. 
Now  I  am  a  man  of  sixty-five;  I  sit  here  and  our  great 
fleet  is  again  lying  in  port.    It  is  sad  for  me. 


I 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  255 

Charleville, 

October  loth. 
As  many  as  there  were  places  for  were  asked  to 
supper.  Before  the  soup  this  time  sack  was  poured 
out.  The  Kaiser  made  a  speech  in  which  he  first  of 
all  praised  the  officers  and  men  in  the  ranks,  then 
Moltke  for  having  conceived  the  plan,  and  Beseler  who 
carried  it  out,  then  three  cheers!  It  had  a  curious 
effect  on  those  present,  the  cracking  up  of  Moltke 
more  than  the  others  at  this  juncture!  It  is  so  mis- 
taken not  to  invalid  him  home  as  a  heart  and  mental 
patient,  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  is;  so  the  poison 
of  slanderous  rumour  percolates  through  the  army, 
and  one  asks  "  Who  is  leading  us?  "  The  retreat  of 
the  Belgian  Army  is  valued  at  its  true  significance  by 
all  thoughtful  people.  A  submarine  saw  it,  and  think- 
ing that  the  soldiers  were  merely  refugees,  didn't  fire. 
It  is  open  to  question  whether  the  50,000  Belgians  and 
English  wouldn't  have  been  better  in  the  Antwerp 
Mouse-hole  than  now  free  for  army  uses.  Neverthe- 
less the  fall  of  Antwerp  has  made  our  country's  po- 
sition easier.  From  East  Prussia  too,  where  things 
were  very  anxious  yesterday,  excellent  news  has  come 
in  to-day.  But  still  the  thought  of  how  we  are  to  come 
out  of  this  war  with  honour  and  without  irreparable 
losses  is  always  weighing  on  us.  My  staff  doctor,  a 
reliable  witness,  said  recently  that  all  three  of  the 
Cabinet  chiefs  blindly  acquiesced  in  everything  the 
Kaiser  said.  The  whole  entourage  takes  its  lead  from 
that.      [The  Kaiser  said,  for  instance,  to  Bethmann 


256  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  Jagow,  that  they,  the  diplomats,  must  never  lose 
what  the  German  sword  had  won,  embarrassed  smiles 
on  the  part  of  both.]  Admiral  von  Miiller  now  too 
deplores  the  order  which  the  Kaiser  sent  by  Pohl  to 
Ingenohl,  which  practically  is  an  order  for  the  whole 
fleet  to  be  capsuled,  and  moreover  with  openings  the 
employment  of  which  would  be  objectless  and  dan- 
gerous. This  is  a  historic  document,  and  I  must  sit 
with  folded  hands,  and  do  nothing  to  save  the  navy 
from  an  unheard-of  scandal.  If  only  the  War  Min- 
ister was  a  man  with  whom  one  could  reason;  but  I 
have  no  one  except  Hopmann,  who  thinks  the  same 
as  I  do,  and  who  has  told  me  that  at  last  it  was  com- 
ing to  the  knowledge  of  men  under  Pohl. 

Charleville, 

October  nth. 
Letter  of  the  9th  with  copy,  by  the  purser  of  the 
'Mains,  just  come  to  hand.  My  poor  boy,  who  felt 
so  strongly  about  the  blunders  in  our  leadership  on 
August  28th!  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  would 
suffer  less  now  if  he  saw  how  his  father's  work  was 
being  turned  to  no  purpose,  I  had  a  letter  from 
Capelle  yesterday,  which  at  several  points  I  was  not 
in  sympathy  with.  He  too  has  misunderstood  me. 
These  great,  sweeping  questions  are  too  difficult  to 
deal  with  in  letters,  without  verbal  discussion.  He 
of  course  is  certain  of  this  much,  that  I  must  still  stick 
it  out  here.  And  that's  what  I  intend  to  do,  as  the 
mental  atmosphere  of  Berlin  would  be  scarcely  more 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  257 

congenial.  Capelle  thinks  I  am,  in  a  sort  of  way,  here, 
"the  fleet  in  being." 

The  fall  of  Antwerp  and  the  method  of  conquest 
have  made  an  impression  abroad.  It  is  indeed  unde- 
niable that  the  German  people  are  making  a  powerful 
demonstration  of  their  strength — here  in  the  West 
pitted  against  three  nations,  in  the  East  against  the 
great  Slav  wave,  and  besides  slimy  Austria  to  be 
snatched  out  of  the  furnace.  To-day  comes  the  news 
that  Turkey  will  strike.  I  shan't  believe  it,  though, 
till  the  guns  begin  to  crackle.  We've  been  disap- 
pointed too  often. 

God  grant  the  poor  troops  in  the  trenches  good 
weather;  the  French,  of  course,  will  stand  the  rain 

worse.     A'  remarkable  war  this !     From  the  

over  Paris,  as  far  as  the  Channel,  a  long  improvised 
chain  of  fortresses  on  both  sides.  On  the  other  side 
a  fortification  built  by  a  hundred  million  of  workers 
in  twelve  days,  without  any  great  losses.  Aeroplanes, 
motors,  etc.,  play  an  undreamed-of  part,  as  does  ma- 
chinery altogether.  Bridges  and  tunnels,  the  building 
of  which  in  other  conditions  would  have  taken  years, 
are  produced  in  about  a  fortnight.  When  one  sees 
this  colossal  industry  on  the  part  of  our  people,  the 
belief  is  forced  on  one  that  they  can  never  be  beaten. 
Only  the  "  silent  pressure  of  sea-power  "  is  the  critical 
element.  As  Herr  von  Hydebrand  said  in  191 1,  in 
the  Reichstag,  "  England  is  the  enemy." 

It  is  maddening  to  see  how  those  fellows  go  on  en- 
joying their  sport  while  through  them  Europe  is  be- 
ing rent  asunder. 


258  MYMEMOIRS 

Charleville, 

October  13th. 
Just  a  few  lines.  I  am  going  to-day  to  Brussels  and 
Antwerp  by  motor,  and  intend,  to-morrow  or  the  day 
after,  to  come  back  here.  The  spirit  in  main  Head- 
quarters is  again  somewhat  exalte.  Owing  to  the  fall 
of  Antwerp  and  the  repulse  of  the  Russians  in  East 
Prussia,  in  spite  of  their  great  numerical  superiority, 
Capelle  says  that  Bethmann,  having  begun  it,  must 
drain  the  dirty  soup  to  the  dregs.  That's  not  my  view. 
Only  a  younger,  more  iron-hearted  man  can  be  in  at 
the  finish.  Bethmann  would  make  it  sheer  wish- 
wash  .    .    .  then  we  shall  see  where  the  wave  breaks. 

Brussels, 
October  13th. 

The  journey  here  was  very  fatiguing,  immediately 
after  lunch,  no  stopping  for  rest,  and  five  hours' 
journey  with  interruptions.  I  shall  have  no  time  to 
see  anything  of  Brussels,  for  to-morrow  early  I  go  on 
to  Antwerp,  to  discuss  matters  with  General  Schroder, 
and  find  out  his  wishes.  Uncertainty  still  prevails 
here,  as  to  where  the  Belgian  army  is  hiding;  prob- 
ably it  has  gone  to  Holland  and  England  in  mufti. 

Charleville, 

October  14th. 

To-day  after  a  journey  of  five  hours,  with  some 
delays,  via  Namur  up  the  Maas,  returned  from  Brus- 
sels. Invited  this  evening  to  sup  with  His  Majesty, 
probably  because  of  submarine  success  in  Gulf  of 
Finland.    The  son  of  Count  Berkheim  did  very  well 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  259 

there,  a  pity  the  enemy  wasn't  England.  My  journey 
was  very  arduous,  and  not  quite  so  satisfactory  as  I 
perhaps  hoped.  Before  we  got  to  Brussels  we  passed 
Charleroi,  where  Napoleon  had  his  headquarters  in 
1815,  before  the  Battle  of  Ligny,  now  it's  a  monstrous 
manufacturing  town  with  hideous  dwellings,  a  small 
handful  of  the  Landsturm  quartered  in  the  middle  of 
it.  After  Charleroi  we  passed  the  whole  battle-field 
of  Belle  Alliance,  adorned  with  many  monuments. 
The  marvellous  changes  of  a  hundred  years  presented 
themselves  vividly  before  my  mental  eye.  In  Brussels, 
the  millionaire  town,  we  found  an  excited  population, 
and  only  at  the  Palais  de  Justice  a  concentration  of 
German  troops  to  the  amount  of  5,000,  among  them 
a  naval  division.  One  of  Field-marshal  von  der 
Goltz's  stafif  told  me  that  at  the  time  when  it  was 
uncertain  whether  we  should  besiege  Antwerp  or  the 
Belgian  troops  at  Brussels,  a  notability  said  to  him, 
''Mais,  monsieur,  vous  etes  les  prisonniers."  After 
the  fall  of  Antwerp  the  tone  naturally  became  rather 
different.  Goltz  was  a  little  disturbed,  because  in 
Lille  and  the  north  great  masses  of  troops  had  been 
seen.  But,  as  I've  just  heard,  the  danger  has  been 
averted.  Here  it  is  still  up  and  down,  hopes  one  day, 
fears  the  next. 

Charleville, 

October  15th. 
They  must  be  very  base  souls  who  credit  me  with 
wanting  to  drive  the  fleet  out  to  sea  from  egotistical 


26o  MY    MEMOIRS 

motives  (who's  at  the  bottom  of  that  rumour  it  would 
be  interesting  for  me  to  find  out).     I  couldn't  do  any- 
thing more  fatuous  than  goad  the  fleet  on  to  fighting 
and   action,   if   I   was   under   the   impression   that  it 
wouldn't  answer.     But  because  I  believe  in  its  suc- 
cess, and  because  I  see  in  its  impassiveness  a  degenera- 
tion of  its  morale,  I  have  urged  activity.    It's  not  neces- 
sary to  offer  decisive  battle,  but  to  develop  an  activity 
which  will  cause  the  English  uneasiness  and  give  the 
torpedo  boats  a  chance  of  attacking  in  the  night.    The 
present  conduct  of  the  war  tends  to  the  killing  of 
initiative  and  to  general  stagnation.     Through  it  the 
fleet,  even  after  the  war,  will  be  ruined.     But  enough 
of  this.     I  would  willingly  resign,  if  I  did  not  cherish 
such  grave   fears   for  the   fate  of   Germany.     They 
won't  crush  us,  but  Germany's  position  in  the  world 
hangs  on  a  thread.    It  really  is  extraordinary  how  very 
unpopular  we   are,   and   how   completely   our  whole 
Diplomatic  Service  has  gone  to  pieces.    A  too  ghastly 
incompetence  in  every  branch  of  it  is  coming  to  light. 
But   I'll   tell   you   a  little  more   about   Antwerp.      I 
traced  out  the  tactics  of  our  naval   brigade,  which 
fought  most  bravely.    The  old  sea-dog,  Schroder,  did 
his  part  splendidly,   with  much  distinction  and  gal- 
lantry.   Row  followed  row  of  trenches,  forts  all  along 
the  line  terribly  riddled.     The  giant  city  of  Antwerp 
almost  empty;  and  here  and  there  despairing  figures 
to  be  seen,  a  curious  sight.    The  naval  brigade  was  a 
little  sweated  by  the  army,  but  there  was  excuse  for 
that,  it  must  be  admitted,  in  the  dire  necessity  of  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  261 

position.  The  marine  artillery  brigade,  hastily  re- 
cruited from  the  coastguards,  and  never  even  or- 
ganized, had  to  man  the  trenches.  The  naval  division 
had  a  very  hard  task  in  defending  a  long  line,  without 
any  artillery  except  our  gunboats.  Schroder  came 
and  welcomed  me  very  heartily.  It  was  a  real  pleasure 
to  meet  and  chat  with  him,  after  having  to  put  up 
with  Pohl  for  so  long.  I  found  myself  envying 
Schroder,  not  only  his  optimism,  but  his  post.  He 
stands  with  his  undertakings  clearly  outlined  before 
him,  and  needn't  look  to  right  or  left.  Whether  the 
brigade,  as  he  hopes,  will  go  on  to  score  as  important 
successes  at  Bruges,  Ostend,  and  perhaps  Calais,  can- 
not yet  be  foreseen,  but  at  any  rate  it'll  get  on  the 
nerves  of  the  English. 

Churchill  was  in  Antwerp  two  days  before  it  sur- 
rendered, tearing  all  over  the  place  in  his  private 
car,  urging  stubborn  resistance  to  the  last.  When  he 
saw  the  affair  was  going  awry  he  drove  off,  and  is 
said  to  be  now  in  France.  Schroder  next  took  me 
over  Antwerp.  Nearly  all  the  endless  wharves  and 
warehouses  showed  nothing  but  German  firms.  Ant- 
werp has  gorged  herself  full  of  Germany.  Shall  we 
keep  the  place,  I  wonder.  Afterwards  I  dined  with 
Schroder  and  his  staff  and  then  drove  to  the  Walchem 
fort,  which  had  been  awfully  battered  with  shells. 
Spent  evening  in  Brussels.  Yesterday  at  nine  in  the 
morning  off  via  Namur,  Gwen,  Dinant,  Kevin,  etc., 
back  here  .  .  .  scarcely  anything  but  ruins  to  be 
seen,  but  just  here  and  there  places  that  hadn't  been 


262  MY    MEMOIRS 

touched.  Went  to  the  Kaiser  last  night.  Nothing 
special.  Everybody  in  good  spirits  and  building  great 
hopes  on  the  reserves. 

Charleville, 

October  j6th. 
Here  we  are  awaiting  with  tension  news  of  further 
events  in  the  north  of  France.  One  is  partly  dubious 
of  any  striking  success.  The  English  have  wriggled 
themselves  out  towards  the  coast,  and  are  far  on 
northwards.  Depression  seems  to  prevail  at  French 
headquarters,  and  the  black  troops  are  said  to  associate 
badly  with  the  white.  The  fall  of  Antwerp  has  been 
rather  a  blow  to  the  London  public.  For  the  rest, 
the  fabrication  of  lies  there  goes  on  and  has  sur- 
passed all  imaginable  bounds. 

Chaslevule, 

October  17th. 

No  one  is  at  all  sure  here  whether  the  new  drive 
the  army  is  now  making  will  lead  to  complete  success. 
It  is  about  the  last  trump  card  we  have  to  play  here. 
If  it  doesn't  come  ofif,  what  Jagow  said  to  me  to-day 
about  the  end  of  the  war  is  likely  to  prove  correct. 
He  thought  that  the  war  would  stagnate,  and  slowly 
fall  asleep  from  sheer  general  exhaustion.  That  would 
be  bad  for  us.  The  conclusion  of  a  peace  which 
wouldn't  satisfy  the  German  people  is  what  I  fear 
under  present  leadership, 

I  don't  believe  for  a  moment  that  our  people  will 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  263 

be  overthrown.  A  nation  that  has  shown  the  brilUant 
quaHties  which  Germany  has  during  this  war  cannot  be 
crushed.  But  whether  the  inheritance  we  are  to  leave 
to  our  children  will  be  a  rich  one,  is  another  question. 
Anyhow  the  methods  of  our  Government  must,  either 
by  its  own  free-will  or  by  force,  be  altered,  I  was 
reading  the  other  day  some  extracts  from  the  Social- 
istischen  Monatschrijften,  one  of  the  intimate  organs  of 
the  Social  Democrats,  that  I  greatly  enjoyed.  Social 
democracy  has  grasped  the  fact  that  its  international 
ideal  is  a  Utopia,  in  this  world,  where  the  elements 
are  so  strongly  antagonistic.  They  have  also,  extra- 
ordinary to  say,  grasped  that  not  Russia  but  England 
is  the  enemy  that  has  to  be  dealt  with  in  this  war, 
England  who  won't  tolerate  at  any  price  an  expand- 
ing Germany.  All  would  be  well  if  we  had  any  real 
political  leadership.  It  is  questionable,  however, 
whether  the  new  command  in  the  army  is  not  too  cau- 
tious after  the  discouraging  beginning;  it's  not  for  me 
to  judge,  but  it  may  fall  short.  Inwardly  one  has  that 
impression.  What  is  really  good  is  that,  at  least  in  the 
east,  we  have  first-rate  men  holding  the  Russian  co- 
lossus at  bay.  They'll  destroy  it.  If  only  our  allies 
were  not  Austrians,  but  Prussians!  Our  submarines 
are  doing  their  work  magnificently.  But  of  course  we 
must  be  prepared  for  mishaps  even  here. 

Charleville, 

October  i8th, 
Of  course,  in  what  concerns  the  fruits  of  victory  we 
shall  not,  owing  to  faulty  leadership,  make  the  most 


264  MY    MEMOIRS 

of  them.  Before  all,  and  that  is  the  worst  part  of  it, 
we  haven't  any  victory  that  has  brought  us  fruits  to 
make  use  of.  We  had  the  game  in  our  hands  and 
played  it  wrong.  I  would  rather  not  express  myself 
thereon  in  writing,  although  the  truth,  or  what  is 
more,  the  facts,  have  long  ago  leaked  out  everywhere. 
Nothing  remains  now  but  to  hold  out,  as  long  as  pos- 
sible, and  let  come  what  may.  Only  by  endurance 
can  we  hope  to  get  a  tolerable  peace.  In  any  case  a 
mighty  disappointment  is  in  store  for  our  people, 
when  one  considers  the  gigantic  effort  and  bloody  sac- 
rifices they  have  made.  If  we  don't  take  the  reins  in 
hand  in  domestic  politics  now,  we  shall  be  forced 
afterwards  to  reforms  which  will  exceed  the  bounds 
of  prudence.  That  can,  with  the  present  system,  only 
be  done  by  the  Chancellor.  Our  system  of  govern- 
ment did  very  well  for  the  old  Kaiser  and  Bismarck, 
but  it  doesn't  do  for  average  mediocrities.  The  con- 
stitution and  leadership  consists  of  two  heads  alone, 
which  is  a  mistake  in  method.  But  when  the  two 
heads  are  below  the  average,  it  is  extremely  bad. 
The  idea  of  ruling  the  Prussian  administration  won't 
work.  Suppose  in  the  other  case  that  I  came  forward 
with  reforms,  everyone  would  say,  with  justice,  what 
did  it  matter  to  me?  My  character  would  be  black- 
ened by  all  around  the  Kaiser,  my  position  would  be 
more  difficult  than  ever,  and  I  should  achieve  nothing. 
Things  must  then  go  on  from  bad  to  worse.  If  the 
war  slowly  stagnates  and  goes  to  sleep,  as  Jagow 
thinks,  it  will  be  all  up  with  Germany's  place  in  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  265 

world.  We  are  so  encompassed  with  the  hate  of  our 
enemy,  and  of  the  neutrals,  with  the  exception  per- 
haps of  Sweden  and  German  Switzerland.  Serbia, 
the  cause  of  the  war,  too,  of  course!  We  are  re- 
garded by  the  whole  world  as  the  instigators.  Just 
read  a  brochure  that's  appeared  in  Holland,  which 
propagates  a  world-combine  against  the  unpolished, 
everywhere-disturbing  parvenu  German,  after  the 
Peace !  Though  it  reeks  with  hate,  there  is  some 
truth  in  it.  In  England  the  war  is  being  carried  on 
with  bull-dog  pertinacity  and  passionate  energy.  We 
too  are  doing  the  same,  but  how  shall  we  get  our 
teeth  into  the  bull-dog's  flanks  with  seven  other  dogs 
at  our  throats?  Our  navy  is  gallant  and  daring,  but 
our  leadership  atrocious.  Yesterday  morning  I  had 
a  severe  set-to  with  Pohl  because  I  regarded  the  send- 
ing out  of  four  torpedo  boats  as  too  nonsensical.  This 
morning  early,  news  came  that  these  had  been  blown 
up. 

Charleville, 

October  igth. 

To-day  the  Chancellor  summoned  me  to  a  consulta- 
tion about  possible  peace  conditions.  I  put  restraint 
on  myself  to  the  utmost  when  I  said  that  we  must 
first  have  a  complete  victory  before  one  could  give 
any  opinion  on  the  subject.  But  I  hope  soon  to  tell 
you  more  by  word  of  mouth.  I  intend  going  to  Kiel 
and  Wilhelmshaven  and  via  Berlin  back  here. 

According  to  reports  just  received,  things  seem  to 


266  MY    MEMOIRS 

be  going  favourably  here  in  the  west.  The  English,  it 
appears,  made  a  very  poorly  arranged  attack  on  the 
German  troops  stationed  to  the  north  of  Lille,  and 
were  repulsed  with  heavy  losses;  the  grand  final  de- 
cision is  expected  here  in  a  few  days.  May  God 
grant  us  a  complete  victory.  We  are  in  bitter  need 
of  it.  England  remains  the  dangerous  enemy.  I  rec- 
ommend you  to  read  the  article  by  Carl  Peters,  with 
which  I  perfectly  agree  as  far  as  his  proposal  to 
treat  severely  the  English  at  the  present  time  in  Ger- 
many. As  for  our  conduct  of  the  war  at  sea,  I  am 
from  beginning  to  end  out  of  patience  with  it.  The 
slaughter  of  the  four  torpedo  boat  crews  came  about 
through  sheer  shortsighted  observation.  We  run  risks 
at  places  where  nothing  but  luck  could  save  us  from 
disaster,  and  risk  nothing  where  in  all  probability  suc- 
cess is  possible.  The  lack  of  initiative  on  our  side  in 
the. navy  infects  the  other  initiative.  Miiller,  however, 
still  excuses  everything. 

Chakleville, 

October  20th. 
Yesterday  evening  with  the  Kaiser,  who  is  not  a  bit 
altered,  and  who  won't  let  you  talk  seriously  to  him, 
though  I  tried  all  I  could. 

Hamburg, 

October  25th. 

Emden  Muller  has  again  snapped  up  six  ships,  and 

the  English  are  raging;  the  Karlsruhe  thirteen  as  well. 

Ballin  isn't  glad,  because  he  says  it  will  make  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  267 

English  still  more  furious.    He  may  be  right;  but  all 
the  same  I  am  delighted.    I  can't  help  it. 

Charleville, 

November  gth. 
You  will  have  heard  from  Treves  of  my  burst  of 
joy  over  the  victorious  combat  off  the  coast  of  Chile. 
Unfortunately  it  was  followed  closely  by  grief  for 
the  fall  of  Tsingtao.  A  work  of  nineteen  years  is 
thereby  wiped  out.  I  have  had  very  kind  telegrams 
from  several  quarters,  from  the  President  of  the 
Reichstag,  also  the  Duke  Johann  Albrecht  has  ex- 
pressed his  warmest  sympathy.  Yesterday,  lecture 
from  His  Majesty  on  contentment.  Nothing  has  hap- 
pened here.  One  hopes  and  hopes  in  the  west.  I 
have  an  instinctive  feeling  that  this  drop  by  drop 
progress  won't  bring  much  to  a  head.  This  morn- 
ing a  long  conference  with  Jagow.  He  has  reasons 
for  opposing  changes  in  embassy  at  Rome. 

Charleville, 

November  13th. 
I  have  suffered  and  suffer  still  more  because  our 
whole  policy  of  recent  years  has  been  crass  futility, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  Empire — apart  from  His  Maj- 
esty here — has  so  totally  missed  fire  and  does  still. 
I  should  be  glad  if  I  had  any  personal  confidence  in 
the  present  leadership  of  the  army.  Of  course  I  can't 
sit  in  judgment,  but  I  wish  I  could  see  the  end.  Here 
there  is  nothing  to  report,  except  that  everything  has 
come  to  a  standstill.    In  the  east  twenty-nine  German 


268       .  MY    MEMOIRS 

and  Austrian  corps  are  ranged  against  forty-three 
Russian.  Our  brothers-in-arms  number,  of  course, 
about  half.  The  Turks  are  crying  out  already  for 
munitions  and  we  haven't  any  to  spare,  quite  apart 
from  the  fact  that  Roumania  no  longer  allows  us 
transit.  My  attempt  to  get  Biilow  instead  of  Flotow 
to  Rome  hasn't  succeeded  with  von  Jagow,  on  account 
of  all  kinds  of  objections.  After  the  war  I  shall  join 
the  Socialists  and  look  for  lamp-posts,  a  whole  heap. 
For  there  is  a  hydra-headed  monster  to  be  scotched 
before  things  can  be  any  better.  I  am  nervous  now 
about  surprises  in  the  North  Sea  and  can't  make  any 
impression  on  Pohl. 

Charleville, 

November  14th. 
Here  the  abominable  weather  continues.  The  poor 
boys  in  the  dugouts !  I  believe  that  now  even  the 
influential  people  have  given  up  hope  that  we  shall 
break  through  in  the  north.  We  shall  not,  therefore, 
get  to  Calais,  which  my  second  naval  division  has  been 
striving  after.  It  is  partie  remise,  and  so  it  will  re- 
main. But  don't  talk  about  it.  Both  sides  lie  facing 
each  other  in  the  north,  absolutely  exhausted.  We 
have  lost  here  about  100,000  men.  We  have  no  new 
corps  wherewith  to  replace  them.  Things  are  not  so 
bad  in  the  east,  but  we  shall  have  to  send  reinforce- 
ments there  too,  because  the  Austrians  are  undepend- 
able.  I  was  talking  to  Colonel  von  Marschall,  of  the 
Cabinet,  just  now.     He,  like  most  of  us  here,  is  of 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  269 

opinion  that  the  extent  of  our  other  losses  hasn't  yet 
come  out;  and  that  England  can't  put  up  as  much 
counter-thrust  as  we  can.  That  may  be  true,  but 
partie  remise  is  bad,  if  the  fleet  can't  help. 

Yesterday  came  most  unfavourable  news  from  the 
Black  Sea — a  Turkish  muntion  ship  torpedoed.  And 
the  Turks  have  no  munitions.  Who  will  hold  out  the 
longest  ? 

That  is  the  question. 

Charleville, 

November  15th. 
I  have  just  come  from  a  consultation  with  the 
Minister  of  War.  He  was  this  time  much  more  ami- 
able and  less  erratic.  The  reason  for  this  is  to  be 
found  in  the  ensemble  of  the  situation,  of  which  he 
too  sees  the  fearful  gravity.  The  quality  of  the 
English  troops  has,  nevertheless,  declined  rapidly. 
This  much  is  evident,  that  in  the  west  a  complete 
deadlock  has  set  in,  and  every  little  advance  is  only 
made  possible  by  an  enormous  loss  of  blood.  Added 
thereto,  the  blockade  weighs  so  heavily  on  the  neutrals 
that  we  are  in  need  of  many  necessary  articles,  such 
as  saltpetre  (powder),  motor-tires,  and  so  on.  He 
seemed  to  look  for  the  way  out  more  through  France 
than  Russia.  But  I  think  that  quite  unfeasible,  as 
Russia  and  France  are  allied  in  the  same  boat.  Here 
the  weather  continues  rough  and  atrocious;  this  morn- 
ing it  snowed  heavily.  The  Kaiser's  mood  and  that 
of  his  entourage  very  depressed.    I  am  anxious  about 


270  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  fleet;  England  is  waiting  for  better  weather.    More- 
over it  is  impossible  to  talk  to  Pohl. 


Charleville, 

November  17th. 

Thank  God  we  have,  in  Hindenburg  and  Luden- 
dorff,  really  great  leaders  in  the  east,  and  that  will 
guard  us  against  the  worst.  Here  in  the  west,  un- 
fortunately, it  is  not  to  the  same  extent  the  case.  I 
had  a  talk  yesterday  with  the  very  able  and  sensible 

S ,  who  could  pronounce  as  his  carefully  weighed 

judgment  that  which  I  can  only  dare  claim  to  have  as  a 
faint  impression.     An  aide-de-camp  has  lately  come 

here  of  whom  S thinks  a  great  deal,  but  these 

hints  are  quite  confidential,  and  perhaps  later  may  be 
of  value  to  me.  In  August,  unheard-of  mistakes  were 
made;  no  organization  in  office  of  the  General  Staff; 
lost  their  heads  later,  which,  as  is  now  universally  rec- 
ognized here,  was  the  cause  of  the  unnecessary  and 
mistaken  retreat.  From  this  has  arisen  finally  the 
present  situation,  out  of  which  really  good  leaders 
could  rescue  us,  as  the  men  in  the  ranks  are  first-rate. 
We  must  wait  for  the  big  "  Berthas  "  till  more  powder 
is  forthcoming.  From  the  beginning  of  the  campaign 
we  have  supplied  the  army  with  powder  by  contract, 
likewise  commissariat,  ordnance,  and  other  materials. 

This  evening  I  was  invited  with  Admiral  von  Pohl 
to  His  Majesty.  We  shall  be  getting  Iron  Crosses, 
which  I  for  one  don't  at  all  want  to  wear.  Accord- 
ing to  my  appraisement  of  our  command  in  the  North 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  271 

Sea,  and  our  part  in  Councils  of  War,  honours  are 
equally  divided  between  T U and  E . 


Charleville, 

November  i8th. 

As  I  expected,  I  was  "  crossed "  yesterday,  and 
moreover  in  the  first  class!  I  take  no  pleasure  in 
what,  under  other  circumstances,  I  might  be  proud  of. 
I  could  not  refrain  from  telling  His  Majesty  that  it 
wasn't  at  all  deserved,  whereupon  His  Majesty  re- 
marked that  all  of  us  here  in  Charleville  hadn't  de- 
served it.  I  thought  with  Caprivi,  "  Orders  come  with 
age  like  childish  diseases."  In  1870  how  I  envied 
everyone  who  had  really  earned  the  cross,  and  now  I 
don't  care  to  wear  it,  for  I  believe  our  fleet  will  do 
nothing,  and  if  it  does,  will  fail.  I  look  with  tension  to 
the  east;  may  a  brilliant  success  take  place  there.  It 
would  assuredly  be  annihilating,  if  we  weren't  so  in- 
ferior there  numerically;  all  we  can  hope  for  is  a  pretty 
decisive  victory,     I  don't  see  things  in  quite  such  a 

gloomy  light  yet  as  L .     If  only  the  Head  was 

different!  The  nation  is  splendid,  and  not  less  so 
troops  and  ships.  The  ships,  when  they  have  been 
allowed  to  act  on  their  own,  have  distinguished  them- 
selves with  eclat,  but  the  command  a  la  August  28th, 
and  court  councils  of  war   .    .    .     Shocking! 

The  English  are  now  in  terror  of  Zeppelins,  per- 
haps not  without  reason.  I  contend  here  wherever 
I  go  for  the  standpoint  of  "  war  to  the  knife,"  but 
I  am  not  in  favour  of  "  frightfulness."     To-day  I 


272  MY    MEMOIRS 

have  used  my  influence  to  get  an  old  English  admiral 
who  was  interned  sent  to  Italy.  Also  single  bombs 
from  flying  machines  are  wrong;  they  are  odious  when 
they  hit  and  kill  an  old  woman,  and  one  gets  used  to 
them.  If  one  could  set  fire  to  London  in  thirty  places, 
then  what  in  a  small  way  is  odious  would  retire  before 
something  fine  and  powerful. 

Charleville, 

November  igth. 
There  is  a  point  on  which  we  must  be  clear.  Does 
England  mean  war  to  the  knife  against  us?  If  we 
arrive  at  the  conviction  that  she  is  unscrupulously 
bent  on  our  extermination,  we  must  also  use  the  knife 
unsparingly  towards  her,  or  we  should  be  guilty  of  a 
crime  against  our  nation,  and  the  future. 

Charleville, 

November  21st. 
An  American  journalist  paid  me  a  visit,  introduced 
by  Erzbergtr;  then  followed  the  Hungarian  Prime 
Minister,  Count  Tisza.  The  American  was  rather 
dissatisfied  with  his  Government.  He  thought  they 
would  have  to  pay  for  the  fall  of  Tsingtao.  He 
pointed  out  that  our  diplomats  have  no  conception 
of  the  power  of  the  press,  and  equally  little  of  trans- 
Atlantic  affairs.  Count  Tisza  was  quite  confident,  only 
regretted  that  we  hadn't  sent  a  few  more  corps  to 
Poland.  I  must  admit,  too,  that  if  we  are  going  to 
stick  here,  as  it  appears,  we  might  easily  have  spared 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  273 

a  few  corps  and  ensured  the  collapse  of  the  Russian 
army. 

Charleville, 
November  22nd. 

The  folks  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  will  find  it  difficult 
to  make  me  the  scapegoat,  for  too  many  people  know 
what  the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  in  July 
.  .  .  insane  gliding  into  war.  Almost  more  dan- 
gerous are  those  with  Pohl  at  their  head,  who  try 
to  attribute  the  inaction  of  our  fleet  to  the  question 
of  type  of  ships  and  technique,  because  the  Kaiser 
would  be  at  the  back  of  them.  But  we  must  leave 
all  this  to  God's  ordering.  No  one  can  deprive  me 
of  the  consciousness  of  having  in  my  fifty  years  of 
service,  especially  during  the  last  eighteen  years,  done 
my  duty. 

I  should  like  to  tell  U once  more  how  urgent 

I  think  the  necessity  of  a  commercial  treaty  with 
Austria.  I  have  been  trying  to  put  it  into  effect 
since  Luxemburg.  We  must  go  on  working  for  it, 
without  any  hesitation.  Count  Tisza  is  an  impres- 
sive personality,  while  Count  Berchtold,  whose  ac- 
quaintance I  made  in  Berlin,  bears  the  stamp  of  medi- 
ocrity on  his  forehead. 

Charleville, 

November  2Sd. 

Count  Spec  is  running  short  of  munitions;  he  can 
scarcely  hold  out  in  a  long  struggle;  it  would  be  a 
miracle  if  he  broke  through.    The  whole  of  America 


274  MY   MEMOIRS 

is  aiding  and  abetting  England  and  France,  and  if  we 
get  a  little  coal  there  is  a  great  outcry.  It's  contemp- 
tible injustice  towards  us,  but  we  could  settle  the 
matter  if  it  weren't  for  the  Cabinet  administration. 
This  evening  I  again  was  with  His  Majesty. 

Charleville, 

November  25th. 

"  Nothing  new  from  Paris."  All  eyes  fixed  with 
tense  interest  on  the  east.  The  position  there  can't 
be  reviewed  certainly,  because  Hindenburg  has  cut 
off  Headquarters.  The  decision  may  be  delayed  for 
a  few  days,  till  the  Pomeranians  attack.  But  any 
check  for  us  is  unlikely,  while  a  disaster  for  the 
Russians  is  quite  within  the  bounds  of  possibility. 
The  Russians,  of  course,  are  gathering  forces  from 
all  directions.  May  our  bold  general  keep  all  the 
luck  on  his  side.  I  can't  possibly  be  satisfied  with 
the  doings  of  our  navy.  Naturally,  I  don't  mean  the 
individual  ships;  they  have,  as  yet,  done  their  duty 
when  they've  had  the  chance  .  .  .  but  the  best  op- 
portunities have  been  missed,  and  if  the  fleet  did  come 
into  action  now,  matters  would  be  bungled.     I  have 

strongly  recommended  T to  Miiller,  as  his  Chief 

of  Staff,  and  another  for  him.  But  Pohl  I  can't  get 
rid  of  here.  We  don't  talk  of  the  service  together — 
in  fact,  I  am  out  of  it. 

Charleville, 

November  sSh. 

To-day  breakfast  with  His  Majesty.  I  took  the 
opportunity  of  saying  that  we  must  look  the  fact  in 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  275 

the  face  of  England  stopping  at  nothing,  and  in  con- 
sequence take  eventually  strong  measures,  i.e.  the  sub- 
marine blockade.  His  Majesty  agreed.  Yesterday 
evening  Havenstein  (Reichs  Bank)  and  Helfferich 
(Deutsche  Bank)  were  there  at  supper  with  Pohl. 
The  conversation  then  turned  on  the  same  subject, 
and  it  seems  His  Majesty  expressed  himself  as  op- 
posed to  it,  supported  by  Valentine  and  Treutler  (both 
weak,  half-hearted  creatures).  To-day,  after  break- 
fast, Valentine  was  not  altogether  against  it.  His 
Majesty,  Valentine,  and  I  were  in  a  corner;  he 
maintained,  of  course,  that  it  was  an  extreme 
measure. 

Charleville, 

December  22nd. 

Now  scribbling  can  be  resumed.  At  Frankfort  we 
had  to  change  carriages  and  at  Metz  get  out.  From 
Metz  a  through  train.  When  the  porter  called  out 
"  Charleville !  all  change !  "  I  didn't  feel  particularly 
glad.  The  escapade  of  our  fleet  to  the  north-west 
must  be  inquired  into  more  closely  before  a  judgment 
can  be  pronounced.  Probably  no  firm  hand  will  be 
taken  against  Pohl  if  against  lesser  people,  so  that 
any  great  alteration  is  not  to  be  attained. 

The  difficulty  lies  chiefly  in  the  Kaiser  having  agreed 
to  the  main  principle  and  holding  to  it.  I  am  among 
the  old  set,  quite  alone  in  my  opinion.  The  necessity 
of  keeping  Flanders  later  appears  to  be  making 
way  forcibly. 


27^  MY   MEMOIRS 

Charleville, 

December  23rd. 
I  had  an  opportunity  of  talking  to  His  Majesty  about 
the  North  Sea.  He  had  already  discussed  it  with 
the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  present,  and  according 
to  whose  reports  it  was  a  wonder  that  the  big  ships 
hadn't  met  with  disaster,  they  had  come  across  so 
many  mines  and  submarines.  He  was  displeased  that 
the  torpedo  boats  hadn't  attacked.  One  can't,  how- 
ever, judge  of  the  whole  situation  without  studying 
the  losses,  and  these  must  be  forthcoming.  One  feels 
that  the  needful  stimulus  was  not  there,  but  it  can't 
be  called  a  defeat.  I  had  an  opportunity  of  mention- 
ing Flanders  and  was  pleased  to  find  that  on  the  whole 
he,  His  Majesty,  shared  my  opinion. 

Charleville, 

December  24th. 

This  morning  I  expounded  once  more  to  Miiller 
my  views  on  our  naval  strategy,  which  he  didn't  con- 
tradict. 

With  regard  to  the  last  enterprise  a  few  more  ques- 
tions were  put  in  commission  by  the  Kaiser,  and  these 
must  wait.  All  energetic  going  forward  is  again 
frustrated. 

I  have  just  come  from  the  Christmas  festivities 
in  the  temporary  chapel,  which  was  very  prettily  deco- 
rated. The  gifts  set  out  on  long  tables,  at  which  the 
soldiers  sat,  a  slightly  raised  platform  with  carpet 
for  His  Majesty  and  the  officers;  in  front  of  it  the 
crib,  very  charmingly  arranged.     Then  came  Gons 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  o.^^ 

in  grey  uniform,  and  after,  monster  Christmas  trees 
all  lit  up.  To  begin  with  three  verses  were  sung, 
"  Ich  bete  an  die  Macht  der  Liehe."  Then  Gons  gave 
an  address,  short  and  to  the  point.  Plessen,  in  the 
name  of  the  army,  thanked  the  Kaiser,  and  called  for 
three  cheers.  H.  M.  replied  in  a  few  stirring  words, 
and  then  went  about  among  the  ranks,  was  very  gay 
and  genial.  Every  man  stood  up  in  his  place  and 
returned  thanks,  which  I  did  too.  To  wind  up  with, 
three  more  strophes. 

"  Stille  Nacht,  heilige  Nacht."  Altogether  a  very 
dignified  and  impressive  little  ceremony. 

Charleville, 

December  25th. 

Comments  that  reach  me  from  many  sides  in  Ger- 
many depress  me  even  more  profoundly.  The  strategy 
for  which  the  Chancellor  is  responsible  renders  me 
practically  powerless,  unless  it  is  in  questions  which 
don't  exist  in  war. 

The  High  Command  of  the  army  is  composed  of 
the  General  Staff  and  the  Admirals'  Staff,  and  are 
directly  under  the  Kaiser.  The  latter  wishes  the  war 
at  sea  to  be  carried  on  exactly  as  it  is  and  no  other- 
wise. In  reward  for  the  excursion  of  the  fleet  to 
England,  Pohl  has  got  the  Iron  Cross  of  the  first 
class.  That  characterizes  the  situation.  It  isn't  any 
use  to  me  that  I  know  the  principle  to  be  wrong,  and 
the  person  honoured  not  a  suitable  one,  for  I've  no 
foundation  to  go  on  to  prove  I  am  right,  quite  apart 


278  MY    MEMOIRS 

from  the  fact  that  the  essential  materials  are  with- 
held from  me.  Roon,  in  1870,  found  himself  in  the 
same  position,  also  recently  Falkenhayn.  The  last 
saw  disaster  coming  and  could  not  do  anything  at  the 
end  of  August.  Stein  in  181 3  was  an  absolutely  free 
agent,  though,  moreover,  formally  in  the  service  of  the 
Czar.  Scharnhorst  was  also  powerless  in  face  of  the 
events  of  1813,  till  von  Bliicher  became  his  Chief  of 
Staff.  Bliicher,  however,  stood  at  the  head  of  the 
army. 

In  what  concerns  the  conduct  of  the  war  I  have  no 
expert  knowledge  of  naval  organization,  and  therefore 
for  me  to  set  the  pace  in  the  Cabinet  would  only  pro- 
cure me  an  ignominious  failure.  But  mere  empty 
interviews  with  His  Majesty  during  my  sojourn  here 
would  make  things  more  intolerable  than  they  now  are. 
Even  if  I  had  any  idea  of  recommending  myself  as 
Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  His  Majesty  wouldn't  take  me. 
I  talked  the  matter  over  with  Plessen  from  his  side 
of  the  question.  The  proposal,  that  is  to  say  the  offer, 
must  come  from  His  Majesty,  and  not  from  me.  I 
would  not,  however,  keep  my  own  counsel  where  his 
Majesty  is  concerned,  and  not  say  what  I  think  now 
any  more  than  when  I  took  over  the  Admiralty  in 
1897,  and  that  was  a  contradiction  as  well  as  a  self- 
recommendation. 

Charleville, 

December  26th. 

M-any  thanks  for  your  interesting  long  letter,  which 
I  have'n't  at  all  prdp'erly  answered  yet.     (Excitement 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  279 

on  the  part  of  America  with  regard  to  the  rumoured 

invitation  to  Roosevelt  to  visit  Grand  Headquarters.) 

Our  leading  caste  is  far  too  poker-backed  for  any  such 

skilful  move  on  the  chess-board  as  inviting  Roosevelt. 

There  is  really  no  truth  in  the  report  of  anything  so 

unusual  happening  in  our  diplomacy. 

L.  sent  me  a  letter  from  an  American  concerning  the 
'  ... 

reasons  why  the  feeling  in  America  and  especially  in 

the  press  is  so  unfavourable  to  us.  An  essential  part 
of  the  blame  he  attributed  to  the  studied  tactlessness 
of  our  treatment  of  American  journalists.  He  com- 
pared the  bearing,  so  urbane,  of  English,  Russian, 
and  French  diplomats,  on  the  same  high  social  level 
with  our  stiff  aristocratic  reserve.  The  dispatching 
out  there  of  such  a  windbag  as  Dernburg  was  again 
a  blunder  in  the  opposite  direction;  intellectual,  tal- 
ented litterateurs  of  the  highest  rank  and  other  promi- 
nent publicists  would  have  been  effective.  All  must, 
with  us,  be  ordered  from  the  top  downwards;  avail- 
able forces  are  not  liquefied,  on  the  contrary  every  in- 
dividual initiative  is  suppressed;  things  have  gone  on 
thus  for  years  in  the  Corps  Consulaire.  The  same 
methods  are  adopted  against  myself.  I  am  convinced 
that  my  discussion  with  Wiegand  can  only  be  politi- 
cally useful;  in  spite  of  that  the  whole  pack  would  have 
been  let  loose  on  me  if  Zimmermann  hadn't  made 
light  of  what  I  said.  All  the  same,  I  am  not  sure  yet 
whether  they  won't,  via  Pohl,  who  is  putty  in  their 
hands,  make  it  unpleasant  for  me. 

Our  successes  in  Russia  can't  have  been  very  great. 


28o  MY    MEMOIRS 

as  no  guns  were  taken.  Serbia  is  almost  entirely 
evacuated  by  the  Austrians,  and  our  hopes  of  getting 
munitions,  etc.,  through  to  Constantinople  have  di- 
minished to  vanishing  point.  The  Roumanians  per- 
mit Russia  transit  for  everything  and  us  nothing. 
That  is  a  bad  lookout.  Nevertheless  I  build  great 
hopes  on  Hindenburg,  and  the  strength  of  our  army 
isn't  in  the  least  shaken.  Their  holding  out  can  be 
reckoned  on. 

Charleville, 

December  28th. 
To-day  we  have  the  most  abominable  Charleville 
weather,  rain,  wind,  and  cold,  and  into  the  bargain 
there  is  the  odious  impossibility  for  me  of  taking 
active  part  in  the  great  affair,  not  even  to  the  extent 
of  advising  the  Admiralty  Staff.  It  is  immeasurably 
hard  for  me  to  contain  myself  here.  The  only  chance 
left  me,  if  it  is  left,  is  to  have  a  voice  on  the  peace- 
terms,  but  that  is  so  far  off,  and  even  then  I  should 
be  sorely  handicapped. 

Charleville, 

December  2gth. 
If  Hindenburg  doesn't  after  all  indeed  help  us  out, 
the  prospect  is  black  indeed.  Here  everything  is  at  a 
deadlock,  and  unluckily  we  are  short  of  munitions; 
that  is  bad,  and  due  to  extraordinary  remissness  on 
the  part  of  the  War  Ministry,  which  obviously  was 
ruled  by  bureaucratic  niggardliness.  Since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  we  have  given  up  to  the  army  our 
immense  hospital  stores  and  munition  bases,  but  of 
course  they  are  not  sufficient. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  281 

Charleville, 

December  31st. 

The  terrible  year  19 14  goes  to  roost,  and  what  may 
the  year  19 15  bring  us  in  hopes  and  disappointments? 
I  cannot  help  cherishing  the  fear  that  at  the  conclusion 
of  peace  our  people,  after  their  gigantic  effort  and 
achievement,  will  be  as  disappointed  with  the  results 
as  they  were  a  hundred  years  ago.  I  shall  be  content, 
for  my  part,  if  we  retain  the  ability,  better  still  the 
possibility,  of  again  working  ourselves  to  the  top. 
So  long  as  I  live,  we  shall  be  on  short  commons,  I 
mean  not  us  alone,  but  the  whole  nation. 

I  read  to-day  in  The  Daily  News,  of  December  12th, 
an  article  headed  "  Lord  Fisher  and  von  Tirpitz," 
which  of  course  contained  many  errors,  but  from 
which  could  be  gathered,  as  it  will  be  from  history, 
that  I  am  the  initiator  of  our  naval  war  strategy.  I 
created  the  fleet,  but  have  had  scarcely  anything  to 
say  in  its  use,  a  detestable  position  for  me.  It  is 
clear,  too,  that  von  Miiller's  scheme  (his  method  of 
dispositions)  was  doomed  in  advance  to  bankruptcy, 
else  the  fleet  would  have  accomplished  great  things. 
One  has  proof  of  that  in  all  the  isolated  actions  in 
which  our  ships  have  been  engaged. 

1915 

Charleville, 

January   ist. 
Church  to-day.     Sermon  rather  too  rhetorical,  and 
suggestive  of  little  to  my  mind.     H.  M.  greeted  me 
graciously,  and  afterwards  there  was  a  march  past 


282  MY    MEMOIRS 

on  the  filthy  road  to  Hiron,  of  Landwehr  and  Land- 
stiirmer  troops,  and  the  staff-guard,  I  should  think 
about  5,000  men.  Then  headquarters,  and  officers' 
corps  formation  and  the  Kaiser  chatting  a  little  with 
different  groups.  New  Year's  congratulations  from 
Pohl  to  Miiller :  "  continue  to  protect  me  during  the 
coming  year"  (naturally  he  means  against  ind). 

I've  more  still  to  say  about  U.'s  letter.  But  he  is 
mistaken.  There's  a  strong  wall  round  the  Kaiser, 
through  which  I  cannot  penetrate,  quite  apart  from 
the  fact  that  I  have  no  longer  the  nerve  for  a  great 
combat.  Change  in  the  administration  of  the  Cabinet 
can  only  be  inaugurated  after  some  great  catastrophe, 
and  from  that  may  God  deliver  Germany.  After 
peace  has  come,  the  spirits  will  of  course  be  let 
loose. 

Charleville, 

January  2nd. 
The  bastion  round  the  Kaiser  is  at  the  present  mo- 
ment more  than  ever  impenetrable.  It  is  just  the 
Kaiser's  peculiarity  that  he  won't  come  to  any  resolve, 
or  bear  any  responsibility.  He  is  reported  to  have 
said  to  Miiller  several  times,  "  Now  the  fleet  must 
really  do  something,"  but  he  can't  be  induced  to  re- 
solve what  it  is  to  do,  and  he  simply  evades  me  when 
I  tackle  and  harangue  him,  which  I  never  lose  an 
opportunity  of  doing.  Miiller  bears  a  heavy  responsi- 
bility towards  our  country,  but  I  fancy  that  he  is 
little  aware  of  it.  He  only  backs  up  the  Kaiser  in 
clinging  to  the  servile  Pohl.    No  influence  that  I  can 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  283 

exercise  is  any  good  against  all  this,  even  in  the  case 
of  a  great  misfortune. 

Charleville, 

January  3rd. 

I  share  your  faith  in  our  people,  but  the  danger 
lies  near  that  we  may  have  to  pass  through  a  phase  of 
Revolution  instead  of  Evolution. 

Charleville, 

January  4th. 
Pohl  has  come  round  to  my  fundamental  view  of 
our  war  strategy.  So  I  have  hopes  that  things  may 
now  go  better.  Only  what  is  wanted  is  to  act  at  the 
minute  what  you  think  at  the  minute,  etc.,  and  here 
it's  not  a  matter  of  minutes,  but  of  five  months.  If 
the  Kaiser  wasn't  directly  influenced  by  Miiller,  we 
should  now  be  bound  to  go  ahead.  I  believe  the  pres- 
sure of  events  is  too  strong — the  fleet  must  advance. 
May  the  great  God  aid  it.  In  favourable  circumstances 
the  decision  may  rest  with  it,  but  I  won't  count  on 
that.  I  will  be  content  if  it  contributed  something 
towards  the  peace  for  which  we  fight.  Pin-pricks 
aren't  enough. 

Charleville, 

January  5th. 

This  morning  I  have  effected  something  in  regard 

to  our  new  enterprise  and  at  last  Pohl  is  at  one  with 

me.    The  thing  is  now  to  be  worked  according  to  my 

instructions  drawn  up  at  Coblenz,  and  before  that  at 


284  MY    MEMOIRS 

Berlin.  In  Berlin,  however,  I  had  reckoned  on  Pohl 
acting  on  his  own  initiative,  and  in  Coblenz  urged  it. 
Characteristic  of  Miiller  and  company's  administra- 
tions; the  proposals  take  the  form  of  a  memorandum. 
That,  if  I  were  Pohl,  I  simply  wouldn't  do,  i.e.  hold 
discourses,  and  leave  memorandums  where  the  Kaiser 
is  concerned.  Otherwise  Miiller  and  friends  plus 
Bethmann  will  take  the  decision  into  their  hands,  but 
I  am  counting  on  the  position  becoming  urgent  all 
round. 

Charleville, 

January  6th. 

I  have  just  passed  an  hour  with  the  Grand  Duke 
of  Baden.  The  Chancellor  has  asked  me  in  writing 
to  give  him  my  views  with  regard  to  the  future  of 
Belgium,  from  my  own  standpoint  as  well  as  from  the 
standpoint  of  Germany's  future,  in  the  form  of  a 
pamphlet.  I  am  agreeable  to  this,  because  I  can  now 
freely  give  my  views  without  being  suspected  of  plot- 
ting against  the  Chancellor.  Capelle  has  been  com- 
missioned to-day  to  draw  up  a  memorandum  and  send 
it  here.  I  shall,  myself,  go  to  Brussels  and  travel 
through  Flanders  to  study  the  question  on  the  spot, 
also  sound  Krupp. 

From  Italy  bad  news;  she  is  out  to  rob,  and  wants 
the  Trentino,  but  I'appetit  vieut  for  Roumania  as  well. 

O  blessed  Hindenburg,  help  us  soon,  we  are  in  sore 
need  of  it!  Still  munitions  are  lacking.  We  are 
losing  men  every  day  and  can't  shoot  back. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  285 

Charleville, 

January  gth. 

Miiller  holding  preliminary  conversations  with  Beth- 
mann;  a  quite  hair-raising  circumstance,  I  think.  In- 
genohl  might  have  more  scope  with  advantage,  but  I 
have  no  longer  confidence  in  him.  I  have  had  a  pretty 
sharp  explanation  with  Miiller,  who  was  very  irate 
over  it,  while  I  remained  calm.  The  written  acqui- 
escence from  Pohl,  in  acquiescence  to  my  ideas,  is 
really  rather  a  joke !  He  greets  my  acquiescence  with 
satisfaction,  after  he  and  Miiller  have  combated  those 
ideas  for  five  months.  But  enough  of  this.  My 
hopes  are  small.  Use's  New  Year's  wish  is  right.  To 
see  my  life's  work  turned  to  no  account,  as  it  is  my 
conviction  that  it  will  be,  is  indeed  dreadfully  hard  to 
bear.  There  were  chances  a  while  back,  but  only 
chances.  On  December  i6th  Ingenohl  had  the  fate 
of  Germany  in  the  palm  of  his  hand.  I  boil  with  in- 
ward emotion  whenever  I  think  of  it. 

A  Roumanian  naval  officer  educated  amongst  us 
sends  greetings  in  a  letter  to  his  old  comrades,  and 
writes  that  he  has  often  spoken  up  for  Germany  .  .  . 
all  no  use.  In  a  few  weeks  war  will  be  declared  on 
Austria  and  Italy  will  follow  suit.  I  believe  that 
already.  Ultimatum  threats  have  been  hurled  forth. 
Wrath  against  our  allies  great  among  our  troops  in  the 
East.  They  can't  get  them  to  advance.  The  plunge, 
which  I  and  Westerkamp  induced  Pohl  to  entertain, 
has  practically  come  to  nothing.  Doubtless  Miiller 
and  Bethmann  have  shunted  the  matter,  and  instructed 


286  MY   MEMOIRS 

the  Kaiser  beforehand.  Instead,  concessions  are  to  be 
made,  half-measures  arranged  which  can  be  of  little 
use  .  .  .  and  in  addition  entail  great  danger.  It  is 
terrible!  Of  course  they  can't  sweep  my  "counsel" 
off  the  face  of  the  earth,  and  its  effects  are  likely  to 
last.  But  not  nearly  enough  has  been  made  of  this  one 
order;  it  could  only  have  been  actually  effective  when 
we  had  got  to  Calais.  From  Flanders  it  would  be 
much  more  difficult  to  undertake,  for  besides  this  minor 
action  the  fleet  would  have  to  strike,  and  that  at  the 
time  could  not  be  guaranteed.  I  build  expectations 
now  on  Hopmann  in  order  to  operate  further.  It  must 
be  confessed,  of  course,  that  at  this  moment,  when 
Roumania  and  Italy  are  standing  on  the  brink,  any 
check  for  Ingenohl  would  be  perilous,  while  here  one 
continues  to  reckon  on  Hindenburg  against  Russia,  who 
is  only  temporarily  held  up  by  this  swine's  weather, 

Charleville, 

January  I2th. 

I  was  reading  yesterday  in  the  Frankfurter  Zcitung 
an  extract  from  a  speech  by  Lord  Rosebery  at 
Dalkeith.  "  We  have  two  facts  of  great  importance 
to  face:  the  first  is,  that  the  British  nation  would  be 
for  ever  defeated  if  it  did  not  fight  to  the  last  shilling 
and  the  last  man;  the  second,  that  the  German  nation 
as  the  greatest  military  power  in  the  world  could 
never  lift  up  its  head  again  if  once  beaten."  These 
words  seem  to  me  to  characterize  the  situation  ex- 
actly, and  from  this  situation  one  sees  no  way  out. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  287 

Yesterday  evening  at  the  Kaiser's,  where  an  officer 
of  Hindenburg's  General  Staff  had  arrived  with  a 
letter  for  His  Majesty.  Shall  we  go  on  scoring  mere 
local  succeesses  as  of  old?  What  frightful  casualties 
there  have  been  without  much  gain.  The  officer  re- 
lated that  the  Russians  will  go  through  fire  and  water 
for  Nicholas  Nikolajewisch,  and  that  so  far  they  have 
only  had  good  guns  to  contend  against;  that  is  to 
say,  in  other  words,  the  power  of  the  Russian  army 
is  not  yet  broken.  He  asked  the  Kaiser  what  the  fleet 
was  going  to  do?  The  Kaiser  was  heard  to  answer, 
England  was  letting  herself  be  misled  all  the  time; 
but  that's  not  the  case.  The  new  management  is  in 
reality,  thanks  to  the  influence  of  W.  and  Z.,  doing 
better  than  I  could  have  dared  to  hope  after  the  omis- 
sions of  Pohl.  Ingenohl  has  now  so  much  scope  that 
he  must  go  forward.  Let  us  hope  that  God  Almighty 
doesn't  punish  those  who  vacillate !  My  nagging  has 
at  last  been  some  good.  Naturally  I  can't  create  a 
leader.  Another  officer  of  the  General  Stafif  has  come 
here  from  Serbia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Heutsch,  and 
has  told  the  story  of  the  Austrian  collapse.  He  praised 
the  Serbian  army,  and  was  of  opinion  that  Roumania 
and  Italy  would  not  keep  out  much  longer,  hence 
Hindenburg's  last  energetic  push.  Shall  we  ever  come 
to  firm  resolution?  I  believe  that  before  this  the  de- 
cision would  have  been  different  had  we  not  set  so 
much  store  by  local  succeseses.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Heutsch  praised  the  Austrian  navy  on  the  Danube; 
in  Poland,  on  the  other  hand  (Admiral  Hauss),  com- 


288  MY    MEMOIRS 

pletely  hypnotized  by  the  Italian  notion  .  .  .  Lissa 
and  Tegethoff  of  blessed  memory!  Communications 
between  Joffre  and  French  firmly  established.  The 
possibility  that  we  shall  send  German  troops  to  Serbia 
is  unluckily  not  on  the  tapis.  The  prestige  of  Austria 
in  the  Balkans  seems  finally  to  be  on  the  decline.  The 
forces,  German  and  Hungarian,  not  Croatians,  excel- 
lent; they  prefer,  however,  to  be  led  by  us,  as  their 
own  officers  are  disheartened.  The  Czech  troops  are 
doubtful. 

Charleville, 

January  14th. 

Great  political  developments  are  in  progress;  it  al- 
most appears  as  if  we  should  have  more  or  less  to 
drop  Austria,  or  by  force  to  tear  pieces  off  her  body 
as  fodder  for  the  vultures  who  prey  around  her. 

Hopmann  has  to-day  told  me  a  good  deal  about 
the  fleet  that  isn't  at  all  reassuring.  Unless  some  radi- 
cal cure  is  not  found  soon,  nothing  will  be  done,  and 
we  expect  to  beat  England  to-day !  All  their  thoughts 
(the  Admirals'),  instead  of  being  fixed  on  that,  are 
centred  on  technique,  which  leaves  much  to  be  decided 
in  every  direction  and  hinders  them  from  accomplish- 
ing anything.  But  the  exploits  of  submarines  and 
aircraft  are  made  a  lot  of,  otherwise  the  German 
people  might  be  out  of  temper  at  the  inactivity  of  the 
fleet.  The  fleet  is  there,  but  a  Tegethoff  is  lacking. 
It  is  too  lamentable.  Added  thereto,  our  general  posi- 
tion is  extremely  serious,  despite  the  small  success  at 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  289 

Soissons,  which  brought  General  von  L.  the  order 
pour  le  merite  forthwith.  This  little  affair  has  dem- 
onstrated for  that  matter  the  fact  that  in  a  well-cal- 
culated storming  attack  the  French  can't  put  up  any 
resistance  to  our  troops.  It  was  the  Brandenburgers' 
5th  Division,  so  famous  in  1870. 

Charleville, 

January  15th. 

People  here  who  know  what  is  going  on  are  be- 
coming grave.  Big  munitions  are  failing,  and  can't 
be  manufactured  fast  enough.  I  should  be  compelled 
to  decide  on  doing  more,  although  that  want  would 
he  felt  at  once,  if  Ingenohl  were  a  leader.  Now  he 
wants  to  send  two  squadrons,  one  after  the  other, 
to  Kiel  for  necessary  re-equipments.  It  is  too  un- 
believable, and  in  doing  it  he'll  be  more  than  ever 
"bottled  up."  A  fleet  is  just  as  bad  a  defensive 
weapon  as  cavalry,  if  not  more  so.  All  the  advantage 
in  the  North  Sea  goes  to  those  who  hold  the  initiative. 
One  has  only  to  think  in  this  connection  of  the  Emden 
and  the  Karlsruhe.  This  is  a  war  of  frittered-away 
opportunities  at  sea,  and  on  land  too. 

The  peace  will  be  a  bad  one,  if  we  don't  get  Ant- 
werp and  Flanders,  therein  lies  the  contrary  compen- 
sation for  all  our  other  losses  in  the  world.  I  have 
just  had  a  visit  from  Monsieur  and  Madame  G.,  who 
offered  to  get  me  news  of  Wolf,  through  a  relation 
of  theirs  in  England.  I  thanked  them  warmly,  but 
it  wasn't  necessary.    Both,  Madame  in  particular,  were 


2go  MY    MEMOIRS 

very  affable.  We  talked  politics  a  little.  Richelieu  and 
Colbert  were  right,  Louis  XIV  had  made  the  greatest 
political  blunders  and  was  guilty  of  the  ultimate  down- 
fall of  France.  Napoleon  I  was  right  in  his  root- 
principle,  and  even  now  if  one  ignored  the  frontier 
dispute  the  interests  of  France  and  Germany  were 
solidly  united,  etc.,  etc.  He  didn't  excuse  himself, 
and  Madame  thought  that  was  quite  right,  but  now 
we  had  to  fight,  and  in  that  I  agreed  with  her.  It 
is  a  pity  that  the  European  nations  are  so  little  ruled 
by  intellect,  England  excepted,  and  she  has  no  soul. 
Whether  she  has  miscalculated  her  strength  remains 
to  be  seen.  All  the  neutrals  grovel  to  her  power. 
There  is  nothing  for  us  to  do  but  rely  on  ourselves. 
A  mighty,  glorious  fabric  are  we,  with  a  hydra-head. 

Charleville, 

January  i6th. 

Capelle  telegraphed  recently  that  I  ought  to  stay 
here.  Letter  followed.  The  situation  seems  to  be 
very  urgent.  It  seems  somehow  that  the  Home  Office 
has  very  much  miscalculated  in  its  estimate  the  supply 
of  corn.  What  if  it  now  comes  to  flight  along  the 
whole  line?  Ballin  now  wants,  all  of  a  sudden,  ener- 
getic conduct  of  the  war  at  sea,  after  having  hitherto 
cried  out  with  the  other  faction,  "  Anything  rather 
than  provoke  the  enemy." 

I  am  glad  that  Retzmann  has  come  back  from  a 
task  that  was  not  based  on  probability,  but  on  moon- 
shine.    I  had  a  presentiment  that  the  thing  would  go 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  291 

awry  like  the  torpedo  boats.  The  tone  among  the 
neutrals  is  increasingly  worse.  England's  bluff  is  stu- 
pendous. 

Charleville, 

January  17th. 

Why  Capelle  should  be  so  urgently  set  on  my  stay- 
ing here  is  still  not  quite  clear  to  me  (he  has  tele- 
graphed twice).  I  can  hardly  imagine  that  the  corn 
question  is  so  serious,  and  I  am  unable  to  think  of 
anything  else.  Anyhow  I  am  here  till  January  29th, 
when  my  Flanders  tour  comes  off.  I  have  almost 
given  up  all  hope  with  regard  to  Ingenohl  and  the 
fleet.  There  is,  though,  still  the  submarine  war  left. 
We  must,  before  everything,  get  England  on  toast, 
else  we  shall  make  a  peace  that  will  destroy  our  posi- 
tion as  a  world-power,  and  Germany  will  be  exporting 
men  again,  instead  of  wares.  U.'s  efforts  haven't 
succeeded,  I  believe,  in  lashing  up  F.,  so  that  H.  gets 
supplies  for  military  inclining  eastward.  Conrad 
again  reconnoitring.  If  Hindenburg  is  sufficiently  suc- 
cessful to  come  to  terms  with  Russia,  which  I  have 
always  thought  would  be  the  best  thing,  it  may  react 
on  the  situation  here. 

Charleville, 

January  igth. 
Yesterday  evening  with  the  Kaiser.    The  conversa- 
tion turned  on  the  submarines.     Treutler  and  Valen- 
tine against  action.     Italy  would  have  a  pretext  for 
attack.     I  said  pretty  plainly  that  if  we  didn't  get 


292  MY    MEMOIRS 

our  knife  into  the  English  we  should  only  fritter 
away  the  sympathy  of  neutrals  still  more,  and  accom- 
plish nothing.  H.  M.  won't.  He  must  first  get  a 
clearer  political  vision,  etc.  The  upshot  of  it  all  was, 
in  the  opinion  of  K.,  that  peace  was  to  be  made,  even 
if  it  was  a  rotten  peace. 

The  Kaiser,  as  usual,  related  how  victory  was  always 
a  matter  of  nerves.  Langenback  (Plessen's  brother- 
in-law)  said  when  he  heard  that  Port  Arthur  had 
fallen,  that  the  Russians  had  surrendered  twenty-four 
hours  too  soon,  or  they  would  have  conquered.  I 
remarked  to  His  Majesty  that  was  quite  correct;  in  a 
wider  sense  there  was  a  twenty-four  hours  in  which 
to  decide  this  war.  His  Majesty  was  silent.  K,  v.  B. 
has  enthusiastically  seconded,  in  a  letter  to  Bethmann. 
I  have  now  tried  to  work  him  up  to  see  that,  as  the 
press  must  bemute,  a  dozen  or  more  prominent  leaders 
of  industry  and  finance  should  meet  together  and  lay 
at  the  foot  of  the  throne  their  collaborated  opinion 
of  what  alone  will  prove  a  lasting  peace  for  Germany. 
But  I  couldn't  make  him  see  it. 

If  he  were  asked,  they  would  all  be  at  one  in  want- 
ing much  more  (I,  for  instance),  and  it  might  look 
as  if  the  Chancellor  was  to  be  overthrown,  and  that 
wouldn't  do.  I  endeavoured  in  vain  to  make  it  clear 
to  him  that  it  was  a  historical  duty  for  him  and  his 
colleagues  to  make  some  announcement  of  the  kind 
before  it  was  too  late;  it  would  merely  give  stability 
to  the  Chancellor,  who  was  oscillating  in  murky  un- 
certainty.   "  Yes,  he  would  think  it  over,  etc."    Such 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  293 

a  lack  of  strong  personality  in  the  upper  ranks,  at  a 
time  when  the  nation's  achievement  is  so  colossal,  is 
astounding,  and  demonstrates  a  great  blot  on  our 
statecraft,  which  will  avenge  itself  bitterly,  sooner  or 
later.  I  am  more  and  more  astonished  that  the  Kaiser 
still  treats  me  well;  he  does  indeed  work  against  me 
behind  my  back  and  prevents  my  getting  on  my  way, 
but  for  me  to  "  go  "  would  excite  too  much  remark. 
The  fleet  could  act  if  it  liked,  but  T.  is  devoid  of  in- 
tuition and  from  here  nothing  can  be  done. 

Brussels, 
January  20th. 

We  started  on  our  journey  at  lo  o'clock,  this  time 
without  hindrances,  via  Charleroi.  The  population  a 
good  deal  calmer  than  they  were  the  first  time.  I  am 
to  meet  Bissing  and  B.  here,  and  to-morrow  go  on 
to  Bruges.  The  situation  as  a  whole  is  gradually  be- 
coming clear.  Above  all  now,  I  stake  my  hopes  on 
Hindenburg.  We  must  first  of  all  beat  Russia  and 
then  come  to  some  arrangement  with  her,  if  Austria 
isn't  shattered. 

Chestnut  trees  in  Southern  Tyrol  handed  over  to 
Italy  in  order  to  pacify  her.  Austria  must  find  breath- 
ing space  towards  the  southeast.  Bulgaria  must  be  a 
little  diverted  so  as  to  fasten  her  to  Austria.  In  re- 
turn Austria  must  resign  what  is  only  harmful  to  her 
and  out  of  keeping  with  her  historic  mission. 

Russia  coming  out  of  the  afifair  with  honour  will 
be  able  to  give  us  certain  little  useful  rights,  such  as 


294  MY    MEMOIRS 

a  bit  of  Lithuania.  That  would  be  nice,  but  not  abso- 
lutely necessary.  Bare  cash  is  not  desirable,  and  we 
don't  want  more  of  Poland  than  we've  got.  Thus 
^everything  must  be  directed  now  to  making  it  possible 
for  Hindenburg  to  conclude  a  peace  with  Russia. 
Roumania  to  have  nothing,  that  is  a  foregone  conclu- 
sion to  appease  Hungary.  Then  Hindenburg  must  be 
endowed  with  absolute  power,  and  we  must  all  do 
our  bit  to  promote  the  end,  by  attacking  England  as 
much  as  we  can.  Have  conversed  with  Bissing  and 
arrived  at  a  complete  understanding  perhaps.  I've 
gained  very  valuable  support. 

Eruges, 
January  22nd. 
The  more  I  see  of  the  governments  of  the  Empire 
under  the  Kaiser  and  the  Chancellor,  the  more  my 
hopes  dwindle.  To-day  I've  been  in  Antwerp,  had 
B.  to  breakfast  and  afterwards  talked  to  General  H. 
Before  I  expressed  an  opinion  he  said,  "  Without  Bel- 
gium, the  war  is  lost."  B.  thought  Ballin  was  for 
keeping  Antwerp,  but  that  the  Chancellor  and  com- 
pany wanted  to  compound  with  the  Congo.  A  veil 
for  those  who  won't  see.  The  revision  of  the  Thirty 
Years  War  in  my  opinion  will  be  for  ever  missed. 
Miiller's  tactics  speak  volumes  for  the  determined  at- 
titude. The  nation  will  have  a  word  to  say  about  that. 
But  the  rich  industrial  middle  classes  have  grown  slack 
and  indolent.  Not  only  at  Charleville,  but  in  Berlin. 
I   have   become   entirely   isolated.      The   air-raid   on 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  295 

Yarmouth  was  a  blunder.  Why  spare  London?  All 
that  flies  or  creeps  should  be  concentrated  on  the  city, 
is  my  emphatic  vote  recorded  in  writing  and  by  word 
of  mouth. 

Charleville, 
January  26th. 

My  thoughts  are  naturally  with  the  fleet.  The  same 
mistake  as  usual  was  made  in  the  preliminary  thrust; 
the  fleet  was  in  port  and  not  on  the  spot  where  the 
covering  forces  should  have  been. 

The  Kaiser's  impression  of  it  may  well  be  that  the 
fleet  is  now  safely  packed  in  a  capsule.  I  am  going 
to  supper  to-night,  and  must  try  to  urge  a  more  virile 
policy. 

Charleville, 
February  6th. 
To-day,  a  second  consultation  with  Miiller,  who, 
in  so  far  as  a  new  modus  vivendi  was  reached,  ran 
away.  The  worst  of  the  submarine  warfare  is  that 
stagnation  of  it  all  may  come  about  through  our  not 
now  having  nearly  enough.  In  that  fact  and  in  the 
starting  off  with  a  blustering  flourish  of  trumpets  and 
threats  to  the  neutrals,  lies  the  most  serious  side  of 
the  affair.  The  Kaiser  and  Miiller  in  this  matter  are 
furious  with  Pohl.  But  with  regard  to  myself,  through 
the  interview  with  Wiegand  I  learn  that  my  name  is 
being  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  matter,  and 
it  is  believed  that  I  was  the  instigator.  I  have  mean- 
while to-day  told  Miiller  that  my  duty  to  the  Father- 
land alone  keeps  me  from  tendering  my  resignation 


296  MY    MEMOIRS 

,now,  but  I  shall  certainly  do  so  after  the  war.  I  told 
him,  moreover,  that  it  was  at  the  Foreign  Office  and 
the  Government  circles  that  the  state  of  things  had 
been  engineered.  I  was  completely  subject  to  the 
Kaiser,  and  exercised  no  influence  at  all.  That  didn't 
seem  to  me  right,  so  long  as  I  was  in  office.  These 
representations  were  very  painful  to  him.  The  real 
original  great  rumpus  between  the  Kaiser  and  me  was 
said  to  be  due  to  the  idea  that  I  thought  it  necessary 
to  coop  up  the  fleet,  and  that  the  Kaiser  didn't  wish 
it.  Now  other  reasons  are  being  found,  and  a  scape- 
goat being  sought  for. 

In  Prussia  events  are  quite  clear.  The  Russians 
wanted  to  strike  a  great  blow,  and  if  Hindenburg 
hadn't  forestalled  them,  the  Russians  would  now  be 
at  the  gates  of  Konigsberg  and  Dantzig. 

Charleville, 
February  7th. 

Pohl,  by  his  vanity  and  lack  of  judgment,  has  made 
a  mess  that  I  have  to  clear  up.  The  whole  VdhX-ish 
direction  of  February  4th  was  superfluous.  We  ought 
to  have  let  the  submarines  develop  their  own  action, 
growing  ever  stronger  and  stronger  according  to  the 
vicissitudes  of  our  forces.  Changes  in  the  command 
were  not  involved  necessarily  by  the  acceptance  of  my 
suggestion.  Instead  of  which,  flourish  of  trumpets, 
intimidation,  and  in  consequence  excitement  among  the 
others,  and  England  warned  and  given  fourteen  days 
to  make  preparations  in. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  297 

The  English  and  French  understood  each  other  in 
the  game  of  bluflf ;  one  must  admit  that  they've  so  far 
done  nothing  in  the  Dardanelles,  and  so  long  as  panic 
doesn't  set  in  among  the  Turks  they'll  do  nothing 
there  in  the  future.  Apart  from  this,  the  Turks  have 
got  eight  of  their  finest  corps  stationed  there,  and  the 
English  oppose  these  with  an  expeditionary  corps. 

Charleville, 

March  2nd. 
This  evening  it  has  been  'phoned  through  that  the 
Note  to  the  United  States  would  be  made  public,  in 
spite  of  a  recent  utterance  of  the  Kaiser's,  The  press 
and  the  public  won't  understand  the  kernel  of  the 
affair.  The  first,  besides,  is  muzzled  and  writes  to  the 
Chancellor's  dictation  (see  Lokal  Anzeiger  of  March 
1st,  1915).  In  this  fashion  the  curb  is  put  on  the 
Chancellor  in  relation  to  the  Kaiser.  The  Kreuz  Zei- 
tung  has  of  course  had  the  courage  to  write  against 
the  Note. 

Charleville, 

March  3rd. 
Absolutely  nothing  to  report  from  here.  To-day 
Admiral  von  Miiller  was  with  Bachmann,  but  natu- 
rally only  a  flying  visit.  As  he  had  to  accompany  the 
Kaiser  to  General  von  Einem,  he  didn't  call  on  me, 
and  was  obviously  amazed  to  hear  from  Geige^  that  I 
was  here.  I  must  continue  to  wait  and  see  what  will 
happen  next.  Bethmann  has  stayed  on  with  Jagow  in 
Berlin.    He  vfill  be  there  for  another  ten  days  pending 

*  Overseer  of  the  Chancellory's  messengers. 


298  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  negotiations.  Here  one  is  told  nothing,  and  leads 
an  inconsolable  existence.  Only  the  gatherings  at  the 
Maison  Gailly  have  become  exceptionally  pleasant. 
We  all  get  on  well  together,  and  I  believe  are  very 
pleased  that  we  do.  In  the  morning  I  took  a  little 
walk  with  Hopmann,  and  in  the  afternoon  with  Bach- 
mann,  whom  I  showed  a  little  of  the  town,  and  then 
strolled  with  him  along  the  Maas  with  its  serpentine 
windings.  This  morning  early  there  was  snow,  it  is 
true,  but  in  spite  of  that,  there  is  a  feeling  of  spring 
and  a  mildness  in  the  air,  over  which,  at  all  events, 
one  can  rejoice. 

The  latest  Frankfurter  Zeitung  does  certainly  praise 
our  Note  in  reply,  but  only  in  very  moderate  terms. 

X told  me  about  his  discussion  with  Bethmann. 

The  impression  he  gathered  from  it  was  little  favour- 
able to  the  Guider  of  our  Destiny.  He  did  nothing 
but  ejaculate,  "  What  am  I  to  do,  what  am  I  to  do  ?  " 
Italy  and  Greece  have  appeared  to  him  in  a  dream — 
Pohl  led  him  to  expect  something  quite  different  from 
what  happened  afterwards.  In  short,  he  is  wearily 
submerged  in  doubts  as  to  whether  God  will  have 
compassion  on  him.  This  sort  of  thing  can't  turn  out 
well  in  the  end. 

Unluckily  Hindenburg's  offensive  has  been  held  up, 
and  Austria  is  no  longer  to  be  counted  on.  The  Rus- 
sians were  beyond  all  expectations,  well  led,  and 
carried  out  their  operations  with  great  skill.  They 
wanted  to  do  the  same  as  Hindenburg.  The  latter 
fortunately  put  a  spoke  in  their  wheel,  otherwise  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  299 

fellows  would  now  be  sitting  down  before  Konigsberg. 
It  seems  that  a  line  of  trenches  now  runs  from  the 
Grodno  as  far  as  Ploczk — which  is  bad  for  us. 

Charleville, 

March  4th. 
The  decision  of  the  present  crisis  lies  undoubtedly 
in  Rome  and  in  the  Dardanelles — that  is  to  say,  in  the 
Turks  breaking  through.  Roumania  and  Co.  have 
got  the  shudders  at  the  thought  of  Constantinople  be- 
ing Russian;  the  Roumanian  jackals  ought  to  have  it, 
of  course.  The  Turks  want  a  submarine,  but  the 
Austrians  have  refused,  as  being  too  dangerous.  We 
have  offered  them  for  it  German  equipments,  so  far 
no  answer.  But  the  story  is  characteristic  of  the 
Atistrians.  Their  Admiral  Haus  is  reserving  his  fleet 
for  Italy.  He  thinks  he  may  bring  off  another  Lissa, 
but  whether  another  Tegetthoff  comes  on  the  scene  is 
open  to  question.  He  conversed  with  our  Naval  At- 
tache chiefly  on  exotic  water-plants,  which  is  his  hobby. 
Off  now,  not  to  the  joyful  chase,  but  to  sit  at  the 
ghastly  table,  where  I  have  come  to  be  so  out  of  place. 

Charleville, 

March  5th. 

We  have  probably  lost  Submarine  8.  We,  however, 
must  resign  ourselves  to  losses,  especially  as,  out  of 
regard  for  the  neutrals,  drastic  restrictions  have  been 
laid  on  submarine  warfare  concerning  compulsory 
rising  to  the  surface  in  doubtful  cases.  To-day  Miiller 
was  here  for  an  hour.    I  am  no  forwarder  with  him. 


300  MY   MEMOIRS 

He  entirely  misunderstood  what  passed  at  the  meet- 
ing at  the  Chancellor's.  He  accused  me  of  having  in- 
troduced a  tone  of  harshness,  which  influenced  the 
meeting  and  rendered  it  fruitless.  Under  Secretary 
for  State  Zimmermann,  on  the  contrary,  said  to  Bach- 
mann  the  next  day  that  the  meeting  had  gone  off  very 
well,  and  we  were  all  unanimous.  So  we  were,  up  to 
the  point  of  the  Chancellor  and  Jagow  standing  quite 
by  themselves. 

What  I  had  said,  in  fact,  slowly  and  emphatically, 
was  that  the  new  American  Note  (No.  H)  was  happily 
couched  in  very  courteous  language.  That  was  the 
first  impression.  But  when  one  tested  the  actual  con- 
tents, they  presented  themselves  as  an  unfair  demand 
(here  my  "harshness"  comes  in)  to  relinquish  the 
"  U-boat "  warfare  and  the  use  of  mines,  and  to  get 
practically  nothing  from  England  in  return  for  doing 
it,  except  at  the  most  a  few  solitary  compromised  con- 
voys. In  respect  to  the  speech  at  the  Kaiser's,  he  said 
that  Bethmann's  suspicion  openly  expressed  that  we 
are  behind  the  agitation  in  the  press.  Was  very  im- 
proper on  the  Chancellor's  part.  He  had  told  His 
Majesty  so.  I  had  energetically  combated  this  charge. 
On  the  other  hand  I  had  alluded  to  loss  of  prestige, 
and  that  was  an  unheard-of  thing  to  attribute  to  the 
Chancellor. 

This  whole  misconception  on  the  side  of  Miiller  is 
quite  incomprehensible  to  me.  The  matter  in  ques- 
tion really  was  whether  the  Note  made  too  weak  an 
impression,  and  if  it  was  accepted   (as  seems  likely 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  301 

enough)  we  are  to  be  blamed  for  it.  Because  we  cried 
out  on  February  4th  (in  the  face  of  my  written  ad- 
vice), so  we  must  continue  to  hold  out,  to  please  the 
Kaiser.  Just  as  if  I  had  said,  "  The  Chancellor  wants 
to  lower  the  prestige."  That  would  be  a  different 
thing.  Then  came  the  Wiegand  affair  and  my  attitude 
to  the  submarine  controversy;  which  he  does  see  now 
in  a  different  light,  so  far  as  he  can  comprehend  it. 
To-morrow  the  discussion  will  continue.  .  .  .  The 
gist  of  the  matter  is:  he  and  the  Kaiser  have  between 
them  held  back  the  fleet. 

The  splendid  spirit  that  prevailed  in  August  of  last 
year  has  evaporated.  The  fleet  could  have  struck,  in 
my  estimation,  with  brilliant  success,  for  both  ships  and 
personnel  were  superior  to  England's.  Now  a  scape- 
goat is  being  searched  for.  First  it  is  found  in  the 
technique,  next  in  myself.  That  view  is  supported  in- 
voluntarily by  a  host  of  those  who  vote  for  remaining 
inactive.  One  tries  to  find  excuses.  It  is  only  to  be 
expected  that  Miiller  and  the  Kaiser  will  succeed  in 
finding  them.  But  had  I  only  commanded  the  fleet  in 
the  first  months !  .  .  .  Now  its  capacity  and  other 
circumstances  are  infinitely  more  unfavourable. 

Charleville, 

March  8th. 
The  Vatican  seems  to  be  throwing  its  whole  weight 
into  the  scale  against  Italy  and  Austria  breaking  with 
each  other.     The  Vatican  and  the  Centre  have  com- 
bined in  order  to  encourage  the  aged  Emperor  Franz 


302  MY    MEMOIRS 

Joseph,  It  would  be  very  important  for  us  if  the 
result  were  in  the  long  run  even  a  passively  favour- 
able one  for  us.  But  at  a  moment  like  this,  that  is  a 
good  deal  to  hope  for. 

I  have  just  been  reading  an  article  in  which  it  is 
energetically  demanded  that  some  definite  pronounce- 
ment shall  be  made  about  our  keeping  Belgium.  That 
in  my  opinion  is  the  only  thing  to  do,  even  if  we  don't 
keep  it  later.  The  visit  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  France 
has  taken  place.  In  connection  therewith  peace  ne- 
gotiations are  on  foot.  Every  imaginable  sign  points 
to  our  wanting  to  give  in  to  England. 

This  morning  Prince  Henry  came  to  see  me.  He 
believed  that  he  was  going  to  be  consulted  on  highly 
important  questions,  and  yet  nothing  serious  was 
mentioned.  .  .  .  Politicians  had  approached  him, 
he  was  the  man  to  enlighten  the  Kaiser,  if  things  went 
on  like  this  there  would  be  a  kind  of  revolution  after 
the  war,  and  so  on.  .  .  .  They  had  also  approached 
the  Kaiser.  I  advised  Prince  Henry  not  to  take  the 
initiative;  he  wouldn't  be  listened  to.  A  group  of 
independent  men  and  the  princes  together  could  do 
it.  A  single  individual  couldn't  and  would  make  noth- 
ing of  it.  Prince  Henry  related  that  there  was  talk  of 
approaching  Hindenburg  with  the  idea  of  his  taking 
over  the  whole  show,  but  Hindenburg  can't  offer  him- 
self.  ...     So  everything  remains  as  it  was. 

A  walk  this  afternoon  with  Bachmann,  warm, 
spring-like  weather;  in  Charleville  at  any  rate  the  first 
real  spring  day. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  303 

Charleville, 

March  gth. 

Uhlesfeld's  view  that  if  possible  we  should  let  the 
others  attack  here  in  the  west  is  shared  by  me;  hence 
we  must  reserve  what  power  of  attack  we  have  left, 
for  the  time  being,  for  the  east  and  southwest.  Natu- 
rally I  am  unable  to  survey  the  situation  thoroughly, 
but  from  all  accounts  there  seems  no  doubt  that  the 
danger  there  is  greatest.  Great  resolution  is  necessary, 
but  in  this  war  that  has  nearly  always  failed  us  at 
the  critical  moment.  The  generalship  of  Frederick 
William  IV  is  repeating  itself. 

Here  people  are  astonished  that  King  Constantine 
has  had  the  courage  to  combat  Venizelos's  desire  to 
take  part  in  the  war.  The  Dardanelles  fiasco  has 
caused  great  excitement  among  the  whole  clique  there, 
but  has  in  no  wise  decided  anything  for  us.  The 
extraordinary  thing  about  it  is  that  if  Constantinople 
had  fallen  into  Russian  hands,  the  Balkan  States  would 
have  settled  down  comfortably  among  the  nettles.  The 
one  disquieting  fact  about  the  Turkish  situation  is  the 
dearth  of  munitions.  We  thought  a  little  while  ago 
that  Roumania  was  going  to  give  in  and  let  our  mu- 
nition trains  through.  But  yesterday  she  again  be- 
came suddenly  restive.  Owing  to  this,  gold  from  both 
sides  flows  into  the  hands  of  the  sharks.  The  monstrous 
confidence  in  victory  which  the  English  are  trumpet- 
ing through  the  universe,  and  which  our  hydra-headed 
ones  are  doing  too,  on  their  side,  is  bringing  the  neutral 
world  round  to  a  belief  in  England. 


304  MYMEMOIRS 

I  told  you  about  the  Munchner  Zeitung  and  the  ar- 
ticle on  Belgium,  and  the  necessity  of  the  Imperial 
Government  giving  some  outline  of  their  intentions 
of  what  they  were  going  to  do  with  it.  Now  the 
paper  has  been  confiscated,  at  the  instigation  of  Beth- 
mann.  I  alluded  to  this  article  in  conversation  to-day 
with  a  Bavarian  military  authority,  on  his  way  to  the 
front  (he  is  the  second  I've  met).  He  had  already 
read  it,  and  entirely  agreed  with  it.  This  Munich 
newspaper  is  quite  an  insignificant  publication,  but  the 
article  was  excellent  and  written  by  an  expert.  It  had 
the  ring  of  being  inspired  by  someone  in  Bavaria,  of 
course.  There  exists  there  a  strong  opposition  to  the 
Chancellor's  views.  The  latter  is  afraid  that  a  new 
modern  "  Burgundy  "  may  arise  there.  There  may  be 
some  truth  in  what  the  King  of  Bavaria  said  to  me 
at  Coblenz :  "  and  if  Prussia  won't  have  it,  we  will 
take  it."  Perhaps  it  was  only  a  jest,  but  a  jest  with 
an  undertone. 

Charleville, 

March  loth. 
The  temporary  slackening  of  the  submarine  cam- 
paign has  its  justification.  But  I  think  it's  gone  far 
enough.  A is  right:  in  present  methods  of  con- 
ducting and  declaring  war,  no  neutrals  could  be  sunk. 
That  was  why  I  was  in  favour  of  a  declaration  of  a 
blockade,  and  limitation  of  space  to  a  zone;  such  as 
from  Channel  to  Southampton  and  East  Coast.  Then 
the  neutrals  would  have  to  keep  away,  if  they  didn't 
want  to  be  fired  at.    For  the  present  limitation  of  the 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  305 

submarine  activity  the  decree  of  February  4th  in  this 
year  was  not  only  unnecessary,  but  extremely  mis- 
taken. We  were  able  to  proceed  without  any  decree, 
as  would  now  happen  if  the  neutrals  weren't  stirred 
up,  no  trumpets  blown,  and  our  base  of  operations 
gradually  increased  according  to  our  powers. 

Charleville, 

March  nth. 

That  Submarine  20  is  lost  you  will  have  heard  ere 
this.  We  are  feeling  very  sad  about  it.  The  submarine 
traps  which  the  English  are  setting  everywhere  are 
hazardous  and  the  whole  of  the  English  and  French 
torpedo  fleet  is  hunting  our  U-boats.  But  it  can't 
be  helped,  we  must  go  through  with  it. 

You  will  have  heard  about  the  Budget  Commission. 
All  parties  pronounced  most  decidedly  in  favour  of 
the  annexation  of  Belgium.  So  far,  so  good;  but  as 
I  was  not  there,  every  imaginable  thing  was  fabricated 
about  me.  Jagow  is  said  to  have  completely  held  his 
peace.  I  have  just  received  your  letter  of  the  loth. 
How  much  I  should  like  to  come  to  Berlin,  but  con- 
sidering my  strained  relations  with  the  Chancellor,  it 
is  better  that  I  should  stay  here.  Reproaches  against 
the  navy,  as  Erzberger  says  to  Capelle,  don't  occur, 
and  when  our  State  is  in  question  the  Chancellor  is 
here.     One  can  work  very  well  with  Bachmann. 

Charleville, 

March  12th. 
I  am  glad  that  Bachmann  is  altogether  on  my  side 
about  the  bad  disposition  of  our  ships,  and  does  all  he 


3o6  MY    MEMOIRS 

can  on  his  side  to  counteract  it.  If  our  fleet  came  into 
action  in  fairly  favourable  circumstances,  or  not  too 
unfavourable  ones,  this  faulty  disposition  would 
vanish  like  a  wraith.  Capelle  has  brought  away  no 
good  impression  to-day  from  the  Budget  Commission, 
either  with  what  concerns  the  navy  or  the  State.  Per- 
haps after  all,  then,  I  shall  have  to  come  to  Berlin. 
The  Foreign  Office  has  got  a  pat  on  the  back  on  ac- 
count of  the  American  Note. 

Everything  is  at  a  standstill  in  the  east,  and  here 
too.  We  are  not  doing  enough  for  us.  The  question 
of  the  Dardanelles  excites  the  Balkans.  It  is  a  dan- 
gerous situation ;  the  stepping  over  the  precipice  on  the 
part  of  one  little  State  can  affect  fatally  the  whole 
course  of  the  war.  Hindenburg  might  take  another 
hundred  thousand  Russian  prisoners,  but  it  wouldn't 
help  much.  The  sinking  of  a  few  English  ships  of 
the  line  would  have  a  greater  effect  on  the  neutral 
nations. 

Charleville, 

March  13th. 
In  spite  of  the  fine  weather,  our  mood  here  is  very 
slack.  In  east  and  west  all  is  quiet,  and  one  can 
hardly  tell  yet  whether  we  shall  make  any  further 
progress.  Gradually  the  blockade  of  Germany  must 
affect  the  whole  temper  of  the  nation,  and  one  can 
never  know  whether  a  section  of  the  proletariat  may 
not  break  out  like  a  carrion  vulture.  Nothing  more  is 
to  be  done  with  the  Austrians.     The  diplomatic  prep- 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  307 

arations  for  a  world-war  were  incredible.  A  great 
number  of  intelligence  departments  useless,  and  the 
same  to  be  said  of  many  embassies.  Never  before  the 
war  does  there  seem  to  have  been  any  consultations 
between  the  Government  and  the  military  officials. 
Blissful  confidence  in  England's  remaining  neutral  till 
the  last;  since  1909  no  increase  of  our  navy.  In  the 
Army  High  Command  no  comprehension  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  England  as  a  factor  in  war,  on  the  con- 
trary the  most  implicit  faith  in  the  old  victory  recipe 
of  the  dead  dough-makers.  In  conclusion  the  Hydra! 
When  one  reviews  all  this,  one  can  only  see  into  a 
dusky  future.  Of  course  it  is  even  a  worse  outlook 
in  France  and  Russia,  but  we  are  fighting  against  the 
whole  world,  inclusive  of  America.  The  grain  steamer 
for  Belgium  unloaded  a  cargo  of  arms  first  of  all  in 
England,  And  here  I  sit  and  can  do  nothing.  The 
disposition  of  our  fleet  was  entirely  wrong;  but  Miiller, 
the  Kaiser,  and  Pohl  adhere  to  it  absolutely,  and  will 
continue  to  do  so.  That  is  the  most  depressing  thing 
of  all.  Our  best  chance  certainly  has  been  missed; 
the  gigantic  increase  of  the  English  fleet  in  a  single 
year  makes  itself  acutely  apparent.  This  morning 
Miiller  was  here,  and  we  cultivated  peaceful  inter- 
course. Bachmann  is  in  Flanders  for  a  few  days.  This 
evening  we  had  with  us  Gravenitz  (a  Wurtemberg 
officer),  and  the  new  Bavarian  Militdtvollmdchtige. 
I  see  very  few  men  outside,  and  time  passes  rather 
monotonously  for  me.  As  a  matter  of  course  I  shall 
stick  out  for  Belgium,  but  to  talk  to  Bethmann  about 


3o8  MY    MEMOIRS 

it  is  absolutely  useless.  I  have  talked  to  him  neverthe- 
less for  an  hour  and  more.  Since  the  meeting  at  the 
Kaiser's  we  are  as  the  poles  asunder.  I  haven't  had  a 
single  conversation  with  him  that  has  led  to  anything. 
It  is  quite  hopeless,  only  the  will  of  the  people  can 
help.  For  me,  too,  the  time  is  not  yet  ripe  for  a  re- 
newed attack,  as  just  at  this  moment  war  conditions 
can't  be  reviewed.  Miiller  related  to-day  that  a  few 
days  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  Stumm,  head  of  the 
English  department  at  the  Foreign  Office,  still  per- 
sisted that  England  wouldn't  come  in.  It  was  all 
bluflF. 

Charleville, 

March  14th. 

General  von  Einem  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
French  in  open  battle  would  not  be  able  to  stand 
against  us.  But  now  we  no  longer  share  that  opinion, 
and  moreover  the  French  are  very  clever  in  making 
use  of  the  country.  Singularly  free  from  dogmatic 
tactics,  and  their  shooting  is  first-rate.  This  morning 
the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  here,  told  me  so.  His 
father  was  absent.  I  talked  to  him  more  frankly  this 
time.  He  was  graver  than  usual,  and  expressed  him- 
self strongly  about  the  whole  "  Hydra." 

The  Eitel  Friedrich  (cruiser)  has  done  well,  like 
all  our  ships  when  they  attack. 

Get  hold  of  the  letter,  if  you  can,  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  Cormorant.  A  real  romance,  but  the 
chase  of  Japanese,  English,  French,  and  Russian 
squadrons  was  naturally  a  bit  too  much.    The  Dutch 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  309 

refused  him  everything  out  of  fear.  The  Americans 
didn't  even  give  him  coal,  but  supplied  our  enemies' 
milliards  with  arms  and  ammunition. 

Charleville, 

March  15th. 
I  shall  not  require  a  whole  sheet  for  this,  for  I 
have  really  nothing  to  report,  and  scarcely  anything 
to  do.  As  things  now  are  I  would  gladly  have  stayed 
longer  in  Berlin.  It  is  very  quiet  here;  I  see  and 
speak  with  hardly  anybody,  and  don't  know  how  to 
occupy  myself  in  these  sad  times.  That  is  what  espe- 
cially depresses  me.  A  little  pleasure  was  given  us 
by  the  success  of  our  submarine.  The  commander  of 
U29  (formerly  of  U9)  dispatched  five  ships.  Other 
submarines  two  or  three.  London  is  said  to  be  quite 
excited  over  it.  I  hear  their  new  temporarily  built 
submarines  are  very  well  constructed  so  that  they  can 
be  turned  to  good  account.  I  should  have  liked  so 
much  to  have  stayed  in  Berlin  for  the  meeting  of 
the  Reichstag,  but  without  the  war  minister  it  didn't 
do  much,  and  now  it's  too  late. 

Charleville, 

March  i6th. 
I  have  no  good  news  to  report  from  the  east.  The 
Austrians  are  again  totally  disheartened.  It  seems 
almost  as  if  they  didn't  want  to  go  on.  The  State 
and  the  army  are  both  obviously  rotten  to  the  core, 
and  in  their  interests  we  have  unsheathed  "  the  shining 
sword." 


3IO  MY    MEMOIRS 

I  am  quite  out  of  it  with  regard  to  plans,  and 
owing  to  the  general  situation  can't  use  those  I  have 
left  to  end  it,  though  the  whole  apparatus  is  there 
ready.  Bethmann  must  be  spared,  was  Miiller's  ad- 
vice to  me  lately.  "  Let  him  go  ...  he  has  no  luck," 
Fredericus  Rex  would  have  said.  If  only  he  with  his 
walking-stick  would  come  down  from  heaven! 

Charleville, 

March  17th. 
Nothing  new  from  Paris.  Miiller  was  at  Bach- 
mann's  to-day,  and  for  a  change  was  in  a  somewhat 
depressed  mood,  such  as  prevails  round  the  Kaiser 
at  present.  This  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  everywhere 
things  have  come  to  a  standstill,  and  in  consequence 
the  negotiations  with  Italy  appear  to  be  at  a  deadlock. 
At  any  rate  nothing  has  succeeded  there  so  far,  as 
she  goes  on  winding  up  her  demands  to  an  ever  higher 
pitch.  Get  the  war  log  of  the  Ayesch-a.  It  is  full 
of  interesting  seafaring  things  for  you  of  a  real  ro- 
mantic nature.  The  Dutch  haven't  behaved  nicely 
about  it,  and  in  every  publication  brought  out  during 
the  war  one  is  struck  by  passages  to  this  effect,  which 
certainly  is  to  be  regretted.  In  September  no  one 
dreamed  any  longer  of  a  short  war.  Neither  did  I 
in  July  and  August.  The  Foreign  Office  would  go 
on  believing  that  it  had  England  in  the  palm  of  its 
hand,  and  could  crow  over  her.  It  still  thinks  so. 
We  ought  to,  and  could,  have  avoided  war  with  Rus- 
sia.    In  former  years  we  could  have  gone  to  Turkey 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  311 

on  our  own  account,  and  then  we  should  have  had 
the  Russians  off  our  hands.  Instead  of  that,  we 
threw  in  our  lot  with  Austria,  and  have  reaped  our 
reward.  Bethmann  and  his  set  hatched  an  oriental 
policy  while  our  economic  enterprise,  whether  we 
like  it  or  not,  spread  over  the  world  necessarily  to 
bring  us  into  competition  with  England,  but  not  into 
war,  if  Russia  had  not  been  among  our  opponents. 
We  must  pick  up  these  threads  again.  But  for  great 
resolves  we  don't  pull  ourselves  together,  and  we  just 
drift  on.  (N.B. — Drift  is  a  good  old  German  expres- 
sion that  also  occurs  in  "  drifting  away.") 

Charleville, 

March  i8th. 

The  position  is  pronounced  to  be  unfavourable,  by 
Bethmann  and  the  Hydra  generally.  The  great  hope 
now  is  a  collapse  on  France's  part.  My  view  is  that 
we  must  just  set  our  teeth  .  .  .  that  is  the  only  way. 
Think  of  Fredericus  Rex  after  Kiinersdorf,  and  we 
haven't  as  yet  experienced  anything  quite  so  bad  as 
that!  Bethmann  and  Jagow  and  their  followers  are 
acting  feebly  in  all  directions  for  internal  political 
reasons,  internal  reasons  that  are  known  everywhere 
externally  and  operate  dangerously. 

Thank  you  for  "  Stein."  The  memory  of  these 
men  seems  to  have  died  out,  but  what  a  powerful 
group  he  had  round  him,  Bliicher,  Scharnhorst,  Boyen, 
Gneisenau,  "  a  band  of  brothers,"  as  Nelson  said. 
But  how  about  1914-15?    Even  the  worthy  Bachmann 


312  MY    MEMOIRS 

is  horrified  at  the  Hydra;  he  found  the  whole  com- 
pany to-day  busy  gardening,  but  with  hang-dog  heads. 
Recently  there  was  discovered  in  a  manure  heap,  in 
the  same  garden,  a  case  of  156  bottles  of  the  best  wine. 

U underestimates    the    actual    power    of    the 

Hydra.  According  to  the  traditions  I  have  grown 
up  with,  I  can't  possibly  stand  in  open  opposition  to 
it,  though  therein,  properly  speaking,  lay  my  chief 
means.  For  the  rest,  I  am  not  allowed  to  further 
my  principle  of  action.  If  I  could  only  turn  out  sub- 
marines more  speedily  .  .  .  but  it  is  to  be  hoped 
that  in  two  or  three  weeks  our  relays  will  be  in 
operation.  The  commanders  of  our  submarines  are 
doing  their  part  magnificently  .  .  .  their  logs  are 
as  exciting  as  novels. 

Charleville, 

March  19th. 

Herr  von  Mutuns  came  with  the  Foreign  Office's 
congratulations.  Earlier  the  Kaiser  rang  me  up  and 
congratulated  me.  A  further  birthday  treat  was  the 
news  that  two  English  ships  of  the  line  had  been 
sunk  in  the  Dardanelles,  and  a  French  liner,  the 
Bouvet.  We  had  already  had  a  telegram  from  Usedom 
with  news  of  the  sinking  of  the  Bouvet.  The  Kaiserin 
sent  me  a  gracious  telegram  which  greatly  pleased 
me.  If  good  wishes  can  be  of  any  help,  I  am  indeed 
well  supplied. 

In  the  east  the  Russians  are  once  more  bringing 
huge  masses  into  the  battle,  and  they  fight  with  great 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  313 

bravery  and  dash.  Eichhorn  would  be  in  a  bad  way 
if  the  Russians  had  more  guns.  The  Austrians  haven't 
advanced  an  inch.  It  seems  that,  without  doubt,  the 
Russians  were  going  to  strike  a  powerful  blow,  but 
their  massed  troops  came  too  late. 

Charleville, 

March  20th. 
Yesterday  evening  it  was  again  very  flat.  Conver- 
sation dragged.  The  Kaiser  saw  big  victories  every- 
where, or  pretended  to  see  them  in  order  to  allay 
his  own  anxiety.  The  one  bright  spot  was  the  con- 
firmation of  the  English  losses  in  the  Dardanelles. 
The  Turks'  or,  more  strictly  speaking,  our  casualties 
were  slight,  but  the  want  of  munitions  was  felt. 
Bachmann  is  also  horrified  at  the  administration  of 
the  Cabinet;  socially  as  well  as  officially. 

Charleville, 

March  21st. 

Your  letter  of  yesterday  just  received.  Yes,  I 
should  have  done  more,  if  I  had  been  allowed  a  freer 
hand.  Miiller  has  received  urgent  petitions  from 
various  people,  Bachmann,  Dick,  etc.,  suggesting  that 
I  shall  be  appointed  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  for 
the  duration  of  the  war,  and  that  I  shall  be  left  to 
my  own  devices  as  to  where  and  when  I  go  on  board. 
Answer  was  invariably  "...  Out  of  the  question — 
the  Kaiser  would  never  consent."  The  latter  wants 
to  conduct  the  naval  war  himself,  and  naturally  he 
couldn't  do  that  with  me  at  his  side.     I  meditate  and 


314  MY    MEMOIRS 

meditate  on  how  I  am  to  escape  from  the  position 
in  which  I  find  myself.  Formally  speaking,  Pohl 
has  the  free  hand,  so  how  can  I  interfere  when  he 
does  nothing,  and  says  that  he  has  no  opportunity? 

The  command  that  battle  is  to  be  sought  a  tout  prix 
can't  be  issued,  but  must  be  locked  in  the  breast  of 
the  person  concerned.  Circumstances  are  different  in 
the  sea-struggle  from  what  they  are  in  the  war  on 
land.  To-day  an  announcement  comes  from  Berlin 
that  9  milliards  have  been  subscribed.  That  is  strik- 
ing evidence  of  a  unanimous  purpose. 

We  hear  from  Pohl  that  the  English,  the  day  after 
the  sinking  of  their  ships,  renewed  their  attack  on 
the  Dardanelles,  which  shows  the  right  spirit.  In  a 
like  fashion  we  should  have  attacked  again  at  once, 
on  January  25th,  even  if  it  had  been  simply  a  case 
of  per  far  contra.  But  the  Cabinet  has  lowered  the 
spirit  of  the  fleet;  the  bacillus  by  this  time  has  pene- 
trated pretty  deeply,  and  without  drastic  changes  in 
the  personnel  there  is  not  much  prospect  of  improve- 
ment. 

We  have  no  fresh  news  from  Constantinople.  Our 
casualties  are  small,  the  forts  little  damaged.  Only 
the  lack  of  munitions  is  grievous.  As  things  are  now, 
the  forcing  of  the  Dardanelles  would  be  a  severe  blow 
for  us.  Yesterday's  last  attempt  on  Przemysl  has 
failed,  the  activity  of  the  Russians  is  great  on  the 
Memel  as  well. 

We  have  no  trumps  left.  Let  us  hope  that  in  April 
the  submarine  war  will  make  further  strides. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  315 

Charleville, 
March  22nd. 

To-day,  dinner  at  His  Majesty's  in  honour  of  the 
birthday  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm  the  First.  Bachmann 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  great  part  of  the 
English  fleet  was  now  in  the  Dardanelles,  and  that 
the  submarine  war  absorbed  no  end  of  light  fighting 
forces.  If  anything  was  to  be  done,  this  was  a  good 
time  to  do  it.  Pohl  resented  any  such  suggestion. 
He  was  not  contemplating  doing  anything,  on  the 
contrary  he  wanted  to  enclose  himself  still  more  inside 
a  radius  of  mines.  Really  it  is  hopeless.  There's  a 
fleet  of  forty  armoured  ships,  half  of  which  are  super- 
dreadnoughts,  and  over  100  torpedo  boats  lying  rust- 
ing in  port,  while  Germany  is  engaged  in  a  struggle 
for  her  very  existence,  and  I  have  to  sit  here,  power- 
less. 

Would  that  this  was  the  only  fault  of  the  Cabinet 
system.  But  for  the  last  two  or  three  decades  I  have 
lived  through  this  objectless  paltering  and  parade  of 
red-tapeism.  I  have  seen  how  each  official  head  of 
the  department  "  works  for  himself  alone  and  thinks 
'  himself '  the  pivot  on  which  everything  turns,  and 
that  it  is  to  the  interest  of  everybody  to  appeal  to  him. 
..."  And  now  we  are  in  the  midst  of  this  awful 
war,  and  the  same  confusion  exists,  the  same  object- 
lessness,  from  the  point  of  view  of  unity.  In  Con- 
stantinople, in  the  navy,  in  the  army,  in  politics,  no 
co-operation,  nearly  everyone  still  squinting  towards 
the   Kaiser,  who  is  surrounded  with  weak  people. 


3i6  MY    MEMOIRS 

There  is  only  one  remedy.  That  is  to  make  Hinden- 
burg  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  and  Chief  of  the  Admiral's  Staff  all  in  one. 
Only  look  at  the  ovations  in  the  Reichstag,  they  evince 
a  complete  oblivion  of  the  real  evil. 

Fortunately  the  fall  of  Przemsyl  comes  almost  at 
the  same  moment  as  the  defeat  of  the  English  in  the 
Dardanelles.  The  one  will  lessen  the  effect  of  the 
other.  But  everywhere  the  Russians  are  attacking 
ruthlessly  and  the  Austrians  are  being  beaten,  and 
we  too  are  getting  nervous.  Hindenburg  is  coming 
to  the  end  of  his  forces.  I  have  been  told  that  Beth- 
mann's  impression  was  that  the  latter  should  be  re- 
called from  Poland. 

Charleville, 

March  23rd. 
His  Majesty  honoured  the  new  knights  pour  le 
merite  with  a  speech  in  which  he  compared  them  to 
a  certain  extent  with  the  Palidones  who  not  far  from 
here,  at  Sedan,  helped  Kaiser  Wilhelm  the  Great  to 
create  the  German  Empire.  I  sat  between  Solnis  and 
Lyncker.  The  latter  deplored  the  utterance  of  Moltke 
in  the  Star  Saal  on  the  receipt  of  the  news  that  Eng- 
land was  coming  into  the  war.  "  The  more  English- 
men, the  better."  He  said  something  the  same  to  me 
when  we  travelled  together  to  Coblenz,  and  I  pointed 
out  to  him  that  he  shouldn't  underrate  the  direct  par- 
ticipation of  the  English  army.  Not  only  politically, 
but  from  a  military  point  of  view,  we  have  floundered 
into  this  war.     No   reflection  on  how  a  world-war 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  317 

should  be  conducted,  no  joint  leadership — in  short, 
just  as  it  is  now  in  the  war  itself.  I  remember  that 
I  wanted  to  confer  with  Moltke  before  his  departure 
from  Berlin  to  Constantinople  and  Turkey;  he  de- 
clined curtly  because  it  would  not  have  interested 
him.  On  the  whole  the  tone  was  very  lacking  in 
enthusiasm.  The  fall  of  Przemysl  weighed  heavily 
on  everybody.  As  I  hear,  there  are  traces  of  the 
same   feeling  at  the   front.     I  next  conversed  with 

General  von  X ,  and  tried  to  indicate  that  greater 

unity  in  the  whole  command  must  come.  The  Kaiser 
ought  to  defer  his  power,  at  least  for  the  time  being, 
to  someone  else,  Hindenburg  for  instance.  I  soon 
saw,  however,  that  such  an  idea  didn't  at  all  meet 

the  views  of  General  von  X ,  the  Kaiser's  favour 

is  sufficient  for  him.  Yesterday  Bethmann  very  feebly 
tried  to  argue  that  we  were  only  fighting  about  Bel- 
gium, otherwise  we  might  have  peace.  Abroad,  they 
will  of  course  get  wind  of  this,  and  Belgium  will  he 
estimated  as  a  kind  of  "  pound  of  iiesh "  mortgage, 
even  if  we  wanted  to  give  it  up  afterwards. 

Prince  Adalbert  is  here,  and  is  trying  to  get  out 
of  his  father  an  order  for  Pohl  to  do  nothing.  Prince 
Adalbert  appears  to  be  acting  under  Pohl's  instruc- 
tions. The  latter  has  now  a  free  hand  to  act  accord- 
ing to  his  own  judgment.  So  that  the  motive  of  this 
proceeding  lies  in  Pohl's  wish  to  be  excused,  by  a 
command,  for  impassivity  and  doing  nothing.  This 
seemed  to  me  preposterous.  Prince  Adalbert  came 
to-day  to  Bachmann  with  the  message  that  the  Kaiser 


3i8  MY   MEMOIRS 

acquiesced,  and  that  he  was  deputed  to  tell  me,  and 
him — ^Admiral  Bachmann — of  his  pleasure.  Bach- 
mann  declined  at  once;  he  would,  in  such  a  fashion, 
accept  no  "  pleasure  "  of  His  Majesty.  Prince  Adal- 
bert has  not  yet  come  to  me,  I  will  send  him  about 
his  business  if  he  does.  Isn't  it  enough  to  make  one's 
hair  stand  on  end.  Pohl  plays  second  fiddle  to  the 
Kaiser.  Indeed,  my  fears  wth  regard  to  Pohl  are 
more  than  justified. 

Charlevtlle, 

March  24th. 

This  morning  Prince  Adalbert  called  on  me  and 
Bachmann  was  present.  Our  conversation  was  only 
general.  Afterwards  I  learned  from  Bachmann  that 
Prince  Adalbert  had  not  dared  to  risk  communicating 
to  me  that  the  fleet  was  to  stand  still  by  word  of 
command.  All  the  same  he  had  telegraphed  it  to 
Pohl  as  the  Kaiser's  command.  A  quite  unheard-of 
proceeding,  which  cannot  be  tolerated. 

Charleville, 

March  25th. 
The  amiable,  always  accommodating  Bachmann  has 
had  a  tiff  with  the  Chancellor,  who  wrote  him  a  posi- 
tively incredible  letter.  The  subject  in  dispute  was 
a  paltry  lapsus  Ungues  that  was  let  slip  by  a  Reserve 
officer  of  the  Berlin  Admiral's  Staff,  at  a  private 
function.  He  merely  remarked  something  to  the  effect 
that  the  Foreign  Office  appeared  to  have  been  slack 
in  the  U-boat  affair  (in  February).    Great  excitement 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  319 

thereat  on  the  part  of  the  Chancellor.  The  "man 
who  talked  of  an  illusion  as  an  achievement"  rubbed 
in  twice  by  word  of  mouth  at  Bachmann's  and  then 
three  epistles!  This  sort  of  touchiness  is  characteristic 
of  the  people  who  guide  our  destiny  in  these  serious 
times. 

Charleville, 

March  26th. 

The  Turk,  Colonel  von  Franckenberg  came,  and 
told  us  about  the  ructions  between  Enver,  Leman,  and 
the  Ambassador.  The  colonel  had  been  through  the 
Suez  campaign.  They  were  mostly  Arab  troops,  who 
were  always  routed  by  gunjfire;  they,  the  Turks  them- 
selves, could  do  little  against  the  firing  of  the  ships. 
There  were  dug-outs  on  the  whole  Egyptian  side,  with 
sand-bags  and  so  on.  During  the  summer  only  easy 
operations  were  possible,  in  the  autumn  they  would 
attack  again.  But,  as  I  said,  that  would  be  too  late. 
On  the  whole  the  Turkish  kingdom  doesn't  seem  to 
be  doing  much.  We  have  selected  curious  allies.  If 
we  only  had  not  sent  on  its  behalf  a  military  mission, 
and  had  adopted  no  anti-Russian  policy  with  England 
in  the  Balkans!  If  instead  of  that  we  had  told  the 
Russians  that  for  all  we  cared  they  might  go  to 
Constantinople,  then  the  Bear  would  be  now  sitting 
opposite  the  Whale,  and  the  whole  herd  of  goats  from 
the  Balkans  would  be  taking  refuge  in  our  arms! 

General  S complained  again  about  the  dearth 

of  munitions,  especially  the  lack  of  powder. 

This  question  of  powder  will  perhaps  decide  the 


320  MY    MEMOIRS 

war.  The  continuous  lack  of  it  with  us  costs  us  every 
day  several  hundred  men,  sometimes  more.  The  di- 
vision of  authority  between  the  war  ministers  and 
General  Staff  in  time  of  peace  weakens  the  joint  out- 
look for  what  is  essential. 

Charleville, 

March  26th. 

Herr  von  N is  perfectly  right.  It  is  an  un- 
heard-of failure  in  our  supreme  command  in  which 
the  head  is  implicated.  I  have  seen  it  coming  for 
a  decade.  How  often  have  I  said  to  you  that  I  didn't 
know  how  the  catastrophe  would  come,  but  that  it 
was  bound  to  come  some  day !  That  is  why  it  is  so 
dreadful  to  be  by  and  witness  it,  and  to  be  part  of  it. 

I  am  going  to  see  X to-day,  but  with  no  inten- 
tion of  talking  matters  over  with  him.     That  would 

do  no  good.    General  von  H is  also  useless  to  me. 

He  is  essentially  a  soldier,  and  wants  to  be  nothing 
else.  Hindenburg  might  be  our  salvation.  I  know 
him  personally,  but  only  slightly,  and  have  no  power 
of  judging  whether  he  possesses  political  vision.  He 
is  said  to  be  a  shrewd  and  thoughtful  man.  The  proper 
stimulus  for  the  bold  and  daring  enterprises  in  the 
east  is  said  to  be  Ludendorff.  If  I  knew  Hindenburg 
better,  and  had  some  pretext,  I  would  go  and  see  him. 
But  I  have  been  told  that  the  Crown  Prince  is  working 
in  this  direction.  He  will  meet  with  no  success,  how- 
ever, or  only  too  late.  Bethmann  and  his  clique, 
Ballin,  and  even  now  Reichstag  circles  are  muddling 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  321 

everything  feebly.  Peace  for  us,  minus  a  great  deal, 
yet  peace.  If  one  really  was  in  earnest  about  wanting 
it,  nothing  could  be  worse  for  the  conclusion  of  peace 
than  this  weak  incompetence. 

I  hear  that  things  in  France  are  looking  very  black ; 
and  I  believe  hopes  are  being  built  on  Caillaux  per- 
sonally. I  don't  think  this  is  true.  The  temporary 
military  dictatorship  of  Jofifre  and  Poincare  still  rules, 
and  will  be  kept  on  the  leash  by  the  English.  Last 
night  the  English  Admiralty  announced  that  it  had 
grounds  for  believing  Submarine  29  (Widdigen)  had 
been  sunk  in  the  Irish  Sea  with  the  whole  crew.  It 
wouldn't  make  this  public  without  good  reason,  and 
U29  was  surprisable.  A  most  lamentable  incident. 
Widdigen  perhaps  was  too  confident,  and  then  there's 
that  perilous  cautiousness  towards  neutrals ! 

Charleville, 

March  27th. 
This  morning  early  Miiller  was  here  and  imparted 
to  Bachmann  that  he  had  accomplished  nothing  with 
the  Kaiser.  He  had  expressed  a  wish  to  be  spared 
memorandums,  and  said  that  he  didn't  wish  to  be 
troubled  with  the  fleet,  hence  the  order.  With  infinite 
difficulty  Miiller  had  elicited  that  at  least  Bachmann 
was  to  have  an  audience  previously;  this  will  take 
place  on  Monday.  If  things  go  on  like  this  I  foresee 
a  gloomy  ending.  Everything  is  on  the  verge  of  bank- 
ruptcy in  Turkey,  and  then  the  Balkan  flood  and  the 
carrion  vulture  will  be  let  loose  on  Austria.     I  see 


322  MY    MEMOIRS 

only  one  way  out:  the  Kaiser  must  say  that  he  is  on 
the  sick  list  for  eight  weeks  or  more,  Hindenburg  must 
come  and  take  Bethmann's  place,  and  both  the  army 
and  the  Admiralty  shall  be  directed  by  him  and  the 
Emperor.  The  Kaiser  must  next  go  to  Berlin.  Kessel 
looked  me  up,  and  he  expressed  himself  as  horrified 
at  the  condition  of  the  Kaiser's  health.  "  He  had  no 
voice  in  anything,  he  had  as  a  matter  of  fact  done 
nothing,  and  was  already  beginning  to  see  that  in  the 
end  he'd  have  to  pay  the  piper,"  so  said  the  Kaiser. 
Kessel  thought  that  the  King  of  Bavaria  must  be  pre- 
vailed upon  to  talk  him  over  into  declaring  himself 
on  the  sick  list.  I  advised  against  it;  any  such  pro- 
ceeding should  come  from  his  side,  and  the  Kaiserin's 
influence  with  him  should  be  used.  The  Staff  Physi- 
cian Z and  his  own  medical  adviser  would  have 

to  demand  it  urgently  from  a  medical  point  of  view, 
for  he  would  never  go  on  sick  leave  without. 

Apparently  Hindenburg  has  great  difficulties  in 
front  of  him,  and  he  (Kessel)  cannot  bear  Ludendorff. 
It  seems  that  only  with  the  help  of  a  great  collapse 
can  a  change  come,  and  then  it  will  be  too  late.  The 
assumption  that  in  the  southeast  lies  the  key  to  the 
final  issue  of  the  war  appears  to  be  gaining  ground 
with  many. 

Charleville, 

March  28th. 

To-day,  early  in  the  morning,  I  had  to  pay  Prince 
Leopold  of  Bavaria  a  visit.     He  had  little  informa- 


MY    WAR. LETTERS  323 

tion  to  impart,  only  was  sure  that  we  must  in  all 
circumstances  hold  out.  Now  I  am  expecting  the 
stafif  doctor,  with  whom  I  went  to  discuss  the  sick- 
leave  matter.  No  news,  alas!  of  Submarine  29,  so 
one  must  give  it  up  as  lost.  What  you  write  on  the 
subject  of  the  Foreign  Office  is  very  interesting.  But 
the  situation  there  is  really  so;  the  former  ambassa- 
dor's work,  now  under  Zimmermann,  doesn't  suit 
either  of  them.  For  the  rest  I  am  not  in  any  doubt 
about  the  present  position  there,  and  I  can't  rate 
Zimmermann  so  high;  whether  he  has  really  "  vision  " 
and  can  seize  a  point  on  the  rebound,  is  dubious 
to  me.  I  wasn't  able  to  discover  it  in  the  Budget 
Commission.  He  took  a  strong  part  in  the  drifting 
into  war  in  July.  He  was  also  responsible  in  giving 
Austria  a  free  hand  against  Serbia.  He  regarded 
the  whole  affair  as  a  diplomatic  war  and  wished  to 
score  a  personal  success.  Then  in  the  U-boat  debate 
he  rode  the  high  horse.  In  two  days  he  totally  turned 
round.  As  a  matter  of  fact  I  am  cold-shouldered 
by  the  whole  lot  of  them,  so  that  I  can't  work 
with  either  the  Chancellor  or  the  Secretary  of 
State. 


Charleville, 

March  29th. 

The  atmosphere  here  is  extremely  depressed.  Fal- 
kenhayn  says  he  can  do  no  more.  One  hasn't  any 
longer  the  least  confidence  in  the  Austrians.  Bethmann 
and  his  supporters  are  seriously  thinking  of  grovelling 


324  MY    MEMOIRS 

to  England.  That  in  my  opinion  would  be  the  worst 
possible  thing  to  do.  To  my  mind  there  is  only  one 
way  out,  and  that  is  to  treat  with  Russia.  Hindenburg 
could  only  be  of  service  if  he  conquered  everything, 
and  that  the  Kaiser  and  the  whole  Hydra  would  never 
permit.  But  it  is  on  this  one  man  that  our  actual 
power  exists.  I  shall  try  before  very  long  to  come 
to  Berlin,  but  first  I  should  like  to  have  another  con- 
versation with  the  Crown  Prince.    The  idea  of  K 's 

to  make  a  strategical  curve  in  the  east  is  quite  good. 
It  would,  I  think,  however,  only  come  to  the  fore 
if  the  Russian  army  were  smashed,  and  at  present 
there  is  no  sign  of  that  happening.  The  fellows  go 
on  attacking  vigorously,  even  with  the  Landsturm, 
as  they  did  on  the  Memel.  And,  moreover,  by  that 
method  we  should  never  be  rid  of  the  Russian  danger 
in  the  future.  The  fellows  ought  to  have  been  diverted 
towards  the  warm  water,  instead  of  which  we  in  con- 
junction with  England  have  hindered  it,  and  now  have 
our  reward.  And  you  may  be  sure  that  after  the 
war  Bethmann  and  his  set  will  do  their  utmost  to 
represent  me  as  its  evil  genius.  I  scarcely  know  a 
single  person  who  has  been  well  disposed  towards 
me,  who  hasn't  after  a  conversation  with  Zimmermann 
had  all  his  good  impression  of  me  wiped  out.  I  know 
that  it  amounted  to  quite  a  system  when  I  was  in 
Berlin.  I  don't  expect  anything  to  come  of  an  ex- 
planation with  Bethmann.  Never  yet  has  it  done  any 
good  in  my  case,  or  in  that  of  others.  He  is  the 
unluckiest  choice  for  his  post  that  could  have  been 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  325 

made.  Nevertheless,  I'll  try  when  I  get  the  oppor- 
tunity. The  whole  constitution  that  his  post  repre- 
sents is  only  suited  to  exceptional  giants.  In  the  ordi- 
nary way  it  is  dangerous,  as  has  now  been  proved  and 
as  we  saw  years  ago.  Bachmann  goes  to  the  Kaiser 
to-day  in  order  to  decide  about  the  order  to  Pohl. 
The  Crown  Prince  has  written  his  father  a  letter 
the  postscript  of  which  has  come  to  our  knowledge. 
In  it  he  begs  of  his  father  to  rescind  the  limita- 
tions imposed  now  on  the  submarine  warfare  which 
have  caused  us  to  lose  too  much.  The  Crown  Prince 
sees  the  matter  quite  clearly,  but  it  is  a  pity  he  never 
learnt  to  work.  The  letter  is  said  to  contain  other 
things.  I  have  heard  that  the  Crown  Prince  is  also 
set  on  Hindenburg.  My  staff  doctor  says  that  the 
Kaiser  prays  formally  for  a  release  through  the  shunt- 
ing of  his  responsibility  on  to  others,  but  then  he 
comes  up  against  the  wall  with  which  he  has  sur- 
rounded himself,  and  against  his  self-conceit.  Old 
Januschauer  writes  to  me  that  the  Kaiser  will  be 
wondering  how  much  of  his  kingdom  of  Prussia  will 
be  left  after  the  war. 

Charleville, 

March  30th. 
Bachmann  returned  from  his  audience  to-day  quite 
sorrowful.  The  Kaiser  listened  to  him,  then  he  held 
a  half-hour's  counter-audience,  and  said  "No.  The 
fleet  should  only  go  out  if  it  didn't  strike.  If  the  last 
was  not  approved  of,  then  the  fleet  should  stay  in." 


326  MY    MEMOIRS 

Charleville, 

March  31st. 

Goltz-Pasha  is  here.  But  up  till  now  I  haven't 
seen  him.  He  has  come  to  sue  for  the  capture  of  the 
Serbian  rag-tag  and  bob-tail.  I  conversed  the  other 
day  with  a  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Jagers,  who  on 
March  19th  left  Constantinople,  and  set  forth  vividly 
how  the  issue  of  the  war  now  depended  on  the  Dar- 
danelles and  Serbia.  Both  Bachmann  and  I  share  this 
view.  It  is  merely  a  question  of  whether  one  can  spare 
troops  from  here  while  enemy  troops  are  massing  as 
they  now  are  on  the  western  front.  That  could  be 
best  decided  by  someone  who  was  not  locally  inter- 
ested here.  Geographically  expressed,  the  decision 
must  really  take  place  in  Berlin.  Meanwhile  very  dis- 
quieting news  has  come  from  the  Carpathians.  The 
A'ustrians   are  yielding.      The   Jager   lieutenant  von 

R recounted  how  massive  officers  sat  on  the  back 

of  the  Austrian  provision  wagons,  but  never  in  the 
front.  Frequently  he  heard  surprise  expressed  that 
we  sent  so  many  sons  of  our  best  families  into  the 
firing  line,  and  now  the  ragged  nationalities  and  the 
ignorant  General  Staff  have  only  just  discovered  these 
things  for  themselves. 

The  Jager  officer  would  have  liked  an  audience  with 
His  Majesty,  but  Plessen  declined.  It  wouldn't  be 
pleasant  for  His  Majesty  just  now  to  hear  more  about 
Turkey.  I  take  a  very  serious  view  of  our  future. 
The  Russian  army  is  fighting  very  well  and  is  better 
led  than  was  ever  anticipated.     They  recover  from 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  327 

their  defeats  with  amazing  rapidity.  The  French,  on 
the  defensive,  fight  splendidly.  The  English  have  been 
under-rated.  The  superiority  of  forces  against  us  is 
powerful  and  our  commanders  have  not,  sad  to  say, 
risen  to  the  occasion.  In  spite  of  this,  in  my  opinion 
we  must  continue  to  hold  on,  so  long  as  Austria  doesn't 
entirely  collapse.  The  Entente  powers,  however,  are 
not  out  for  the  defeat  of  Austria,  but  for  the  crushing 
of  Germany  alone.  With  regard  to  U.'s  letter,  I  can 
only  express  the  wish  that  he  may  be  right  in  his 
conclusion  that  the  middle-class  party  are  unanimous 
on  the  point  of  holding  out.  Erzberger  appears  to  be 
already  overthrown,  and  I've  had  a  letter  from  an  In- 
dependent Conservative  parliamentarian  that  smacks 
strongly  of  downfall.  .  .  .  Haug,  Banks,  Wilhelm- 
strasse,  and  all  their  branches;  and  in  the  army  itself 
there  are  no  outstanding  occurrences  of  an  encourag- 
ing nature  except  in  the  east.  The  Wilhelmstrasse, 
if  they  want  to  face  deficit,  should  shout  plus,  as 
England  has  done  in  such  a  grand  manner,  then  the 
deficit  would  at  least  be  smaller. 

Charleville, 

April  1st. 
If  the  work  of  my  life  is  wrecked,  I  believe  that 
I  shall  have  much  to  bear.  I  have  already  written 
to  you  on  the  result  of  Prince  Adalbert's  mission. 
The  order  for  Pohl  which  Bachmann  has  dispatched 
is  thoroughly  to  my  approval.  Pohl  in  accordance 
therewith  is  to  act  solely  on  his  own  authority,  but 


328  MY    MEMOIRS 

whether  he  has  the  impulse  to  act  is  another  question. 
But  I  must  admit  that  circumstances  for  him  have 
now  become  much  more  difficult.  The  submarines  go 
on  being  effective,  but  the  necessity  of  sparing  the 
neutrals  weakens  their  whole  operations  and  involves 
us  in  losses.  The  latest  is  that  grain  is  to  be  con- 
voyed to  England  by  Norwegian  ships  via  Norwegian 
ports.  Bachmann  to-day  was  summoned  to  a  con- 
clave with  Falkenhayn  on  the  subject  of  whether 
Austria  couldn't  do  something  at  sea.  Unluckily  we 
heard  yesterday  that  the  attempt  to  send  munitions 
to  Turkey,  by  the  Danube,  had  failed.  The  Danube 
steamer  concerned  in  this  attempt  was  fired  on  and 
destroyed  by  Austria.  B.  found  that  the  Army  High 
Command  was  somewhat  in  perplexity,  not  know- 
ing exactly  what  to  do  next.  When  one  studies 
Frederick  the  Great,  one  is  always  amazed  and 
delighted  at  how  in  the  most  difficult  situations  the 
new  idea  comes,  and  is  carried  out  like  a  lightning 
flash. 

I  don't  know  whether  U.  has  read  Homer  Lee;  he 
sets  forth  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  progress  of  the 
world  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  England  plus  Amer- 
ica, alone  should  rule  the  earth;  that  it  would  be  nec- 
essary with  this  object  to  keep  a  big  army  on  the 
German-Dutch  frontier,  and  in  Schleswig,  in  order  to 
combat  Germanism,  which  would  bar  the  progress 
of  civilization  if  it  were  not  suppressed.  From  his 
own  point  of  view,  the  man  is  right.  For  the  moment 
Falkenhayn  is  again  troubled  about  Italy.    The  nego- 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  329 

tiations  are  said  to  have  come  to  a  standstill  in  a  dan- 
gerous manner. 

Charleville, 

April  2nd. 

I  went  to  church  to-day  to  celebrate  Good  Friday. 
After  church  there  was  a  march  past,  but  without 
music.  I  told  the  Kaiser  that  before  long  I  was  going 
to  Flanders,  Berlin,  and  Hamburg  on  submarine  busi- 
ness. Then  we  conversed  on  the  topic  of  the  U-boat 
campaign;  and  I  seized  the  opportunity  of  saying  that 
the  order  to  spare  neutrals  had  created  a  great  danger 
for  the  submarines;  they  could  too  easily  be  rammed 
on  rising  to  the  surface.  The  Kaiser  went  at  once 
to  Bachmann,  to  give  him  an  express  audience.  We 
made  a  little  round  in  the  walk  home.  Had  hardly 
got  there,  before  a  telephone  message  came  from 
Miiller,  that  he  would  like  first  to  get  into  touch 
with  the  Chancellor  about  it.  Afterwards  Goltz  Pasha 
called  on  me.  He  is  here  to  hold  an  audience  with 
the  Kaiser  on  the  subject  of  the  Serbian  State  and 
the  Osmans. 

He  has  found  indecision  here.  It  is  the  grave  ques- 
tion of  the  hour:  are  we  going  to  hesitate  again  and 
be  too  late?  Breaking  through  here  seems  scarcely 
possible;  in  Prussia  everything  halts;  the  Austrians 
are  falling  back — Activite  celerite,  said  Napoleon  I. 
Act  we  must,  but  how  is  it  to  be  done,  with  the  Hydra? 
The  Kaiser  said  the  other  day,  that  he  would  have 
every  Frenchman  cleared  out  of  Alsace  (the  corner 
by   Bel  fort).     Besides,  the  bones  of  a  Pomeranian 


330  MY    MEMOIRS 

Grenadier  were  worth  more  to  him  than  all  the  Bal- 
kans. Nevertheless  whole  hecatombs  have  been  sac- 
rificed to  the  Serbian  quarrel;  and  the  fatal  hour  for 
the  German  Empire  is  standing  at  the  door. 

Of  his  sons,  the  Kaiser  hears  oftenest  from  Prince 
Eitel  Fritz,  but  he  is  too  simply  a  soldier.  Miiller's 
influence  is  now  the  greatest.  He  almost  rules  the 
State,  at  any  rate  the  navy,  and  doesn't  believe  it 
himself.  I  have  recently  told  him  my  belief  that 
Bethmann  must  go.  Yes,  but  who  is  to  be  put  in  his 
place?  Whereupon,  I  mentioned  Hindenburg.  Pohl 
has  written  to  Bachmann  that  Prince  Adalbert  brought 
him  the  inferred  command  not  to  attempt  anything 
more.  Pohl  pretends  not  to  have  had  anything  to  do 
with  it.  In  the  meantime  Bachmann's  revised  version 
of  the  command  gives  the  freest  possible  hand  for 
action.  Not  that  I  think  the  fleet  will  now  render 
any  notable  assistance.  This  is  the  war  of  missed 
opportunities. 

Charleville, 

April  3rd. 
This  evening,  summoned  to  His  Majesty.  To-mor- 
row evening  we  are  to  have  Prince  Solms  here  and 
little  Prince  Waldemar.  The  Kaiser  has  really  given 
in  now,  and  has  granted  absolutely  free  action  to  the 
submarines.  Latterly  the  submarine  war  has  been 
thoroughly  successful.  Trade  in  England  is  declining 
steadily  with  Scandinavia  and  Holland  for  example, 
at  the  rate  of  80  per  cent.    Insurance  premiums  have 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  331 

gone  up  with  giant  leaps,  and  in  proportion  the  cost 
of  living  in  England,  and  also  wages.  That  at  least 
is  something  that  it  is  always  satisfactory  to  hear. 
Falkenhayn  is  to-day  gone  to  Berlin.  Everyone  is 
very  uneasy  here  about  Italy,  and  concentration  of 
troops  towards  the  east  has  been  established.  Had 
things  been  settled  according  to  Prince  Adalbert's 
ideas,  the  affair  would  be  different;  in  that  contin- 
gency, Bachmann  and  I  would  have  been  shelved.  But 
now  as  the  matter  stands  Pohl  has  an  entirely  free 
hand,  and  the  submarine  warfare  can  go  on  unhin- 
dered. 

So  soon  as  the  Russians  are  no  longer  ice-bound, 
they  will  undertake  something;  and  we  shall  be  at  a 
disadvantage,  as  was  the  case  last  autumn,  so  it  is 
feared  here,  where  one  is  beginning  to  be  nervous. 
The  Russians  too  have  succeeded  in  laying  mines  in 
the  Baltic,  as  far  as  Rijgru.  I  intend  the  day  after 
to-morrow  to  travel  to  Bruges  and  stay  there  a  few 
days. 

To-day  Miiller  said  to  Bachmann  the  Chancellor 
must  be  spared,  and  allowed  to  stay  in  office.  Once 
again  he  has  made  such  a  fine  speech,  at  the  Bismarck 
celebration.  Isn't  that  original?  I  wonder  that  Bis- 
marck didn't  step  down  from  his  pedestal. 

Charleville, 

April  4th. 
America  is  going  on  supplying  arms  and  munitions, 
and  neither  the  Irish  nor  the  German  Americans  will 
alter  it,  for  it  is  too  good  a  business.    The  retreat  of 


332  MY    MEMOIRS 

the  Austrians  is  stayed,  as  the  Prussians  stepped  in 
at  the  last  minute.  All  the  danger  is  now  concentrated 
in  Italy.  Hindenburg  ought  to  be  put  in  Bethmann's 
place,  otherwise  the  upshot  of  the  affair  will  be  bad. 
Thank  you  for  Wolf's  address,  about  which  I  was 
not  quite  sure.  I  am  so  sorry  for  the  poor  boy,  but 
would  he  be  much  happier  now  under  Pohl,  who  with 
Miiller  has  made  such  a  ghastly  muddle  of  the  naval 
campaign?  Bachmann  told  me  to-day  how  urgently 
he  had  entreated  Miiller  to  lay  the  whole  matter  before 
me,  and  how  he  had  always  vehemently  replied  that  the 
Kaiser  would  on  no  condition  agree.  X.  writes  too 
that  I  ought  to  insist  on  it.  I  could  only  do  it  if  I 
said  that  Pohl  was  no  good  for  the  purpose,  and 
this  without  any  reserve.  I  should  merely  place  the 
question  before  the  Cabinet  and  gain  nothing.  Bach- 
mann and  I  now  work  together  in  perfect  harmony 
and  so  I  reap  more  advantage  than  if  I  were  in  the 
wrong  box. 

Charleville, 

April  5th. 

Yesterday  evening  animated  conversation  went  on 
till  pretty  late.  I  quite  liked  Wild  von  Hohenboen. 
We  had  many  things  in  common.  His  idea  is  that 
in  the  extreme  case  we  could  hold  out  against  Italy 
too,  and  moreover  would  have  to.  Behind  the  front 
here,  powerful  forces  are  being  massed.  The  inten- 
tion is  now  to  get  Kitchener's  army  out  of  the  way. 
He  thought  it  quite  wrong,  too,  that  we  didn't  speak 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  333 

out  our  mind  about  Belgium.  The  treatment  of  the 
question  by  the  Chancellor  was,  seemingly,  sheer 
weakness,  and  showed  no  will  to  conquer.  Little 
Prince  Waldemar  was  very  nice,  but  shy,  and  old 
Solms  told  hunting  stories  and  stroked  his  moustache. 

Charleville, 

April  8th. 
Prince  Henry  is  to  recruit  here  a  little  after  his 
arduous  task  at  Kiel !  A  programme  has  been  drawn 
up.  The  Kaiser  overwhelmed  with  news  of  victories 
.  .  .  the  opposite  may  not  be  brought  to  him,  among 
others  "  gigantic  rising  in  India,"  etc.  The  connois- 
seurs are,  on  the  other  hand,  in  dejection.  The  Kaiser 
and  his  brother  abuse  England;  Valentine  said,  if  only 
we  would  follow  the  policy  of  Metternich.^  Very 
characteristic  that.  The  Kaiser  seeks  consolation  in 
the,  to  my  mind,  dangerous  idea  that  the  First  Punic 
war  was  a  failure,  it  was  not  till  the  Second  that.  .  .  . 
Well  then,  we  must  build  a  lot  more  ships.  This  kind 
of  thing  is  our  misfortune  and  may  be  our  ruin.  And 
yet  they  all  cry  Hallelujah.  No  conception  of  the 
extreme  gravity  of  the  situation  for  the  future  of 
Germany.  In  short,  I  am  under  the  impression  we 
shall  sue  to  England. 

Charleville, 

April  gth. 

To-day  Miiller  was  here  and  I  demanded  of  him 
an  assurance  that  in  any  kind  of  peace  negotiations 
that  might  arise  I  should  have  a  voice,  as  I  had  been 
'  Till  1912  German  Ambassador  to  England. 


334  MY    MEMOIRS 

promised  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Miiller  assented 
— perhaps  my  request  is  in  some  degree  two-edged, 
for  it  is  too  late  for  any  co-operation,  but  at  least 
I  have  eased  my  conscience.  Miiller  knew  nothing 
of  any  peace  negotiations.  Once  more  I  explained 
to  him  my  whole  point  of  view,  and  succeeded  mo- 
mentarily in  impressing  him.  He  said  it  was  too  de- 
plorable that  the  Kaiser  was  surrounded  by  mere 
la-de-da  courtiers.  These  gentry  were,  from  long 
habit,  too  inclined,  one  and  all,  to  take  their  cue  from 
the  Kaiser's  method.  That  was  much  to  be  regretted. 
He  did  not  consider  himself  in  the  matter  at  all.  He 
admitted  jealousy  of  Hindenburg  in  the  east.  In  con- 
nection with  our  fleet,  the  Kaiser  wished  to  be  left 
in  peace,  and  not  to  be  worried  about  it;  he  himself 
really  didn't  know  what  the  next  day  might  bring 
forth. 

To-day  the  Crown  Prince  has  been  extremely  cour- 
teous, but  very  reserved.  I  have  still  hopes  of  him. 
Certainly  he  hasn't  learnt  to  work,  but  he  has  dis- 
cretion, lets  other  men  work,  is  not  vain,  and  will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Cabinet  adminstration. 
I  believe  too  that  he  is  a  good  judge  of  character. 
But  the  Kaiser  won't  give  him  his  head.  Miiller 
boasts  that  he  helped  us  out  in  the  Prince  Adalbert 
business;  he  hoped,  however,  that  Pohl  would  do  his 
part. 

Unfortunately  we  haven't  got  any  munitions  through 
to  Turkey,  and  therein  for  the  moment  the  danger 
lies.     Just  now  things  are  rather  better  with  Italy. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  335 

Charleville, 

April  loth. 
The  news  that  comes  to  hand  about  the  political 
situation  is  so  uncertain  that  one  never  knows  what 
to  believe.  To-day  it  is  reported  that  the  feeling  in 
England  is  very  slack,  and  that  England  wants  to 
direct  the  policy  into  a  different  channel.  It  is  to  be 
hoped  that  we  shan't  help  her  in  this. 

Charleville, 

April  nth. 
W.  came  in  to  see  me  to-day  and  related  that  in 
Berlin  a  powerful  league  has  been  formed  to  which 
many  influential  persons  belong,  to  arrange  peace  at 
any  price  with  England.  I  hadn't  heard  of  it  before. 
Financiers,  bankers,  all  former  ambassadors  and  at- 
taches; in  addition  the  Wilhelmstrasse  renegades,  in 
full  force,  "  lasciate  ogni  speranza."  One  may  indeed 
say,  according  to  news  received  here,  the  English  are 
not  at  all  happy  or  hopeful.  The  submarine  war  is 
having  great  effect,  it  increases  economic  difficulties, 
and  in  addition,  there  is  no  lasting  arrangement  with 
the  Japs.  Endurance  and  initiative  were  for  us  the 
one  right  thing.  Our  naval  attache  in  Rome  has  com- 
municated disquieting  news.  It  seems  that  England  is 
threatening  Italy,  and  apparently  the  fellows  can't 
stand  it.  The  brigandage  against  Austria  appeals  to 
the  man  in  the  street  more  than  the  future  position 
on  the  Mediterranean.  To-day  I  went  to  church  out 
of  respect  to  Prince  Henry.  A  very  indifferent  ser- 
mon.    To  believe,  means  to  conquer.     Just  as  if  one 


336  MY    MEMOIRS 

hadn't  to  help  God  Almighty  out  a  little!  I  have 
had,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  to  give  up  Hopmann,  It  was 
a  real  pain  to  me.  I  can  only  make  use  of  Capelle 
in  certain  matters;  and  besides  he  lives  too  much  in 
his  own  future.  For  me  this  war  must  have  a  sad  end. 
Had  I  commanded  the  fleet  at  the  beginning!  I 
can't  help  thinking  always  of  that. 

Charleville, 

April  i2th. 

Yesterday,  very  pleasant  evening  at  Stenay  (head- 
quarters of  Crown  Prince).  The  Prince  said  he  was 
delighted  to  see  me  at  Stenay,  else  it  would  have  been 
rather  difficult  to  meet,  as  we  were  both  "  suspect." 
This  remark  gave  me  great  satisfaction.  To-day  I 
had  another  conversation  with  Wild  von  Hohenboen. 
I  was  again  pleased  with  him,  and  we  agreed  that  what- 
ever happens  we  must  stand  together.  Bachmann's 
dispute  with  Bethmann  is  still  going  on.  Miiller  has 
again  taken  Bethmann's  part  in  an  unheard-of  man- 
ner. I  entertain  a  suspicion  that  Bachmann  inten- 
tionally broke  a  lance  because  he  is  on  my  side.  When 
he  took  over  his  present  post,  Miiller  was  perpetually 
exhorting  him  to  be  on  the  side  of  Bethmann,  no  matter 
what  the  circumstances.  There  was  really  no  occasion 
unless  was  added  "  not  on  the  side  of  the  Secretary 
of  State." 

Retzmann  ^  wrote  the  other  day  to  Hopmann :  "  We 
shall  be  fighting  to  the  bitter  end  against  the  English- 

'  For  several  years  naval  attache  in  Washingfton. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  337 

American-Belgian-Franco  capitalist  combine,  which 
wanted  to  dispose  of  the  world  to  its  own  advantage, 
because  we  were  the  one  people  who  could  go  their 
own  way  alone,  and,  what  is  more,  succeed.  Oil  trusts, 
tobacco  trusts,  Chinese  railways,  etc. 

"  A  little  echo  from  Stenay.  Prince  Henry  said  to 
the  Crown  Prince  one  must  always  expect  to  be  abused; 
it  had  been  the  same  with  his  grandfather,  and  father, 
and  when  the  Crown  Prince's  turn  came,  it  would  be 
the  same,  too,  with  him.  The  Crown  Prince  said  one 
must  first  see  the  sort  of  people  whom  the  Kaiser  had 
about  him,  before  one  could  judge.  Prince  Henry 
suggested  that  he,  the  Crown  Prince,  would  choose 
very  similar  people,  whereupon  the  latter  said  '  No, 
that  I  never  would.'  " 

It  was  so  wrong  to  forbid  the  object  of  the  war  to 
be  discussed.  One  might  say,  that  we  would  never 
suffer  again  such  a  conspiracy  as  that  formed  by 
England,  Belgium,  and  France,  still  it  was  an  object, 
and  allowed  the  necessary  freedom.  The  lukewarm 
flabbiness  of  the  Chancellor  is  foolish.  If  Italy  is  to 
be  stopped,  the  affair  is  not,  after  all,  so  bad  for  us. 
But  I  am  afraid  that  here  we  lack  the  required  energy 
to  stimulate  Austria.  It  has  unfortunately  been  too 
clearly  demonstrated  that  this  limb  is  rotten,  and  we 
are  unable  to  guarantee  its  duration  for  any  length 
of  time.  Miiller  would  bolster  it  up  with  a  Greater 
Serbia,  or  Great  Slav  State.  We  have  really  loaded 
the  dying  camel  too  heavily. 


338  MY    MEMOIRS 

Charleville, 

April  14th. 
It  is  a  pity  that  I  haven't  come  into  any  touch  at 
all  with  Falkenhayn.  What  J.  says,  that  the  other 
party  must  pull  itself  together,  is  difficult  in  that 
people  holding  office  can't  act  disloyally.  I  can  of- 
ficially and  to  people  in  office  express  my  opinion 
freely,  but  I  can't  conspire,  for  instance,  with  Parlia- 
mentarians. What  I  fear  is  that  there  is  no  one  at 
the  top  who  will  take  the  lead.  To  mention  names, 
Krupp,  Henckel,  etc.  Krupp,  with  whom  I  am  per- 
sonally intimate,  I  could,  as  diplomat,  tell  everything, 
but  I  couldn't  infuse  into  him  the  will  to  act.  If  this 
will  really  animated  high  personages  and  leaders,  then 
would  the  scheme  of  a  league  of  landowners,  a  Haus 
league,  for  the  free  discussion  of  war  aims,  not  have 
hung  fire  as  long  as  it  actually  has.  In  short,  t  still 
believe,  alas!  If  things  aren't  altered  it  will  be 
brought  into  the  argument. 

Charleville, 

April  15th. 
I  have  tried  to  get  something  out  of  Prince  Henry 
about  naval  affairs.  Either  he  had  nothing  to  say,  or 
wished  to  keep  it  back.  I  still  can't  grasp  why  our 
fleet  didn't  strike  last  autumn.  Ingenohl  had  the  fate 
of  Europe  in  the  palm  of  his  hand.  Our  relations,  or 
rather  regotiations  with  Italy  are  not  yet  broken  off, 
so  a  slender  hope  still  remains  of  her  not  striking. 
The  French  airmen  have  dropped  five  bombs  here, 
and  unfortunately  only  Germans  were  killed.     Now 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  339 

the  Charlevillers  are  rejoicing  over  these  heroes  who 
have  played  us  this  dirty  trick,  and  we  are  actually 
good-natured  enough  to  repair  the  damage  they  have 
done.  The  Kaiser  is  furious,  and  the  latest  is  that 
Buckingham  Palace  is  to  be  "  in  bounds."  He  really 
seems  to  imagine  that  by  a  tacit  harmony  between  the 
chiefs  he  can  spare  himself.    Curious  logic! 

Charleville, 

April  17th. 

Miiller  has  complained  about  the  Zeppelin  raids, 
and  I  think  that  he  is  quite  right.  I  shall  try  to  put 
a  stop  to  this  childish  juggling  with  Zeppelin  airships. 
Bachmann  went  last  night  to  a  big  dinner  at  the  War 
Minister's.  There  he's  seen  with  his  own  eyes  how 
Pohl  even  in  these  circles  makes  a  goose  of  himself 
with  his  bragging  prophecies,  etc.  "  We  can  destroy 
London,  the  army  couldn't  attempt  such  a  thing — 
England's  doom  is  in  the  submarine  warfare."  And 
it's  such  a  contemptible  little  man  as  this  that  Miiller 
appoints  as  Chief  of  the  Admiralty  Staff,  and  now  as 
commander  of  the  fleet.  Perhaps  if  I  had  been  able 
to  judge  Ingenohl  last  autumn  as  I  can  at  present,  I 
might  have  succeeded  better  with  the  Kaiser. 

The  idea  of  a  rapprochement  with  England  is, 
doubtless,  according  to  the  Foreign  Office's  plan,  be- 
ing praised  in  the  press,  and  this  standpoint,  of  course, 
is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  keeping  of  Belgium  in 
any  shape  or  form.  If  we  should  follow  the  policy 
recommended  by  Count  Mont    (ostensibly  with  the 


340  MY    MEMOIRS 

knowledge  of  the  Foreign  Office),  in  the  Berliner 
Tagchlatt,  we  shall  confess  ourselves  beaten  and 
simply  sink  to  the  position  of  England's  body-slave 
and  tool  against  Russia.  The  danger  of  the  Russian 
inundation  can  only  be  met  by  trying  to  stem  it.  But 
if  we  don't  succeed  in  that,  and  we  are  bound  to  fight 
once  more  against  Russia,  this  time  on  the  side  of 
England,  there  will  be  nothing  further  for  us  to  do 
but  pour  out  our  blood  for  that  purpose.  We  were 
forced  to  support  Russia,  on  the  question  of  Persia, 
at  the  time  of  the  Potsdam  Convention,  and  if  that 
doesn't  suffice,  we  must  say  to  them,  go  to  the  Bos- 
phorus,  we've  no  objection.  Then  the  whole  company 
would  toady  us.  Although  the  methods  of  procedure 
are  different  to-day,  Bismarck  was  right  in  the  ground- 
principle. 

Charleville, 

April  i8th. 

To-day  I  was  at  church.  There  one  always  meets 
every  variety  of  person.  To-day  Dallwitz  was  there. 
We  talked  about  the  war  and  also  got  on  the  topic 
of  Tarasp.  Dallwitz  said  that  I  had  then  been  right, 
word  for  word.  I  took  the  opportunity  of  draw- 
ing his  attention  to  the  "  approach "  to  England, 
and  in  this  he  shared  my  views.  Dallwitz  is  the  can- 
didate for  the  Chancellorship,  backed  by  Valentine. 
The  War  Minister  delighted  me  with  the  remark  "  It's 
begun  to  roll — roll."  So  then  our  surplus  strength 
is  to  be  turned  to  account,  and  not  to  wait  any  longer 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  341 

for  Italy.  If  the  steam-roller  succeeds  in  its  rolling, 
that  will  be  the  best  cold  douche  Italy  can  have. 
Whether  or  no  Hindenburg  is  too  great  a  man  for 
the  Kaiser,  he  is  the  right  man.  I  am  finally  disgusted 
with  the  eternal  bickerings  of  the  Cabinet.  Do  you 
think  they'll  ever  cease?  Anyhow  I  could  not  work 
with  it,  apart  from  the  fact  that  a  post  in  it  would  not 
be  in  accordance  with  my  gifts.  I  have  read  Tim 
Klein's  Bismarck  with  great  enjoyment.  How  often 
the  old  giant  must  have  turned  in  his  grave  since  he 
died !  I  saw  the  storm  gathering  years  ago,  but  could 
do  nothing  to  avert  it.  For  years  I  have  seen  how 
the  fleet  was  being  demoralized,  and  worked  for  pa- 
rades and  inspections.  ...  I  recognized  the  fact 
perfectly  and  have  often  talked  it  over  with  my  col- 
leagues without  being  able  to  effect  any  improvement. 
As  X.  wrote  to  me  lately,  he  was  sorry  that  he  had 
advised  me  to  stay  on  in  the  autumn  of  1912  (when, 
by  the  way,  came  that  outrageous  letter  from  Holtz- 
dorfer,  inspired  by  the  Kaiser).  X.  is  absolutely 
right;  I  have  regretted  ever  since  the  war  that  I 
didn't  take  my  conge  then.  I  shall  look  out  with 
intense  interest  to  see  if  Bethmann's  attitude  behind 
the  Count  Mont  article  has  any  effect. 

Bethmann  has  now  won  over  the  Social  Democrats 
and  Liberals  on  the  Left  with  his  anti-Russian  policy; 
Erzberger,  at  all  events,  has  gone  over  to  his  camp, 
which  means  a  great  deal.  It  is  rumoured  here  that 
England,  up  to  a  certain  point,  will  be  gracious.  Then, 
at  once,  arms  will  be  opened  here  and  England  asked 


342  MY    MEMOIRS 

to  come  and  make  her  bed  with  us,  in  spite  of  all  the 
huzzahs  and  fanfares  of  victory.  Wait  and  see!  Our 
little  submarines  pop  into  eternity  everything  that 
comes  in  their  way.  The  Chancellor's  hair  stands  on 
end,  and  it  makes  the  Kaiser  nervous  also.  Against 
us  all  things  are  permissible,  and  our  modesty  and 
virtue  now,  when  our  existence  hangs  on  a  thread, 
causes  the  others  to  have  doubts  about  our  winning. 
But  if  we  aren't  weak-kneed  we  shall  conquer. 

Charleville, 

April  igth. 
Miiller  came  to  see  me  to-day  and  said  that  probably 
before  the  end  of  the  month  the  Kaiser  will  be  moving 
somewhere  else,  Miiller  evidently  thinks  that  in  such 
circumstances  as  these  the  Kaiser  is  best  out  of  the 
way.  I  think  so  too.  Hindenburg  must  be  put  in  his 
place,  in  order  to  create  terror  abroad.  It  is  pathetic 
that  to  talk  of  war  aims  is  forbidden  and  a  pack  of 
hounds  let  loose  to  foster  weakness  and  milksopism, 
just  at  the  moment  when  everything  depends  on  our 
stiffening  our  backs. 

Charleville, 

April  20th. 
That  the  Social  Democrats  are  supporting  the  Chan- 
cellor is  certain.  The  Grand  Seigneurs  are  miserable 
wretches,  their  Serene  Highnesses  fine  folk,  not  quite 
applicable  to  Ludwig  the  Bear.  The  two  or  three 
Conservative  members  are  too  weak.  Hintze's  journey 
to  Peking  is  regarded  as  a  consummate  coup,  especially 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  343 

brought  off  by  the  officials  of  the  Foreign  Office.  I 
could  almost  be  tempted  to  become  Bethmann's  suc- 
cessor, if  it  were  only  to  hurl  out  those  fellows.  But 
there's  such  a  lot  of  them  that  one  would  never  ac- 
complish it. 

That  England  is  swearing  is  highly  satisfactory,  for 
it  demonstrates  that  she  is  beginning  to  be  uncomfort- 
able. Would  that  we  could  get  the  new  kind  of  sub- 
marines turned  out  and  ready  for  action  before  Eng- 
land lets  herself  be  inveigled  into  peace  negotiations. 
Here  the  Kaiser  and  his  "  organs  "  are  tearing  their 
hair  again,  because  the  little  U-boat  has  rammed  the 
Dutch.  He  may  thank  himself  for  that.  Instead  of 
standing  up  proudly  and  firmly  against  neutral  Hol- 
land, not  too  well  disposed  towards  us,  we  cringe  and 
humbly  beg  pardon  of  the  Dutch.  Thank  God  that 
Bachmann  is  here  now.  The  Chancellor  honours  him 
with  his  displeasure  and  Miiller  is  always  raging  furi- 
ously against  us. 

Charleville, 

April  2ist. 

To-day  the  Kaiserin  summoned  me  to  an  interview. 
I  told  her  my  unvarnished  opinion  of  the  state  of 
things.  The  Kaiser  was  encircled  and  embedded  here 
in  a  mass  of  flabbiness.  {"  Yes,  unfortunately,  it  is 
true,"  said  she. ) 

I  told  her  frankly  that  we  ought,  as  Frederick  the 
Great  said,  to  arm  our  hearts  with  steel,  and  not  in  any 
circumstances  knock  under  to,  and  cry  out  for  help 


344  MY    MEMOIRS 

from,  those  who  wanted  to  lay  us  in  the  dust.  She 
said  that  the  conduct  of  Mont  was  unheard-of,  but  the 
Kaiser  himself  would  not  give  the  lead.  I  said  that 
Mont's  case  was  by  no  means  isolated,  and  was  closely 
associated  with  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  I  told  her  what 
might  possibly  be  done  if  Bethmann  fell  from  office, 
and  that  was  to  call  in  Hindenburg.  She  thought  he 
would  never  consent,  being  too  purely  a  military  man. 
I  told  her  very  plainly  that  he  had  a  sound  human 
understanding  and  that  the  very  fact  of  his  being 
"  military  "  appeared  to  me  to  be  an  advantage,  as  it 
would  infuse  unity  into  the  whole.  She  next  re- 
marked that  it  wouldn't  be  believed;  that  she  held 
back  on  account  of  her  six  sons;  whereupon  I  said 
that  on  the  contrary  all  who  had  the  honour  to  know 
the  circumstances  intimately,  centred  their  hopes  on 
her.  Therefore  it  was  highly  desirable  that  the  Kaiser 
should  come  to  Berlin,  where  such  a  limited  sphere  of 
influence  around  him  could  not  exist  in  the  same 
degree. 

To-morrow  she  leaves,  I  don't  believe  either  that 
she  can  alter  the  situation. 

If  His  Majesty  would  leave  the  war  on  sea  to  me, 
and  would  let  me  go  where  I  liked,  then  I  would  com- 
pass it.  But  there  can  be  no  question  of  his  doing 
anything  of  the  kind.  Bethmann,  Muller,  and  Treutler 
together  do  all  they  can  to  prevent  the  navy  coming 
into  action,  and  the  Kaiser  nearly  faints  when  it  strikes 
the  smallest  blow.  To  have  to  stay  here  and  endure  all 
this  is  terrible  for  me.     This  evening  I  was  invited 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  345 

to  Herr  von  Stumm's  (the  typical  Foreign  Office  of- 
ficial), to  meet  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Finance,  Djavid 
Bey,  and  compliment  the  Turks.  I  couldn't  very  well 
refuse. 

Charlevijlle, 

April  22nd. 

To-day,  shortly  before  lunch,  the  War  Minister  came 
to  congratulate  me  on  my  fifty  years  of  service,  be- 
fore starting  on  his  tour  of  Flanders.  He  did  it  very 
heartily.  He  expressed  a  firm  belief  still  in  the  suc- 
cess of  our  fleet.  But  I  don't  believe  in  it  myself  any 
longer.  The  best  opportunities  were  missed  in  the 
autumn  of  last  year.  The  English  too  now  ap- 
pear to  be  actually  holding  back.  Their  geographical 
position  permits  of  their  doing  that  without  the  ob- 
jective of  their  fleet  miscarrying.  England  is  influ- 
encing the  neutrals  more  and  more  to  shut  us  out.  If 
England's  prestige  at  sea  was  shaken,  Italy  would 
not  think  of  ranging  herself  against  us.  At  one 
o'clock  I  went  to  table  and  sat  next  the  Kaiserin ;  from 
here  she  goes  to  Strasburg,  then  to  Karlsruhe,  back 
to  Berlin.  .  .  .  She  said  that  the  removal  of  main 
Headquarters  to  Berlin  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  The 
Kaiser  may  be  going  for  eight  or  ten  days  to  Silesia. 
I  intend  therefore  to  come  to  Berlin  on  the  27th. 
Djavid  Bey  and  the  Turkish  General  were  present. 
The  Kaiser  talks  of  Falkenhayn  as  the  coming  leader 
of  allied  armies,  thus  Hindenburg  nowhere. 

The  Frankfurter  Zeiting  publishes  to-day  a  long 


346  MY    MEMOIRS 

article,  wherein  it  depicts  Russia  as  the  only  enemy 
with  whom  we  are  to  keep  up  lasting  hostilities,  be- 
cause of  its  natural  strength,  and  the  Slav  hordes 
pressing  on  us.  More  cleverly  written  than  the  Mont 
article,  perhaps  by  my  "  friend  "  Stein,  at  all  events 
inspired  by  the  Foreign  Office.  I  am  getting  already 
numbers  of  congratulations  on  my  jubilee  which  really 
are  appalling. 

KUXHAVEN, 

May  I2th. 

We  left  Wilhelmshaven  at  10.30,  with  two  very  fast 
torpedo  boats;  through  ships,  barricades,  outposts 
.  .  .  here.  The  sea  was  calm.  At  about  twelve 
we  touched  Heligoland,  where  the  last  time  I  was 
expected  with  Trara.  M.  would  be  astonished  at  all 
the  changes  there.  The  island's  present  aspect  makes 
an  extraordinary  impression;  no  Heligolanders,  no 
bathing  visitors,  no  women  and  no  children,  nothing 
but  men  armed  to  the  teeth.  On  the  whole  Heligoland 
has  not  counted  so  much  in  the  war  as  we  used  to 
think  it  would.  The  war  in  the  North  Sea  has  taken 
such  very  different  developments.  There  was  hardly 
a  breath  of  wind,  the  sun  was  warm,  but  the  air  like 
steel.  At  two  o'clock  dinner  in  the  Casino,  which  was 
very  prettily  and  comfortably  arranged.  The  spa- 
cious dining-room  was  full  to  the  last  place,  only  the 
commanders  were  officers  on  active  service,  for  the 
rest,  mostly  reserve  officers,  of  all  trades  and  profes- 
sions. A  good  tone  and  spirit  of  comradeship  seemed 
to  prevail.    Admiral  Jacobsen  launched  a  speech  at  me 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  347 

which  I  naturally  was  obliged  to  answer,  and  which 
I  concluded  mentally  with  the  catch  phrase,  "  Heligo- 
land— Ostend."  At  four  o'clock,  put  off.  I  think  we 
got  here  at  seven  and  drove  by  motor  to  Nordholz, 
our  air-force  base.  Two  years  ago  there  was  nothing 
but  bare  wild  heath,  now  aerodromes,  roads,  etc.  Our 
air-forces  are  at  any  rate  in  good  hands. 

Kiel, 
May  13th. 
Prince  Henry  received  me  at  the  station,  and  came 
back  at  once  to  the  hotel  with  me.  After  half  an 
hour's  pause  came  on  to  the  castle,  the  Princess 
Fraulein  von  Planker  (lady-in-waiting),  SackendorfT 
(Court-Marshal),  Captain  Z.  S.  Heinrich,  Captain 
Westerkampf.  The  Princess  amazingly  well-informed, 
she  is  the  organizer  of  a  gigantic  work  in  the  hospitals. 
Early  yesterday  out  Germania,  Kaiserliche  Wirft, 
S.M.S.  Kron  PrinB  (Dalwigk),  torpedo  inspection, 
formation-inspection  (Rebour),  submarine  inspection, 
submarine  commandants  of  small  U-boats  flashed  out 
altogether,  also  the  torpedo-boat  command  made  an 
excellent  impression.  This  is  the  war  of  the  captain 
and  the  lieutenant.  Many  admirals  have  failed,  partly 
because  of  ill-luck,  partly  because  of  Miiller.  The 
navy  swarms  with  sailors.  Fine  fellows,  these  guardi- 
ans of  the  sea,  and  they  aren't  allowed  to  come  into 
action.  In  the  evening  I  invited  Rebour,  Henkel,  Dal- 
wigk, Siemens  (submarine  inspection),  Trotha,  and 
my  colleagues.    Conversation  fluent  and  all  very  agree- 


348  MY    MEMOIRS 

able.  X.  infuriated  with  Pohl,  who  does  all  he  can 
to  find  pretexts  for  doing  nothing,  especially  is  he 
keen  on  finding  technical  deficiencies.  The  Prince  is 
going  to  fetch  me  again— 9  o'clock  to  12  a.m. 

WiLHELM  S  HAVEN, 

July   13th. 

The  day  has  been  uselessly  spent.  It  is  now  going 
on  toward  eight  o'clock.  I  have  invited  Admiral  Kraft 
and  a  few  submarine  commandants.  Yesterday  long 
discussion  with  Y.  Everywhere  general  indignation 
expressed  at  the  mismanagement  in  the  navy.  Eighty 
per  cent,  of  public  opinion  want  me.  There's  to  be  a 
deputation  to  His  Majesty.  In  spite  of  that  I  play 
the  part  of  Horatius  Cockles,  for  the  hour  for  acting 
has  gone  by.  Of  course  I  would  accept,  but  only  under 
the  condition  of  being  allowed  full  power.  But  for 
this  I  would  extend  myself.  Pohl  has  simply  gam- 
bled chances  away,  as  Captain  L.  said.  Not  only  his 
staff,  but  everywhere,  they  are  crying  out  for  me. 

All  the  baiting  seems  to  have  completely  ceased, 
and  to-morrow  crucifise.  I  derive  a  certain  satisfac- 
tion from  it  all.  I  don't  believe  H.M.  will  do  it,  but 
God  must  decide.  It  will  be  a  life-long  lesson  for 
Miiller. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  20th. 

I  shall  certainly  be  here  for  a  fortnight,  then  per- 
haps off  to  the  eastern  front.  Hindenburg  has  too 
much  on  hand  at  the  moment  for  me  to  visit  him  just 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  349 

yet.  And  first  of  all  I'll  see  how  things  go  here. 
Our  guards  are  now  facing  the  Russian  guards  who 
have  been  brought  to  the  front  from  Petersburg.  It 
is  being  presumed  therefrom  that  the  Russians  are 
compelled  to  use  their  last  men  there. 

Falkenhayn  has  told  Bachmann  that  the  Chancellor 
wants  to  annex  Courland;  the  English  will  take  pleas- 
ure in  that,  for  then  we  shall  sit  tight,  for  a  hundred 
years,  and  the  Russians  the  same.  England  laughs  in 
her  sleeve;  and  we  are  to  withdraw  from  Belgium. 
Then  England  will  have  gained  her  object,  and  we 
shall  be  reduced  to  a  mere  second-class  continental 
State  again.  To  Falkenhayn  the  people  in  Turkey  and 
the  Balkans  are  quite  a  matter  of  indifference.  The 
whole  set  round  the  Kaiser  has  slowly  gone  to  sleep, 
and  the  Kaiser  fills  in  the  map  himself. 

Emanuelssegen, 

July  22nd. 

Bachmann  had  a  talk  yesterday  with  Miiller.  The 
latter  is  obviously  uneasy  about  the  whole  situation  at 
sea.  The  question  of  the  High  Command  has  cropped 
up  again.  I  doubt,  however,  if  the  choice  will  fall  on 
me.  Miiller  said  yesterday  that  he  had  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  striven  for  something  of  the  kind, 
but  couldn't  bring  it  off.  Again  on  January  2nd  he 
had  once  more  called  on  the  Kaiser  and  named  me,  but 
had  failed  utterly.  The  Kaiser  doesn't  really  require 
any  High  Command,  he  can  himself  see  to  that. 

This  version  doesn't  seem  to  me  very  credible.    For 


350  MYMEMOIRS 

if  Miiller  had  really  wished  it,  he  would  certainly  have 
been  obliged  to  speak  to  me  on  the  subject  first.  He 
not  only  didn't  do  this,  but  he  put  Pohl  in  Ingenohl's 
place  without  so  much  as  litsening  to  me.  To  Bach- 
mann,  moreover,  he  seems  to  have  said  on  February 
2nd,  that  before  me  younger  officers  would  come  into 
consideration,  who  had  not  been  out  of  it  for  so  long 
as  I  had;  such,  for  example,  as  Holtzendorff.  During 
the  conversation  between  Bachmann  and  Miiller  yes- 
terday, my  name  was  not  mentioned.  In  another, 
he  did  casually  remark  that  Pohl  and  I  could  not  work 
together,  and  he  believed  in  the  first  as  an  expert. 
We  have  all  been  trembling  with  anxiety  as  to  whether 
we  are  going  to  yield  further  to  America. 

Emanuelssegen  bei 
Kattowitz, 
July  23rd. 
Enver  has  sent  a  dispatch  to  Falkenhayn,  which  ac- 
cording to  my  estimation  is  marked  by  a  threatening 
tone. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  24th. 
I  can't,  for  my  part,  form  any  conception  of  how 
we  are  to  force  Russia  to  make  peace.  The  "  chasm  " 
is  too  wide,  but  we  can  always  press  onwards.  It 
must  be  a  joy  to  England  that  her  two  most  for- 
midable rivals  are  tearing  each  other  to  pieces.  Rus- 
sia will  wait,  and  we  shall  not  get  many  troops  free 
to  send  to  the  west,  even  if  we  halt  on  the  line  of 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  351 

the  Berg.  Captain  Eric  von  Miiller  has  been  here 
since  yesterday;  he,  too,  is  a  little  aghast  at  the  way 
in  which  we  continue  to  neglect  Turkey.  He  an- 
nounces, on  the  other  hand,  that  the  internal  condi- 
tion of  England  is  favourable  to  us.  Hence  the 
enormous  exertions  in  the  Dardanelles;  if  these  sur- 
render, the  whole  of  the  Balkans  will  be  let  loose  upon 
us.  Falkenhayn  doesn't  see  that,  and  the  whole  of 
our  policy  should  be  directed  against  England.  With- 
out the  assistance  of  Italy,  Gallipoli  will  be  difficult 
to  capture. 

Two  more  submarines  are  now  on  their  way  there. 
But  before  three  weeks  they  can  hardly  make  their 
presence  felt,  and  in  them  alone  lies  the  hope  of  doing 
something.  Kampf,  Westarp,  and  Bassermann  wish 
to  beard  the  Kaiser  personally  about  Turkey  and  the 
submarines.  They  won't  achieve  much.  To-day  we 
are  expecting  the  Note.  The  pantaloons  of  the  Wil- 
helmstrasse  must  be  in  a  thoughtful  frame  of  mind. 
In  the  case  of  the  Note  being  rude,  Bethmann,  Jagow, 
and  company  will  say,  "  We  have  the  navy  to  thank 
for  that." 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  2nd. 

America  is  so  shamelessly,  so  barefacedly  pro-Brit- 
ish, that  it  is  hard  to  credit  that  we  shall  eat  humble- 
pie.  Yet  in  this  connection,  I  believe  nothing  to  be 
impossible. 

A  remark  in  the  Note  indicates  that  we  have  already 
made  promises,  privately,  to  limit  the  submarine  ac- 


352  MY    MEMOIRS 

tivity.  But  now  it  is  a  question  of  a  formal  declara- 
tion before  the  whole  world,  and  before  the  whole 
German  people.  The  answer  can  take  weeks  to  get 
there.  I,  for  my  part,  will  not  join  in  a  formal  re- 
nunciation of  the  submarine  warfare,  whereby  we 
should  abandon  the  only  weapon  we  have  in  our  hands 
against  England  in  the  future.  The  relief  of  Muktar 
Pasha,  and  the  refusal  on  Falkenhayn's  side  to  do 
anything  to  help  Turkey,  weighs  equally  on  my  mind. 
Meanwhile  England's  pressure  on  the  neutrals  becomes 
stronger  every  day,  and  we  are  playing  at  Napoleonism 
in  Poland. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  26th. 

To-day  at  ten  o'clock  to  Teschen,  the  headquarters 
of  the  Archbishop  Frederick.  The  scenery  in  Galicia 
is  very  pretty,  we  had  the  Beskidian  group  of  moun- 
tains in  front  of  us.  We  were  welcomed  with  great 
friendliness  in  Teschen;  absolutely  harmless  old  gentle- 
man with  whom  Conrad  von  Holtzendorfif  can  have  no 
difficulty  in  dealing.  Afterwards  we  were  received  by 
the  heir  to  the  throne,  who  is  very  youthful,  but 
evidently  has  interests.  .  .  .  Grand  staff,  to  whom 
we  were  introduced.  I  heard  nothing  but  Count  So- 
and-So,  Count  this,  that,  and  the  other.  At  breakfast 
I  sat  next  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  is  very  proud 
of  his  only  son.  The  latter  has  just  got  through  his 
exam,  both  in  German  and  Hungarian.  His  father 
(brother  of  the  Dowager-Queen  of  Spain)  owns  much 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  353 

property  in  Hungary.  He  told  me,  his  nephew,  the 
King  of  Spain,  had  written  that  he  had  been  offered 
hundreds  of  millions  if  he  would  join  the  quadruple 
Allies,  but  said  so  long  as  he  was  King  he  wouldn't 
hear  of  it.  Moreover  he  had  his  army  to  support 
him.  Everyone  was  incensed  in  Teschen  by  the  ef- 
frontery of  the  American  Note,  and  couldn't  conceive 
that  we  should  be  so  weak  as  to  draw  back.  (H  only 
that  sentiment  were  shared  by  our  pantaloons  in  of- 
fice!) It  is  hoped  that  the  line  on  the  Isonzo  may  be 
held ;  but  it's  not  certain.  Unfortunately  Conrad  was 
absent,  he  had  been  ordered  to  Vienna.  I  should  have 
been  glad  to  have  made  the  acquaintance  of  the  most 
interesting  personality  connected  with  these  head- 
quarters. I  haven't  much  faith  in  Kampf's  doing 
anything  effectual  with  the  Kaiser.  We  have  heard 
nothing  yet  from  Berlin  about  the  Note.  Miiller  is  in 
Berlin  to  consult  with  Capelle. 

Emanuelssegen, 

July  27th. 

A  year  ago  yesterday  I  arrived  in  Berlin,  and  was 
received  with  the  announcement  that  all  was  going 
well.  I  had  then  no  confidence  in  peace,  and  un- 
fortunately my  prognostications  proved  to  be  right. 
Now  we  have  already  left  5oo,ck)0  men  lying  dead  on 
the  battle-fields,  and  over  a  million  wounded.  Besides, 
there  is  no  end  in  view  to  this  frightful  war.  I  think 
too  that  the  aggressively  harsh  tone  of  the  Note 
promises  nothing  good  for  us.    We  have  heard  nothing 


354  MY   MEMOIRS 

definite  as  yet  from  Berlin.  Herr  Kriege,*  it  seems, 
has  entirely  turned  round  about  the  submarines.  He 
doubtless  thinks  that  his  time  has  come,  and  a  new 
democracy  is  in  the  making.  The  efforts  on  the  part 
of  old  Kampf  and  his  companions,  with  the  Kaiser, 
have  been  defeated,  or  rather  have  defeated  them- 
selves. The  reason  is  not  known  to  me;  some  other 
plan  is  now  to  be  set  on  foot,  in  which  I  am  to  have  a 
part.  To-morrow  I  shall  know  more  about  it.  No 
consultation  has  taken  place  in  Berlin,  after  all,  be- 
tween Capelle  and  Admiral  von  Miiller.  From  that 
and  other  news,  I  conclude  that  matters  with  regard 
to  the  fleet  are  still  the  same  as  of  old. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  28th. 

To-day  I  had  a  letter  from  Capelle.  He  writes  that 
Admiral  von  Miiller  has  obviously  avoided,  on  pur- 
pose, conferring  with  him,  and  that  he  considers  the 
creation  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  for  the  navy 
shelved.  H  the  Atnerican  Note  should  not  be  an- 
swered, the  submarines  and  their  work  will  perish  of 
inanition.  I  don't  think  it  at  all  likely  that  any  acute 
crisis  will  arise  in  which  I  could  come  to  the  fore, 
Capelle  is  very  troubled  about  Turkey.  How  we  shall 
bear  this  severe  political  slap  in  the  face,  he  doesn't 
know.    He  is  sceptical  too  about  Russia's  giving  in. 

We  have  had  a  new  circumstantial  dispatch  from 
the  first  officer  on  the  Mainz,  of  the  fight  of  August 

^  Legal  adviser  at  the  Foreign  Office. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  355 

28th.  I  will  send  it  to  you.  The  Mains  fought  bril- 
liantly, but  pro  nihilo.  An  exchanged  prisoner,  a  doc- 
tor, had  learnt  the  dispatch  by  heart,  and  wrote  it 
down  afterwards  in  Germany. 

All  efforts  which  have  been  made  by  politicians 
and  others  to  induce  Falkenhayn  to  take  Austria  in 
hand  and  teach  her  discipline  have  been  in  vain.  Here 
we  see  and  hear  little  from  Pless.  I  have  therefore 
reconsidered  my  plan  of  going  to  Dantzig.  Yesterday 
I  wrote  to  Hindenburg,  and  told  him  that  I  would  pay 
him  a  visit  directly  he  had  finished  his  present  task. 
He  was  at  any  rate  in  calm  waters  again. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  2gth. 
This  morning  I  had  a  letter  from  Bassermann,  who 
tells  me  that  a  proclamation  from  the  All  Highest  is  to 
be  issued  on  August  ist,  which  is  likely  to  prove  some- 
thing of  a  fiasco  in  spite  of  a  fanfare  of  trumpets.  It 
was  to  contain  the  announcement  that  we  were  not 
carrying  on  a  war  of  conquest.  Further  words  to  the 
effect  that  we  had  no  intention  of  enlarging  our  fron- 
tiers, and  were  ready  to  make  peace,  had  been  after- 
wards crossed  out.  Bassermann  thinks  that  such  a 
proclamation  (a  confession  practically  of  our  defeat) 
would  make  the  very  worst  possible  impression,  both 
at  home  and  abroad.  He  entreated  me  to  prevent  the 
making  public  of  its  contents.  It  is  true  that  all  such 
inspired  utterances  and  pamphlets  tend  in  the  same 
direction.     I  telephoned  at  once  to  Berlin,  to  procure 


356  MY    MEMOIRS 

further  authority,  then  I  went  to  Pless.  But  the 
Chancellor  had  already  left  for  Berlin.  In  Pless  I 
called  on  Wild  von  Hohenboen,  who  knew  nothing 
about  the  above  subject,  but  was  shocked  when  I  told 
him.  But  meanwhile  I  did  not  consider  the  authority 
I  got  sufficient  with  which  to  approach  Bethmann, 
much  less  the  Kaiser.  Bethmann  could  easily  repudi- 
ate the  interpretation  as  an  insult.  Wild  von  Hohen- 
boen appeared  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the  news  from 
Russia,  where  all  has  not  succeeded  so  well  as  was 
hoped,  hence  no  surrendering  and  the  prospect  of  Rus- 
sia settling  down  permanently,  and  we  likewise  con- 
gealing. At  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  Russia 
might  have  given  in  at  the  first  bid,  but  not  now. 
Then  we  had  a  long  talk  on  the  subject  of  Turkey;  he 
takes  the  state  of  things  there  very  seriously.  At  six 
o'clock  Miiller  has  appointed  to  see  me.  I  don't  know 
what  he  wants.  In  all  probability  to  talk  about  sub- 
ordinate personnel,  connected  with  Admiralty  business. 

With  reference  to  the  official  report  of  the  fighting 
on  the  Mainz  on  August  28th,  one  can  gather  from 
it  how  strong  our  fleet  was,  and  how  it  would  have 
disinguished  itself  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  if  it 
had  been  put  to  the  test. 

Miiller  has  been,  and  the  upshot  of  the  visit  was 
much  what  I  anticipated.  He  knew  about  the  procla- 
mation, but  disputed  the  contents.  The  Chancellor 
too  is  still  undecided  as  to  whether  they  shall  be 
allowed  to  stand.  A  dispatch  from  our  military  at- 
tache in  Athens  represents  the  Greeks  as  resenting 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  '357 

intimidation  on  the  part  of  England,  who  wants  to 
force  Greece  into  the  war.  According  to  their  news- 
papers, they  are  displaying  more  pluck  in  this  respect 
than  Holland. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  30th. 

You  will,  of  course,  have  read  the  article  in  the 
Kreus  Zeitung  of  yesterday  which  criticises  the  pro- 
posed tendency  of  the  proclamation.  Miiller  conferred 
to-day  with  Treutler,  who  naturally  expressed  him^ 
self  very  pleased  at  the  whole  tone  of  the  proclamation, 
and  saw  nothing  in  it  to  find  fault  with.  For  the  rest, 
Miiller  carefully  kept  off  the  subject  of  the  American 
Note. 

Emanuelssegen, 
July  sist. 
Letters  from  J.  and  U.  just  to  hand.  They  are, 
with  justice,  infuriated  about  the  Note  and  the  con- 
duct of  our  affairs.  A  change  can  only  come  about 
if  Falkenhayn,  Bethmann,  Jagow,  Miiller,  and  all  their 
crew  go.  In  fact  a  clean  sweep  is  wanted  of  the  whole 
bad  system.  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  work  it  alone. 
The  political  parties  when  they  went  over  to  Beth- 
mann, on  account  of  the  submarine  question,  fell, 
although  they  knew  the  saying,  "  march  separately, 
fight  together."  Even  so  the  press  is  about  to  veer 
round.  Behuke  writes,  beside  himself,  over  the  de- 
terioration of  the  submarine  activity  in  consequence 
of  the  limitations  imposed  on  it.     As  U.  writes,  the 


358  MY    MEMOIRS 

fact  that  the  submarines  have  functioned,  so  to  speak, 
has  doubtless  been  hidden  from  America.  I  have 
from  the  first  always  stuck  out  for  energetic  measures 
towards  America,  but  could,  however,  never  achieve 
more  than  per  far  figure,  as  the  ways  and  means  of 
acting  did  not  lie  in  my  department.  Later  I  will 
tell  U.  of  my  one  to  two  hours'  audience  with  the 
Chancellor.  I  convinced  him  to  a  certain  degree.  But 
twelve  hours  afterwards  he  had  turned  round.  How 
little  reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  parliamentarians  is 
demonstrated  by  the  National  Liberals  being  in  the  act 
of  turning  their  coat  on  the  Belgian  question.  What  is 
now  the  public  opinion  of  which  U.  writes  that  it  is 
running  high?  The  revolution  in  the  leadership  of  our 
grand  but  too  modest  people  can  only  be  brought  about 
by  men  who  are  free  to  act.  Neither  the  army  nor  the 
navy  can  do  it.  I  don't  mean  to  say  by  that,  all 
cannot  work  together.  But  one  can't  go  and  shout 
on  the  housetops  when  one  has  resigned  office.  For 
me  it  is  particularly  hard,  when  I  reflect  on  the  hur- 
rahs of  the  enemy  elicited  by  the  possibility  of  my 
retirement  and  its  consequent  effects.  In  this  connec- 
tion I  may  remark  that  Wild  von  Hohenboen  at  my 
recent  interview  expressed  himself  strongly  about  my 
and  Bachmann's  attempted  resignations;  he  said  that 
for  his  part  he  couldn't  understand  such  conduct  on 
our  side  .  .  .  obviously  he  very  much  disapproved 
of  it.  U.  is  also  at  one  with  me  in  saying  that  we 
must,  wherever  possible,  watch  for  succeess  in  the 
east. 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  359 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  1st. 
We  drove  to  Pless  to  solemnize  in  the  church  the 
anniversary  of  the  outbreak  of  war.  Little  gathering 
in  front  of  the  castle.  I  told  His  Majesty  that  he 
should  console  himself  by  looking  into  the  future;  all 
would  certainly  go  well  yet,  if  we  only  stood  "  firm." 
H.M.  said  that  of  course  we  should  stand  "  firm."  I 
heard  from  the  aide-de-camp  that  the  proclamation 
had  been  published.  We  then  went  into  the  tiny 
church,  which  was  full  to  the  door.  The  pastor  gave 
out  that  the  collection  was  for  the  Red  Cross.  The 
service  was  very  reverent  and  uplifting,  and  taken  by 
a  very  old  clergyman,  simple,  to  the  point,  and  cer- 
tainly his  own  convictions.  "  Till  now  the  Lord  has 
helped  us;  understand,  dear  brothers  and  sisters.  He 
has  helped  us.  God  desires  it  of  us  that  we  too  should 
help  ourselves  to  the  utmost,  in  the  purest  sense,  and 
then  He  would  help,"  etc.  H.M.  talked  on  the  way 
back  from  church  to  the  castle,  again  about  the  Second 
Punic  war,  with  which  he  evidently  comforted  him- 
self. I  combated  the  view  as  much  as  I  possibly  could. 
After  that  fearful  struggle  there  was  a  long  pause  of 
from  fifty  to  a  hundred  years;  all  we  had  to  think 
about  now  was  how  this  war  was  to  end.  The  fine 
old  pastor  divided  his  discourse  into  two  parts.  Retro- 
spective and  Prospective.  With  regard  to  the  pros- 
pects he  said,  "  Enormous  exertions  are  still  in  front 
of  us,  in  order  to  overthrow  our  enemies,  and  then 


360  MY    MEMOIRS 

will  come  the  heavy  trial  of  peace  negotiations.  Then 
shall  we  not  say :  '  Till  now  the  Lord  has  helped  us  '  ? 
but  we  shall  also  say,  '  Be  not  afraid,  the  Lord  is  with 
Thee. ' "  It  was  much  to  be  regretted  that  Treutler 
wasn't  there.  Pohl  has  again  been  trying  through  his 
first  "  aide  "  to  succeed  in  doing  what  Prince  Adalbert 
failed  recently  to  achieve  at  Charleville.  He  wants  to 
get  a  command  issued  for  the  fleet  to  stay  in.  Miiller 
now  finds  this  desire  on  Pohl's  part  very  reasonable. 
Bachmann  was  enraged,  but  unluckily  possesses  little 
power  in  spite  of  his  nominally  influential  post. 
Should  Miiller  and  the  Kaiser  continue  to  hold  fast 
by  this  opinion,  then  Trotha  has  a  very  poor  prospect 
of  succeeding  in  his  exertions.  The  Court-Chamber- 
lain von  X.  took  a  turn  with  me  in  front  of  the  castle, 
and  told  me  that  the  Kaiser  had  again  spoken  in  an 
appreciative  tone  of  me,  and  said  that  in  the  years 
before  the  war  and  at  its  outbreak  I  was  the  only  one 
who  had  recognized  the  danger  existing  with  regard 
to  England.  Then  X.  said  we  had  better  not  chat 
together  longer  or  it  would  rouse  suspicion.  There 
were  only  Treutler,  Valentine,  Lyncker,  and  Plessen 
outside  the  castle.  Isn't  that  a  sign  of  the  glass  house 
that  I  inhabit? 

It  is  reported  that  three  Prussian  officers  have  been 
court-martialled  and  shot  by  the  French  for  a  mere 
trifling  offence.  Wild  suggests  threatening  reprisals. 
Bethmann  is  against,  the  Kaiser  in  favour.  Bethmann 
thought  it  would  be  too  brutal.     Wild  was  going  to 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  361 

confer  with  Treutler  on  the  matter,  and  is  furious 
about  it.  Now  you  see  from  this  what  sort  of  society 
it  is  of  which  the  Kaiser  is  the  centre. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  2nd. 

The  Declaration  of  London  is  less  favourable  for 
us  than  U.  imagines.  It  all  turns  on  the  idea  of  free 
exports.  According  to  definitions  hitherto  existing, 
there  is  no  equivalent  in  it  for  the  giving  up  by  us  of 
the  submarine  warfare.  I  have  had  a  message  from 
Hindenburg  with  thanks  for  my  letter  and  "  Letter 
will  follow." 

No  news  from  the  east.  Prince  Eitel  has  written 
that  the  footguards  again  have  had  heavy  casualties. 
One  could  put  up  with  that  if  there  was  any  certainty 
to  look  forward  to  of  ultimate  success  in  the  east, 
Surely  to  obtain  this  it  would  be  worth  while  stirring 
ourselves  up  to  confiding  the  whole  business  to  Hin- 
denburg.   Oh  vanitas  vanitatum. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  3rd. 

We  have  picked  up  flash-light  decrees  according  to 
which  the  English  send  out  "  armed  parties  "  to  the 
neutral  ships,  and  then  attack  with  them  our  subma- 
rines. If  the  limitations  aren't  abolished,  our  U-boats 
can't  go  on  for  long  like  this.  We  are  planning  new 
proposals  in  this  connection.  Really  I  cannot  see  why 
our  officials  at  the  Foreign  Office  should  make  us  so 
cheap  now,  and  bow  their  knees.    We  have  made  con- 


362  MY    MEMOIRS 

cessions  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  justice  and  have 
had  our  ears  boxed  before  the  whole  world  more  than 
once.  That's  all  the  easier  for  the  Yankees  to  do, 
because  they  have  doubtless  heard  from  Jagow  of  the 
limitations  of  our  submarine  war,  and  now  the  Eng- 
lish will  know  it  too  and  be  jubilant.  Their  trade 
will  improve  again.  Concerning  Russia,  Wild  von 
Hohenboen  has  told  me  without  any  instigation  that  at 
the  beginning  of  the  "  push  "  in  Galicia,  if  we  had 
tried,  we  could  have  treated  with  Russia  and  success 
would  have  been  probable,  but  now  now.  People  in 
touch  with  Falkenhayn,  however,  think  that  Peters- 
burg can  scarcely  hold  out  the  winter,  and  Turkey,  on 
the  other  hand,  may  go  to  pieces.  Roumania  as  before 
is  quite  inaccessible,  and  the  idea  is  to  use  threats  to- 
wards her.  Whether  that  is  right,  from  a  military 
point  of  view,  I'm  not  in  a  position  to  say.  Politically 
it  is  right  to  act  vigorously  with  Austria.  One  cher- 
ishes for  her  a  tremendous,  and  to  my  mind  quite  un- 
justifiable respect.  Hindenburg  has  sent  me  a  very 
friendly  invitation.  I  intend  to  start  on  Thursday  the 
5th.  As  he  is  said  to  eschew  all  politics,  I  fear  my 
mission  will  not  be  very  fruitful  in  results.  But  I  shall 
try  to  make  the  Belgian  and  English  questions  clear 
to  him  from  my  standpoint. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  4th. 
Through  the  excitement  caused  by  the  proclamation 
in  Berlin,  I  take  it  as  a  certainty  that  it  has  undergone 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  363 

alterations.  Thus  I  am  all  the  more  enraged  at  the 
whole  Bethmann-inspired  press  interpreting  the  actual 
words  of  the  proclamation  in  a  different  sense  from 
what  they  are  meant  to  convey.  It  is  at  the  same  time 
so  crassly  stupid  to  understate  the  significance  of  our 
pugnacious  guarantees,  even  if  the  Chancellor  doesn't 
intend  to  hold  to  them.  It  is  not  a  question,  in  all  con- 
science, of  exploiting  the  spirit  of  our  people  for  the 
time  that  is  to  come  after  the  war,  but  in  every  eventu- 
ality to  influence  the  market  at  the  conclusion  of  peace 
in  our  favour.  I  haven't  much  faith  in  the  Reichstag's 
influence  since  it  turned  tail  about  the  submarine  ques- 
tion. I  cannot  altogether  say  that  Capelle  advised 
me  badly  on  the  U-boat  affair.  He  had  politely  agreed 
to  my,  at  that  time,  proffered  resignation,^  and  in  the 
answer  it  is  confirmed  that  Bethmann  and  Falkenhayn 
had  crippled  the  submarine  warfare,  and  the  existence 
of  the  actual  proffer  of  resignation  is  proved. 

I  send  you  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung.  The  whole 
Chancellor  press  is  now  tending  towards  the  retention 
of  Courland  in  order  to  compensate  the  German  people 
for  the  loss  of  Belgium.  In  the  east  we  have  made 
good  progress  to-day.  The  granting  of  a  loan  to  Bul- 
garia by  Berlin  and  Vienna  may  be  regarded  at  least 
as  a  rapprochement,  and  it  seems  to  me  further  em- 
phasized by  the  fact  that  a  Bulgarian  military  attache 
was  present — so  I  have  just  been  told — at  the  pres- 
entation of  the  terms  of  agreement  to  the  General  Staff. 
But  I  shall  not  believe  in  those  fellows  till  they  have 

'  In  June,  1915,  after  the  Lusitania  Note. 


364  MY    MEMOIRS 

fired  a  shot.  It  would  be  too  refreshing  after  so  many 
disappointments,  and  might  constitute  a  real  turning- 
point. 

The  chief  cause  of  my  position  in  Charleville  being 
further  embittered  is  that  Pohl  goes  about  everywhere 
stirring  up  animus  against  me. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  5th. 
Ah,  it  is  indeed  well  that  my  old  master  did  not  live 
to  see  this  war,  and  my  position  in  relation  to  it.  The 
tone  that  prevails  in  the  fleet  is,  I  hear,  everywhere 
despairing.  But  Trotha  will  not  be  able  to  alter  any- 
thing. There  exists  a  regular  constellation  of  per- 
sonalia unfavourable  to  me :  the  Kaiser,  who  won't 
give  me  up  to  the  fleet,  the  Cabinet  chiefs,  the  men 
round  Bethmann,  and  also  Falkenhayn.  He  does  not 
answer  Hindenburg's  purpose,  who,  in  spite  of  that, 
keeps  him  at  the  rudder.  Warsaw  is  said  to  have 
fallen,  but  there  is  no  official  confirmation  of  these 
reports.  Nicholas  N.  is  a  fine  chap;  the  whole  High 
Command  of  the  Russian  army,  admirable  though  in 
organization,  officers,  industry,  etc.,  doesn't  come  up 
to  ours.  The  farther  we  penetrate  into  Russia,  the 
better  pleased  are  the  English.  It  is  quite  true  that 
the  more  we  progress  eastwards,  the  more  our  policy 
is  guided  in  the  same  direction.  There  is  no  longer 
any  doubt  that  the  Chancellor  and  the  Kaiser  too,  and 
the  folk  aiitour  de  lui,  are  coming  to  the  decision  of 
giving  up  Belgium  at  once.     An  article  in  the  Kreus 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  365 

Zeitung  made  me  suspicious  of  this  some  time  ago.  I 
have  had  a  document  drawn  up  by  the  Admiralty 
which  deals  with  England's  and  our  economic  ques- 
tions. The  inquiry  is  very  satisfactory  for  us,  espe- 
cially after  the  installation  of  the  submarines,  though 
in  accordance  with  our  orders  these  have  fallen  off 
in  the  Atlantic.  I  believe  too  that  England  will  by 
degrees  accommodate  herself  better  to  the  situation. 
Our  people  have  rendered  splendid  assistance  in  this 
past  year  of  war,  but  whether  it  can  go  till  a  sound 
peace  has  been  obtained  for  us  is  doubtful;  the  superi- 
ority of  forces  against  us  is  so  enormous,  and  our 
policy  so  bad.  The  whole  of  North  America  must 
practically  be  numbered  among  our  enemies.  If  there 
existed  in  Switzerland  any  lofty  consciousness  of  Eu- 
rope's future  shaping,  she  would  participate  actively, 
but  she  is  no  more  likely  to  do  it  than  Sweden,  al- 
though her  entry  would,  without  any  doubt,  settle 
everything.  Sweden,  according  to  my  calculations, 
could  be  won  over,  if  we  set  about  it  in  the  right  way. 
I  have  an  admirable  coadjutor  in  Mann,  and  can 
wholly  rely  on  him.  The  longer  I  work  with  him,  the 
greater  is  my  confidence  in  him,  which  is  saying  a 
great  deal.  It  has  never  been  the  same  in  an  equal 
degree  with  Capelle.  Not  that  I  haven't  a  high  opinion 
of  his  shrewdness  and  parliamentary  knowledge,  which 
I  have  always  valued.  Just  at  present  he  is  partly, 
in  spite  of  himself,  influenced  by  the  circumstance 
that  he  is  undoubtedly  destined  to  be  my  successor. 
F.  E.  belongs  to  those  Germans  who  invariably  boil 


366  MY    MEMOIRS 

over  from  sentimental  or  other  motives.  The  saying 
of  the  Great  Frederick  with  regard  to  the  art  of  poli- 
tics is  certainly  right.  ("The  great  art  in  politics 
is  not  to  swim  against  the  stream,  but  to  turn  all 
events  to  one's  own  advantage.")  But  it  is  not  ap- 
plicable to  the  moment  when  action  should  have  been 
taken,  and  I  have  stood  out  for  these  questions  during 
the  war  and  have  beaten  my  head  against  the  wall 
which  surrounds  the  Kaiser  (see  Clause witz  on  the 
catastrophe  of  1806).  What  would  have  happened  to 
me  if  I  too  had  locked  myself  inside  that  wall?  I 
alone  should  not  have  had  the  power  to  break  through 
it.  In  181 3  it  was  broken  in  from  the  outside,  and 
then  even  enough  was  left  of  it  to  deprive  Prussia  of 
some  of  the  fruits  of  her  terrific  exertions. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  6th. 
Rejoicings  over  the  fall  of  Warsaw  are  only  half- 
hearted. As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  taken  only  the 
western  half,  and  that  affords  proof  that  the  Russian 
army  has,  in  reality,  slipped  away  and  escaped  being 
enveloped.  At  last,  the  Highest  Command  of  the 
army  have  convinced  themselves  that  something  must 
be  done  for  Turkey,  and  by  way  of  Serbia  too.  A 
train  of  circumstances  has  led  up  to  this  conclusion. 
Bachmann  addressed  an  urgent  letter  to  Falkenhayn 
on  the  subject  of  Turkey.  Also  our  ambassador  in 
Roumania  has  advised  against  a  hostile  attitude  to 
her.     Austria  wants  too  to  go  for  Serbia.     I  have 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  367 

only  been  able  to  help  a  little,  in  an  indirect  way. 
We  ought,  in  my  opinion,  to  cut  off  Roumania  eco- 
nomically, and  give  her  the  cold  shoulder  entirely. 
The  stupid  part  of  it  is  that  we  have  got  wheat  lying 
in  Roumania  for  which  we  have  paid  in  advance; 
an  incredible  piece  of  blindness.  But  I  hope  all  will 
come  right  if  Turkey  can  be  kept  going.  Our  two 
new  submarines  are  on  the  way.  May  the  Lord  pro- 
tect them;  I  don't  know  whether  England  has  got 
wind  of  them.  The  coast  in  Flanders  is  guarded  more 
strongly  than  ever.  Massing  of  troops  continues  to 
take  place  in  the  Dardanelles,  on  islands  taken  from 
Greece.  Have  you  read  the  National  Liberals'  Vote 
of  Confidence?  It  assures  downfall.  But  one  can 
put  little  faith  in  their  stability.  The  third  publication 
in  the  Norddeutschen  Allgemeinen  of  dispatches  from 
the  Belgian  Ambassador  is  again  stupendous.  It  is 
a  source  of  wonder  to  me  that  the  Foreign  Office 
allow  them  to  be  published.  Can't  we  see  as  clearly 
as  these  gentlemen?  If  any  one  of  us  had  entertained 
such  views  before  the  war,  he  would  have  been  the 
bete-noir  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  The  dispatches  are 
expressive  of  the  veriest  scorn  of  our  constant  scrap- 
ping. While  England's  elaborate  preparations  for  war 
were  going  on,  for  our  navy  since  1909  no  sum  at 
all  had  been  voted.  What  a  different  debut  the  navy 
would  have  made  in  the  war  if  the  whole  amount 
(tale)  of  1912  had  been  granted  instead  of  30,000,000 
to  40,000,000  yearly  being  squandered  by  the  Treasury 
and    Chancellor!      The    Belgian    gentlemen    foresaw^ 


368  MY    MEMOIRS 

quite  correctly  that  the  fleet  as  a  bogy  for  the  mob 
would  be  used  solely  as  a  pretext  by  Grey  and  com- 
pany. Our  increasing  superiority  over  the  English 
in  trade  and  industries — in  short,  the  greed  for  mo- 
nopolies, and  sheer  envy,  were  the  causes.  We  wob- 
bled and  wavered.  Russia  we  incensed  by  our  recent 
Balkan  policy.  That  was  what  U.  noticed  in  the 
utterances  of  Prince  Gagarin.  The  blunder  is  hardly 
to  be  repaired,  and  we  are  being  driven  forward  into 
lasting  hostilities  with  Russia. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  7th. 
Yesterday  the  Chancellor  led  me  a  dance  once  more. 
Vexation  over  it  gave  me  a  sleepless  night.  This 
morning  I  went  to  Pless  for  an  audience  with  Beth- 
mann.  Helfferich  (secretary  to  the  Treasury),  has 
directed  a  long  epistle — perhaps  by  order — to  Beth- 
mann.  Helfferich  (Secretary  to  the  Treasury),  has 
abandonment  of  the  submarine  warfare,  but  a  com- 
munication to  Wilson  to  that  effect.  The  Chancellor 
is  calling  in  Falkenhayn  and  Mijller  to  help  him.  In 
principle  the  Kaiser  has  also  been  won  over.  The 
affair  will  be  managed  so  that  the  Kaiser  via  Miiller 
gives  express  instructions  to  the  submarines  and  these 
will  be  conveyed  secretly  to  Wilson.  It  is  the  same 
thing  over  again,  though  this  time  the  German  public 
is  supposed  to  have  been  prepared,  owing  to  me.  I  have 
never  concealed  my  attitude.  Toward  the  end  of 
the  month  you  may  expect  me  in  Blasien.     First  of 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  369 

all  a  dispatch  from  Bernstorff  is  expected,  who,  as  I 
remarked  to  Bethmann,  is  sure  to  sing  in  the  same 
key.  I  believe  that  the  whole  affair  has  been  arranged 
according  to  plan.  Whether  anything  will  come  of 
my  journey  to  the  east  remains  to  be  seen.  I  am 
depressed  in  soul.  All  trouble  and  efforts  seem  to  have 
been  in  vain. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  8th. 

Heavy  fighting  has  been  going  on  since  yesterday 
in  the  Dardanelles.  The  English  know,  without  doubt, 
that  our  submarines  there  are  not  available  yet  for 
action.  In  consequence  they  have  brought  all  their 
ships  there  and  have  opened  a  frightful  bombardment 
on  all  the  forts  and  all  the  positions.  The  situation 
is  obviously  very  critical.  How  earnestly  I  have 
urged,  alas!  in  vain,  that  more  of  our  submarines 
should  be  sent  thither,  and  at  greater  speed.  Should 
the  Dardanelles  fall,  then  the  world-war  has  been 
decided  against  us. 

This  morning  at  11.30  renewed  audience  with  His 
Majesty,  who  told  me,  to  begin  with,  that  he  did 
not  want  to  send  a  reply  Note  to  America.  He  would 
of  course  leave  himself  a  loophole.  Bernstorff's  dis- 
patch was  now  being  awaited.  Miiller  has  bowed  en- 
tirely to  the  opinion  of  the  Chancellor.  We  have  in 
front  of  us  an  affair  which  has  been  planned  out  for 
weeks  beforehand.  The  bankers  too  have  been  in- 
volved in  it.     Afterwards,  a  long  political  discussion. 


370  MYMEMOIRS 

The  Kaiser  was  less  gracious  to  me,  whether  in  con- 
sequence of  the  attitude  I  have  taken  up,  I  don't  know. 
Milller  pretends  that  the  Kaiser  knows  nothing  definite 
about  the  conversations  between  me  and  Bethmann. 

Wild  von  Hoen  has  been  kept  informed  by  Bach- 
mann  and  is  furious  about  the  whole  affair.  Beth- 
mann has  promised  me  that  before  taking  further  steps 
he  will  consult  me.  It  appears  that  through  my  ac- 
tion time  has  been  gained,  and  that  is  of  some  value. 
The  Crown  Prince  has  been  sounded. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  gth. 
Milller  was  closeted  with  me  for  two  and  a  half 
hours,  and  I  have  worked  on  him  strongly.  For  the 
time  being  I  have  convinced  him,  but  for  how  long 
is  another  question.  I  start  the  day  after  to-morrow 
for  Berlin,  stay  there  a  day,  and  then  to  Hindenburg. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  loth. 
This  morning  at  Pless,  His  Majesty  with  many  kind 
words  handed  me  the  order  pour  le  merite,  in  honour 
of  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the  annexation  of 
^Heligoland,  with  special  congratulations  on  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  ports  and  defences  there.  Admiral 
Miiller  was  asked  to  fasten  it  on  me.  Whether  it 
was  the  result  of  the  two  hours  and  a  half  conversa- 
tion, I  don't  know,  but  would  rather  think  not,  as  my 
invitation — without  Bachmann — had  come  previously. 
I   told   Miiller  that   I   was  very  much  touched,   but 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  371 

could  take  little  pleasure  in  the  events  attending  the 
present  course  of  the  war  at  sea.  Besides,  through 
it  the  resolve  I  had  communicated  to  him  would  be 
rendered  more  difficult  for  me.  Miiller  thought  it 
arose  from  the  latest  attitude  of  the  Chancellor.  On 
my  asking  further,  if  the  Kaiser  were  likely  to  stand 
firm,  he  said  that  he  thought  yes.  I  had,  however, 
the  feeling  that  Miiller  might  be  running  with  the 
hare  and  hunting  with  the  hounds.  For  the  moment 
the  danger  seems  averted,  unless  another  Lusitania 
case  comes  to  pass,  which,  judging  from  the  conduct 
of  Treutler,  seems  to  be  in  the  air.  My  attitude,  in 
the  event  of  Helfferich's  proposals  falling  through, 
was  moreover  as  categorical  as  anyone  could  desire. 
Now  the  matter  of  Notes  and  what  is  connected  with 
them  has  so  fallen  out  that  we  can  resume  submarine 
activity  to  the  utmost  of  our  capacity,  as  soon  as  the 
war  on  land  shapes  itself  more  favourably;  thus  my 
staying  on  has  been  of  some  use.  If  Helfiferich  had 
pressed  his  point  and  gained  it,  then  it  would  not 
have  been  possible.  The  relations  of  Pohl  to  Miiller 
have  certainly  been  severely  strained.  The  latter  says 
that  directly  we  are  secure  against  new  enemies  by  land, 
we  must  resume  the  submarine  warfare  ruthlessly.  Al- 
ways up  and  down !  In  many  respects  it  would  be  use- 
ful to  continue  my  sojourn  here,  in  spite  of  that — 
nota  bene,  against  the  advice  of  Capelle.  I  shall  not 
let  myself  be  detained,  but  travel  to-morrow  to  Berlin 
and  in  the  evening  of  the  next  day  to  Lotzen.  Miiller 
urges  me  strongly  to  speak  without  any  reserve  to 


372  MY    MEMOIRS 

Hindenburg.  Miiller  and  many  others  are  not  satisfied 
with  Falkenhayn,  and  neither  is  Hindenburg.  Great 
losses  through  frontal  attacks,  but  no  pulverizing  of 
Russia.  The  latter  has  of  course  had  immense  casual- 
ties, though  without  sustaining  any  perceptible  damage. 
The  old  Arch-duke  and  several  Austrians  present, 
among  them  Conrad  von  Hatzendorflf,  with  whom  I 
could  have  talked  much  longer  if  I  hadn't  been  so 
closely  observ^ed  by  the  Kaiser.  Young  Knorr  has 
carried  out  a  brilliant  mine-laying  operation.  An  Eng- 
glish  fast  cruiser  destroyed  in  combat,  and  such-like. 
He  came  back  towards  our  coast  and  there  was  taken 
prisoner.  Pohl  has  again  omitted  to  provide  a  base 
for  the  damaged  cruiser  which  Knorr  commanded. 
He  had  a  crew  of  120  men,  40  English  prisoners, 
with  4  officers  on  board.  After  the  sinking  of  his  ship 
he  reached  a  Swedish  schooner  (the  Eyster  Tiet)  with 
130  men.  Further  particulars  are  still  unknown. 
Bulgaria,  according  to  my  opinion,  won't  make  any 
signs  of  friendship  so  long  as  our  guns  are  silent  on 
the  Danube;  still  Bulgaria  has  already  to  some  extent 
shown  her  hand. 

Berlin", 
August  i2th. 
A  day  of  intense  heat  in  Berlin.  I  shall  have  to  leave 
at  ten  o'clock  for  Lotzen.  Here  little  that  is  satisfac- 
tory. Command  in  the  navy  all  at  sixes  and  sevens; 
the  Kaiser,  Miiller,  Pohl,  Prince  Henry,  and  so  on. 
The  fleet  again  let  slip  an  opportunity  when  Knorr 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  373 

came  back.  In  the  east,  hazardous  operations  with 
absolutely  no  prospect  of  success.  Roumania,  before 
defining  her  attitude,  given  a  sum  of  400,000,000  marks 
for  wheat  and  is  making  a  long  nose  at  us,  and  Turkey 
in  continual  danger,  and  no  relief  in  prospect  for 
her  through  Falkenhayn.  Peace-talk  in  the  Norddeut- 
schen  Allgemeincn,  which  will  generally  be  interpreted 
as  weakness.  The  Chancellor  has  a  cue  for  me  in  mind, 
i.e.  peace  at  any  price,  England  not  to  be  irritated; 
action  of  submarines  only  to  be  postponed  till  after 
the  Reichstag,  because  the  preparations  are  not  yet 
sufficient  and  not  yet  ripe  for  ruin.  Trotha  has  written 
in  despair. 

This  morning  I  had  a  long  talk  with  Rosicke,  I 
believe  satisfactory.  He  was  profoundly  astonished 
when  I  explained  my  views  to  him  and  declared  the 
arch-enemy  to  be  Trust  magnates  in  New  York,  Lon- 
don, and  Paris,  who  had  imbibed  the  idiotic  pan- 
Slavism  stunt.  He  hadn't  expected  any  such  opinion 
from  me,  as  in  the  Reichstag  I  had  always  supported 
the  Left.  I  told  him  that  as  I  was  merely  tolerated  at 
my  post,  standing  alone  and  opposed  from  every  side 
(outside  Parliament),  I  had  accepted  any  help  I  could 
get. 

Tableau  L  He  stood  out  for  big  agricultural  ac- 
quisitions in  the  east  as  a  counter-blast  against  any 
increase  of  Belgian  industries.  Later  I  met  Count 
Taube.^  He  was  very  pleased  to  see  me.  I  stirred 
up  MiJller  to  take  Count  Taube  to  the  Kaiser,  owing 
'  Swedish  Ambassador  in  Berlin. 


374  MY    MEMOIRS 

to  my  departure.     I  can't  do  anything  further,  which 
is  to  be  regretted. 


LOTZEN, 

August  isth. 
To-day  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  arrived  here. 
Long  conversation  with  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff, 
complete  convergence  of  views  on  the  situation  as  a 
whole.  Hindenburg  sees  no  prospect  of  altering  the 
state  of  things,  autour  du  roi.  The  "  mass  "  was  too 
impenetrable.  He  had  implored  the  Kaiser  not  to  fol- 
low the  counsels  of  von  F.  Also  in  the  last  great 
operations  he  had  urgently  advised  against  the  strat- 
egy which  always  went  on  attacking  from  the  front, 
so  that  the  Russians  by  this  method  were  able  to  slip 
away,  and  which  had  cost  us  enormous  losses.  Ac- 
cording to  Hindenburg's  and  Ludendorff's  opinion, 
the  whole  Russian  army  would  have  been  captured 
three  weeks  ago  if  they  had  been  pursued.  He  had 
written  to  the  Kaiser  to  the  effect  that  the  whole 
German  people  who  had  rendered  such  grand  assist- 
ance looked  up  to  their  Kaiser,  but  mistrusted  the 
strategy  and  leadership  of  the  High  Command  .  .  . 
all  to  no  purpose.  After  that  I  can't  wonder  that  I 
have  achieved  so  little,  though  Hindenburg  strikes 
me  as  having,  in  spite  of  all,  a  consciousness  of  having 
performed  something  great,  the  memory  of  which  he 
will  carry  with  him  to  the  grave.  It  is  touching  to 
see  how  the  people  here  honour  him,  young  and  old; 
the  aged  granddames  and  young  mothers  hush  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  375 

children  in  awe  and  all  salute  as  he  comes  along.  He 
can  hardly  move  for  flowers.  The  loyalty,  trustwor- 
thiness, and  simplicity  of  his  character  are  positively 
refreshing  after  one  comes  from  the  cursed  crew  of 
intriguers  at  Pless.  I  have  spoken  straight  from  my 
heart ;  and  he  and  Ludendorff  likewise.  He  will  give 
me  all  the  support  he  can  for  Turkey  and  the  subma- 
rines. We  are  at  one  on  the  question  of  Belgium  and 
Russia,  but  the  fact  remains  that  Falkenhayn  has  the 
power  in  his  hand.  Group  Hindenburg,  group  Prince 
Leopold,  group  Mackensen,  all  are  subject  to  Falken- 
hayn. 

This  afternoon,  beautiful  trip  and  walk  round  a  por- 
tion of  the  lake  and  through  the  Boyen  forts  .  .  . 
explanation  of  the  Russian  position.  The  fellows 
had  been  here,  devilish  close,  and  ruins  marked  the 
places  they  had  temporarly  conquered.  Very  pleas- 
ant gathering  at  mess.  I  am  well  entertained  and  look 
forward  with  pleasure  to  travelling  to-morrow  in  my 
saloon-carriage  to  Memel,  and  from  there  on  by  motor 
to  Libau.  Nine  hours  by  motor  from  here  would 
have  been  a  little  too  much.  Besides  in  my  saloon- 
carriage  (special  train)  I  can  read  and  finish  my  letters 
for  the  post,  but  in  the  next  few  days  you  will  get 
no  letters  from  me  as  I  shall  at  earliest  not  be  able 
to  post  to  you  before  August  17th.  It  is  already  rather 
autumnal  here. 

Morning  early.  At  about  8  a.m.  Hindenburg  fetches 
me  for  a  walk.  He  said  when  I  remarked  on  the 
greetings  everywhere  of  the  population  in  all  the  vil- 


376  MY    MEMOIRS 

lages  and  hamlets,  "  Yes,  the  people  are  touchingly 
devoted,  but  I  would  gladly  do  without  some  of  that 
if  my  Imperial  master  would  be  a  little  less  distant 
virith  me." 

Supper  very  delightful.    Further  talk  with  Luden- 
dorflF. 

In  Special  Train,  Lotzen  to  Memel. 

August  14th. 
It  really  was  refreshing  to  spend  a  whole  day 
in  the  society  of  that  little  circle  at  Lotzen  (a  society 
of  brothers,  as  Hindenburg  expressed  it).  This  morn- 
ing from  8  till  9.30  I  took  a  glorious  walk  with  Hin- 
denburg. The  lake-landscape — with  its  beautiful 
woods,  its  undulating  fertile  country,  the  lakes,  which 
flashed  like  opals  in  the  evening  light,  and  in  the 
morning  like  floods  of  silver — revealed  itself  in  really 
enchanting  beauty;  the  air  crisp,  and  yet  not  at  all 
chilly.  Hindenburg  entirely  shares  my  outlook  and 
estimate  of  the  state  of  affairs.  He  swore  to  the 
Kaiser  in  Posen  that  he  would  make  things  different. 
But  His  Majesty  had  previously  been  instructed  by 
Falkenhayn  in  the  minutest  details,  and  told  Hinden- 
burg he  was  mistaken,  etc.  Now  we  have  sustained 
huge  losses  and  have  not  achieved  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy,  as  was  once  within  the  bounds  of  proba- 
bility, and  we  are  being  driven  slowly  and  surely  into 
a  war  of  defence.  After  the  first  extensive  successes 
on  this  front,  we  ought  to  have  made  the  best  use 
of  the  superiority  in  our  railways,  and  thrown  our 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  377 

armies  in  massed  formations  on  the  Left  Wing,  as 
the  Right,  owing  to  big  distances  and  defective  railway 
communications,  could  not  be  utilized  for  that  pur- 
pose. He  still  holds  this  would  be  the  right  thing 
to  do,  even  though  the  whole  gigantic  success  may  no 
longer  be  possible,  and  only  on  the  day  before  yester- 
day sent  a  vigorously  worded  telegram  to  Falkenhayn 
to  this  effect,  in  order  to  be  quite  loyal  to  Falkenhayn, 
and  not  to  the  Kaiser.  He  hoped  that  Falkenhayn 
may  yet  grasp  the  idea.  Is  not  all  this  too  fearful? 
Here  is  the  man  who  can  lead  soldiers  and  generals, 
who  would  be  capable  of  putting  everything  straight 
and  bringing  to  the  Kaiser  himself  the  fame  of  an 
overwhelming  victory,  and  he  is  intentionally  shunted 
on  one  side,  I  was  entertained  with  the  heartiest  kind- 
ness and  courtesy  in  Lotzen.  Hindenburg  made  a 
speech  which  abashed  me,  but  for  which  I  returned 
thanks  on  the  spot.  I  closed  with  the  hope  that  as 
once  the  sun  had  risen  in  the  east  for  Prussia  in  its 
darkest  hour,  so  now  in  these  serious  times  for  Ger- 
many and  Prussia  it  would  rise  again.  I  made  no 
secret  here  of  the  fact  that  the  fleet  had  been  inten- 
tionally and  craftily  held  back.  I  talked  over  my  posi- 
tion with  Hindenburg,  without  the  least  reserve.  He 
approved  of  my  conduct;  I  could  not  go  to  the  Kaiser 
and  say,  "  Give  me  the  fleet."  Nothing  would  pre- 
vent Hindenburg  from  coming  to  the  station  to  see 
me  ofif  at  10.45.  Ludendorff  declared  likewise  that  it 
was  impossible  to  effect  a  change  in  the  situation.  For 
the  rest  Hindenburg  promised  to  write  to  Bethmann 


378  MY   MEMOIRS 

and  urge  him  vigorously  to  do  something  in  the  in- 
terests of  Turkey,  and  the  submarines.  I  send  you 
his  motto,  which  Ludendorff  gave  me  at  the  station. 
By  4  P.M.  we  were  in  Memel,  then  three  hours  by 
motor  to  Libau.  The  Russians  have  plundered  here 
in  a  terrible  manner,  and  have  outraged  many  girls; 
some  run  about  half  mad,  others  have  drowned  them- 
selves. Helfferich's  scheme  is  already  known  in  Ber- 
lin and  considered  by  Westarp  and  Bassermann  to  be 
extremely  dangerous. 

Dantzig, 
August  15th. 

To-days  news  came  of  an  air-raid  on  London,  the 
sinking  of  a  light  cruiser  and  of  a  destroyer  in  the 
North  Sea.  Also  the  torpedoing  of  a  big  transport 
ship  in  the  ^gean  Sea,  by  a  little  U-boat,  isn't  bad. 
That  is  all  the  more  satisfactory  as  I  cannot  see  any 
proper  objective  for  our  operations  in  the  Gulf  of 
Riga,  where  the  danger  from  Russian  mines  and  sub- 
marines is  very  great — keeping  in  at  all  events  pro- 
duces not  the  least  possible  success.  I  haven't  advised 
the  Upper  Command  in  the  Baltic  in  vain  against  it. 

Libau  was  very  interesting.  They  have  created  a 
second  Wilhelmshaven  there,  but  when  it  was  ready 
they  found  that  Reval  was  a  more  suitable  base  for 
their  object.  A  real  Russian  trick.  The  place  con- 
tains about  70,000  to  80,000  inhabitants,  and  is  the 
bathing  place  for  Courland.  For  us,  that  is  for  the 
navy,  Libau  isn't  of  much  value.     The  question  of 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  379 

Courland  was  debated  with  zeal,  and  our  army  chiefs 
there  were  in  favour  of  keeping  it;  will  too  be 
difficult  to  leave  it.  There  is  of  course  no  question 
of  the  majority  of  the  population  wishing  to  be  Prus- 
sian, Perhaps  certain  Baltic  barons  form  the  excep- 
tion to  the  rule,  because  they  are  afraid  that  if  re- 
patriated they  would  be  hung  by  the  Russians.  On 
the  other  hand,  no  great  difficulties  would  arise  if 
Courland  was  converted  into  a  "  colony "  for  the 
next  twenty  years.  The  capture  of  Cracow  and  the 
advance  of  our  army  are  in  themselves  certainly  sat- 
isfactory occurrences,  but  in  no  way  decisive.  There 
is  absolutely  no  certainty  about  the  Balkans,  and  Tur- 
key's case  remains  the  grave  danger. 

Dantzig, 
August  igth. 
Yesterday  evening  at  the  Crown  Princess's.  Very 
graciously  received  by  her.  The  little  princes  drawn 
up  in  a  row,  and  behind  them  the  mother,  who  looked 
extraordinarily  well  and  pretty.  The  house  (a  pres- 
ent from  the  shrewd  town  of  Zoppot)  is  charmingly 
situated,  and  within  is  a  real  treasure  house.  The 
chief  room  on  the  ground  floor,  white  with  gold,  opens 
on  the  terrace,  whence  there  is  a  view  of  the  whole 
bay  beyond  the  shrubs  and  trees.  We  had  half  an 
hour's  conversation  alone.  I  expressed  myself  very 
frankly,  and  stood  up  especially  for  Hindenburg.  Cap- 
tain Mann  told  me  that  Prince  Joachim  had  written 
to  the  Crown  Princess  a  strong  letter,  asking  her  to 


38o  MY   MEMOIRS 

do  all  she  could — at  any  rate  as  far  as  her  husband 
was  concerned — to  support  Hindenburg,  who  was  be- 
ing kept  in  the  background,  and  then  she  added  in 
English,  "just  the  same  with  our  old  navy  man." 
The  Crown  Princess  told  me  that  Falkenhayn  had 
gained  tremendous  kudos  of  late  through  his  victories 
in  the  east.  I  said  they  weren't  the  victories  of  Fal- 
kenhayn, but  of  the  wearers  of  the  field-gray  uniform. 
In  my  opinion  Hindenburg  was  undoubtedly  in  the 
right.  Hindenburg,  Ludendorff,  and  Hoffmann  form 
a  distinguished  group  who  knew  the  skill  of  the  Rus- 
sians in  getting  out  of  a  hole.  Our  position  is  such 
that  we  want  something  more  than  mere  frontal  vic- 
tories with  heavy  losses.  Affairs  should  be  settled  in 
three  weeks  at  most.  These  three  weeks  for  Greece, 
Roumania  and  Company  may  also  be  decisive.  Let 
us  hope  all  will  yet  go  well,  but  the  outlook  is  full  of 
dangers. 

Between  Kustrin  and  Berun  (in  the  train), 

August  igth. 
In  spite  of  the  bumping  of  the  train  I  should  like 
to  try  to  write  you  a  few  lines  before  I  am  seized 
by  the  claws  of  Berlin.  I  have  only  read  extracts 
of  the  Chancellor's  speech,  as  reported  by  telegram. 
It  has  been  greeted  with  loud  applause.  What  he  said 
about  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  is  to  my  mind  mere 
hot  air;  he  will  easily  come  to  an  understanding  with 
England  on  that  kind  of  freedom.  The  most  impor- 
tant part  of  his  speech  was  that  which  dealt  with  the 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  381 

Polish  question.  We  have  been  clearly  making  peace 
proposals  to  Russia;  the  foreign  papers  are  full  of  it. 
The  menace  of  a  Poland  free  from  Russia  is  used  as 
a  lever.  There  is  confirmation  from  abroad  that  after 
Bethmann's  speech  Russia  answered  "  No."  In  the 
east  we  have  come  to  a  standstill,  at  which  England 
will  be  very  pleased.  I  thought  of  staying  a  few 
days  in  Berlin  to  get  information,  then  I  go  to  Pless 
for  an  audience,  and  shall  return  soon  after  to  Berlin. 
Capelle  being  seriously  ill,  I  shall  later  have  to  pro- 
long my  stay  in  Berlin  or  nothing  will  be  done  at  the 
office.  I  have  quite  understood  U.  in  his  application 
of  the  Declaration  of  London.  But  I  was  suspicious 
of  a  conclusion  of  peace,  proclaiming  it  as  Freedom 
of  the  Seas,  which  means  England  would  get  every- 
thing and  Germany  practically  nothing. 

Berlin, 
August  22nd. 
The  success  of  Bethmann  and  Helfferich  renders 
my  personal  position  very  difficult.  I  fear  that  the 
Arabic  aflfair  will  prove  a  further  motive  for  an  out- 
burst against  the  submarines.  If  more  restrictions  fol- 
low, it  will  be  an  unfortunate  moment  for  me  to  insist 
on  my  resignation.  I  have  at  most  the  Conservatives 
behind  me.  It  will  be  said  that  now  the  first  con- 
sideration should  be  help  for  Turkey,  and  that  the  rest 
can  wait.  From  a  military  point  of  view  that  is  not 
wrong.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  question  of  how  the 
unrestricted    submarine    campaign    can    be    resumed 


382  MY   MEMOIRS 

against  England  when  it  has  once  been  interrupted. 
I  pass,  despite  this,  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  as  a 
scapegoat,  and,  moreover,  if  the  war  goes  on — and, 
judging  from  all  accounts  from  England,  it  is  to  con- 
tinue— they  will  perhaps  in  the  winter  be  bound  to 
come  back  to  it. 

I  have  now  read  the  full  report  of  Bethmann's 
speech,  which  has  made  a  great  impression  because 
of  the  war  aims,  and  therefore  has  raised  his  prestige. 
Everyone  of  course  reads  into  it  what  suits  him,  but 
he  has,  all  the  same,  bound  himself  still  further.  Be- 
fore the  speech  the  situation  was  different. 

I  was  interrupted  by  Schulze  ^  who  has  eight  days* 
leave.  It  was  a  great  relief  to  talk  to  him,  especially 
on  the  submarine  war  in  Flanders.  He  saw  at  once 
my  unusually  difficult  position,  but,  in  spite  of  it,  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  neither  I  nor  the  Kaiser 
could  at  this  moment  produce  an  effect.  I  am  not 
so  sure.  The  Chancellor  has  a  good  opportunity  of 
either  wringing  my  neck  or  breaking  my  back.  I  am 
not  at  all  satisfied  with  our  Riga  expedition;  against 
my  express  advice,  which  I  telegraphed,  it  has  taken 
place,  and  we  have  made  ourselves  ridiculous  and  suf- 
fered severe  losses. 


Berlin, 
August  24th. 

You'll  come  short  of  news  from  me  in  these  days. 
I  am  so  stifled  with  calls  and  etiquette:  in  addition  to 

^  Commander  E.  E.  Schultze,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Naval  Corps. 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  383 

this  many  people  have  thought  fit  to  write  and  con- 
gratulate me  on  a  "  Merite  "  which  I  don't  acknowl- 
edge. I  haven't  yet  heard  how  the  Arabic  affair  is 
turning  out.  The  gallant  Barnabe  ^  has  just  left  me. 
He  came  to  cross-question  me  about  the  torpedoing 
of  two  Spanish  ships.  We  don't  know  anything  about 
it,  of  course;  if  it  was  done  by  our  submarines  we 
must  wait  for  their  return  before  we  can  know  any- 
thing for  certain.  Meanwhile  the  English  press  is 
making  the  most  of  it.  Everything  is  permissible 
that  the  English  do,  but  we  may  not  do  anything. 
You  are  quite  right  about  Bethmann's  long  speech. 
If  one  could  see  behind  the  scenes,  the  policy  of  sen- 
timent which  we  have  been  carrying  on  would  be 
judged  differently.  But  the  German  people  are  still 
sentimental,  and  so  the  speech  made  an  impression. 
Our  diplomats  were  naturally  deplorable.  But  they 
have  some  excuse.  They  never  had  any  "  aim  "  set 
before  them,  and  when  they  had,  such  as  "  brotherly 
love  with  England,"  it  was  a  wrong  one  because  un- 
attainable. By  the  way,  I  am  afraid  that  this  idea 
is  not  dead  even  now.  The  creation  of  an  independent 
Poland,  etc.,  will  make  us  enemies  of  Russia  for  the 
next  hundred  years,  and  vassalage  under  England 
may  very  easily  arise  from  it.  In  Belgium,  too,  we 
are  sentimental.  Instead  of  playing  off  the  Walloons 
against  the  Flemish  we  are  uniting  the  country  and 
encouraging  a  Belgian  national  feeling  which  did  not 
exist  before.     In  regard  to  commercial  relations  with 

*  Spanish  Ambassador. 


384  MY   MEMOIRS 

Japan,  especially  conciliation  with  the  Japs,  I  have 
contributed  towards  this  end  in  various  ways.  But 
it  would  lead  me  too  far  to  enter  on  that  question  now. 
Owing  to  my  attitude  towards  the  Wilhelmstrasse, 
which  perpetually  rages  against  me,  notwithstanding 
my  restraint  hitherto,  I  can't  do  much.  The  slightest 
hint  is  regarded  there  as  an  attack  on  their  prerogative. 
The  Wilhelmstrasse  is  headless,  as  a  well-known 
American  reporter  says.  This  evening  important  con- 
ference between  Jagow  and  Gerard.  The  latter  of 
course  knows  that  by  bluff  he  can  get  all  he  wants. 
We  have  given  way  so  much  already  that  I  suppose 
we  shall  certainly  go  on  sliding. 

To-day  I  called  on  Lobel  to  get  information  about 
things  in  general.  He  too  was  far  from  delighted 
with  the  long  speech.  According  to  his  construction 
it  was  in  the  main  directed  against  Russia,  and  the 
Chancellor  practically  said  to  England,  "  You  have 
certainly  been  unfaithful  to  me  and  have  behaved 
atrociously,  yet  for  all  that  I  am  ready  to  take  you 
again  to  my  bosom."  Or,  in  other  words,  "Leave 
Russia  to  me,  and  I  will  leave  Belgium  to  you." 

The  affair  in  Riga  is  an  instructive  example  of  the 
confusion  that  prevails  in  the  navy.  We  struck  a  wild 
blow  in  the  air,  and  the  Russians  are  crediting  them- 
selves with  a  great  sea  victory.  I  had  urgently  ad- 
vised against  it  from  Libau. 

You  are  quite  right  in  the  idea  that  one  should  not 
struggle  against  circumstances,  but  adapt  oneself  to 
them  and  make  the  best  of  them.     During  this  long 


MY    WAR-LETTERS  385 

year  I  have  become  an  expert  in  this.  But  now  the 
thing  is  different.  Bethmann  and  his  set  possess  abso- 
lute power,  and  so  does  Falkenhayn.  I  am  a  thorn  in 
the  flesh  to  them  all,  and  they  won't  let  me  have  a  say 
in  anything.  I  am  utterly  powerless  against  them. 
The  real  cause  of  this,  apart  from  the  past,  lies  in  the 
fact  that  I  have  never  believed  for  a  moment  in  a  real 
understanding  with  England,  and  the  policy  of 
truckling  to  her  I  consider  is  now,  as  it  always  has 
been,  senseless.  Added  to  this,  one  is  faced  with  the 
acute  difficulties  with  neutrals  that  all  naval  war 
entails.  I  do  not  regard  the  subject  simply  from  the 
point  of  view  of  how  I  am  to  get  out  of  it.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  at  all  that  my  efforts  have  been  sys- 
tematically crippled.  You  are  right  in  what  you  say 
about  Bethmann's  speech — "  Thoroughly  German," 
and,  on  that  account,  a  success!  The  historian  of  fifty 
years  hence  will  judge  differently.  I  leave  by  the  night 
train  for  Emanuelssegen.  I  am  very  sorry,  in  view 
of  the  present  situation,  to  leave  the  Admiralty  and 
Berlin.  But  it  can't  be  helped.  For  me  the  illness  of 
Capelle  is  a  great  misfortune. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  26th. 

It  was,  as  I  had  foreseen,  a  deliberately  planned 
attack  by  the  Chancellor  on  the  submarines.  Although 
I  was  with  him  in  Berlin  he  didn't  say  a  word  about  it. 
On  the  contrary,  Jagow  declared  at  the  Budget  Com- 
mission that  the   submarines  wouldn't  be  interfered 


386  MY    MEMOIRS 

with.  Last  night  I  received  in  BerHn  the  command, 
"  To-morrow  at  12  noon,  audience."  The  Chancellor 
travelled  by  the  same  train;  at  Kattowitz  Bachmann 
was  awaiting  me  with  the  news  that  we  were  to  go  at 
once.  I  came  here  first,  however,  to  put  on  my  better 
uniform — Bethmann,  Treutler,  I,  and  Bachmann. 
The  first  gigantic,  but  he  could  do  with  a  quiet  sleep 
instead  of  perpetually  sitting  on  a  barrel  of  gun- 
powder. He  is  going  to  inform  Wilson  that  the  sub- 
marines had  been  ordered  not  to  damage  ships  manned 
by  Americans.  We  weren't  agreed,  as  he  was  quite 
unapproachable;  afterwards  audience.  Falkenhayn 
was  cross-examined,  Admiral  von  Miiller  ditto,  the  rest 
of  the  assembly  nodded  acquiescence  all  the  time.  But 
the  Kaiser  was  displeased.  He  reviewed  the  range  of 
the  decision  and  agreed  with  us  quietly  that  we  must 
wait  to  hear  further  particulars  of  the  last  case. 
Falkenhayn  had  begun  by  seconding  Bethmann  very 
energetically,  but  when  he  saw  that  the  Kaiser  was 
not  altogether  that  way  inclined,  changed  his  course 
towards  the  policy  of  waiting,  followed  by  Miiller. 
So  no  real  decision  was  arrived  at.  Bethmann,  furious, 
said  after  dinner  to  Bachmann  that  he  would  not  take 
the  responsibility,  and  would  not  leave  Pless  before 
the  decision  he  wanted  had  been  agreed  to.  Vanity 
and  sensitiveness  have  a  great  deal  to  do  with  this.  He 
is  working  now  on  a  memorandum,  and  the  Emperor 
will  gave  way  under  the  pressure  of  the  combined 
camarilla,  there  is  no  question  about  that.  We  are  now 
trying  to  get  Muller  to  come  to-morrow  to  discuss  the 


MY   WAR-LETTERS  387 

possibility  of  a  compromise.  Bethmann  wants  to  dis- 
close the  orders  already  issued.  (Meanwhile  no 
further  orders  are  to  be  given.)  But  there  is  a  dif- 
ference between  secret  orders,  which  leave  the  English 
still  in  doubt  as  to  what  we  are  doing,  and  publicity. 
Then  the  great  Lusitania  case  is  to  be  submitted  to  a 
judicial  inquiry  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  offered 
in  the  form  of  the  famous  Declaration.  This  passage 
in  Bethmann's  speech  bears  on  the  face  of  it  the  inter- 
pretation "  England  keeps  everything,  but  we  nothing." 
There  is  no  doubt  he  is  making  for  renunciation  of 
Belgium  and  dismemberment  of  Russia  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  autonomy  in  Poland.  Frederick  the  Great 
and  Bismarck  must  have  turned  in  their  graves.  I  have 
no  faith  in  the  voice  of  the  army  against  this  decision. 
It  won't  be  heard  until  it  is  too  late.  What  I  shall  do 
now  I  don't  know,  but  I  must  wait  and  see  how  things 
turn  out. 

Emanuelssegen, 
August  27th. 
Yesterday  the  Kaiser  decided  that  the  instructions 
for  Bernstorff  were  to  be  discussed  and  arranged  be- 
tween the  Chancellor  and  ourselves.  Meanwhile,  this 
morning,  without  summoning  us,  Bethmann  got  round 
the  Kaiser.  Miiller  and  Treutler  came  to  us  this  after- 
noon. The  former  backed  out  with  amiable  evasions. 
His  colleague  informed  us  that  the  thing  was  already 
settled.  I  don't  think  that  I  can  swallow  this,  and  I 
travel  to  Berlin  to-morrow  evening.     I  don't  know 


388  MY   MEMOIRS 

what  the  instructions  are,  unfortunately,  but  shall  apply 
for  them  to  the  Chancellor,  and  then  act  accordingly. 
I  believe  this  is  the  end  of  the  matter  as  far  as  I  am 
concerned.  I  have  one  more  audience,  fixed  for  to- 
morrow, at  Libau.  I  could  hardly  refuse  the  inter- 
view without  at  the  same  time  handing  in  my  resig- 
nation. So  for  this  reason  I  shall  go  once  more  to 
Pless.    Miiller  is  trying  to  effect  a  compromise. 

[With  the  final  departure  from  Main  Headquarters, 
this  war  correspondence  ends.] 


II 

SOME   REMARKS   ON   OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY 
I 

The  professional  foundation  for  the  campaign  of 
calumny  publicly  carried  on  against  the  Imperial  navy 
must  have  been  constituted  by  a  few  journalists  who, 
having  formerly  served  in  it,  felt  themselves  relieved 
of  the  necessity  of  admitting  that  they  had  never  had 
anything  to  do  professionally  with  either  a  modern 
battleship  or  a  submarine. 

The  enlightened  opinion  of  naval  officers,  capable 
of  judging,  remained  in  the  background,  because  the 
navy  was  not  in  the  habit  of  entering  into  newspaper 
controversies. 

Besides  the  public  calumnies,  rumours  in  themselves 
much  more  dangerous  went  the  round  of  "  initiated  " 
political  circles.  To  the  measures  adopted  syste- 
matically, at  any  rate  for  the  most  part  by  interested 
parties,  to  ruin  my  position  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation, 
the  navy,  and  the  Kaiser,  belong  the  rumours  which 
were  spread  about  the  inadequate  construction  of  ships 
and  weapons.  It  was  given  out  through  every  possible 
channel  that  our  ships  were  badly  constructed,  particu- 
larly that  they  were  under-armed  and  not  adapted  for 

389 


390  MYMEMOIRS 

long-range  firing.  The  battle  of  Jutland  has  in  part 
afforded  a  proof  to  the  contrary,  and  prompted  Ad- 
miral Scheer  to  inform  the  Kaiser  that  the  excellence 
of  the  materiel  contributed  largely  to  the  success  of  the 
battle.  The  Kaiser  felt  himself  bound,  in  view  of  the 
feeling  in  the  officers'  corps,  to  express  in  a  telegram 
from  Wilhelmshaven,  even  after  my  dismissal,  his 
recognition  of  this  service  to  the  navy.  As  feeling  is 
still  being  roused  by  charges  of  this  kind,  and  as 
there  are  interested  parties  who  still  seek  to  shift  the 
historical  responsibility  for  the  inadequate  use  of  the 
sea-power  actually  at  our  disposal  from  themselves  on 
to  the  mistakes  supposed  to  have  been  made  during  my 
period  of  office,  I  propose  to  deal  with  some  of  the 
charges  which  have  come  to  my  ears. 

To  begin  with,  it  is  an  idiosyncrasy  of  our  people 
to  estimate  foreign  products  higher  than  their  own. 
From  this  idiosyncrasy  our  navy  also  has  not  been 
free,  especially  in  regard  to  the  English  navy.  One 
was  disposed  to  accept  the  boasting  assertions  of  Eng- 
lish firms  at  their  own  valuation,  and  to  consider  new 
technical  improvements  to  have  been  actually  carried 
out,  even  in  the  case  of  older  ships.  Also  when  we 
were  able  to  bring  English  materiel  into  comparison 
with  our  own  and  practically  to  prove  the  contrary,  it 
was  frequently  difficult  in  this  respect  to  convince  the 
fleet,  once  a  preconceived  opinion  had  been  formed,  or 
an  external  superiority,  for  instance,  in  calibre  estab- 
lished. For  example,  we  could  produce  indisputable 
scientific  and  technical  proof  that  our  rifles,  guns,  and 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING   POLICY      391 

armour  were  superior  to  the  English.  This  was  often 
passed  over  with  the  catch-phrase  that  these  were  only 
"  range  results,"  without  reflecting  that  this  is  the  only 
method  by  which  indisputable  comparisons  were  pos- 
sible. In  a  memorandum  of  Admiral  Ingenohl's  there 
occurs  the  characteristic  statement  that  it  was  not  till 
after  his  experience  in  the  war  that  he  could  convince 
himself  of  the  extraordinary  effectiveness  of  our 
armour-piercing  shells  and  their  superiority  to  the 
corresponding  English  shells.  To  the  manufacture  of 
these  armour-piercing  shells  we  had  devoted  particular 
care  and  labour. 

Apart  from  the  peculiarity  of  this  mode  of  reason- 
ing which  is  so  widespread  among  us,  we  must  also 
remember  that  to  arrive  at  a  correct  judgment  of  the 
standard  of  sea-power  achieved  it  is  necessary  to 
regard  the  finished  achievements  as  a  whole  and  not 
seize  on  individual  flaws.  Flaws,  of  course,  were 
bound  to  exist  in  our  equipment,  for  the  creation  of  a 
sea-power  needed  the  labour  of  a  whole  generation, 
and  this  amount  of  time  fate  did  not  allow  us. 

Further,  we  have  to  consider  that  our  navy,  com- 
pared with  the  great  foreign  navies,  has  always  found 
itself  in  financial  straits,  which  in  view  of  the  Chan- 
cellor's attitude  towards  the  fleet  had  a  most  hamper- 
ing effect  on  its  development,  especially  during  the  last 
five  years  before  the  war.  On  the  voting  of  the  esti- 
mates during  this  time  we  were  every  year  emphatically 
informed  by  the  Chancellor,  through  the  medium  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  that  we  were  only  to 


392  MY   MEMOIRS 

count  on  small  amounts;  and  therefore  in  order  to 
arrive  at  sums  which  could  be  negotiated  with  the 
Treasury,  all  the  demands  of  the  various  branches  of 
the  navy  for  the  preliminary  estimates  were  cut  down 
as  low  as  possible.  The  Admiralty  then  approached 
the  Treasury  with  the  minimum  demands.  But  in- 
stead of  rewarding  our  restraint,  the  Treasury  forced 
us  every  time  to  accept  further  considerable  reduc- 
tions on  these  estimates  which  we  had  put  forward  as 
a  minimum.  In  the  years  immediately  before  the  war 
the  negotiations  with  the  Treasury  dealt  with  sums 
that  were  of  no  real  financial  importance  to  the 
Empire.  Ten  per  cent,  of  the  military  estimates  of 
191 3  would  have  been  sufficient  to  meet  the  acute 
requirements  of  the  navy.  I  may  mention  as  examples 
a  certain  acceleration  in  the  building  of  ships  already 
laid  down,  the  supply  of  oil  fuel,  the  improvement  of 
the  fire-control,  quicker  adoption  of  technical  improve- 
ments, and  so  on.  In  view  of  the  shortage  of  money 
with  which  the  Admiralty  had  to  reckon,  and  the 
fear,  encouraged  by  the  Treasury  and  Reichstag,  of 
exceeding  the  estimates,  it  will  be  readily  understood 
with  what  caution  the  available  money  was  distributed, 
and  how  we  were  constantly  forced  to  weigh  in  the 
balance  the  cost  of  remedying  even  the  smallest  defect, 
which  in  consequence  remained  a  defect.  The  different 
departments  of  the  navy  which  could  not  ignore  the 
constitutional  necessity  for  the  further  development 
of  the  Navy,  always  shifted  the  blame  on  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  of  the  Admiralty  if  their  demands  were 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      393 

not  granted,  under  the  impression  that  their  special 
demand  was  the  essential  one,  and  that  the  Secretary 
of  State  ought  to  have  stood  out  for  it.  Among  the 
Great  Powers  our  estimates  for  building  took  until 
1905  the  fifth  place,  in  1906  (after  the  Russian  fleet 
fell  out)  fourth;  in  1907  (when  France  fell  behind) 
third;  in  1913  (after  the  new  increase  in  the  Russian 
fleet)  again  in  the  fourth.  So  little  have  we  contrib- 
uted to  the  rival  "  piling  up  "  of  armaments !  Even 
though,  through  thrift  and  industry,  we  created  the 
second  strongest  fleet,  there  were  still  many  wishes 
unfulfilled. 

I  now  come  in  detail  to  the  reproaches  with  re- 
gard to  our  materiel. 

In  view  of  the  international  rivalry  in  the  building 
of  big  ships,  I  did  not  think,  both  on  political  and 
financial  grounds,  that  I  was  in  a  position  to  set  the 
pace.  In  the  great  changes,  for  example  the  transi- 
tion to  the  building  of  dreadnoughts,  and  in  the  in- 
crease from  time  to  time  of  calibre,  we  were  generally 
quite  a  year  behind  the  English.  In  spite  of  that  I  am 
convinced  that,  taking  the  technical  periods  as  a  whole, 
our  new  materiel  surpassed  theirs. 

In  these  important  changes  other  determining 
factors  have  to  be  considered.  Thus  in  1906  there 
was  only  one  firm  in  Germany,  and  that  moreover  with 
an  English  patent,  which  could  build  large  turbine 
engines.  We  were  obliged  therefore  to  limit  ourselves 
at  first  to  supplying  these  to  the  first-class  cruisers,  and 
keep  to  the  piston  engine  for  the  ships  of  the  line  laid 


394  MY    MEMOIRS 

down  in  1906.  The  retention  of  these  engines  goes 
side  by  side  with  the  turret  disposition  of  the  heavy 
guns  which  has  been  condemned  by  so  many  critics. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  arrangement  makes  firing  from 
both  sides  possible,  and  has  certain  tactical  advantages 
in  case  the  line  is  outflanked  in  consequence  of  numeri- 
cal superiority  on  the  enemy's  side,  in  striking  against 
the  enemy's  line  and  in  the  melee.  In  building  the 
various  squadrons  we  were  obliged,  having  regard  to 
our  system  of  defence,  to  give  attention  to  the  homo- 
geneity of  the  individual  ships  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
interchange  of  crews  and  the  supply  and  exchange 
of  reserves.  This  brings  with  it  the  tactical  advantages 
that  such  homogeneity  ensures. 

As  far  as  the  heavy  guns  are  concerned,  with  the 
exception  of  the  latest  ships,  ours  were  behind  the 
English  in  calibre.  But  that  was  counterbalanced  by 
other  advantages,  for  the  piercing  power  of  our  heavy 
guns  remained  fully  equal  to  the  piercing  power  of 
the  guns  of  English  ships  of  the  same  class,  and  this 
was  of  the  first  importance.  Our  projectiles  were 
designed  to  take  effect  afterwards  in  the  interior  of 
the  enemy  ships.  When  we  heard  that  the  English 
were  increasing  the  power  of  their  guns  and  it  was 
assumed  that  in  all  probability  they  would  increase  the 
strength  of  their  armour,  inferior  to  ours  hitherto,  we 
resolved  in  1912-13  to  pass  over  the  intermediate 
stages  and  at  once  adopt  a  calibre  that  would  ensure 
for  the  squadron  laid  down  in  19 13  in  any  case  a 
superiority  in  this  respect,  and  we  chose  the  38-centi- 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING   POLICY      395 

metre  gun.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  English 
adopted  this  calibre  at  the  same  time  as  our- 
selves. 

The  following  table,  based  on  official  data,  shows 
the  considerable  inferiority  of  the  English  first-class 
battleships  in  artillery-piercing  power.  And  it  should 
be  noticed  too,  in  this  connection,  that  the  advantages 
on  the  German  side,  such  as  size  of  steel  plates,  quality 
of  armour  and  shells,  are  not  considered. 

Whole  volumes  might  be  written  to  indicate  in  de- 
tail how  we  have  made  full  use  of  the  vast  superiority 
of  our  Krupp  guns  over  the  heavy  English  wire-bound 
type.  To  laymen  who  are  interested  in  the  question 
I  should  like  to  convey  some  idea  how  important  was 
this  saving  of  weight  by  the  adoption  of  a  slightly 
smaller  calibre,  for  every  increase  immediately  affected 
the  construction  of  the  turrets  with  their  heavy  armour 
and  simply  ate  up  weight.  This  would  have  been  a 
mistake  if — as  was  actually  the  case — it  was  not  neces- 
sary and  of  direct  use  for  the  armour-piercing  power 
of  our  guns,  for  the  weight  saved  could  be  used  for 
other  purposes.  In  the  chapter  on  shipbuilding  I  have 
already  discussed  the  measures  taken  to  prevent  our 
ships  sinking ;  this  was  the  purpose  to  which  the  weight 
saved  was  transferred.  I  will  here  only  touch  on  a  few 
of  the  advantages  we  possessed  over  the  British  fleet, 
and  which,  among  other  things,  made  the  reasonable 
limitation  of  our  heavy  calibre  possible.  We  used  up 
about  100  tons  for  our  metal  cartridge  boxes,  as  com- 
pared with  the  oil-silk  used  by  the  English ;  the  conse- 


396  MY   MEMOIRS 

quence  was  that  when  the  magazines  took  fire  the 
English  ships,  like  the  battle-cruisers  Queen  Mary, 
Indefatigable,  and  Invincible  were  blown  to  pieces, 
while  on  the  SeydlitB,  when  the  magazine  caught  fire, 
there  was  no  explosion,  though  of  course  the  maga- 
zine was  gutted  and  there  was  loss  of  life.  As  the 
result  of  experiments  with  targets  we  disposed  of 
several  hundred  tons  in  strengthening  the  hull  below 
the  water-line  to  get  better  protection  against  tor- 
pedoes. Our  fore-turret  alone  weighed  400  tons;  it 
had  the  unusual  armour  thickness  of  400  mm.,  and  was 
so  broad  that  on  both  sides  one  could  look  straight 
astern  clear  of  the  funnels,  which  was  of  great 
advantage  for  the  control  of  the  ship  in  action.  The 
turrets  surrounding  the  central  fire-control  communi- 
cated directly  with  the  lower  parts  of  the  ship  by 
means  of  shafts,  and  particularly  with  the  central 
control  of  the  ship,  which  was  amidships  below  the 
water-line  and  ended  in  a  gangway  which  contained 
the  electric  connections  in  an  absolutely  protected 
position.  Our  arrangements  for  night-fighting  were 
highly  developed.  In  the  night  following  the  battle 
of  Jutland  the  English  precautions  were  miserable 
compared  with  ours,  as  an  officer  I  know  told  me.  All 
our  ships  were  armed  with  guns  of  middle  calibre, 
armour-protected,  sheltered  by  parapets  which  the 
English  had  not.  Our  battleships  also  had  six  or  seven 
torpedo  tubes  below  the  water-line.  Had  the  action 
been  fought  to  a  finish,  this  in  itself  might  have  been 
the  decisive  factor.    I  could  give  many  more  examples. 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY      397 

This  is  a  province  which  can  only  be  dealt  with  by 
means  of  special  apparatus  and  with  the  assistance  of 
a  large  staff  of  specialists. 

The  examples  I  have  given,  however,  are  sufficient 
for  the  purpose.  They  demonstrate  well  enough  how 
much  understanding  of  such  a  province  is  brought  to 
bear  by  the  mercenary  writers  on  the  navy,  who  at 
the  present  time  are  advancing  their  own  inter- 
ests by  throwing  mud,  and  have  their  information 
for  the  most  part  from  discontented  subordinate 
officers. 

Now  with  regard  to  the  reproach  that  our  light 
cruisers  were  too  lightly  armed,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  of  this  class  of  ship  we  could  only  lay 
down  two  yearly.  Originally  the  estimates  allowed 
for  three  cruisers,  but  the  third  cruiser  was  cut  off  by 
the  Reichstag,  while  England,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
accordance  with  her  trans-Atlantic  requirements,  had 
laid  down  yearly  three  or  four  times  that  number. 
This  enabled  the  English  continually  to  oppose  light 
cruisers  of  the  most  modern  type  to  our  cruisers, 
among  which  older  types  had  to  be  used.  Further, 
our  light  cruisers  had  to  serve  for  foreign  service  as 
well  as  in  home  waters.  For  this  reason  we  set  special 
value  on  speed.  Those  English  light  cruisers  that  were 
armed  with  15-centimetre  guns  were  inferior  in  speed 
to  ours  of  the  same  class.  The  Karlsruhe  turned  this 
to  excellent  account.  As  her  object  was  not  to  fight, 
she  evaded  her  opponents  with  little  trouble.  She  was 
in  her  time  the  fastest  ship  in  the  Atlantic.     In  the 


398  MYMEMOIRS 

case  of  the  fight  and  loss  of  the  Emden  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  English  ship  was  four  years 
younger  and  nearly  2,000  tons  bigger  than  the  Emden; 
thus  no  comparison  can  be  drawn.  In  her  last  fight 
the  Emden  was  at  a  still  further  disadvantage,  as  a 
considerable  portion  of  her  gun-crews,  commanded 
by  her  first  lieutenant,  Lieutenant-Commander  von 
Miicke,  and  two  other  officers  had  been  told  off  to 
destroy  a  wireless  station  on  shore,  so  were  not  present 
in  the  fight. 

So  long  as  the  range  of  the  torpedo  was  small,  that 
is  to  say  till  about  1910-11,  and  when  in  order  to  get 
within  range  the  torpedo  boats  had  to  come  up  very 
close  to  their  target,  the  lo-centimetre  gun  not  only 
sufficed  for  the  light  cruiser  against  enemy  torpedo 
boats,  but  was  superior  to  a  gun  of  15  centimetres, 
in  that  it  allowed  for  a  greater  number  being  carried 
and  possessed  a  greater  rapidity  of  fire  than  the  larger 
calibre.  As  regards  action  against  enemy  light  cruisers 
it  continued  to  be  quite  sufficient  in  all  cases  up  to 
the  time  when  these  began  to  be  armoured.  Larger 
calibre  had  indeed  seemed  desirable  before  this  for  the 
use  of  the  light  cruisers  on  foreign  service.  The  in- 
terests of  the  war  at  home,  which  as  far  as  we  were 
concerned  was  of  the  first  importance,  were  quite  the 
opposite  of  those  abroad.  Therefore,  as  early  as 
1910,  I  had  sent  in  preliminary  designs  for  small 
cruisers  with  heavier  arms.  In  191 1  I  summoned  the 
Commander-in-Chief's  staff  to  an  interview  on  this 
question,  and  allowed  them  extra  munitions  in  order 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      399 

that  they  might  study  the  calibre  question  by  means  of 
practical  tests.  The  result  was  that  both  the  fleet- 
staff  under  Admiral  von  Holtzendorff  and  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  experimenting  ships  pronounced 
in  favour  of  the  retention  of  the  lo-centimetre  gun 
as  a  standard  calibre  for  the  light  cruisers.  The  com- 
manding officer  of  the  experimenting  ships  emphasized 
at  the  same  time  the  possible  increase  in  the  number  of 
guns  while  retaining  the  limited  dimensions  of  the 
cruisers,  which  for  their  work  as  torpedo-boat  de- 
stroyers was  to  their  advantage. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  English  went  back  for 
similar  reasons  from  their  light  cruisers,  armed  only 
with  15-cm.  guns,  to  ships  like  the  Arethusa  class,  with 
a  main  armament  of  lo-cm.  guns,  and  a  15-centimetre 
at  bow  and  stern.  All  the  experts  and  commanding 
officers  had  pronounced  against  the  two-calibre  arma- 
ment which  I  had  asked  them  to  consider.  Yet  in  spite 
of  this,  and  the  financial  and  other  difficulties  involved, 
I  resolved  at  the  beginning  of  19 12  on  my  own  initia- 
tive to  institute  a  change  in  the  calibre  of  our  light 
cruisers;  and  as  we  learned  just  then  that  the  bigger 
classes  of  English  light  cruisers  had  been  armoured 
at  the  water-line,  we  were,  according  to  my  opinion, 
bound  to  pass  on  at  once  to  a  15-cm.  gun,  as  a  mini- 
mum calibre  for  the  light  cruisers,  as  not  sufficient 
armour-piercing  power  could  be  obtained  with  less 
calibre. 

At  the  special  audience  at  the  beginning  of  May, 
1912,  at  which  this  subject  was  to  be  discussed,  the 


400  MY   MEMOIRS 

Emperor  did  not  agree  with  the  view  of  the  naval  staff 
as  to  this  change.  He  said  that  the  ships  would  be 
too  big,  and  that  a  gun  like  the  13-cm.  sufficed  for  the 
army.  I  might,  however,  study  the  question  further 
if  I  liked.  But  as  a  change  in  the  calibre  had  become 
necessary,  and  from  inquiries  I  ascertained  that  the 
13-cm.  army  gun  was  not  sufficient,  I  gave  the  con- 
tract in  May,  1912,  for  the  construction  of  a  light 
cruiser  with  a  15-cm.  gun.  At  the  end  of  September, 
1912,  His  Majesty  approved  the  design  which  had 
meanwhile  been  prepared  for  the  light  cruiser  type 
with  15-cm.  gun  of  the  year  1913.  One  of  these 
cruisers,  the  Wiesbaden,  came  to  a  glorious  end  in  the 
battle  of  Jutland. 

It  has  been  complained  with  regard  to  our  torpedo 
boats  that  they  had  not  sufficient  fuel  capacity.  We 
had  in  this  case  to  contend  with  the  difficulty  that  our 
coal  did  not  give  the  same  heat  as  that  used  by  the 
English  torpedo  boats;  and  even  if  we  had  procured  a 
small  supply  of  English  coal  for  our  torpedo  boats, 
it  was  impossible  during  a  long  war  to  maintain  a 
sufficient  supply  of  English  coal.  Also  in  relation  to 
the  use  of  oil  fuel  we  were  severely  handicapped  by 
the  difficulty  of  getting  supplies  compared  with  Eng- 
land, who  enjoyed  absolute  freedom  in  this  respect. 
As  we  didn't  possess  any  oil  wells  near  enough,  we 
were  compelled  to  maintain  a  supply  for  war.  This 
was,  however,  next  to  impossible  in  the  case  of  the 
big  ships.  The  expenditure  of  hundreds  of  millions 
would  have  been  required,  but  even  with  the  torpedo 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     401 

boats  we  had  to  exercise  economy.  In  the  year  19 12 
we  were,  however,  obHged  to  adopt  oil  as  the  sole 
fuel  in  the  torpedo  boats  because  we  could  no  longer 
cope  with  the  heavy  claims  on  transport  which  coal 
demanded.  We  did  this  with  the  full  consciousness 
that  with  the  abolition  of  the  coal  bunker  we  were 
giving  up  a  considerable  part  of  the  safety  of  the 
torpedo  boats  against  sinking  and  fire.  The  English 
had  once  adopted  the  exclusive  use  of  oil,  but  in 
recent  years  had  come  back  to  coal  as  a  fuel,  because 
oil  was  too  expensive.  It  is  to  be  gathered  from  this 
that  the  English,  who  were  in  a  quite  different  position 
from  ourselves,  vacillated  on  the  question  till  just  be- 
fore the  war. 

Another  method  of  increasing  the  range  of  the 
torpedo  boats  was  to  increase  the  displacement,  but  the 
fleet  (fleet  and  torpedo  inspection)  urged  still  in  the 
years  1909  and  1910  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  the 
boat,  because  they  believed  that  the  bigger  boats  were 
too  difficult  to  handle  in  action,  especially  if  the  line 
were  broken.  After  urgent  pressure  had  been  brought 
to  bear,  in  the  year  1910  I  yielded  to  the  proposal  of 
the  inspector  of  the  torpedo  arm  to  allow  a  series  of 
torpedo  boats  with  less  displacement  and  proportion- 
ately less  coal  capacity  to  be  built,  after  the  inspectors 
responsible  for  the  construction  and  erection  of  the 
torpedo  boats  gave  the  assurance  that  there  was  to 
be  no  diminution  in  the  range  of  these  boats,  which 
were  to  be  fed  by  an  increased  oil  supply.  The  assent 
of  the  inspectors  to  this  not  being  obtained,  we  returned 


402  MY   MEMOIRS 

again  to  the  larger  type  boats  in  the  year  1912.  Any 
essential  increase  in  the  range  could  only  be  reached 
for  the  torpedo  boats  with  a  corresponding  increase 
of  the  displacement.  At  our  naval  manoeuvres  in  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea  the  need  for  such  an  increase 
of  range  v^as  not  apparent.  It  was  not  till  the  hanging 
back  of  the  English  fleet  during  the  war,  and  the  con- 
sequent possibility  of  our  making  an  attack  on  the 
English  coast,  that  the  necessity  for  an  increased  range 
came  strongly  into  evidence.  After  the  outbreak  of  war 
we  had  taken  over  a  number  of  boats  built  in  Ger- 
many for  the  Argentine  Republic.  These  boats  were 
intended  for  the  Atlantic,  and  were  much  bigger  than 
the  boats  of  our  type.  They  had  a  displacement  of 
about  1,500  to  2,000  tons.  One  can  see,  quite  apart 
from  the  financial  question,  that  this  places  the  tor- 
pedo-boat arm  on  a  quite  different  basis.  At  the  cost 
of  a  certain  diminution  in  numbers,  torpedo  ships  are 
obtained,  which  of  course  require  increased  armament. 
In  the  battle  of  Jutland  these  big  boats,  formerly  des- 
tined for  Argentina,  took  part  as  well  as  boats  of  our 
own  type.  As  I  have  been  informed,  in  the  fighting 
by  day,  boats  of  our  type  proved  the  more  efficient. 
Questions  of  type  and  tactical  disposition  entered  on  a 
new  phase  in  1912.  In  view  of  the  interpretation  of 
the  Naval  Law  we  had  hitherto  limited  ourselves  to  a 
single  type  of  cruiser,  which  had  to  be  used  both  on 
foreign  service  and  in  home  waters.  We  were  obliged 
on  this  account,  because  of  the  few  ships  we  had  of 
this  kind  at  our  disposal,  to  change  about  and  make 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      403 

one  serve  both  purposes.  When  we  then,  as  explained 
above,  adopted  a  considerable  enlargement  of  the  small 
cruisers,  these  lost  in  the  process  much  of  their  original 
character  as  destroyers.  For  this  object  they  v^ere 
too  big  and  too  costly,  and  speed  could  no  longer  be 
taken  as  the  fundamental  condition  of  their  construc- 
tion. To  build  two  different  types  we  should  have  to 
build  more  than  two  ships  a  year,  which  involved  an 
alteration  of  the  law.  This  was  not  practicable  in 
1912  and  1914,  not  only  owing  to  political  conditions, 
but  to  the  limited  financial  conditions  forced  upon  us. 
The  road,  then,  which  we  thought  of  pursuing  was 
in  a  certain  degree  a  return  to  the  principle  which  we 
acted  on  in  the  first  fourteen  years  of  the  existence  of 
this  arm  when  we  built  only  small  torpedo  boats,  and 
that  was  to  give  every  torpedo-boat  flotilla  a  large 
convoy. 

Seeing  that  torpedo  boats  and  their  organization — 
because  they  don't  rest  on  a  traditional  type — are  not 
clearly  defined  in  the  naval  law,  we  could  have  fol- 
lowed the  course  without  more  ado,  as  soon  as  money 
for  the  navy  came  in  more  readily.  A  slight  but  by  no 
means  decisive  defect  in  our  power  for  defence  has 
arisen  here,  which,  however,  by  the  perfecting  of  naval 
law  could  have  remedied  itself  all  the  more  easily  as 
the  usefulness  of  our  extended  foreign  service  made 
itself  more  widely  felt.  The  question  touched  on  here 
was  before  the  war  not  yet  ripe  as  a  whole,  and  re- 
quired tactical  tests  near  home  before  we  could  deal 
with  its  solution  on  a  wider  scale. 


404  MYMEMOIRS 

II 

Now  I  pass  on  to  deal  with  reproaches  from  the 
progressives,  to  the  effect  that  under  my  manage- 
ment the  Admiralty  administration  had  not  sufficiently 
insisted  on  the  development  of  the  submarine  nor 
recognized  its  importance,  and  I  shall  only  deal  with 
these  reproaches  in  so  far  as  they  have  not  already 
received  an  official  contradiction  supported  by  all 
parties  at  a  committee  of  the  Reichstag  in  the  spring 
of  1917. 

On  the  outbreak  of  war,  we  were,  as  far  as  the  sub- 
marine weapon  goes,  at  the  head  of  all  the  navies  of 
the  world. 

In  what  concerned  the  technical  development  of  the 
submarine  type  and  the  number  of  highly  developed 
submarines  the  success  was  achieved  because  we  used 
our  experience  in  the  development  of  the  torpedo 
weapon  and  systematically  applied  it  to  the  submarine 
and  because  from  the  beginning  we  set  its  future  em- 
ployment for  long-distane  work  before  us  as  our  aim. 
Submarines  that  are  only  capable  of  serving  in  the 
defence  of  harbours  of  a  limited  coast-line  have 
hitherto  had  for  Germany,  in  view  of  the  situation  of 
her  coast-line,  no  real  importance. 

Apart  from  a  long  series  of  minor  problems  of 
engineering,  it  was  first  and  foremost  the  motor  on 
which  the  development  of  the  submarine  depended  for 
long-distance  employment.  The  stronger  and  better 
the  motor  the  nearer  we  approached  to  our  aim.     So 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      405 

we  threw  ourselves  heart  and  soul  into  its  develop- 
ment on  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  tests  of  Mi.  In 
order  to  acquire  a  suitable  petrol  motor,  a  competition 
of  the  most  distinguished  and  competent  motor  firms 
was  held  early  in  1908  to  build  an  850  horse-power 
motor.  Contracts  were  entered  into  for  this  object 
with  Augsburg  Motor  Co.,  Ltd.,  Nuremburg  Motor 
Co.,  Ltd.,  the  Germania  Works  at  Kiel  and  Korting 
of  Hanover,  Fiat  of  Turin.  We  had  previously 
achieved  considerable  results  with  the  Korting  motor 
in  Ml,  and  it  was  presumed  that  even  stronger  ma- 
chines of  this  kind  would  be  possible.  But  to  supply 
submarines  at  that  time  in  large  quantities  to  any 
great  extent  would  have  been  a  mistake,  for  there  were 
a  number  of  other  details  of  this  arm  not  yet  perfected 
and  requiring  development  before  they  would  answer 
our  purpose.  Also  we  did  not  know  what  effect  any 
considerable  increase  in  the  size  of  the  boat  would 
have  on  its  diving  capacity.  The  most  important  rea- 
son, however,  why  even  the  Korting  motor  did  not 
enable  us  to  build  a  satisfactory  submarine  for  long- 
distance work  in  war  was  that  the  visibility  of  the 
boat  from  smoke  formation  by  day  and  fire  reflection 
by  night  was  too  great. 

In  spite  of  this  we  did  not  stop  our  efforts  to  carry 
on  the  development  of  the  other  details  of  submarine 
construction,  and  in  the  next  few  years  seventeen  sub- 
marines altogether  were  equipped  with  petroleum  mo- 
tors. The  folly  of  the  reproach  from  the  Democratic 
side  that  in  these  years  we  had  neglected  to  provide 


4o6  MY   MEMOIRS 

submarines  in  large  numbers  and  so  lost  a  great  chance 
in  the  world-war,  is  best  demonstrated,  without  going 
into  any  enumeration  of  the  other  impossibilities,  by 
the  melancholy  fact  that  in  war  our  petroleum  boats 
were  the  first  to  fall  victims  to  the  enemy  and  that  the 
two  last  boats  of  this  kind  that  were  left  we  withdrew 
from  action.  Had  we  followed  that  path  of  develop- 
ment, we  should  never  have  conducted  a  submarine 
war  with  any  prospect  of  success.  Instead  of  that  we 
did  everything  we  could  to  develop  other  motors  side 
by  side  with  the  petroleum  motor,  among  which  the 
Diesel  motor  offered  the  most  prospect  of  success. 
We  succeeded  in  building  with  this  an  entirely  satis- 
factory submarine  engine,  with  which,  since  U19  was 
built  in  191 1,  all  our  submarines  were  equipped.  But 
such  new  developments  had  to  go  through  a  stage  of 
so-called  infantile  disease  which  was  not  finally  out- 
grown until  1913,  at  a  time  when  we  had  a  great 
number  of  boats  with  Diesel  engines,  partly  completed 
and  partly  under  construction. 

When  war  broke  out  we  were  at  once  in  a  position 
to  get  a  type  of  boat  perfectly  adapted  for  war  pur- 
poses, and  equipped  for  long-distance  service,  in  the 
so-called  MS  boat,  which  could  be  ordered  by  telegram 
ready  for  mobilization. 

In  July,  1 914,  twenty-eight  boats  were  ready,  and 
seventeen  in  course  of  building,  altogether  forty-five 
boats.  The  great  submarine  base  in  Wilhelmstrasse, 
as  well  as  the  branch  base  in  Heligoland,  the  construc- 
tion of  which  had  taken  ten  years,  was  nearly  com- 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      407 

pleted,  but  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  was  not  quite 
ready  for  use. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  materiel  and  engineering, 
and  in  view  of  the  stage  reached  in  the  development 
of  the  submarine  for  long-distance  work,  and  the  time 
required  for  construction  of  quays  and  harbours,  we 
could  not  build  many  more  until  the  summer  of  19 14. 
The  number  of  the  boats  finished  would  have  been  con- 
siderably greater  (we  might  have  had  forty-one  in- 
stead of  twenty-eight)  if  the  manufacturers  engaged 
had  been  in  a  position  to  carry  out  their  contracts. 
The  boats  U31  and  U41  ordered  by  me  in  the  year 
1912,  which  were  to  form  the  chief  reinforcement  of 
the  submarine  flotilla  authorized  by  the  submarine  esti- 
mates of  1912,  ought  to  have  been  delivered  between 
October  ist,  1913,  and  August  ist,  1914.  But  as  the 
Germania  Yard  found  it  could  not  make  the  two-stroke 
motor  built  by  it  satisfactory,  these  eleven  boats  were 
retarded  by  nearly  a  year  and  a  half.  Not  only  were 
the  boats  themselves  not  forthcoming,  but  the  crews 
for  these  boats  were  not  trained;  so  the  experience 
that  might  have  been  gained  since  October  ist,  19 13, 
was  missed,  and  besides  this  these  boats  were  blocking 
the  Germania  Dockyard,  which  in  consequence  could 
not  deal  with  the  new  orders  issued  on  mobilization. 

At  the  Dantzig  Yard  the  delay  in  building  U29  and 
U30  was  less  as  both  boats  were  commissioned  in  the 
autumn  of  1914. 

This  failure  of  the  most  modern  submarine  class, 
U31  to  U41,  is  of  the  greatest  importance.    The  fault 


408  MY    MEMOIRS 

lay  in  the  fact  that  the  two  firms  concerned  were  un- 
able to  carry  out  what  they  had  anticipated.  Sub- 
marine production  was  still  in  its  infancy.  Herein  lies 
another  reason  why  we  could  not  have  produced  more 
boats  in  peace-time  than  was  actually  the  case. 

The  question  as  to  how  far  our  submarines  were 
capable  of  rendering  material  assistance  in  the  war  had 
not  yet  been  settled  in  July,  1914.  Before  1912  opin- 
ions were  divided  as  to  whether  the  men  would  be  able 
to  hold  out  for  longer  than  three  days.  The  settling 
of  the  question  was  taken  in  hand  with  energy,  though 
on  the  men's  account  with  a  certain  amount  of  caution 
made  necessary  by  the  state  of  peace.  A  few  single 
boats  were  first  told  off  for  trial  voyages  of  endurance. 
In  the  winter  of  1912-13  the  whole  flotilla  was  sent 
to  the  North  Sea.  They  were  to  go  out  a  distance  of 
300  miles  (Heligoland — England)  and  then  maintain 
their  station  ready  for  action  as  long  as  possible. 
They  stayed  out  eleven  days.  As  a  result  of  these 
experiments  a  number  of  improvements  were  intro- 
duced which  made  it  possible  to  prolong  this  time  con- 
siderably. 

The  fittings  necessary  were  at  once  ordered,  and  the 
success  of  these  was  proved  in  the  war.  War  experi- 
ence, too,  naturally  led  to  a  further  improvement  of 
the  boats.  But  all  the  improvements  and  adaptations 
cannot  alter  the  fact  that  our  first-class  submarines 
sent  on  long  distances  consisted  entirely  of  the  type 
that  was  in  use  before  the  war.  Not  till  the  year  19 18 
were  larger  boats  of  a  new  type  added.     When  in 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING   POLICY      409 

August  and  September,  1919,  the  possibility  of  using 
boats  of  a  lesser  radius  of  action,  against  England 
from  Flanders,  became  more  likely,  small  and,  later 
on,  intermediate  submarines  were  designed  and  were 
ordered  in  great  numbers.  Small  Barkas  motor  en- 
gines were  sufficient  for  propelling  the  first  of  these 
and  they  were  procurable  from  several  firms.  In 
March,  1916,  altogether  147  boats  were  under  construc- 
tion, and  were  to  be  delivered  in  the  same  year  as 
they  were  estimated  for. 

That  was  the  utmost  limit  of  achievement  of  which 
our  manufacturers  at  that  time  were  capable.  For 
more  recent  times  I  lack  the  necessary  official  report. 

The  following  is  a  comparison  between  the  develop- 
ment of  the  submarine  in  England  and  the  point  it  had 
reached  on  the  outbreak  of  war : 

In  1906  England  built  only  small  submarines  with 
petrol  engine  drive,  as  harbour  and  coast-line  de- 
fences, and  only  one  of  which — Bii — put  in  an  ap- 
pearance during  the  war.  This  boat  was  towed  with- 
out a  crew  to  Tenedos,  near  the  Dardanelles,  and 
worked  close  to  its  base.  In  1906  experiments  were 
begun  with  boats  of  a  wider  radius  of  action.  The 
boat  of  the  English  C  class  was  designed  and  a  large 
number  of  these  were  built.  But  they  were  not  then 
available  for  long-distance  use.  Not  till  the  boat  of 
the  Budget  year  19 10  could  motors  of  800  horse- 
power be  obtained  for  long-distance  use.  The  motor 
was  constructed  after  the  Diesel  pattern.  These  were 
the  E  class.     Of  this  class  in  July,  19 14,  the  seventh 


4IO  MY    MEMOIRS 

boat  was  commissioned,  and  these  English  E  boats 
are  the  only  ones  that  can  really  be  compared  with 
ours.  There  was  no  separate  accommodation  for  the 
men  in  these,  and  this  was  also  absent  from  at  least 
the  first  fifty  built  during  the  war.  Their  sojourn  in 
German  waters  was  at  the  end  of  1914  limited  to  four 
days,  later  to  six  days;  from  which  one  can  judge  of 
their  capacity  for  long-distance  service.  Some  of  them 
went  to  Russia;  they  were  escorted  as  far  as  Kattegat, 
where  they  had  their  tanks  refilled.  As  we  heard  later 
in  Helsingfors,  where  they  were  sunk  before  the  town 
was  taken  by  our  troops  in  1918,  their  motors  were 
very  unreliable — "burst  as  often  as  the  Russians'." 

When  war  broke  out  there  were  thus  seven  English 
submarines  as  against  ten  German  boats,  perfectly 
completed  for  long-distance  service.  How  thoroughly 
developed  and  fit  for  active  service  our  type  of  boat 
was  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  these  boats  throughout 
the  war  responded  to  all  that  was  required  of  them, 
and  until  shortly  before  the  end  could  be  employed 
with  the  greatest  success.  This  claim  cannot  be  made 
for  any  other  weapon  in  the  army  or  navy  constructed 
before  the  war.  The  number  of  our  boats  would  have 
been  double  if  the  promised  deliveries  from  the  build- 
ing firms  had  been  executed.  If  one  includes  the  sub- 
marines built  in  England  from  1906  to  1909,  and  sets 
them  against  our  bigger  and  more  highly  developed 
petrol  boats  built  in  the  same  period,  England  shows 
7-1-10=17  boats  against  Germany's  10 -f  15  =  25 
boats.     The  most   important  point   is   that  we  had 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY      411 

tested  and  perfected  an  efficient  submarine  for  long- 
distance service  in  war  and  could  simply  go  on  building 
it  without  any  further  experiments  being  necessary. 

Even  more  unfavourably  does  France  come  out  of  a 
comparison  with  our  position.  For  this  there  lies 
before  us  ample  irrefutable  evidence  in  the  report  of 
a  committee  of  the  French  Chamber  of  July,  191 5,  and 
March,  19 16.  According  to  it  the  Augsburg  firm  de- 
livered the  first  serviceable,  of  course  small,  Diesel  mo- 
tor-engines to  France  in  1907.  When  France  wanted 
to  adopt  in  19 10  a  bigger  radius  of  action,  so  many 
difficulties  were  encountered  in  the  construction  of  the 
bigger  engines  necessary  that  in  face  of  such  failures 
it  was  decided  to  go  back  to  steam  engines  in  spite  of 
their  disadvantages.  The  opinion  seemed  to  prevail 
that  it  was  better  to  possess  an  imperfect  submarine 
driven  by  steam  than  none  at  all.  These  boats  were 
not  ready  in  1915,  when  their  building  was  stopped 
in  order  to  return  again  to  Diesel  motors.  According 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Marine,  apart  from  the  inferior 
diving  capacity  of  the  steam  submarines  their  great 
visibility  and  the  risk  of  suffocation  for  the  crew  were 
too  great.  In  the  year  1916  the  French  had  still  not 
succeeded  in  producing  an  unimpeachable  Diesel  motor. 
Creusot,  the  most  important  French  motor  firm,  had 
forty  times  running  failed  with  one  of  these  bigger 
motors. 

From  this  it  is  clear  that  France  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  had  no  submarine  adapted  for  long-distance  serv- 
ice purposes. 


412  MY    MEMOIRS 

After  such  a  comparison  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  the  English,  as  a  result  of  their  own  experience 
and  that  of  the  French,  believed  it  to  be  impossible 
for  our  submarines  to  penetrate  into  the  Irish  Sea,  and 
'that  they  supposed  we  had  hidden  escort  ships  and 
secret  bases  on  their  coasts.  My  administrator  in 
Sardinia  was  interned  because  he  was  under  suspicion 
of  maintaining  such  a  base.  America,  even  when  she 
declared  war  against  us,  had  no  submarines  at  all 
adaptable  for  long-distance  service. 

The  above  statements  prove  that  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  we  not  only  stood  at  the  head  of  all  the  nations 
of  the  world  in  the  quality  and  number  of  our  subma- 
rines, but  we  could  do  more  deadly  damage  with  them 
than  all  our  opponents  put  together.  Compare  with 
this  fact  the  systematically  circulated  lie  that  the  sub- 
marine weapon  had  been  neglected. 

While  testing  the  use  of  our  submarines  for  war 
it  became  increasingly  evident  that  the  development  of 
the  navy  as  a  whole  cannot  be  directed  by  one  man. 
The  Secretary  of  State  exercised  no  authority  over  the 
executive  command.  Even  the  technical  experiments 
had  to  be  submitted  for  their  approval.  It  is  natural 
that  the  executive  command  were  opposed  to  all  experi- 
ments for  the  development  of  submarines.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  fleet,  as  a  certain  number  of 
submarines  were  already  available,  wanted  them  to 
co-operate  with  the  fleet  in  manoeuvres;  he  regarded 
the  submarines  chiefly  as  auxiliaries  to  the  high-seas 
fleet  and  employed  them  as  protective  cordons,  or  as 


I 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     413 

scouts.  Exercises  useful  for  long-distance  work,  on 
the  other  hand  fell  into  the  background,  though  in  in- 
dividual cases  they  were  tried  and  also  worked  out 
theoretically. 

The  war,  the  fine  achievements  of  Weddegen,  Her- 
sing,  and  others,  soon,  however,  fixed  the  real  im- 
portance of  this  new  weapon,  and  so  it  came  about 
that  by  September,  1914,  the  idea  of  employing  the 
submarines  against  hostile  merchant  shipping  was 
taken  seriously  into  consideration.  If  this  kind  of 
long-distance  service  for  the  submarines  had  not  taken 
an  important  part  in  our  deliberations  before  the  war, 
but  only  the  employment  of  the  submarines  against 
enemy  fighting  forces,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
up  to  19 14  w€  had  no  means  of  gauging  correctly  the 
possible  extent  of  this  long-distance  activity;  above 
all  the  violation  by  England  of  the  Declaration  of 
London  and  the  Paris  Convention  of  1856,  though 
certainly  not  considered  out  of  the  question,  was  not 
expected  to  the  degree  which  it  actually  reached  later. 

With  the  object  of  enlightening  the  lay  mind  on  this 
point,  which  has  been  intentionally  obscured,  I  will 
try  to  summarize  the  salient  points  in  a  few  brief 
sentences. 

I.  Submarines  which  can  only  be  employed  at  short 
distances  from  their  base,  i.e.  only  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  coast,  had  for  Germany  neither  political 
nor  military  value.  Therefore  we  skipped  over  this 
phase  at  once,  to  concentrate  on  the  development  of 
high-sea  boats. 


414  MY    MEMOIRS 

II.  The  significance  of  the  high-sea  submarine  was 
fully  recognized  by  us,  and  its  development  as  energet- 
ically and  quickly  pursued  as  was  consistent  with  ef- 
ficient equipment  and  the  safety  of  the  personnel. 

III.  So  soon  as  the  high-sea  submarine  was  practi- 
cable for  war  purposes  we  procured  in  peace-time  as 
many  as  our  manufacturers  could  deliver,  a  fact  which 
my  successor  early  in  191 7  emphatically  impressed 
upon  the  Reichstag  Committee. 

IV.  On  the  outbreak  of  war  we  stood  with  our  sub- 
marines first  of  all  the  nations,  both  from  the  point 
of  view  of  quality  as  well  as  quantity  of  our  otherwise 
limited  fleet. 

V.  Their  use  in  war  and  the  endurance  of  the  crew 
could  only  be  practically  tested  when  the  high-sea  sub- 
marines were  actually  available. 

VI.  As  this  was  only  the  case  shortly  before  the 
war,  one  could,  when  the  war  began,  hardly  foresee 
what  their  radius  of  service  would  be. 

VII.  Our  enemies  were  completely  surprised  at  the 
performances  of  our  submarines.  This  surprise  might 
have  had  a  decisive  effect  on  the  war.  It  put  into 
our  hands  a  certain  but,  at  the  time,  limited  chance  of 
success. 

VIII.  The  command  of  the  high-sea  fleet  attached 
great  value,  both  in  peace  and  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  to  the  employment  of  the  submarines  to  support 
the  fleet  in  battle,  especially  as  advance  lines  having 
a  similar  effect  to  minefields. 

IX.  The  Admiralty  on  the  other  hand  opposed  long- 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING    POLICY      415 

distance  service  from  the  beginning,  as  it  involved 
employment  against  hostile  battleships  and  merchant- 
men. 

X.  It  is  of  course  an  understood  thing  that  with 
regard  to  the  last  we  entertained  the  intention  at- 
tributed to  us  by  Percy  Scott,  in  the  form  of  a  ro- 
mance by  Conan  Doyle,  of  trying  to  annihilate  Eng- 
land with  our  submarines. 

XI.  Such  intentions,  however,  would  have  had  no 
object  unless  the  submarines  had  proved  their  full 
capacity  both  in  personnel  and  materiel  on  the  high 
seas. 

XII.  This  could,  in  consideration  of  the  actual  state 
of  development  of  the  submarine,  only  have  been 
reached  during  the  war  because  the  improvement  in 
the  endurance  of  the  crews  to  a  great  extent  had  only 
been  effected  immediately  before  the  war. 

XIII.  When  during  the  course  of  the  war  we  ob- 
tained, comparatively  speaking  soon,  a  satisfactory 
verdict  on  this  point,  there  came  into  the  foreground 
the  weighty  question  of  international  and  military  law 
relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  on  commerce  at 
sea. 

XIV.  This  question  had  not  been  sufficiently  ma- 
tured when,  against  my  vote,  but  with  the  Chancellor's 
approval,  the  Government  issued  the  decree  of  Febru- 
ary 4th,  191 5. 

XV.  In  the  navy  we  had  arrived  at  the  conviction 
that  If  the  submarine  commercial  war  were  to  have 
any  lasting  effect,  the  U-boats  must  be  allowed  to 


4i6  MY   MEMOIRS 

torpedo  without  warning.    This  principle  by  no  means 
excluded  concessions  to  neutrals. 

XVI.  In  the  existing  maritime  law  which  we  hitherto 
had  strictly  observed  there  were  no  precedents  for 
submarine  war  on  commerce. 

XVII.  When  England  unscrupulously  outraged  all 
the  fundamental  principles  of  the  old  maritime  law 
by  declaring  a  blockade  in  defence  of  its  definitions, 
and  by  sowing  the  open  North  Sea  with  mines,  and 
when  America  accepted  this  proceeding  practically  as 
maritime  law  "  adapted  to  the  conditions  of  modern 
warfare  and  commerce,"  then  without  doubt  we  ac- 
quired the  formal  right  to  adopt  a  policy  of  quid  pro 
quo.    This  the  submarines  enabled  us  to  do. 

XVIII.  We  did  not  possess  the  formal  right  alone, 
but  also  the  right  of  self-preservation  of  a  nation 
starving  and  fighting  for  its  very  existence  gave  to  us 
a  natural  right. 

XIX.  The  legal  as  well  as  the  natural  right,  after 
the  Government's  declaration  had  once  been  issued, 
had  to  be  maintained  with  the  most  emphatic  determin- 
ation by  the  leaders  of  our  empire  in  the  face  of  the 
whole  world. 

XX.  From  a  military  point  of  view  the  submarine 
war  on  commerce  grew  in  importance  so  soon  as  the 
deciding  factor  was  no  longer,  and  moreover  could  not 
be,  naval  war.  For,  directly  the  submarine  war  be- 
came the  chief  weapon,  the  fleet,  self-defeated,  was 
bound  by  its  presence  to  make  and  hold  a  free  passage 
for  the  return  of  the  submarines  from  our  waters. 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     417 

Here  I  am  going  to  give,  with  his  permission,  the 
views  of  our  leading  submarine  expert,  who  at  the 
beginning  of  its  use  in  war  was  captain  of  Ui,  and 
trained  the  submarine  captains,  personally  took  over 
and  tested  numerous  boats,  and  as  commanding  officer 
of  the  submarines  in  Flanders,  received  the  Ordre 
pour  le  Merits.  I  quote  from  a  letter  of  his  written 
in  the  spring  of  1918,  to  which  I  have  had  access.  Com- 
mander Bartenbach  is  one  of  the  few  naval  officers 
who,  through  his  exertions  in  time  of  peace,  is  in  a 
position  thoroughly  to  review  our  submarine  develop- 
ment, and  at  the  same  time  has  had  the  greatest 
experience  during  the  submarine  war. 

"  Commander  Bartenbach  to  Admiral  2.  D.  Dick. 

"  Bruges, 

"  April  loth,  1918. 
"  Your  Excellency, 

"  Your  kind  letter  of  April  6th  I  will  answer  as 
fully  as  I  can  without  reference  to  the  documents. 

"(10),  Development  of  the  submarine  before  the 
war. — At  first  we  aimed  at  only  a  high-seas  submarine 
for  attack.  It  would  have  been  easy  for  a  Secretary  of 
State,  not  obsessed  with  the  necessity  for  high-sea 
qualifications  in  the  submarines,  to  pacify  his  own 
conscience  and  that  of  the  people's  representatives  by 
the  building  of  a  number  of  small  boats  at  a  cheap 
rate. 

"  In  view  of  the  hight  cost  of  carrying  out  the  naval 
programme  due  to  the  ever-increasing  cost  of  battle- 
ships, armoured  cruisers,  and  torpedo  boats  (oil  fuel), 
the  Grand  Admiral — who,  God  knows,  had  to  contend 


4i8  MYMEMOIRS 

with  parsimony  on  all  sides — was  strongly  tempted  to 
economize  in  other  directions.  This  he  did  not  do  in 
the  case  of  the  submarines,  but  broad-mindedly  set  his 
country's  safety  above  money  considerations,  and  so 
laid  a  sound  foundation  on  which  to  build.  For  in- 
stance, U21,  which  was  in  operation  as  one  of  an  ac- 
cepted class  to  go  to  the  Dardanelles  and  save  Turkey, 
and  perhaps  to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  war,  was  commissioned  in  the  year  1913, 
after  taking  more  than  two  years  to  build.  So  even 
by  the  end  of  19 10  the  recognition  of  the  submarine's 
value  in  war  was  taking  practical  form.  Such  boats, 
however,  cost  three  times  as  much  money  and  far 
more  labour  and  time  than  a  small  surface-boat.  One 
could  have  built  three  times  as  many  boats  of  re- 
stricted range,  such  as  the  earlier  English,  French, 
Russian,  Austrian,  Italian,  and  other  boats.  But  we 
had  progressed  by  leaps  and  bounds,  and  in  1914  our 
type  of  U-boat  took  the  lead.  Everyone  must  admit 
that  a  type  so  perfect  as  U21,  which  fulfilled  all  de- 
mands made  upon  it  and  stood  tests  designed  not  by 
a  politician  nor  a  civilian,  but  by  the  Grand  Admiral 
himself,  is  a  proof  that  the  value  of  this  weapon  was 
justly  estimated.  When  in  the  beginning  of  February 
I  interviewed  the  Secretary  of  State  his  first  question 
was: 

"  '  How  long  could  one  of  our  submarines  hold  out 
off  the  Thames  ?  ' 

"  This  question  could  at  that  time  only  have  been 
asked  by  a  naval  officer  who  clearly  foresaw  the  way 
in  which  the  submarine  would  be  used.  An  explana- 
tion of  the  purpose  of  the  submarine  forms  the  first 
sentence  in  the  memorandum  on  the  use  of  submarines 
which  has  been  worked  out  at  the  Admiralty,  not  by 
the  Naval  Staff. 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     419 

"  '  The  aim  to  be  kept  in  view  in  submarine  con- 
struction is  their  use  off  the  enemy's  coast.' 

"  This  was  the  aim  of  the  tests  carried  out  in  1912 
and  1913  to  determine  how  long  a  submarine  could 
remain  at  sea. 

"  In  the  spring  of  191 2  two  boats  were  sent  to  the 
Baltic,  and  in  the  winter  of  1912  the  whole  flotilla  to 
the  North  Sea  with  orders  to  hold  their  stations  in 
readiness  for  action  as  long  as  possible  after  a  cruise 
of  300  miles  (Heligoland — England).  On  that  oc- 
casion they  remained  at  sea  eleven  days.  These  facts 
also  refute  the  legend  which  is  continually  cropping 
up  that  before  the  war  a  submarine  could  hardly  be 
relied  on  to  remain  at  sea  twenty-four  hours.  Even 
in  1909  submarines  sailed  with  the  fleet  in  manoeuvres 
for  days. 

"  We  had  all  good  reason  to  keep  these  tests  and 
experiences  secret  before  the  war.  The  tests  were 
ordered  by  the  Grand  Admiral  under  the  heading  of 
'  technical  experiments '  because  the  fleet  and  the  Na- 
val StafT  did  not  know  how  far  we  had  got.  In  my 
opinion  these  facts  are  convincing  proof  that  the 
Grand  Admiral  recognized  the  value  of  the  submarine 
in  war  as  few  others  did. 

"(b)  The  first  condition  for  the  manufacture  of 
such  submarines  as  should  really  correspond  to  the  re- 
quirements of  war  was  the  construction  of  a  service- 
able, fast  running  (because  of  the  accumulators),  not 
very  heavy  engine  of  at  least  850  horse-power.  The 
production  of  such  an  engine  would  be  a  masterpiece  of 
engineering,  and  competition  was  aroused  by  the  order 
for  a  sample  850  horse-power  engine  placed  with  the 
best  firms — the  Augsburg  engine  works,  the  Germania 
shipbuilding  yard,  Fiat  of  Turin,  and  the  Reutzer 
gas-engine  works.    The  petrol  engines  of  the  Korting 


420  MY   MEMOIRS 

and  Daimler  firms  had  not  proved  sufficiently  capable  of 
development.  The  reproach  that  preference  was  given 
to  Korting  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  on  U2  Daimler 
engines  were  fitted  but  did  not  prove  satisfactory,  so 
that  for  petrol  engines  only  Korting  was  left. 

"Of  these  experimental  engines,  only  the  Augs- 
burger  engine-works  could  turn  out  the  four-stroke, 
and  the  Germania  shipbuilding  yard  the  two-stroke 
engines,  within  anything  like  the  time  allowed.  All 
the  other  firms,  in  spite  of  enormous  labour  and  ex- 
pense, failed  to  do  so  by  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
These  two  types  of  engine  were  now  adopted,  the 
Augsburg  four-stroke  for  the  boats  in  the  Imperial 
Dantzig  dockyard,  and  for  those  in  the  Germania 
Yard  the  two-stroke. 

"  The  whole  available  motor  industries  of  Germany 
and  some  abroad,  such  as  the  Fiat,  Turin,  thus  strained 
every  nerve  in  the  competition  to  obtain  an  efficient 
engine.  The  German  navy  was  the  first  to  possess  an 
850  horse-power  oil  engine  for  submarines.  Unfortu- 
nately the  two-stroke  motor  of  the  Germania  Yard 
after  several  trials  was  not  free  from  objection  which, 
as  is  shown  below,  was  to  be  the  cause  of  serious 
trouble. 

"  (c)  As  regards  the  number  of  boats  put  in  hand, 
after  the  type  was  fixed,  there  was  the  money  question 
to  be  considered,  and  besides  that  the  fact  that  a 
sudden  leap  forward  in  development  should  be 
avoided;  for  the  private  firms  were  only  willing  to 
adapt  themselves  to  the  building  of  the  submarines  if 
there  was  an  assured  prospect  later  of  continuous 
business  in  this  department. 

"  (d)  The  naval  estimates  (submarine  estimates  of 
191 2)  raised  the  sums  hitherto  standing  at  disposal 
for  this  end.    Immediately  boats  were  ordered  in  large 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     421 

numbers.  In  1912  contracts  were  given  for  U27-30 
(Imperial  Yard,  Dantzig),  U31-41  (Germania  Yard), 
U42  at  Fiat,  San  Giorgio;  in  all  16  submarines,  an 
unprecedented  number  at  that  time.  Besides  this 
an  estimate  was  given  for  the  building  of  another  at 
the  Weser  Yard  (a  steam  boat),  making  a  seventeenth 
submarine.  I  think  that  this  is  striking  proof  that 
after  the  submarine  estimates  had  been  passed,  every- 
thing was  done  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  means  to 
hand  for  the  building  of  submarines.  In  this  year 
too  an  endeavour  was  made  to  put  the  submarine 
construction  on  a  wider  basis.  The  following  firms 
were  approached:  the  Weser  shipbuilding  yard  estab- 
lished a  department  for  submarine  designing;  Schichau 
declined  unconditionally;  Vulcan,  Hamburg,  declined 
to  establish  a  department  for  designing,  would  only 
undertake  to  carry  out  finished  designs  already  pre- 
pared so  long  as  further  contracts  were  assured;  Fiat, 
San  Giorgio,  received  a  contract,  U42. 

"  I  add  here  for  Your  Excellency's  benefit  that  the 
Estimates  Committee  chose  to  regard  this  energetic 
placing  of  contracts,  and  the  consequent  ear-marking 
of  grant  for  a  period  of  three  years,  as  an  encroach- 
ment on  the  Budget  rights  of  the  Reichstag. 

"  (e)  The  reasons  why  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  there  were  not  more  submarines  with  the  fleet  lies 
in  the  failure  of  the  builders,  who  were  not  in  a  po- 
sition to  deliver  the  boats  contracted  for  by  the  Grand 
Admiral  within  the  time  specified.  When  the  war 
began  we  had  in  commission  (Ui  and  U2  were  re- 
tained for  training  purposes)  U3  to  U18,  U19  to 
U27  =  25  boats. 

"  We  should  have  had,  if  the  firms  in  question  had 
fulfilled  their  promises,  U3  to  U41  =  39  boats. 

"  The  struggles  with  the  builders  to  avoid  delays, 


422  MYMEMOIRS 

the  sharp  attacks  of  the  Secretary  of  State  in  person 
on  the  Germania  Yard,  the  action  taken  against  the 
inspector,  are  fresh  in  Your  Excellency's  memory. 
The  loss  of  over  a  year  of  training  and  experience 
caused  by  over  a  year's  delay  in  the  delivery  of  U23 
to  U26,  U31,  etc.,  and  the  lack  of  fully  trained  com- 
manders and  crews  naturally  weighed  almost  as  heavily 
in  the  scale  as  the  lack  of  material  and  equipment. 
We  should  have  occupied  quite  a  different  position  on 
August  1st,  1914,  if  the  builders,  who  talked  so  big, 
had  fulfilled  the  promises  they  had  made  to  the  Grand 
Admiral  based  on  their  own  calculations. 

"  The  main  ground  of  excuse  for  the  grossest  of- 
fender— the  Germania  Yard,  which  failed  in  the  de- 
livery of  the  eleven  submarines  U31  to  U41 — ^lay  in 
the  fact  that  the  two-stroke  engine,  which  was  accepted 
on  the  strength  of  a  test  in  August,  191 1,  and  which 
could  never  again  be  made  satisfactory,  so  that  we 
were  compelled,  in  order  to  avoid  delay  with  these 
boats,  to  substitute  Augsburg  engines  at  the  expense 
of  the  Germania  Yard.^ 

"  In  these  circumstances  the  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 
was  powerless  to  alter  anything  when  a  further  half- 
dozen  submarines  were  ordered  in  the  year  1912;  and 
these  too  had  to  wait  for  engines.  Your  Excellency 
is  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  the  responsible  ship- 
building official  was  relieved  of  his  post.  In  the  speech 
by  Struve  this  gentleman  is  mentioned  as  a  valuable 
asset  that  had  not  been  sufficiently  made  use  of. 

"  (2a).  About  the  submarines  in  war-time  I  can 
only  speak  from  personal  experience  of  the  beginning 

*  The  two-stroke  motors  were  at  last,  after  nearly  a  year  and 
a  half's  delay,  made  eflficient  in  December,  1914.  The  substitutes 
ordered  in  Augsburg  have  been  used  in  other  boats. — Editor's 
note. 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING    POLICY     423 

of  the  war,  as  afterwards  through  my  duties  here  I 
was,  so  to  speak,  not  so  much  in  the  picture. 

"  At  the  mobilization  orders  were  placed  as  had  been 
arranged  for  the  MS  boats,  and  at  once  put  in  hand 
in  the  Weser  Yard,  because  the  Germania  was  heavily 
burdened  with  the  retarded  U31  to  U41,  and  from 
Austrian  submarines  besides.  It  speaks  for  itself,  that 
these  arrears  standing  over  from  peace-times  hindered 
the  building  of  new  boats. 

"  Above  everything  it  was  a  question  now  of  press- 
ing on  the  boats  under  construction;  that  this  was  done 
with  energy  by  the  submarine  inspection  staff  is  proved 
by  the  peremptory  letter  addressed  by  the  Admiralty  to 
the  General  Director  of  Krupp's  in  Essen  against  which 
Krupp  protested. 

"  At  that  time  the  question  of  labour  had  already 
been  taken  in  hand,  and  workmen  procured  from  the 
Imperial  dockyard  and  Fleusburg. 

"  In  view  of  the  time  they  took  to  build  (eighteen 
months  for  the  first  boat)  it  did  not  seem  possible  that 
the  latest  submarines  would  be  ready  for  use  in  this 
war  as  all  Germany  thought  of  it  in  those  days.  I 
will  bear  the  brunt  of  this  reproach  myself. 

"  But,  as  soon  as  the  Flemish  coast  was  occupied, 
the  Grand  Admiral  resolved  to  build  small  submarines 
which  could  be  ready  early  in  191 5,  so  as  to  make  the 
fullest  use  of  the  Flemish  harbours.  The  submarine 
experts  even  advised  against  the  building  of  such  small 
boats.  The  Secretary  of  State,  however,  ordered  the 
building  of  thirty-two  small  boats,  and  he  proved  to  be 
right,  for  these  boats  have  rendered  excellent  service, 
and  are  still  being  used  with  success,  though  unfortu- 
nately for  other  reasons  they  could  not  all  be  com- 
missioned. 

"  A  proof  of  the  wide  outlook  of  the  Grand  Ad- 


424  MY   MEMOIRS 

miral  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  immediately  after  the 
occupation  of  the  Flemish  coast,  even  before  the  naval 
division  was  sent  there,  he  sent  a  submarine  expert 
as  senior  officer,  to  test  the  harbours  and  defences  from 
the  point  of  view  of  submarines.  To  this  investiga- 
tion is  due  the  present  effective  exploitation  of  the 
Flemish  coast. 

"  On  the  further  course  of  the  submarine  building 
I  have  no  detailed  information,  but  it  appears  to  me 
that  at  all  events  in  1916  a  period  of  sterility  occurred 
in  the  submarine  productivity.  One  has  the  feeling 
that  instead  of  building  every  possible  submarine  re- 
gardless of  consequences  we  are  trying  to  avoid  hav- 
ing too  many.  Undoubtedly  the  uncertainty  whether 
or  not  a  submarine  war  was  to  be  waged  had  an  in- 
jurious effect  on  the  submarine  production,  for  it 
stands  to  reason  that  every  nerve  will  not  be  strained 
in  the  production  of  a  weapon  that  may  never  be 
brought  into  use.  In  view  of  the  situation  as  a  whole, 
when  all  raw  material  and  all  labour  was  in  requisition 
for  other  important  war  purposes,  it  had  to  be  care- 
fully weighed  whether  it  would  be  right  to  divert  un- 
certain material  and  uncertain  labour  from  other  uses. 
A  Government  that  would  not  have  a  submarine  war 
simply  because  the  number  of  submarines  was  too 
small,  by  giving  a  definite  promise  to  take  up  the 
submarine  war  when  a  considerable  increase  had  been 
made  in  the  number  of  boats  (say  double)  would  have, 
without  doubt,  secured  a  quicker  delivery  of  these 
boats  and  have  gained  for  itself  public  confidence. 
This  is  the  plainest  proof  that  there  were  other  reasons 
for  the  Government's  attitude,  and  that  the  inadequate 
number  of  boats  was  only  a  pretext. 

"  As  to  the  provision  of  further  shipbuilding  yards, 
the  demands  of  Str.  justified  in  essentials  were  in  fact 


OUR    SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     425 

granted.  The  arguments  set  forth  by  Herr  von  G. 
are  wide  of  the  mark.  To  keep  the  construction  of 
U-boats  a  secret  no  longer  served  any  purpose,  after 
the  English  had  put  several  more  boats  in  hand. 

"  Motor-engines  are  also  built  in  the  shipyards  (for 
example  at  Blom-a-Voss),  their  development  is  the 
affair  of  the  navy.  It  is  much  more  a  question  of 
multiplying  the  production  of  existing  types  than  of 
improving  on  them.  For,  Your  Excellency,  may  I 
be  allowed  to  add  that  the  building  policy  of  the 
Admiralty  from  about  the  beginning  of  191 7  was 
much  more  severely  criticized  by  the  fleet  than  by 
Herr  Str,  That,  however,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  Grand  Admiral;  on  the  contrary,  one  misses  his 
great  resourcefulness  and  abounding  energy  at  every 
step.  Owing  to  urgent  pressure  brought  to  bear  by 
the  fleet,  all  the  last  building  contracts  were  increased 
to  the  amount  that  the  Admiralty  had  originally  laid 
down  as  possible. 

"  Taking  these  things  into  consideration,  I  should 
recommend  that  the  Str.  attacks  only  be  dealt  with  in 
so  far  as  they  concern  the  person  of  the  Grand  Admiral 
and  his  building  policy  before  and  after  the  war.  In 
proceeding  to  deal  with  the  questions  framed  by  Herr 
von  G.,  I  should  like  to  set  before  Your  Excellency 
the  following  facts  based  on  my  war  experience,  in 
relation  to  the  question  whether  in  the  spring  of  191 5 
we  had  sufficient  submarines  for  a  submarine  campaign. 

"  In  the  year  191 5  a  U-boat  reached  four  times,  in 
1916  three  times,  the  successes  of  1917,  despite  the  re- 
stricted orders  then  in  force.  The  reason  for  this 
was  that  defensive  measures  against  submarines  were 
not  immediately  available,  and  were  only  gradually 
developed.  These  measures,  which  consist  in  the  arm- 
ing of  merchant  steamers,  could  not  have  been  adopted 


426  MY    MEMOIRS 

more  quickly  than  was  the  case  side  by  side  with  the 
colossal  task  of  supplying  a  big  army  in  the  field  with 
artillery.  England  required  for  the  submarine  defence 
armament  about,  at  a  modest  estimate,  12,000  light 
guns. 

"  We  allowed  this  time  when  we  held  the  upper 
hand  to  slip  by  without  taking  full  advantage  of  it, 
and  so  were  confronted  in  19 17  with  an  incomparably 
more  difficult  task  than  in  191 5  or  19 16.  We  can  ac- 
complish to-day  with  the  number  of  our  boats,  and  by 
dint  of  the  utmost  strain  on  the  crews  and  heavy  losses, 
the  same  monthly  record  as  we  were  able  to  maintain 
in  1915,  with  one-quarter  of  the  boats,  and  in  1916 
with  one-third,  and  this  with  comparatively  little 
effort.  The  blame  for  having  hindered  the  full  ex- 
ploitation of  this  weapon  cannot  be  wriggled  out  of 
by  all  those  who  held  forth  against  the  submarine  cam- 
paign, and  just  as  little  can  they  cleanse  their  hands  of 
the  blood  which  must  still  flow  in  order  to  win  the 
necessary  victory  in  face  of  the  new  defensive  meas- 
ures of  the  enemy, 

"  Here  follows  the  really  important  point  that  the 
deficiency  in  transport  which  had  set  in  already  in 
19 1 5  continued  to  make  itself  felt  during  the  follow- 
ing years,  and  both  hindered  and  delayed  such  a  re- 
inforcement of  the  English  army  as  was  the  case  in 
1916. 

"  The  navy  ofi9i5toi9i6  found  itself  in  the  same 
situation  as  a  regiment  or  infantry  which  faces  an 
enemy  who  has  not  yet  fortified  his  position,  and 
knows  that  this  position  must  be  taken  before  the 
enemy  can  be  beaten.  They  report  that  the  position  is 
easy  to  take.  They  see  the  enemy  every  day  digging 
himself  in  more  deeply,  making  barbed-wire  defences, 
posting  artillery,  and  they  announce  this  repeatedly  to 


OUR   SHIPBUILDING   POLICY     427 

those  behind,  begging  for  permission  to  attack.  This 
is  always  refused.  Only  when  the  opponent  has  forti- 
fied his  position  strongly,  and  has  perfected  his  plans 
for  defence,  does  the  permission  to  attack  arrive,  and 
then  everybody  is  astonished  that  this  position,  which 
was  said  to  be  so  easy  to  take,  should  cost  long,  weary 
struggles  and  much  bloodshed.  Perhaps  to-day  such 
military  parallels  are  more  easily  understood  than 
naval  illustrations. 

"  We  consider  it  a  like  piece  of  arrogance  that  parlia- 
mentarians, civilians,  etc.,  should  presume  to  pass 
judgment  as  to  whether  or  no  the  forces  are  sufficient 
for  a  military  or  naval  operation  which  the  responsible 
leaders  have  decided  on.  Who  ever  heard  of  such 
a  thing  as,  for  example,  before  the  present  offensive 
on  the  Western  front,  a  representative  of  the  people 
passing  judgment  on  the  quality  of  the  munitions? 
What  would  Ludendorff  say  to  such  interference?  No 
one  among  the  German  people  would  understand  it. 
But  on  the  subject  of  the  submarine  war  everyone 
may  have  a  voice.  How  things  would  stand  with  us 
to-day  if  we  had  not  combined  to  carry  on  the  sub- 
marine war,  even  though  it  was  belated,  I  need  not 
describe;  in  my  opinion  we  should,  in  spite  of  our 
strength  on  the  Western  front,  be  in  a  desperate  posi- 
tion. We  cannot  too  strongly  contest  the  view  that  in 
1915  and  1916  we  had  not  sufficient  submarines;  it  is 
merely  a  convenient  evasion  for  all  those  people  who 
now  feel  at  the  bottom  of  their  hearts  that  their  op- 
position to  a  submarine  war  was  a  fatal  blunder.  In 
conclusion,  the  verdict  of  those  who  work  with  the 
U-boats  must  be  the  criterion,  not  that  of  outsiders. 

"  The  above  remarks  have  been  somewhat  hastily 
written  down  owing  to  pressure  of  time.  I  must 
therefore  respectfully  beg  that  the  style  may  not  be 


428  MY    MEMOIRS 

too  harshly  condemned.  Should  Your  Excellency  de- 
sire to  make  public  in  the  press  what  I  have  written 
here,  I  am  quite  agreeable.  We  have  held  our  tongues 
too  long  on  these  absurd  perversions  of  history. 

"  I  am, 
"  Your  Excellency's  humble  servant, 

(Signed)     "  Bartenbach." 


THE  END 


1^ 


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